The Stateless Bedoun in Kuwait Society

A Study of Bedouin Identity, Culture and the Growth of an Intellectual Ideal

Volume II

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Appendix A

Analysis of Interview Data

Appendix A features the following sections:

i. A full list of themes and participant numbers

ii. A visual organiser illustrating the themes arising from the interview data
Appendix A, i
Themes and quotations from the interview transcripts

Appendix A, i, features three tables featuring three meta-themes derived from the analysis, a full list of all the themes derived from the meta-themes, and the participant numbers connected to each theme.

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Themes Derived from the Meta-theme - Bedoun identity

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<td>Tribal origins (Sub-theme)</td>
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<td>• The importance of family and tribal names (P8, P13)</td>
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<td>• Differences between (and mixing among) the Sunni and Shia sects (P3, P5, P12)</td>
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<td>The Bedoun and tribal politics (sub-theme)</td>
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<td>• Adoption of values for personal survival (P9, P10, P11, P15)</td>
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<td>• Value of the stateless collective (P4, P9, P12, P13, P15, P16, P17)</td>
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Changing social roles of Bedoun women (sub-theme)
- Bedoun women financially supporting families (P8, P11)
- Covering of identity or expression of ‘national’ identity (P7)
- Women returning to the home after their education (P7)
- Seclusion impacting the formation of the marriage relationship (P4)
- Bedoun women challenging oppression (P4, P7, P8, P16, P17)

Bedoun children and Kuwaiti citizen mothers (sub-theme)
- Children’s destiny overseas (P1)
- Additional rights vulnerable to removal (P4)
- The citizen woman as a link to basic rights (P3)
- Citizen mother’s rights facilitate access to education (P5)

Changing social roles of Bedoun men (sub-theme)
- The traditional life pattern and the seclusion of men (P8, P9, P12, P13, P15, P16, P17)
- The prohibitive cost of traditional marriage practices for stateless males (P8, P13)
- Seclusion due to poverty, unemployment and instability of employment (P10, P11, P14)
- Seclusion men due to lack of civil identification documents (birth and marriage) (P12, P13)
- In relation to suicide of stateless men (P1, P12, P16, P17) Specifically in relation to oneself (P5, P8)
- Pressure on the Bedoun collective (P9, P12)

Collective identity and government interactions (theme)

Family histories and citizen registration (sub-theme)
- Documents citing the Bedoun were Kuwaiti (P8, P9)
- Did not know it was necessary (P4)
- Nomadic culture (P3, P6, P12)
- Illiteracy (P3, P6)
- Unable to travel to the registration office (P8, P12)
- Rejection of second-degree nationality (P9)

Experiences of the current generation – myths and reality (sub-theme)
- The myth of ‘waiting’ for citizenship (sub-sub-theme)
  - The process of parliamentary citizenship grants (P4)
  - The Central Apparatus contribution to the myth of ‘waiting’ (P7)
  - Intergenerational suppression and lack of due process (P13)
- The actual process of citizenship acquisition – a case example (sub-sub-theme)
  - Benefit of the Kuwaiti mother category (P5)
  - Limitations of the Kuwaiti mother category (P5)
  - Denial of urgent medical treatment (P5)
  - The strategy of delaying citizenship (P5)

Official methods used to change Bedoun identity (sub-theme)
- General refusal to provide documentation (P3, P6, P12, P13)
- Refusal of authorities to process marriages (P8)
- Identity re-allocation by government - Saudi Arabian and Syrian (P14, P11)
- Government rejection military personnel of the Six Day War (1967) and October
war (1973) (a case example) (P14)

*Note:* Bedoun identity – includes analysis of meta-theme, themes, sub-themes and minor sub-themes
Themes Derived from the Meta-theme - Marginalisation of Identity and Culture

Marginalisation of identity and culture (meta-theme)

Ethnic targeting and social exclusion (theme)

Ethnic targeting of the northern tribes (sub-theme)
- Northern tribes (P3, P5, P17)
- Northern tribes’ accent and/or dialect (P3, P5)
- Tribal sectarianism (P3, P14)
- Northern and southern tribes and sectarian issues (P12)
- Distinctions between tribal origins (P13, P17)

Other themes related to the ethnic targeting and Bedouin identity (sub-theme)
- ‘Iraqi’ (P4, P7, P12)
- ‘Foreigner’ (P12, P13)
- Bedou status (P3, P5, P6, P9)
- Religious sectarian stigma (P3, P14, P17)
- Native people (P3, P9)
- Difference (P5, P12, and P17)

Poverty and homelessness (sub-theme)
- Homelessness and hunger after the Iraq war (P8, P16, P17)
- Poverty generally (P3, P4, P15, P9, P16, P17, participant observation/photographs)

Stigma, stranger status and Bedouin identity (theme)

Stigmatisation and the citizen population (sub-theme)
- The Bedou at the centre of Hadar-Bedou tension (P5)
- Stigmatisation by citizens of the Bedou (P3, P5, P7, P9, P13)
- Citizen’s fear of association with the Bedou (P8, P16, P17)
- Fear of reprisal on family (P3, P5, P9)
- Citizen’s fear of removal of citizenship (P16, P17)
- Abuse of power (P5, P8)

Experiences treated as a stranger (sub-theme)
- Treated as if they are not ‘real’ Kuwaitis
  - Treated as if they do not exist (P13, P14, P6)
  - No right to say you are Kuwaiti (P5, P9, P10, P11)
  - Treated as disloyal to Kuwait (P4, P7, P13)
- Government policy to exclude the Bedou (P7, P8, P9, P13) – see also under identity – suicide and eradication
- Criminalisation (P4, P7, P8, P13)
- Concern for the future and lack of opportunity (P5, P8, P9, P11, P12, P16, P17)
- Strangers within the tribe (P14, P15)
- Religious values do not overcome Bedou stigma (P3, P14)
- Impact of new citizenship on Bedou identity (P3, P5)
  - Acquisition of Kuwaiti citizenship
  - Acquisition of citizenship from a Western country
Contradictions of the Bedoun-citizen stranger status (sub-theme)
• Treated as outsiders despite cultural sameness (P4, P6, P8, P12, P13)
• Government gave my rights away to strangers (P4, P14)

Social integration (theme)

Prior to administrative expulsion (1986) (sub-theme)
• Integration of stateless and citizen society (P4, P8, P9)

Social integration in the present day (sub-theme)
• Tribal solidarity (P8) – also under identity
• My generation… must change their ideas (P7) – also under identity
• They will learn how to think independently (P3) – also under education
• A new society (P9) – also under education

‘Passing’ as a citizen (sub-theme)
• Children of Kuwaiti mother’s special status (P4)
• Passes due to new nationality status (overseas) (P3)
• Passes due to new nationality status (Kuwaiti) (P5)
• Passes due to identity concealment (P6)

Friendship and the disclosure of identity (sub-theme)
• Non-disclosure of identity in the social circle (P5, P7)
• Disclosure of identity in the social circle
  o Fear of loss of friendship (P6, P14)
  o Fear of identification (P3, P7)
• Danger to friendship group (P9)
• Little in common with friends (P6, P7)

Note: Marginalisation of identity and culture – includes meta-theme, themes, sub-themes and minor sub-themes
Table A3

*Themes Derived from the Meta-theme* - Bedoun Education and the Intellectual Ideal

**Bedoun Education and the intellectual ideal (meta-theme)**

**Institutional Issues (theme)**

**Institutional discrimination (sub-theme)**

- **Central Apparatus issues (minor sub-theme)**
  - Bedoun entrance delayed by Central Apparatus bureaucracy (P17)
  - Undocumented status – Central Apparatus prohibiting work in area of professional training (P10)

- **Issues within educational institutions (minor sub-theme)**
  - Course options substantially restricted to the Bedoun (P2, P6, P7, P10, P17)
  - Bedoun cannot access degree education; results are questioned (P6, P7, P10, P15)
  - Bedoun unable to join student clubs at Kuwait University (P5, P9)
  - Schools were businesses, with limited tuition (P3, P14)
  - General discrimination by teachers in the school system (P5, P6, P15)

**Access to education (sub-theme)**

**The informal system (minor sub-theme)**

- *Wasta* is used to access education (P8, P7)
- ‘Sponsorship’ – support for Bedoun participation in the community (P6, P9)
- Accessed private citizen support to go to school (P15)
- The *Khatatib* School (P9)
- Direct negotiation with Ministry of Education regarding ‘undocumented’ Bedoun

**The formal system (minor sub-theme)**

- Entrance after mother became a Kuwaiti citizen (P5)

**Positive experiences in education (theme)**

**Positive social relations (sub-theme)**

- Positive experience with peers (P3, P4, P9)
- Good relationships with teachers/Professors (P5, P11)
- Part time study facilitates a larger and longer term social network (P13)

**Persistence, resilience and high achievement (sub-theme)**

- The impact of education bans (P16)
- Returning to school to access Kuwait University (P5)
- High achievement and lifelong learning (P3, P11)
- Love of learning (P3, P5, P7, P9)
- Family support (P7, P8)

**Participation in civil society (sub-theme)**

- Giving back to the community (P3)
- Kuwait University activities (P9)
• The Khatabib School (October 2014) (see also scholarships) (P9)

Intellectual life (sub-theme)
• Changing your ideas (P5)
• Self-realisation of the scale of the Bedoun problem (P3)
• Suppression of Bedoun authors (P9)
• Creating a new society (P9)

Aspirations (sub-theme)
• I have ambition, I want a better situation (P4)
• They are content with what they have. The new generation is not (P5)
• My biggest dreams are the their basics in their life (P6)
• They want to study and finish university like citizens (P9)
• I want to be the good guy – avoiding criminalisation (P13)

The social and cultural purpose of education (theme)

Fulfilment of basic needs (sub-theme)
• Poverty alleviation – family (P6, P9, P15)
• Productivity (P4, P8) (from Work opportunities linked to the vocational sector (P4, P8)
• Financial independence (P16) (from quote ‘I want to know myself, to support myself’)

Cultivation of Self (sub-theme)
• Hope (P8, P10, P11, P17)
• Life purpose (P17)
• Self-worth
  o Dignity (P16)
  o Self-esteem (P3)
  o Self-confidence (P17)
  o Self-respect (P15)
• Self-awareness (P3, P7, P11, P16)

Identification with a higher purpose (sub-theme)
• Intellectual growth (P3, P8)
• Personal excellence (P3, P10)
• Personal empowerment (P8)
• Identification with higher principles (P17)
• Transcend limitations (P3, P4)

Improvement of society (sub-theme)
• Positive input into society (P3, P7, P13)

Recognition and reconciliation with other social groups (sub-theme)
• The Bedoun identity is Kuwaiti (P5)
• They must ask the Bedoun about their heritage (P9)

Marginalisation in education (theme)

Experiences of overt abuse (sub-theme)
• Students abused due to tribal background in citizen schools (P3)
• Students locked in rooms without being taught (P8)
• Amplification and shaming of Bedoun identity (P10)
• Whole classes failed for no reason (P14)

Experiences of stigmatisation (sub-theme)
• Self or others hide their identity at university now (P5, P6, P7)
• Avoidance of identity disclosure, exposure as impoverished (P6, P15)
• Resisting the practice of concealing identity (P5, P7)
• Children of stateless/citizen couples attempt to migrate (P1)
• Anti-Bedouin sentiment at Kuwait University (P2)
• Experience of stigmatisation – involvement of Central Apparatus – (P10) - see Experiences of overt abuse
• See also Institutional issues above, which discusses abuse by teachers.

Social segregation in education (theme)

Expulsion of the Bedoun from schools 1986-1992 (sub-theme)
• I started crying (P16)
• I waited 19 years enter university (P17)
• I am Kuwaiti. The government made the difference between us (9)
• They couldn’t do anything for us, we came to understand that (P4)
• They will say Bedoun. They will know (P8)
• Experiences acquiring education when borders closed to the Bedoun (P2, P3)

The unschooled Bedoun (sub-theme)
• Imposed idleness – P3 (females), P6, P16, P17 (males)
• A wasted life (P10, P11)
• The street life (P7)
• No work, no exit from house (P12)
• Expense of the private system; criminalisation of the community (P13)
• Intergenerational impacts (P13, P16, P17)
• Comparison of experience in a new country (P3)

Note: Bedoun education and the intellectual ideal – meta theme, themes, sub-themes and minor sub-themes
### A Visual Organiser Illustrating the Themes Arising from the Interview Data

**Table A4**

*Themes Arising from the Analysis of Interview Data*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meta-theme</th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Sub-theme</th>
<th>Minor sub-theme</th>
<th>Minor sub-sub theme</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Bedoun identity</td>
<td>Tribal identity</td>
<td>Tribal origins</td>
<td>Presence prior to the modern state</td>
<td>Native people</td>
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<td>Transnational tribal origins, tribal alliances</td>
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<td>Bedoun and citizens - we are the same, culturally</td>
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<td>The removal of family and tribal names by government</td>
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<td>Religion as a source of humanitarian values and the principle of equality</td>
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<td>Religious values do not transcend</td>
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<td><strong>the stigmatisation of statelessness</strong></td>
<td>Differences between (and mixing among) the Sunni and Shia sects</td>
<td>Religious tensions related to multiple factors</td>
<td>The Bedoun and tribal politics</td>
<td>Bedoun/citizen mix in tribes</td>
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<td>Personal identity</td>
<td>Personal evaluations of identity</td>
<td>The emergence of different values in the new generation</td>
<td>The need to adapt or to retreat</td>
<td>Adoption of values for personal survival</td>
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<td>Changing social roles of Bedoun women</td>
<td>Bedoun women financially supporting families</td>
<td>Covering of identity or expression of ‘national’ identity</td>
<td>Women returning to the home after their education</td>
<td>Seclusion impacting the</td>
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<td><strong>formation of the marriage relationship</strong></td>
<td><strong>Bedoun women challenging oppression</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Bedoun children and Kuwaiti citizen mothers</strong></td>
<td><strong>Children’s destiny overseas</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Additional rights vulnerable to removal</strong></td>
<td><strong>The citizen woman as a link to basic rights</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Citizen mothers’ rights facilitate access to education</strong></td>
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<td><strong>The traditional life pattern and the seclusion of men</strong></td>
<td><strong>The prohibitive cost of traditional marriage practices for stateless males</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Seclusion due to poverty, unemployment and instability of employment</strong></td>
<td><strong>Seclusion men due to lack of civil identification documents (birth and marriage)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>In relation to suicide of stateless men</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Collective identity and government interactions</strong></td>
<td><strong>Family histories and citizen registration</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Documents citing the Bedoun were Kuwaiti</strong></td>
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<td>Unable to travel to the registration office</td>
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<td>Rejection of second-degree nationality</td>
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<td>Experiences of the current generation – myths and reality</td>
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<td>The myth of ‘waiting’ for citizenship (sub-theme)</td>
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<td>The process of parliamentary citizenship grants</td>
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<td>The Central Apparatus contribution to the myth of ‘waiting’</td>
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<td>Intergenerational suppression and lack of due process</td>
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<td>The actual process of citizenship acquisition – a case example</td>
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<td>Limitations of the Kuwaiti mother category</td>
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<td>Denial of urgent medical treatment</td>
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<td>The strategy of delaying citizenship</td>
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<td>Official methods used to change Bedoun identity</td>
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<td>General refusal to provide documentation</td>
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<td>Refusal of authorities to process marriages</td>
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<td>Marginalisation of identity and culture</td>
<td>Ethnic targeting and social exclusion</td>
<td>Ethnic targeting of the northern tribes</td>
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<td>Northern tribes’ accent and/or dialect</td>
<td>Tribal sectarianism</td>
<td>Northern, southern tribes and sectarian issues</td>
<td>Distinctions between tribal origins</td>
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<td>Other themes related to ethnic targeting and Bedouin identity</td>
<td>‘Iraqi’</td>
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<td>‘Foreigner’</td>
<td>Bedouin status</td>
<td>Religious status</td>
<td>Religious sectarian stigma</td>
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<td>Poverty and homelessness</td>
<td>Poverty and hunger after the Iraq war</td>
<td>Poverty generally</td>
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<td>Stigma, stranger status and citizen</td>
<td>The Bedoun at the centre of Hadar-Bedoun</td>
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<td>Bedoun identity</td>
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<td>Stigmatisation by citizens of the Bedoun</td>
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<td>Citizen’s fear of association with the Bedoun</td>
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<td>Fear of reprisal family</td>
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<td>Citizen’s fear of removal of citizenship</td>
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<td>Abuse of power</td>
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<td>Experiences treated as a stranger</td>
<td>Treated as if they are not ‘real’ Kuwaitis</td>
<td>Treated as if they do not exist</td>
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<td>No right to say they are ‘Kuwaiti’</td>
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<td>Treated as disloyal to Kuwait</td>
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<td>Government policy to exclude the Bedoun</td>
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<td>Criminalisation</td>
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<td>Concern for the future and lack of opportunity</td>
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<td>Strangers within the tribe</td>
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<td>Religious values do not overcome Bedoun stigma</td>
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<td>Impact of new citizenship on Bedoun identity</td>
<td>Acquisition of Kuwaiti citizenship</td>
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<td>Acquisition of citizenship from a Western country</td>
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<td>Contradictions of the Bedoun-citizen stranger status</td>
<td>Treated as outsiders despite cultural sameness</td>
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<td>Government gave my rights away to</td>
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<td>Social integration</td>
<td>Prior to administrative expulsion (1986)</td>
<td>Integration of stateless and citizen society</td>
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<td>Social integration in the present day</td>
<td>Tribal solidarity</td>
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<td>My generation… must change their ideas</td>
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<td>They will learn how to think independently</td>
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<td>A new society</td>
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<td>Experiences 'passing' as a citizen</td>
<td>Children of Kuwaiti mother’s special status</td>
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<td>Passes due to new nationality status</td>
<td>Citizen of a Western country</td>
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<td>Citizen of Kuwait</td>
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<td>Passes due to identity concealment</td>
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<td>Friendship and the disclosure of identity</td>
<td>Disclosure of identity in the social circle</td>
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<td>Non-disclosure of identity in the social circle</td>
<td>Fear of loss of friendship</td>
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<td>Fear of identification</td>
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<td>Danger to friendship group</td>
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<td>Little in common with friends</td>
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<td>Bedoun education and the intellectual ideal</td>
<td>Institutional Issues</td>
<td>Institutional discrimination</td>
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<td>Central Apparatus issues</td>
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<td>Undocumented status – Central Apparatus prohibiting of</td>
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<td>Sponsorship – support for Bedoun participation in the community</td>
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<td>Accessed private citizen support to go to school</td>
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<td>The <em>khatatib</em> school</td>
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<td>Direct negotiation with Ministry of Education for ‘undocumented’ Bedoun</td>
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<td>Positive experiences in education</td>
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<td>Part time study facilitates a larger and longer-term social network</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aspirations</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>I have ambitions, I want a better situation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>They are content with what they have. The new generation is not</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>My biggest dreams are the basics in their life</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
They want to study and finish university
I invest in my life… want to be the good guy
…To be a good person. I feel I *should* be.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The purpose of education</th>
<th>Fulfilment of basic needs</th>
<th>Poverty alleviation - family</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Productive employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Financial independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivation of Self</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hope</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Life purpose</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-worth</td>
<td>Dignity</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-esteem</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-confidence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-respect</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-awareness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification with a higher purpose</td>
<td>Intellectual growth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personal excellence</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personal empowerment</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identification with higher principles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transcend limitations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A duty to one’s people</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement of society</td>
<td>Positive input into society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognition and reconciliation with other social groups</td>
<td>The Bedoun identity is Kuwaiti</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Bedoun identity is Kuwaiti
The must ask the Bedoun about
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marginalisation in education</th>
<th>Experiences of overt abuse</th>
<th>Students abused due to tribal background in citizen schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Students locked in rooms without being taught</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amplification and shaming of Bedoun identity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Whole classes failed for no reason</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiences of stigmatisation</td>
<td>Self or others hide their identity at university now</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Avoidance of identity disclosure, exposure as impoverished</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resisting the practice of concealing identity</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Children of stateless/citizen couples attempt to migrate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anti-Bedouin sentiment at Kuwait University</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Experience of stigmatisation – involvement of the Central Apparatus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social segregation in education</td>
<td>Expulsion of the Bedoun from schools 1986-1992</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I started crying</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I waited 19 years to enter university</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I am Kuwaiti. The government made the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>difference between us</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They couldn’t do anything for us, we came to understand that</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They will say Bedoun. They will know</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trapped behind borders closed to the Bedoun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The unschooled Bedoun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imposed idleness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The street life</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A wasted life</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No work, no exit from house</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expense of the private system; criminalisation of the community</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergenerational impacts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison of experience in a new country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B
The Bedoun: Bedouin heritage and citizenship

i. The main Bedouin tribes of Kuwait
ii. Collective names of the Bedouin (including the Bedoun) of Kuwait
iii. Government Legislation and Other Commitments to Grant the Bedoun Citizenship (1950-2014)
iv. National Census and other Bedoun identity documents
v. The Constitution of Kuwait (1922/1962), Article 25 (military servicemen)
vi. The Nationality Law (1959) of Kuwait
Appendix B, i

The Main Bedouin Tribes of Kuwait

The Main Bedouin Tribes of Kuwait are set out below. Not all tribes had claims tribal dirah (traditional lands) extending across what is now the territory of Kuwait. However, tribes had access to other tribes’ dirah by agreement due to the principles of resource sharing among tribes (Wilkinson, 1983). The main tribes were incorporated into the state by tribal agreements with the ruler, the al Sabah, and later, through the parliamentary process. The spellings in English commonly differ, for example, between the two authors below.
Table B1

The Main Tribes of Kuwait and Their Traditional Tribal Territories (Dirah)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Tribal Unit</th>
<th>Tribal Territory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Azmi</td>
<td>Awazem</td>
<td>Kuwait and eastern area of Saudi Arabian Gulf coast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Ajmi</td>
<td>Ajman</td>
<td>Southern and western Kuwait and eastern Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutairi</td>
<td>Mutair</td>
<td>North eastern Saudi Arabia and Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashidi</td>
<td>Rashaydah</td>
<td>Kuwait and North eastern Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Anzi</td>
<td>Anza</td>
<td>Northern Arabian peninsula from Syria/Jordan to Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shmmari</td>
<td>Shammar</td>
<td>North central Saudi Arabia and western Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhafiri</td>
<td>Dhafir</td>
<td>Zubair in Iraq westwards and south into Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khaldi</td>
<td>Bani Khalid</td>
<td>Kuwait and eastern Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fadhli</td>
<td>Fadhul</td>
<td>Southwestern Iraq and northern Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dosari</td>
<td>Dawasir</td>
<td>West central Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murri</td>
<td>Murra</td>
<td>The Empty Quarter north through eastern Saudi Arabia and Qatar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hajeri</td>
<td>Bani Hajer</td>
<td>Qatar and eastern central Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qahtani</td>
<td>Qahtan</td>
<td>Central Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Utalbai</td>
<td>Utban</td>
<td>Northern central Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This list was revised and updated by Professor Abdulla Alhajeri (2004, table 3.2, p.79) in Citizenship and Political Participation in the State of Kuwait: The Case of the National Assembly (1963-1966). Some of the original information incorporated was from the work of Abdullah Khalifah al Shayeji (1988, table 5.6, p.206) Democratization in Kuwait: The National Assembly as a Strategy for Political Survival. The Bedoun were assumed to be members of the Bedouin tribes of Kuwait until 1983 (al Anezi, 1989, p.263).
Appendix B, ii

Collective Names of the Bedouin (including the Bedoun) of Kuwait

What hindered the outcome Freeth envisioned in 1970, whereby the badu would be assimilated and the term no longer used to designate a distinct social group? (al Nakib, 2014, p.7)

The names used to refer to the Bedouin of Kuwait - including the Bedoun - are provided in Table B2, below. I have listed eight names. The table may be read with Appendix C, i, which sets out other names used to describe the Bedoun, which evolved during the historical process of their marginalization and expulsion.

Different spellings for the term Bedoun

Bedoun: Lorch, May 12, 1991; Fineman, November 8, 1992. The spelling was also used by the United Nations Security Council, July 2, 2004 and June 30, 2005, the Arab Times in Kuwait. This spelling is use in this research.


Bidun is a French term for slum-dweller, formerly used to characterise north African poverty. I have never found any direct no correspondence to the Arabic term ‘Bedoun’ meaning ‘without.’ It is a derogatory term, beyond the scope of the present discussion.
### Table B2

*The Collective Names of the Bedouin (Including the Bedoun) of Kuwait*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Terms</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Origin of the terms and references</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sons of the desert <em>Abna al badiyya</em></td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>A local term used in Kuwait (al Waqayan, 2009; Beaugrand, 2014b, p.737), still used today by the Bedoun to describe themselves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dwellers of the Kuwait desert/Bedouins of Kuwait <em>Badiat al Kuwayt</em></td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>A local term used in Kuwait, still used. Officially, the term legally exempted these tribal members from the Nationality Law regarding foreign residents Beaugrand (2014b, p.737). It was cancelled by Emiri Decree 41/1987 (Group 29, 2012, p.6). Clearly, the term refers to the Bedouin within the territorial boundary of the modern state of Kuwait.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Semi-settled Bedouins of Kuwait <em>Arab dar</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>The term comes from the concept of the Islamic abode in Quranic philosophy, <em>dar</em> meaning house, abode or structure (Ramadan, 2008). Thus, the term may simply mean the house or home of the Arabs, as in the <em>dirah</em> (traditional lands) of the Bedouin. The term <em>Arab dar</em> was also used by Dickson (1949, p.108-109); he indicated he applied the term to semi-nomads, including those who pitched their black tents on the outskirts of Kuwait city annually (see Appendix H for photographs). It is likely al Anezi (1989) adopted the term from this author.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Semi-settled Kuwaiti Bedouins <em>Uraib dar</em></td>
<td></td>
<td>Al Anezi (1989, p.174-175, n44) claimed the term <em>uraib dar</em> meant Bedouins of Kuwait who were permanently settled outside Kuwait City but within the territory. The distinction between two groups, one which observed the (unmarked) territorial boundary and one which did not, is entirely theoretical, but it also happened to reflect Dickson’s (1949, p.108-109) discussion of the process of transition to permanent settlement, also seen in al Moosa (1976).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Nomadic Kuwaiti Bedouins</td>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>Settled in Kuwaiti, but no fixed place of residence (seasonal settlement at multiple sites), no observance of territorial boundaries (national boundaries) due seeking pasture for their flocks. As above, Al Anezi (1989, p.174-175) attempted to compare the Bedouin with anthropological</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6 Semi-desert or desert people 1960s Denotes different designations in Arabic – pastoral or desert dwellers. Alhajeri (2014, p.18) may have been referring to the above terms *Arab dar* and *uraib dar*, used by Dickson (1949) and al Aanezi (1989) further refined, reflecting an attempt to illustrate anthropological distinctions.

7 Kuwaiti Up to the 1960s ‘All were citizens of the State of Kuwait in the 1950s,’ in Al Anezi (n.d., in Alhajeri, 2014, p.18). This was reflected on the National Census, with the Bedoun listed under ‘Kuwaiti’ until their removal in 1992 (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994; see Appendix D, iii). It was also reflected on the actual National Census document issued to the Bedoun (see Appendix B, iv).

8 Bedoun/Bedoon/ Bidoon Official use 1970s-1980s (1) Initially authors referred to the Bedoun as the Kuwaiti Bedouin. The term was used by some Kuwaiti academics writing their theses in English at universities in the United Kingdom and the United States.

Local use prior to 1970s (2) (1) Al Fayez (1984, p.257-8) defined the term Bedoun as reference to Bedouins who had been recruited in the security forces (police, military and national guard), acknowledging no prior nationality.

Use by journalists and Human Rights Watch (3) Al Anezi (1989) referred to the term *Bedoon* being used in place of *nationality* on government records, to indicate Kuwaiti Bedouins waiting for citizenship. The name was officially dropped in a Council of Ministers Resolution 1983, see ‘non-Kuwaiti national.’

Use by academics (4) (2) I have not found the term in local use prior to 1970s, as Alhajeri (2014, p.18; 2013, p.18) stated, but he may have been referring to oral discourse and/or Arabic language authors or newspapers such as *al Qabas*. For example, in al Moosa (1976) they were referred to as Bedouins who were waiting to receive their promised citizenship grants, and distinguished from non-Bedouin stateless people. But he did not use the term, Bedoun.

(3) The term was first used by in the West by Foreign correspondents initially discovered the Bedoun after the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait (Cushman, June 30, 1991, July 16, 1991; Evans, February 28, 1991; Gasperini, August 20, 1991; Lorch, May 12, 1991; Wilkinson, May 20, 1991) prior to Human Rights Watch (1991a) in September, 1991, deriving the term ‘jinisya’
from Crystal, 1992. It was also later used by Fineman (November 2, 1992, November 8, 1992). In Evans, February 28, 1991, the Bedouin were labelled ‘Iraqi intruders’ by government authorities. Human Rights Watch (1995) claimed the term was regarded as a temporary one, used to refer to individuals who were waiting for their citizenship claims to be verified, while government issued them with documents stating they were *bedoon jinsiyya*.

(4) Other spellings include *Bedoon*, *Bidoun*, *Bidoon* and the derogatory term which has a different meaning, *Bidun*. See Chapter 2 regarding development of definitional terms by academics. See below for use of the different spellings.

*Note:* Source information is given in each section. I have listed the number of terms used to refer to the Bedouin in the column on the left. The numbers continue on in Table C1, *The collective names of the Bedouin (including the Bedoun) of Kuwait*, which concerned the official names given to the Bedouin after their administrative expulsion in 1986 (‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003).

Table B2 above, features mainly traditional names from the Arabic which were used by the Bedouin themselves, referring to their desert and/or nomadic practices. Other names were introduced based on anthropological classifications that distinguished Bedouin tribes at various stages of nomadism and settlement, such as fully nomadic, semi-nomadic and settled. These classifications were usually based on the types of animals that the Bedouin grazed, or the type of pasture consumed. The term *Bedouin* was never confined to a fully nomadic existence in the desert for all but refers to tribal social structures and/or relationships (Alshawi and Gardner, 2014), depending upon scholars’ theoretical inclinations (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of this theory). Unfortunately, many terms for the Bedouin and Bedoun are not referenced by scholars.
Appendix B, iii

Government Legislation and Other Commitments to Grant the Bedoun Citizenship
(1950-2014)

Table B3 below, sets out the range of commitments that the government of Kuwait made to the Bedoun in public, that the group would be granted Kuwaiti citizenship. It appears to be the first time the range of assurances has been collated. It included reference to government legislation and claims (official pronouncements not necessarily legislated).
Table B3

List of Government Legislation and Other Commitments to Grant the Bedoun Citizenship (1950-2014)

| Date  | Type                          | Details of the commitment and references                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|-------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1961  | Legislation                   | The first open registration period for citizenship claims to be lodged took place from 1961-1963, as part of implementation the Nationality law (Kuwait) 1959. References: al Moosa (1976); al Haddad (1981); al Anezi (1989, p.183, n83); Human Rights Watch (1995). |
| 1965  | Government conditions, permanent settlement program | Mass naturalization of the Bedouin on the basis of their tribal identity, from 1965. The same programs were run throughout the Middle East at the time, organised via the United Nations, the Arab League, the ILO and other partners with state governments. References: Bocco (2006); Zahir (1985, p. 53) in Stanton Russell (1989, p.34). |
| 1972  | Legislation                   | The Nationality Law (1959) Article 5(3) was amended to allow for the naturalisation of stateless students who were born in Kuwait and had completed high school in Kuwait – a short-lived law marred by corruption and of little benefit to the group (see al Anezi, 1989). References: Bocco (2006); Zahir (1985, p. 53) in Stanton Russell (1989, p.34). |

1990-1992 Legislation December, 1990, recommendation of the Academic Team for Population Policy submitted a report to the Supreme Council to reverse the policy of ‘population balance’ from granting Bedouin citizenship en masse, to strictly prohibiting any further mass citizenship being distributed to the stateless Bedouin of Kuwait (the Bedoun). Citizenship would be given to the stateless Bedoun only if they could prove their eligibility under the Nationality Law of 1959. Policy was legislated for official implementation in Supreme Planning Council Resolution No. 11 of January 8, 1992, adopted by Cabinet, January 30, 1992. A recommendation to provide citizenship to all who had proved they resident prior to 1965 was never implemented. The proposal for the new, national population policy came from the Supreme Planning Council and the Committee for Population Policy and Manpower Development on the same date: January 8, 1992


2010 Government claim On November 5, 2010, the Supreme Planning Council Study published a figure of 34,000 of this category recommended ‘eligible for naturalisation.’ The figure appeared to have been drawn from figures announced under the pledge of 1976, Law 100/1980 and Law 22/2000 (all listed above). This group, who were eligible to receive citizenship under Law 100/1980. They were predominantly members of the military and police services, drawn from the northern tribes (al Moosa 1976; al Fayez, 1984; Alhajeri, 2004).

Sources: The ‘2010 Study’ published in al Qabas, 34 Thousand Candidates for Naturalization from 106 Thousand, see Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.21. See also Stanton
Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, n32 for the first time this group was identified at the policy level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Government claim</td>
<td>The same group identified above (re: 1990) related to a ‘new’ identity system introduced by the Central Apparatus, announced in <em>The Kuwait Times</em> (‘Color ID Cards for Bedoons Soon,’ 2012, April 21). The population would be identified under four different colours, reflecting Central Apparatus classifications already used within the Apparatus (see <em>8,000 Bedoons to Become Illegal Residents Soon</em>, June, 18, 2012, in <em>The Kuwait Times</em> and <em>Judicial Recourse for Bedoun Colours</em>, December 23, 2012 in <em>The Arab Times</em>). According to the categorisation criteria, those designated the green identity category were ‘eligible’ for citizenship. The meaning of the green identity category under the new system implied that the recipients of would receive citizenship, but it was not guaranteed. From 2012 to 2016, government worked to reduce the number in this group it believes are eligible for citizenship, from over 35,000 to just a few thousand, and it appears the number will soon be reduced to zero (see Appendix D, part iv). Sources: ‘Color ID,’ 2012; ‘8,000 Bedoons,’ 2012; ‘Judicial Recourse,’ 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Legislation</td>
<td>In 2013, parliamentarians presented a range of arguments as to why the Bedoun should/would be naturalised upon legislation to approve the annual citizen lists. Amnesty International (2013a), the AFP (<em>Kuwait Passes Bill to Naturalise 4,000 Stateless People</em>, March, 20, 2013) and the BBC (<em>Kuwait MPs Pass Law to Naturalise 4,000 Stateless Bidun</em>, March 20, 2013) issued pre-emptive statements stating that the legislation would be used to grant citizenship to the Bedoun, followed by Human Rights Watch in <em>The Kuwait Times</em> (<em>Rights Group Praises Kuwait Bedoon Move</em>, March, 27, 2013). No grant was received by any Bedoun out of 4,000 grants to ‘foreigners’ after the legislation was passed. Amnesty International’s (2013a) report on the matter, <em>Kuwait: Small Step Forward for Bidun Rights as 4,000 ‘Foreigners’ Granted Citizenship</em>, was later removed from the Kuwait UNHCR webpage and the Amnesty International webpage. Human Rights Watch (2014, p.2) confirmed that no Bedoun received citizenship out of the 4,000 grants. Sources: ‘Kuwait MPs,’ 2013; ‘Kuwait Passes Bill,’ 2013; Amnesty International (2013a); ‘Rights Group,’ 2013; Human Rights Watch (2014, p.2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Legislation</td>
<td>National Assembly legislated to allow parliament to naturalize up to 4,000 people in 2016, reported by Izzak (May 17, 2016) in <em>The Kuwait Times</em> (<em>Nod to naturalize 4,000 in 2016</em>, May 11, 2016). The law gave government the opportunity to naturalise Bedouns, but similar laws passed in previous years has led to government naturalizing few individuals, overlooking Bedouns, for example in the legislation of 2013.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to a number of sources, primarily Alhajeri (2004), also al Haddad (1981) al Fayez (1984), al Anezi (1989) in Human Rights Watch (1995s) and Beaugrand (2011), the government of Kuwait provided specific assurances that citizenship would be granted to the stateless Bedouin population *en masse*. These were not abstract promises but from 1961, legislated events (1961-1963, 1970, 1972, 1980, 2000), a Ministerial announcement (in 1975) and most recently in 2012, government announcements made though the local media. In 2014, Beaugrand (2014a) implied there was some kind of misunderstanding between the public and the government of Kuwait, such that the public had adopted wishful thinking to governments’ previous statements. This interpretation should be ignored, because as I have demonstrated via the multiple citations above, the tendency for government to ‘promise’ citizenship to the Bedoun is virtually a public institution in Kuwait, and it is used as a mechanism that has been used to quell and delay confrontations between the community and authorities for decades.

Furthermore, Beaugrand (2014a) has never published any systematic analysis of these claims and legislative actions in the National Assembly. Pre-emptive claims in news media that have misled the public could be blamed solely on the news media, if it were not for vigorous National Assembly discussion that includes public statements of intent to grant citizenship, which were characteristic of the legislation passed in 2013. Indeed, it is possible that pre-emptive claims (‘promises’ that citizenship would be forthcoming to tens of thousands), parliamentary debates and legislative actions have occurred simply because there are parliamentary and other government sources who *do* actually support the grant of citizenship to the Bedoun.

In most cases, citizenship applications have been followed by undisclosed processes of assessment and evaluation of claims characterised by lack of transparency, arbitrary and/or biased decision making and what appeared to be in many cases, a simple failure to actually process applications (see Human Rights Watch, 1995, 2000). The issue of citizenship for the Bedoun was raised recently in relation to legislation being passed in 2016 to prepare for 4,000 new citizenship grants. These are regular parliamentary grants, but they require fresh legislation to enact the grants each time, and this process tends to lead to national discussion about how many Bedoun will receive citizenship as a result (al Anezi, 1989). Although a variety of parliamentarians claim the law will be passed to grant the Bedoun citizenship, this has rarely happened. In an unusually frank revelation during discussion time, MP Yousef Zalzalah and MP Saleh Ashour reflected on the failure of past
promises and legislation enacted by the National Assembly, reported by Izzak (May 17, 2016):

MP Yousef Al-Zalzalah slammed the government’s treatment of bedoons, saying some of them can’t get married, get an education or get the least of their basic rights. ‘This is a form of oppression and there are people who are deliberately oppressing bedoons,’ he said. ‘Bedoons must be allowed to live a dignified life.’ (Izzak, May 17, 2016)

The current law will not resolve the problem of bedoons, adding that those who think that the current government will resolve the issue are “dreaming”. He said that in the past, dozens of similar laws were passed but failed to resolve the problem, “because we need the government to believe in resolving the problem”. (MP Saleh Ashour in Izzak, May 17, 2016)

That these national debates occur at all should be regarded as some indication of the Bedoun’s integration in Kuwaiti society and the importance that their citizenship holds for some parties. But moreover, the information forms an important historical record that illustrates the local perception of the group as ‘Kuwaitis,’ and not as ‘other nationals,’ emphasising the confounding social and political position of the group: while no other ethnic group in Kuwait has been as violently targeted for so long as the Bedoun, nor has any other non-Kuwaiti citizen ethnic group been so integrated in the life of the nation.
Appendix B, Part iv
National Census and Other Bedoun Identity Documents

These documents have not been reproduced due to security concerns, but are available to the examiners on request.
Appendix B, v
The Constitution of Kuwait (1922/1962), Article 25 (military servicemen)
The Constitution of Kuwait 1962

Article 25
The State shall guarantee the solidarity of Society in bearing burdens arising from catastrophes and public calamities and shall guarantee compensation to those sustaining damages by reason of war or in the performance of their military duties.

Source: The Constitute Project
Appendix B, vi
The Nationality Law (1959) Kuwait

The following translation of the Nationality Law (1959) Kuwait is from an unofficial translation at Refworld, the United Nations online reference library. Note that Articles 4 and 5 concern ‘service to the state,’ a concept which is referred to elsewhere in the text of these Appendices in relation to Bedoun public servants and their families having qualified for the conditions required to be granted citizenship.

Article 1
Original Kuwaiti nationals are those persons who were settled in Kuwait prior to 1920 and who maintained their normal residence there until the date of the publication of this Law. Ancestral residence shall be deemed complementary to the period of residence of descendants.
A person is deemed to have maintained his normal residence in Kuwait even if he resides in a foreign country if he has the intention of returning to Kuwait.

Article 2
Any person born in, or outside, Kuwait whose father is a Kuwaiti national shall be a Kuwaiti national himself.

Article 3
Kuwaiti nationality is acquired by any person born in Kuwait whose parents are unknown. A foundling is deemed to have been born in Kuwait unless the contrary is proved.

Kuwaiti nationality may be granted by Decree upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior to any person [upon his attaining his majority who was] born in, or outside, Kuwait to a Kuwaiti mother whose father is unknown or whose kinship to his father has not been legally established. The Minister of the Interior may afford to such children, being minors, the same treatment as that afforded to Kuwaiti nationals until they reach their majority.

Article 4
Kuwaiti nationality may be granted by Decree upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior to any person of full age satisfying the following conditions:
1. That he has lawfully resided in Kuwait for at least 20 consecutive years or for at least 15 consecutive years if he is an Arab belonging to an Arab country. The requirement of consecutive residence shall not be affected if the applicant leaves Kuwait on official business. If he leaves for a reason other than that of official business, but retains the intention of returning, the period spent abroad shall be deducted from the total period of his residence in Kuwait;
2. That he has lawful means of earning his living, is of good character and has not been convicted of an honour-related crime or of an honesty-related crime;
3. That he has knowledge of the Arabic language;
4. That he possesses qualifications or renders services needed in Kuwait;
5. That he be an original Muslim by birth, or that he has converted to Islam according to the prescribed rules and procedures and that a period of at least 5 years has passed since he embraced Islam before the grant of naturalization. Nationality thus acquired is *ipsa facto* lost and the Decree of naturalization rendered void *ab initio* if the naturalized person expressly renounces Islam or if he behaves in such a manner as clearly indicates his intention to abandon Islam. In any such case, the nationality of any dependant of the apostate who had acquired it upon the naturalization of the apostate is also rendered void.

A Committee of Kuwaiti nationals, appointed by the Minister of the Interior, shall select from those who apply for naturalization, the applicants whom it recommends for naturalization in accordance with the provisions of this Article.

The number of persons who may be naturalized in any one year in accordance with the provisions of this Article shall be decided by an Act.

**Article 5**

Notwithstanding the provisions of the immediately preceding Article, the following may be granted Kuwaiti nationality by Decree, upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior:

1. Any person who has rendered valuable services to Kuwait;
2. Any person [upon his attaining his majority who was] born to a Kuwaiti mother and who has maintained his residence [in Kuwait] until reaching the age of majority and whose foreign father has irrevocably divorced his mother or has died. The Minister of the Interior may afford to such children, being minors, the same treatment as that afforded to Kuwaiti nationals in all respects until they reach the age of majority;
3. An Arab belonging to an Arab country provided that he had resided in Kuwait since before 1945 and has maintained his residence there until the promulgation of the Decree providing for his naturalization;
4. A non-Arab provided that he had resided in Kuwait since before 1930 and has maintained his residence there until the promulgation of the Decree providing for his naturalization. Ancestral residence shall be deemed complementary to the period of residence of descendants for the purposes of the application of the third and fourth paragraphs of this Article, provided that the descendant was born in and is residing in Kuwait. Proof of residence shall be effected according to the procedure prescribed by Article 21 of this Law.
The number of persons who may be naturalized in any one year in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article shall be decided by an Act.

The grant of Kuwaiti nationality in virtue of the provisions of this Article shall be further subject to the conditions laid down in paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of the Article immediately preceding.

Article 6
A person who has acquired Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of the provisions of any of Articles 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8 of this Law shall not have the right to vote in any Parliamentary election within 30 years following the date of his naturalization. The provisions of this Article shall apply to any who have already acquired Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of naturalization prior to the enactment of this amendment. The 30 year period shall be deemed to start to run in the case of such persons from July 6, 1966.

A person to whom this Article applies shall not have the right to stand as a candidate for or to be appointed to membership of any Parliamentary body.

Article 7
The [foreign] wife of a foreigner who has acquired Kuwaiti nationality shall not ipso facto be considered to be a Kuwaiti national unless she declares her wish so to be considered within one year following the date of her husband's naturalization. The children, being minors, of a foreigner who has acquired Kuwaiti nationality, shall, ipso facto, themselves be considered to be Kuwaiti nationals. They shall have the right to decide whether to retain their nationality of origin within a year of their attaining the age of majority.

Article 8
Kuwaiti nationality may be granted by Decree upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior to a foreign woman who marries a Kuwaiti national provided that she declares her wish to acquire Kuwaiti nationality and that the marriage shall have lasted for at least 15 years from the date of her declaration. All or part of the above requirement as to time may be waived upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior. In the event of such woman's marriage being terminated by divorce or the death of her husband, and if a child had been or is born to her by her husband, Kuwaiti nationality may be granted to her by Decree upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior, provided that she maintains her lawful and normal residence in Kuwait until the end of such 15 year period.

Article 9
A foreign woman who has acquired Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of either of the two articles immediately preceding shall not lose it upon the termination of the marriage
unless she thereupon re-acquires her nationality of origin or acquires another nationality.

Article 10
A Kuwaiti woman who marries a foreigner shall not lose tier Kuwaiti nationality unless she acquires the nationality of her husband at her own request.

Article 11
A Kuwaiti national shall lose his Kuwaiti nationality if he becomes voluntarily naturalized according to the law of another State. His wife, being a Kuwaiti national, shall not lose her Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of her husband's naturalization unless she voluntarily acquires the nationality of her husband. His children, being minors, shall also lose their Kuwaiti nationality if they themselves acquire ipso facto the nationality of the State according to the law of which their father has become naturalized if that law so provides. Such children shall reacquire Kuwaiti nationality upon their informing the Minister of the Interior within two years following their attaining the age of majority of their wish to do so.

A Kuwaiti national who has lost his Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of the provisions of this Article may reacquire his Kuwaiti nationality by Resolution of the Council of Ministers upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior, provided that he has lawfully resided in Kuwait for not less than one year and provided further that he applies for such reacquisition and has renounced his foreign nationality. He shall resume his Kuwaiti nationality upon the acceptance of his application by the Council of Ministers.

Article 11 part [note: the part number was not stated in this translation]
A foreigner who may acquire Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of the provisions of any of Articles 4, 5, 7 or 8 of this Law shall renounce any other nationality he may have within three months following the date of his naturalization according to the law of Kuwait and shall provide evidence of his having done so to the Minister of the Interior. In the event of his failure to do so, his naturalization shall ipso facto be revoked and deemed void ab initio. Kuwaiti nationality shall be revoked by Decree upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior. Kuwaiti nationality which may have been acquired by any dependant of any such person shall also be revoked.

Article 12
A Kuwaiti woman who has lost her Kuwaiti nationality by virtue of the provisions of either of the two Articles immediately preceding may reacquire her Kuwaiti nationality by Resolution of the Council of Ministers upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior, provided that she has renounced her foreign nationality and that she has maintained her normal residence in Kuwait or has returned to reside in Kuwait. She
shall resume her Kuwaiti nationality from the date of the Resolution of the Council of Ministers.

**Article 13**
The nationality of a Kuwaiti national naturalized by virtue of any of Articles 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8 may be revoked by Decree upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior in the following cases:

1. Where naturalization has been acquired by virtue of fraud or on the basis of a false declaration. Kuwaiti nationality which has been acquired by any dependant of any such person may also be revoked;
2. Where, within 15 years of the grant of naturalization, a person is convicted of any honour related crime or honesty-related crime. In such case, the nationality of the convicted person alone may be revoked;
3. Where, within 10 years of the grant of naturalization, a person is dismissed from public office on disciplinary grounds for reasons relating to honour or honesty;
4. Where the competent authorities have evidence that a naturalized person has disseminated opinions which may tend seriously to undermine the economic or social structure of the State or that he is a member of a political association of a foreign State. Kuwaiti nationality which has been acquired by any dependant of any such person may also be revoked.

**Article 14**
A Kuwaiti national may be deprived of his Kuwaiti nationality by Decree upon the recommendation of the Head of the Departments of Police and Public Security, in the following cases:

1. Where a person has entered the military service of a foreign State and has remained in such service notwithstanding an instruction from the Government of Kuwait that he leave such service;
2. Where a person has worked for a foreign State which is at war with Kuwait or with which diplomatic relations have been suspended;
3. Where a person is normally resident abroad and lie has become a member of an association whose objects include objects which may tend seriously to undermine the social or economic structure of Kuwait or where he has been convicted of an offence involving breach of his allegiance to Kuwait. In such cases, only the person concerned may be deprived of his nationality.

**Article 15**
Kuwaiti nationality may, by Decree issued on the submission of the Head of the Departments of Police and Public Security, be restored at any time to a person from
whom it was withdrawn or who was deprived of it in accordance with the provisions of the Articles preceding.

**Article 16**
The acquisition, withdrawal, deprivation or re-acquisition of Kuwaiti nationality shall be of no retrospective effect, unless express provision to the contrary is made [by the relevant Decree or other instrument].

**Article 17**
The age of majority referred to in any provision of this Law shall be in accordance with the general provision at any time in force of Kuwaiti law.

**Article 18**
All declarations, notifications of choice and option, application forms and all other forms and procedures referred to in this Law shall, where effected in Kuwait, be addressed to the Head of the Departments of Police and Public Security. Where effected outside Kuwait, they shall be presented to the Consular bodies authorised to attend to them.

**Article 19**
The Head of the Departments of Police and Public Security shall issue to every Kuwaiti national a certificate of Kuwaiti nationality after investigation has been made to establish his right to such nationality in accordance with the provisions of this Law.

**Article 20**
In every case, the burden of proof shall rest upon one who claims Kuwaiti nationality.

**Article 21**
Kuwaiti nationality as provided for by the provisions of this Law may be proved by way of an investigation carried out by Nationality Committees established by Decree upon the recommendation of the Head of the Departments of Police and Public Security. Such Committees may accept documentary evidence as constituting proof of Kuwaiti nationality. The Committees may also admit evidence submitted by witnesses considered to be trustworthy, and be guided by matters of common repute and any other circumstantial evidence as they may consider to be sufficient to substantiate a claim to nationality.

The Committees shall report to a Supreme Committee to be established by Decree upon the recommendation of the Head of the Departments of Police and Public Security. No determination of a Committee shall be valid until it shall have been affirmed by the Supreme Committee.

Membership of all such Committees and rules of procedure to be adopted by them shall be regulated by Decree upon the recommendation of the Head of the Departments of Police and Public Security.
Article 21 part A
A nationality certificate may be withdrawn if it appears to have been obtained by virtue of fraud or on the basis of a false declaration or on the basis of false evidence submitted by a witness. Such withdrawal shall be effected by Resolution of the Council of Ministers upon the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior. Kuwaiti nationality which has been acquired by any dependant of any such person may also be revoked.

Article 21 part B
Any person who has made, whether orally or in writing, incorrect statements to the administrative authorities responsible for verification of Kuwaiti nationality or to the Committees established for that purpose, with the object of seeking to prove his own Kuwaiti nationality or that of another, or with the object of seeking to facilitate the acquisition of Kuwaiti nationality according to the provisions of this Law and who is not proved to have made reasonable effort to determine the truth of his statements, shall be liable to either or both of a term of imprisonment not exceeding three years and to a fine of not more than 200 Kuwaiti Dinars.

If such person has furnished statements knowing them to be false, he shall be liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding seven years and to an additional fine of up to 500 Kuwaiti Dinars.

Article 22
For a period of 2 years from the date of entry into force of this Law, no Kuwaiti passports will be issued save to those who have established their Kuwaiti nationality in accordance with the provisions of this Law.

Article 23
All passports issued before the date of entry into force of this Law and all passports issued during the period of 2 years thereafter as provided by Article 22, to any who does not carry a certificate of Kuwaiti nationality as provided for by Article 19, shall cease to be valid on the expiration of that two-year period.

Article 24
This Law shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall enter into force as from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette.

All Orders for its due implementation shall be issued by the Head of the Departments of Police and Public Security.

Note The text above is an unofficial translation which incorporates all changes/amendments from Decree Law No. 40/1987, Decree No. 1/1982, Decree Law No. 100/1980 and Statute no. 30/1970. For a discussion on the frequent amendments to the Nationality Law of Kuwait (1959), see al Anezi (1989). This version was accessed
at UNHCRs *Refworld* online reference library
(http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4ef1c.html).
Appendix C
Discursive omissions, objectification, dehumanisation

Analysis of government sources
i. Other names used to describe the Bedoun
ii. Al Waqayan’s (2009) stages of criminalisation of the Bedoun
iii. ‘Other nationality’ typing (2010-2014)
iv. Colour typing of the Bedoun population by the Central Apparatus (2012-2014)
v. Identity cards issued to Bedoun by the Ministry of Interior, pre-2012 and post-2012

Analysis of academic sources
vi. Key themes in academic and public discourses concerning the Bedouin and Bedoun
vii. Thematic analysis summaries
viii. A visual organiser illustrating the themes arising from academic and public discourse on the Bedouin and Bedoun
Table C1 below illustrates other names used to describe the Bedoun, aside from Bedouin, Bedoun, Kuwaiti and other traditional or anthropological references to the Bedouin of Kuwait.
Table C1

Other Names Used to Describe the Bedoun

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Origin of the terms and references</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Without nationality</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Beaugrand (2014b) stated this form was derived from the previous use of ‘desert dwellers’ badiat al Kuwayt, but the connection is unclear. Bedoun individuals in this study disagreed with this interpretation. The name ‘without’ was connected to the Bedoun not being given their ‘papers’ (i.e. documents proving citizenship), which coincides with historical facts (Chapter 6). Rather, the term appears to have been introduced by Western academics from 1992 (see Chapter 2). The Kuwaiti academics I have studied in this research, did not use the term at that time. For example, al Anezi (1989, p.255) referred to the Bedoun as stateless Bedouins, while al Moosa (1976, p.158) referred to the Bedoun as Bedouins who had not yet received citizenship, actually distinguishing them from stateless people. The term signified the expulsion of the Bedoun listed as ‘Kuwaitis’ in the National Census, and the beginning of criminalising definitions used by scholars. Sources: Beaugrand, 2014b, p.737; Crystal (1992, p.75; 1995, p.182); Human Rights Watch (1991a, p.50; 1995).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Non-Kuwaiti, non-Kuwaiti national Ghayr Kuwayt</td>
<td>From the 1980s, likely first official usage from 1984</td>
<td>(1) Introduced 1983, used by government authorities from at least 11 August 1984 (Al Anezi, 1989, p.263, in Alhajeri, 2004, p.86). The name was officially adopted in a Council of Ministers Resolution 1983 that prohibited the use of the term ‘Bedoun’ on official documents. Al Anezi (1989) stated the resolution was not published, but the policy was evident in its usage by senior officials in the Kuwaiti newspapers al Anbaa and al Rai (p.263, n132). The adoption of this term by government marked the beginning of transformation of Bedoun identity to ‘unknown’ illegal migrants and re-organisation of the group with criminal restrictions, ending their regulation by the state as citizens. (2, 3) Used in the 1980s: the term was believed to have been the commencement of the policy change on the stateless Bedoun seen in 1985-1986 (Human Rights Watch, 1995, Beaugrand, 2011b; Beaugrand, 2014, p.737). In this thesis, I argue that the policy change commenced in the 1970s, indicated by al Moosa’s (1976) study. Therefore, I adopt al Anezi’s (1989) viewpoint on the use of this term. See Chapter 6.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(4) In 1992 the population was moved from ‘Kuwait’ to ‘Non-Kuwaiti, other Arab’ on the national census (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994). The population became ‘non-Kuwaiti’ due to the actions of government which allocated to different nationalities through the ‘status adjustment’ program (see population typing and labelling in Appendix C, iii and iv, and Appendix E, parts v and vi.

(5) Decree 409/2011 allowed the use of the term as an alternative to a previous policy of forcing stateless people to claim their ‘original nationality’ is a non-Kuwaiti one and to name it for use on official documentation (Kuwait Government Response, 2011, p.7).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Approximate date</th>
<th>Approximate term and notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Unidentified nationality</td>
<td>Approximately 1990s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Undetermined nationality Ghayr muhaddad al-jinsiya</td>
<td>1980s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Unknown identity Majhul al huwiyya</td>
<td>After 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Unknown citizenship</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Illegal residents</td>
<td>1974 (1), 1986 (2), 1987 (3), 1986-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
developments in Bedouin society in Kuwait.

(1) The terminology is similar that used by the Committee for Illegal Dwellings (1986) from 1974, as the Committee oversaw the shanty Bedouin ‘problem’ by al Moosa (1976, p.66). Scope for claiming the ‘illegality’ as well as the statelessness of Kuwait’s Bedouin was explored in the Committee’s study.

(2) Based on the Study of the country’s problem of the category of the ‘stateless’ (December 29, 1986, in ‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003), the Bedoun became ‘illegal residents’ in 1986-1987. The document itself was a description of a policy of administrative expulsion (see Appendix E, ii, for a copy of the newspaper article that released the document, in Arabic). It was a forerunner policy document describing the outcome of the repeal of article the Immigration Law 17, article 25(h), below. This policy showed the method by which the Bedoun population would be switched from stateless Bedouin to the term ‘illegal residents’ in both policy and practice. See BedoonRights.org, ‘Full Translation,’ October 12, 2012

(3) In 1987, the Law 17/1959, the Immigration Law (Aliens Residence Law) was amended. Article 25(h) was repealed in Ministerial Resolution 649, according to Longva (1997, p.72, n7, and Beaugrand, 2010, p.128).

(4) 1993 the Central Committee to Resolve the Status of Illegal Residents was established by Decree 221/1993, October 19 1993. Government admitted to the term being in use from 1993 in Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch (2011, p.3), aligned with the establishment of the committee. Beaugrand (2014b) also seems to have been in agreement with this interpretation (contrarily to the citation above at (3)). She believed that the term came into use after the liberation of Kuwait, ‘when the state started to handle their case through a specific administrative authority’ (p.737). However, the Bedoun were subject to such an authority since the beginning of Kuwait’s independence (see Appendix D, ii.

1987 (4) 1993

Beaugrand (2010, p.19, 80; 2014, p.744) stated this is the term used by the Executive Committee for Illegal Migrant’s Affairs, but Human Rights Watch (2000) translation referred to ‘illegal residents.’ The discrepancy seems to regard the not illegal status but the transition of the terms for migrants – that is, the actions of the Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program, recording the Bedoun under other national

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi, Syrian, Saudi Arabian, Jordanian or according to alternative fake passports: Eritrean, Dominican, Comorian and others</td>
<td>1986 onwards</td>
<td>Government policy related to ‘illegal resident status’ claims that the stateless population are actually individuals with ‘original nationality’ officially held in other states. On this basis, the Bedoun were forced to ‘admit,’ ‘reveal,’ and/or ‘accept’ other nationalities being listed as their identity, on official identity documents and government documents, particularly in order to receive documents such as birth, marriage and death certificates. This policy implemented up to 2011 and was supposed to be halted under Decree 409/2011. The labelling of the Bedoun with other nationalities appears to remain the normative practice, based on reports the Decree 409/2011 reforms including use of the term ‘non-Kuwait’ are not being implemented. See Reply of Government of Kuwait to the Human Rights Committee (17 October – 4 November, 2011); Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch (2011, p.7); WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514 (November 26, 2006).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stateless (3)</td>
<td>1986 onwards</td>
<td>Used by al Moosa (1976), who claimed there was a very small group of stateless residents in the Bedouin desert settlements, plus a large number of Bedouin who had not yet been granted citizenship (Al Moosa, 1976 p.158, 188). The Bedouin are also contextualised as a stateless group in Human Rights Watch (1991, p.5) and Alhajeri (2014, p.18). ‘Stateless’ is a legal status in international law, designating lack of nationality: Article 1 of the 1954 Convention on Stateless Persons defines the stateless individual as ‘one who is not considered a national by any state under the operation of the law.’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Source information is provided in each section. I have listed the number of terms used to refer to the Bedoun in the column on the left. The numbers continue from Table B2, The collective names of the Bedouin (including the Bedoun) of Kuwait, which concerned the traditional and self-ascribed names.

In Table C1 above, the numbers in the left hand column continue from Appendix B (Collective names of the Bedouin (including the Bedoun) of Kuwait). I have done this to illustrate the continuity of evolution of names that the Bedoun referred to themselves according to traditional custom, by the state and others. The evolution of names demonstrates a trend to deny the Bedoun identity and their legal status and to portray them as a people ‘unknown’ (unknown identity). I have explained in this thesis (Chapter 2, 6) that
this notion was untrue, but it formed an important part of the mono-ethnic, nationalist ideology that attempted to justify the eradication of the Bedoun.

After the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, the Bedoun entered a phase of criminalisation and subjection to false claims that the group held citizenship in other states. This phase was elaborated by academics (Crystal, 1995; Ghabra, 1997b; Longva, 1997), promoting the ideology internationally. Al Waqayan (2009) discussed three evolutionary phases of the experience of the Bedoun collective, saw through the ideology and analysed it as predominantly criminalizing. I aligned the different names featured in this Appendix and Appendix B according to his model (see Appendix H, below). The term ‘unidentified bodies’ was used by Kenneth Roth (Director of Human Rights Watch) to refer to murdered Bedouns during the ethnic cleansing of the group (Roth, June 11, 1991), perhaps indicating the expediency of the terms ‘unidentified’ and ‘unknown’ to refer to the Bedoun. Roth’s writing published separately to Human Rights Watch had been censored to delete discussion of the Bedoun.
Appendix C, ii

Al Waqayan’s (2009) Theory of Criminalisation of the Bedoun

Al Waqayan (2009) theorized three evolutionary phases of the experience of the Bedoun collective, including recognition of the Bedoun as Kuwaitis, rejection including denial and indictment, marking the criminalisation of identity, expulsion and statelessness.

Table C2

Terms for the Bedoun Analysed Using Theory of al Waqayan (2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage of Recognition</th>
<th>Stage of Rejection</th>
<th>Stage of Indictment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recognition as Kuwaitis until further notice to entitled to all rights except the right to nationality</td>
<td>Rejection of the collective and denial of rights and nihilistic terms which denied the state was aware of the group's origins and/or legal status</td>
<td>Indictment such as charged with possession of foreign nationalities, stripped of all rights, forced to produce ‘original documents’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Native and Kuwaiti</th>
<th>Without nationality</th>
<th>Non-Kuwaiti</th>
<th>Unidentified, unknown</th>
<th>Illegal</th>
<th>Other nationality labels</th>
<th>International Law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sons of the desert (1), Dwellers of the desert (2), nomadic Kuwaiti Bedouins (3), settled Kuwaiti Bedouins (4), Semi-desert (5) or desert people of Kuwait (6)</td>
<td>Bedoun (7), Bedouin Jinsiyya (8)</td>
<td>Non-Kuwaiti national s (9), non-Kuwaiti (10)</td>
<td>Unidentified nationality (11), non-specific nationality (12), undetermined nationality, (13) unknown identity (14)</td>
<td>Illegal residents (15), illegal migrants (16)</td>
<td>Iraqi, Syrian, Saudi Arabian, Jordanian (17)</td>
<td>Stateless (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labelling combined with programs for purchase of fake passports with no effective nationality.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table C2 above, aligned the range of different traditional names and names used by government and others for the Bedoun that were listed in Appendices B, ii and C, i with al Waqayan’s (2009) three developmental stages in Stateless in Kuwait: The Crisis and Consequences (Journal of Asseyasah Addawliah, No.175, January, 2009) (translated by
Mohammed al Anezi of London). In the second stage, the stage or rejection, the government of Kuwait began to deny that the Bedoun were stateless and to deny the concept of statelessness in international law, actually existed. This stance remains the official policy today (see Appendices E, iii, and iv).

Beaugrand (2010) interviewed al Waqayan, noting he was an insider at the Majlis al Ummah (Kuwait’s parliament), where he had unique access to government’s strategy toward the Bedoun. He was the second Kuwaiti scholar to discuss the ‘status adjustment’ program after al Anezi (1989), and offered some sense of the scope of the program, applied to thousands of Bedoun public service employees. Al Waqayan (2009) was also the first scholar to examine the Bedoun issue from a cultural perspective. This aspect of his work is discussed in Chapter 8. The scholar is highly respected by community leaders and intellectuals in the Bedoun community.
Appendix C, iii
‘Other Nationality’ Identity Typing (2010-2014)

This section is derived from a thematic analysis of documents concerning the administration of the Bedoun population, and the system imposed to change their identity, from 2010. Two major themes emerged:

1. The use of ‘other nationality’ labelling to change the Bedoun’s identity (1983-), linked to previous committees and ‘studies’ of the Bedoun (1965-)
2. Colour-typing of the Bedoun population into different levels of criminalisation (2012-), linked to the ‘other nationality’ labelling (above), the issue of ‘security restrictions’ (1992-) and preparation for mass deportation (1986-)

Both of these themes comprise key elements of the Ministry of Interior’s ‘status adjustment’ program, managed by the Central Apparatus (a division of the Ministry of Interior).

The first theme was associated with the claim by government that the Bedoun had citizenship in other Arab states, which was known to be a false claim that forms part of an ideology of eradication featured in scholarly work of the early 1990s (see literature review, Chapter 2). This data is set out in this Appendix. The second theme referred to the typing of the Bedoun population according to four colours. The public introduction of the internal colour typing system in 2012 marked the public promotion of the typing system (‘8,000 Bedoons,’ 2012), along with the promotion targets ‘met’ in the ‘status adjustment’ program. The data from this second theme, is set out in Appendix C, iv (below).

The typing of the population was reflected in the Supreme Planning Council (2010) study of the Bedoun (Appendix E, ii). The study was conducted as part of a series of ‘studies’ of the Bedoun than ensued for decades, as part of a culture of surveillance developed within the Municipality of Kuwait, the Central Statistics Office and the Ministry of the Interior since the 1960s. I then compared the data to statistics released in 2014 (Table C4), which showed the implausible nature of the workings of the Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program, in particular claims the Bedoun hold citizenship in other countries to justify their ‘status adjustment’ to an ‘original’ nationality. There appears to be a substantial population loss of Bedoun with ‘Iraqi’ between 2010 and discrepancies in statistics on ‘Syrian’ nationalities between 2014 and 2015, in statistics released by the Apparatus in Appendix G, iv, below. This aspect warrants further attention, but I take full responsibility for any errors in the calculations, which are mine.

Bedoun research participants squarely challenge the notion of the ‘Saudi Arabian’ Bedoun, inviting outsiders to apply a ‘common sense’ test. They ask what Saudi Arabian citizen in their right mind, would reside in Kuwait for any time for the purpose of obtaining
Kuwaiti citizenship via the processes of the Central Apparatus, when they already hold Saudi Arabian citizenship and live in relative luxury over the border in their own country, in their own house, with their own family? Furthermore, it is well known in Kuwait that Saudi Arabian citizens have been historically, granted dual citizenship from Kuwait without any need to pretend to be Bedoun, which is a second reason why a Saudi Arabian citizen would not bother to pretend to be Bedoun. The argument seems to be quite a logical one. The development of the so-called Comoros Plan has led to one Kuwaiti MP pointing out that the very suggestion of such a plan virtually proves that the notion asserted by government since the 1980s, that the Bedoun have another nationality, has always been fictitious (I discussed governments’ awareness the Bedoun were stateless when they first arrived in Kuwait, in Chapter 2).
Typing of the Bedoun Population by the Supreme Planning Council (2010)

Table C3

*The Supreme Planning Council Study, November 2010*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number affected</th>
<th>Status/nationality label</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>Registered in 1965 census</td>
<td>Eligible for naturalization [implying: to be naturalized] (See notes below)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>Already ‘Iraqi Citizens’</td>
<td>Have 3 years to correct status before legal action may be taken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>Other ‘known origins’</td>
<td>Have 3 years to correct status before legal action may be taken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106,000</td>
<td>Total number of stateless people registered with various government authorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Sources include ‘34 Thousand Candidates for Naturalization from 106 Thousand,’ *al-Qabas*, November 5, 2010 (accessed November 14, 2010) in Human Rights Watch (2011, p.21) (I was unable to access the URL provided by Human Rights Watch).

The first group of 34,000 shown in the table above, who were registered in the national census of 1965, were also identified in 1992 (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994) and 2000 (Human Rights Watch, 2000, 2001) as eligible to be granted citizenship according to the Nationality Law (1959). They were members of the northern tribes in state security services, including the national guard, military (Ministry of Defence) and police services (Ministry of Interior) (Alhajeri, 2004). The group was estimated at approximately the same size in different government announcements through to 2016. It appears unlikely statistics published about the size of Bedoun population sub-groups were ever updated (a span of 24 years), since the data has been repeatedly re-released without reference to past releases. Note that there are no Saudi Arabian ‘other nationals’ in the population. In the data shown in Table C4, a massive jump in figures is shown, where over 58,000 Saudi Arabian ‘nationals’ are claimed by the Central Apparatus.

Comparison of ‘Other National’ Labelling of the Stateless Bedoun (2010-2014)

In Table C4 below, I compare figures issued by the Supreme Planning Council (2010 in Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.21) and Colonel Mohammed al Wuhaib of the
Central Apparatus (Nacheva, April 6, 2014). Note that al Wuhaib referred to figures dating back to 1986, but the Supreme Planning Council also studied the ‘illegal’ population, which was deemed illegal in 1986 (‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003) and therefore, it is fairly safe to assume the population counts commenced from the same point. Note that the 2014 figures appear to match the current population numbers, even though the ‘other nationality’ of individuals was supposed to have been identified since 1986. That is, there appears to be no historical fluctuation for the total population growth. Rather, it appears that the ‘other nationalities’ are not discovered historically as claimed by the government, but rather, applied to current population figures.
Table C4

Bedoun ‘Other Nationality’ Origins According to the Ministry of Interior (2010 and 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status/nationality label</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Kuwaiti’ Bedoun who qualify as citizens</td>
<td>34,000 Registered in 1965 census, eligible for naturalization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi nationality</td>
<td>42,000 Already ‘Iraqi Citizens’</td>
<td>11,958 Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabian nationality</td>
<td></td>
<td>58,770 Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other nationalities, usually other Arab states not of the Arabian Gulf</td>
<td>26,000 Other ‘known origins’</td>
<td>7,879 Syria + 1,856 Iran + 520 Jordan + 6,296 ‘others’ = 16, 551 others of known origins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undetermined nationality</td>
<td>4,000 Unknown</td>
<td>Unstated by the source.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(calculated by author: 111,000 total population - 87,279 ‘known’ origins = 23,721 ‘unknown’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>106,000 total population (registered with various government authorities)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Sources for the data under 2010 include: ‘34 Thousand Candidates for Naturalization from 106 Thousand,’ al-Qabas, November 5, 2010 (accessed November 14, 2010) in Human Rights Watch (2011, p.21) (I was unable to access the URL provided by Human Rights Watch) Sources for the data under 2014 include: Nationality origins according to 2014 data announced by Colonel al Wuhaib, Manager of the Nationality Department of the Central Apparatus (Nacheva, April 6, 2014).
Appendix C, iv

Colour Typing of the Bedoun by the Central Apparatus (2012-2014)

This section is derived from a thematic analysis of documents concerning the administration of the Bedoun population, and the system imposed to change their identity, from 2010. The nature of the analysis was introduced and the first theme arising from it, was discussed in Appendix C, iii, above. The second theme referred to the typing of the Bedoun population according to four colours. The public introduction of the internal colour typing system in 2012 marked the public promotion of the typing system (‘8,000 Bedoons,’ 2012), along with the promotion targets ‘met’ in the ‘status adjustment’ program. The data from this second theme, is set out in this Appendix.

The Bedoun were issued with green, plastic identification cards issued prior to 2012. The new system added to the existing stratifications of the population according to four types: green, yellow, blue and red. The colour types had already been used by government bureaucrats to classify individuals security files internally. The issue of the new cards in 2012 marked the public promotion of the typing system (‘8,000 Bedoons,’ 2012), along with the promotion targets ‘met’ in the ‘status adjustment’ program: the number of individuals pressured by the Central Apparatus to relinquish their identity each month or every few months, reported as a cumulative total since 2011 (‘6051 Illegal Residents,’ 2014; ‘6,860 Illegal Residents,’ 2015; ‘7,828 Illegal Residents,’ 2016). The colour types reflected a more public, goal-oriented approach to the criminalisation of the Bedoun linked to particular country labels (false ‘nationalities’ of the Bedoun).

The approach signified a new phase of implementation of restrictions on the Bedoun, following the Arab Spring. Previously, the obscurity of nations with which the Bedoun were associated, such as the Dominican Republic and Liberia (see Appendix E, part v) made the system somewhat easier to detect. The narrowing of labelling to only Middle East states appeared to be a streamlining ‘improvement’ to the system, which has/had the potential to make mass population shifts on the National Census more difficult to detect. The adoption of public goals by the Apparatus seemed to be motivated by the Apparatus’ need to ‘remedy’ the Bedoun problem through ‘study’ by the end of 2015, and to improve the credibility of its processes. However, the nature of media releases indicated that authorities had used their new, public voice in the media to intimidate the population (Major General Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah has played a key role in this effort).

However, as conditions deteriorated in Kuwait after the Arab Spring, Kuwaiti MPs began to call out the ‘status adjustment’ labelling as a fake apparatus, having nothing to do with the Bedoun’s ‘other nationality,’ while doing nothing to solve the Bedoun’s condition...
of statelessness. Some MPs have come very close to acknowledging the program is a system of eradication/administrative ethnic cleansing, continually used to oppress the Bedoun. For example, MP Faisal al Duwaisan in ‘Government to Offer,’ 2014 and MP Hassan Jawhar in ‘Tough Requirements,’ 2014 spoke out about the system, which was associated with the banning of Bedoun children from commencing school in September, 2014.

Three colour categories attached to different timelines for deportation (the yellow, blue and red types) except those designated to ‘green,’ who were identified as having met all requirements for citizenship according to the Nationality Law (1959) (‘8000 Bedoon,’ 2012; ‘Judicial Recourse,’ 2012). The recognition of this important sub-group could be traced back to 1992 (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994); this particular category was then criminalised 

Table C5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Card Type</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Outstanding case issues</th>
<th>Citizenship: disqualifying condition</th>
<th>Other issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Maybe provided</td>
<td>Pending further study</td>
<td>‘Security offences’ approx. 21,000 issued between 2012-2014</td>
<td>Established residency prior to 1965 &amp; all other conditions required for citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td>May become eligible with further documentation</td>
<td>Must provide further documents; documents undefined</td>
<td></td>
<td>May meet all conditions for naturalisation… ‘Verification’ process undefined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>Not eligible</td>
<td>Fraudulent passport</td>
<td></td>
<td>Government coerced military to buy fraudulent passports and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Red | Not eligible | Other Arab, criminal, security risk | Residency proof only from 1980; proof of residency up to 32 years; maybe longer

---


In the thematic analysis of documents, I analysed each colour type according to its function stated by government sources at the time of initial announcement (from approximately the beginning of 2012) and thereafter (through to approximately the end of 2014) in order to analyse the system as a whole. The findings indicated that the card system was based on a complex set of meanings that appeared to significantly fluctuate over just two years. I traced changes to the meanings of the cards based on official announcements and published sources from the Central Apparatus, such that a pattern of movement of meanings was detectable, whereby the meanings of the categories were merged and switched. These movements indicated the system was circular, closed, subject to an internal logic. All identity types were fluid to the extent that they fulfilled essentially the same functions: criminalisation, denial of citizenship and functional components of the programmed erasure of identity of the Bedoun. A key area of focus is the double-speak surrounding the requirement of the Bedoun to obtain fraudulent identity documents to ‘adjust status,’ that which the Apparatus claims are both illegal acts of a criminal nature (‘8,000 Bedouns,’ 2012; ‘Judicial Recourse,’ 2012), and legal acts that re required to make one’s status ‘legal’ (‘Hope for non-census,’ 2014).

For example, from 2012-2014, government announcements indicated that the yellow identity type took on characteristics of the red identity type (‘8,000 Bedoons,’ 2012) and the green identity type (‘Hope for non-census,’ 2014). I discuss these changes further in Appendix G, iv.

**Eradication of the Citizenship ‘Eligibility’ of Bedoun Who Had Qualified for Citizenship Under the Nationality Law (1959).**

The major area of government activity appears to have been regarding the green identity category, reducing the number of individuals eligible to receive citizenship under the Nationality Law (1959) and The Constitution of Kuwait (1922/1962) via criminalisation (Appendix D, iv). This action can be linked to the suppression of the Bedoun’s freedom of expression and public gathering since the Arab Spring and the issuance of punitive, ‘secret’ ‘security restrictions,’ which removes the groups right to citizenship claims in Kuwaiti law.
due to the extraordinary powers of the Ministry of the Interior and the Central Apparatus. The focus of this activity was revealed in the statistics I have set out above.

The shifting of numbers of the Bedoun was shown in the gradually disappearance of the category of 34,000 Bedoun registered in the 1965 National Census, from 2010 to 2014 in Table C4 (in the data reported by the Apparatus in Nacheva, April 6, 2014) and the 21,000 ‘security restrictions’ issued in Table C5 above (under the column headed Citizenship: disqualifying condition). The disappearance of the category of those eligible to receive citizenship under Kuwaiti law confirmed that the purpose of the strategy of applying 21,000 ‘security offences’ to this group between 2012 and 2014, rendering them ‘criminals’ was to rationalise why the group of Bedoun who had long qualified for citizenship 'officially' should never receive it (‘80,000 Bedoons,’ April 5, 2016).

The individuals in the group as I have mentioned, were identified as having qualified for citizenship in 1992 (Stanton Russell and Ramadhan, 1994). They were consistently promised citizenship from at least 1992 (twenty years), but between 2012 and 2014, around 21,000 of the group were issued ‘security offences,’ reducing the overall number of Bedoun who were regarded as ‘eligible’ for citizenship by the Central Apparatus, to just 15,000. By 2016, the group was included in generalised statements about the acceptance of the Government of the Comoros of ‘all’ the Bedoun population (the whole ethnic group) as citizens (Izzak, May 17, 2016). That is, the new plan for wholesale erasure of the Bedoun, as opposed to the previous strategy of splitting the group and attempting to allocate separate, false national identities connected to other (non-Arabian Gulf) Arab countries, appears to be applied to all Bedoun. That is, the group ‘eligible’ for citizenship were to be brought under the same pressures of the Comoros Plan, indicating government’s intention to force that group also, to undergo erasure and identity replacement (the allocation of a false identity). I have discussed the history of this group and their basis of having qualified for citizenship decades ago, in Appendix D, iv, as one of multiple methods of Bedoun population reduction used by the state.

The Purpose of the New Colour Typing Identification System of 2012

The perception of the identification system described by government and key civil society actors is shown below. The data includes statements from representatives of the Central Apparatus, the Kuwait Lawyer’s Society and Mona Kareem at BidoonRights.org, which represented the opinions stateless Bedoun population at the time the data was published.
Table C6

Comparative Perceptions of the Bedoun Colour Typing Identification System
Introduced by the Central Apparatus (2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government of Kuwait</th>
<th>Kuwait Lawyers Society</th>
<th>BidoonRights.org</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To preserve a civilised image of commitment to human rights. ‘Human rights’ were delivered in eleven reforms in Decree 409/2011</td>
<td>Majority will be distanced from attaining citizenship</td>
<td>An additional system of stratification of types (on top of the one already imposed).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate delivery of government services</td>
<td>No provision of citizenship for those deemed eligible to receive it</td>
<td>An illusion that some are more deserving than others (based on arbitrary criteria).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Enjoyed’ services, ‘privileges,’ ‘rights,’ ‘benefits,’ ‘facilities,’ ‘package of measures’</td>
<td>No sign commitments already made to grant citizenship would be ever fulfilled.</td>
<td>The system weakens social solidarity (by dividing people into categories and types).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report to Central Apparatus or immigration to submit documents to change identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table C6 above contrasted the perspectives of three different sources about the new Bedoun identity typing scheme introduced in 2012. The perspective helped to unlock key concepts used by the government of Kuwait, regarding the system of erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing) carried out via methods of population typing and organisation into different categories of identity change associated with different levels of prohibitions/access to basic public services. Each colour type was associated with different levels of criminality associated with each type, which represented the stage at which individuals were placed along the process of ‘status adjustment’ – that is, transition to identity change to another nationality label and erasure of Kuwaiti, Bedouin ethnic and Kuwait national identity (shown across the proliferation of labelling types, illustrated in previous tables in Appendix C, Tables C1-C5).
The key concept from the government’s perspective was that the notion that ‘human rights’ was connected to the erasure of the Bedoun’s identity (national and ethnic). According to the Central Apparatus sources, Human ‘rights’ delivered in Decree 409/2011 were rewards for submitting a fraudulent passport to the Central Apparatus. Hence, the linkage between Arab Spring human rights reforms were shown not to be genuine and authentic, but yet another strategy to mislead the Bedoun population and the international community about the true nature of the ethnic cleansing ‘status adjustment’ program. This connection appears to have been misunderstood or omitted by authors to date, including human rights organisations, due to the complicated nature of the system. However, government statements issued in local news articles and KUNA (the government’s news agency) actually make the connection patently clear, while the different perceptions by local actors (government, Kuwaiti lawyers and a Bedoun representative) have helped to deconstruct these concepts and increase our ability to understand the system. Therefore, the inability of human rights organisations (particularly the UNHCR statelessness unit) and scholars who have worked on Kuwaiti society to date, to grasp the ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun population under the new system since 2012, must be questioned.

From 2012, the new identity types resulted in ‘different benefits’ being issued based on the ‘type’ their identity type the Bedoun were allocated under (Nacheva, April 6, 2014), although the exact nature of different levels of rights given to the Bedoun was (and still remains) unclear. The ‘status adjustment’ program involved declaring another nationality, but ‘more rights’ are given after the fraudulent passport is submitted, according to a Central Apparatus source in Nacheva (April 6, 2014). This latter statement indicated the importance of face-to-face psychological pressure tactics used by the Central Apparatus (described as ‘transactions’ in WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable, November 26, 2006; ‘Color ID Cards,’ 2012) to forced individuals into signing an initial document declaring they have another identity in return for access to public services, which they are then expected to ‘prove’ by obtaining and submitting fraudulent passport or other types of identification documents stating they are a citizen of another country (Nacheva, April 6, 2014). The identity documents to adjust status could be submitted at either the Central Apparatus office in Ardiya or the immigration department in the governate of Mubarak al Kabeer (Saleh, February 9, 2014).

The assertion by the Kuwait Lawyers’ Society that government commitments to grant the Bedoun citizens would never be fulfilled under the new scheme was later proven to be correct. For the history of government commitments to grant citizenship to the Bedoun, see Appendix D, ii. Evidence of this fact soon came to hand in the so-called annual citizenship list grants issued by parliament. Four thousand ‘foreigners’ - individuals who
already held citizenship in other countries - were granted citizenship in 2013. Not one Bedoun was granted citizenship (‘Kuwait Plans,’ 2013). This occurred after the law was only passed in parliament by MPs on the basis of arguments that the law was specifically for the purpose of granting the Bedoun citizenship (‘Kuwait Plans,’ 2013; ‘Rights group,’ 2013).

The notion of a five-year period of access to various rewards by government (‘services,’ ‘benefits’ and so on) has been a strategy discussed by government since 1983 (al Anezi, 1989). It is an old strategy, and one that has merely set out to provide basic access to public services, in response to pressure from humanitarian activists who have asserted that Kuwait must provide access to basic public services according to international law. But this strategy of holding out only five years’ access to such services has never been matched with actual access for the whole population. The five-year period of access to public services was conditional and arbitrary by the government’s own account: there were no safeguards built into the system to ensure its effective implementation or that access would be provided for the actual five years. The possibly that the five year period would be extended was even more remote, since all that the population could rely on was the ‘promise’ by government, never fulfilled (Amnesty International, 2013b; Human Rights Watch, 2014). Such promises are well known to the community; they tend not to be fulfilled, just as promises to grant citizenship to them are not fulfilled.

The commentary issued by the Kuwait Lawyers’ Society (‘Judicial Recourse,’ 2012) and BedoonRights.org (‘From Discriminating,’ 2012; ‘Kuwait’s Cabinet’ 2012, para. 2) (by Mona Kareem and her research team) demonstrated insider perspectives held by those who see through the ideology of Bedoun identity erasure and eradication. The five-year period of ‘services,’ ‘benefits,’ ‘privileges’ and ‘incentives’ (access to basic public services) has also been extended in the ‘Comoros Plan’ (‘Government to Offer,’ 2014; ‘MPs Conflicted, 2016). The rewards for submitting to identity change under the Comoros government ‘economic citizenship’ offer (‘Government to Offer,’ 2014) are almost guaranteed to be as meaningless as the Decree 409/2011 ‘human rights’ reforms (Kuwait government response to Human Rights Watch, 2011; Reply of Government of Kuwait to the Human Rights Committee, 17 October – 4 November, 2011), because government has refused or been incapable of providing basic public services to all Bedoun (Amnesty International, 2013b; Human Rights Watch, 2014) that the government claimed were human rights ‘enjoyed’ by the Bedoun population (‘Kuwait Showcases,’ 2015). Kareem also highlighted the fact that the new identity system further splintered the group bureaucratically and socially, in order to weaken it (‘Kuwait’s Cabinet,’ 2012).

The hierarchical nature of the system of typing identifies micro-target groups, that is, it prioritizes who should be erased/eradicated first. As I have discussed in Chapter 7 and Appendix G, The Arab Spring-Comoros years – 2011-2016) have been characterised by the
targeting of those who were eligible to receive citizenship according to the Nationality Law (1959) and the Constitution of Kuwait (families of military servicemen), via the reduction of numbers ‘eligible’ in the green identity category (see Appendix D, part iv). They have also been targeted for over attempts to exercise freedom of expression, public gathering. Those in the green identity category in particular, have been labelled as ‘activists.’ They are punished in response to virtually any form of public intellectual activity that involves expressions of their collective identity or culture, which is generalised as ‘activism.’ The ‘security restriction’ is essentially an acceleration of the erasure process, which renders them Bedoun Bedoun (see discussion in Chapter 7).

The program according to the government’s own accounts, happens to prepare the group for physical ethnic cleansing by relocation (to the Comoros) or genocide (physical eradication by killing or physical transfer to danger zones, such as Syria or Iraqi theatres of war). The strategies of eradication used during the Iraq war must be born in mind when the ideology of eradication of the Bedoun (vis a vis the stateless Bedoun do not exist: there is no such concept as statelessness), and the administrative strategies used to achieve it (‘status adjustment’ has been in place since 1983, see Appendix E), have remained stable for some twenty-five years. The similarity between the statements of intent to remove the group to a desert camp and the Abdali border camp, and the strategies of deporting the group incrementally by dumping them in war zones (previously Iraq) without water, food or any arrangement with the ‘receiving’ nation, add to the likelihood that already a range of previously practiced (and successful) methods of destroying the Bedoun population are likely to be used again in the future. Any risk assessment of the impact of the Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program system of typing and ‘conversion’ to other nationalities must take these factors into account. The historical data and cultural patterns present in Kuwaiti society and the government bureaucracy (including the subjective data of key actors) should be incorporated into any serious study of the Bedoun population, for it is only by incorporating these different sets of data that the full picture of the harm currently being done to the Bedoun population and their future risk can be fully understood.
Appendix C, v

Identity Cards Issued to the Bedoun by the Ministry of Interior, Pre-2012 and Post-2012

The identity cards shown below (Image C1 to C4) have been modified by computer and re-photographed to protect the card recipients.

Image C1

*Photograph of an identification card issued 2012, from the front*

![Image C1](image1)

Image C2

*Photograph of an identification card issued from 2012, from the back*

![Image C2](image2)

*Note:* On the back of the card in Image 9.2 above, the statement at the bottom states that the card cannot be used as an identification card. The card is part of the new identity typing system. The recipient was classified as the yellow type and was required to report to the Central Apparatus every twelve weeks to ‘renew’ his card. The requirement was stated on the card.
Note On the back of the card in Image 9.4 above the statement in red asserts that the card cannot be used as an identification card.

Many of the Bedoun research participants pointed out that the statement is indicative of the ideology of erasure, in that the government of Kuwait is loathe to issue any form of legitimate identification whatsoever to the Bedoun population that would confirm their actual existence. The statement on the back of the identity cards was perceived as an expression of the resentment of the authorities of the state, to their existence. The nihilistic sentiment was aligned with statements issued by government that there is no stateless population in Kuwait, that the Bedoun are not stateless, and that there is no such concept (in international law) as statelessness (see Appendices E, iii, iv).
Appendix C, vi
Key Themes in Academic and Public Discourse Concerning the Bedouin and Bedoun

What led to the resurgence of the hadhar-badu dichotomy in Kuwaiti popular discourse in the 1980s and 1990s? (Longva, 2006, p.182)

1980: Rejection of Bedoun evidence for citizenship
1983: Identity erasure, the ‘status adjustment’ program, begins
1985: Kuwaitization policy introduced
1985: Committee for the Study of Illegal Residents (Bedoun only) takes over from Shanty Clearance Higher Committee (Bedouin citizens and stateless Bedoun)
1986: Administrative expulsion of the Bedoun
1986: Measures preventing Bedoun from founding families
1992: Bedoun prohibited from mass naturalisation on ethnic grounds
1992: Bedoun expelled on the National Census
1990-1995: Ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun

This thematic analysis of discourse about the Bedouin and Bedoun of Kuwait was organised under three meta-themes: Contemporary colonialism and tribalism theory, ‘developmental’ approaches and ‘new’ theory - eradication dialogues. The analysis was conducted on scholarly discourse and a limited number of additional news articles that helped to illustrate the major themes pursued in the academic literature. The purpose was to explore the predominant themes that arise in the literature regarding the Bedouin ethnic group and the Bedoun sub-ethnic group, which was referred to Chapter 6, the discussion. Detailed analysis tables are provided in the following section, Appendix C, vii. A visual organiser illustrating the breadth and depth of the analysis is also included in the final section, in Appendix C, viii.

This Appendix illustrates the role of the Bedoun in Bedouin-Hadar ethnic conflict in Kuwait.

This area of literature about the Bedoun has developed almost entirely separate from the large corpus of human rights reports about the group, although dialogues criminalizing the Bedoun published by Western scholars in the 1990s appear to have been a direct response by scholars, to the human rights atrocities committed against the group immediate after the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait after their invasion of the country. This analysis helps to illustrate the discursive forms of ethnic hatred directed toward the Bedoun in the light of the previous violence the group has been subjected to by the state. The examples analysed appeared to have been produced largely at the level of the intelligentsia for consumption by non-Bedouin, literate populations as ideology. For example, much of the local material produced by pro-Hadar academics was promoted as potential national policy; other material is put forward as positivistic statements of fact, not only regarding
colonialist misrepresentations of identity, but also the themes suggesting or justifying physical and/or cultural eradication.

Thus, it also forms supplementary information to the ethnic targeting of the Bedoun experienced in ordinary, everyday social interactions discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, as it provides an important link between the prejudices of the populace and the policy of the government Apparatus. According to Znaniecki’s (1952a) theory of cultural and ideological systems, is the likely the main source of ideology used to construct and manage the system of imposed, restrictive cultural re-organization (M. Secombe, personal communications, January 22, 2016), of the Bedoun. Below, I highlight the range and development of ideas that indeed, point to the salience of this theory.

**Contemporary Colonialism and Tribalism Theory**

The meta-theme of contemporary colonialism and tribalism theory was related to three themes, negative and selective omissions of the Bedoun from scholarly work specifically examining the Bedoun, or Kuwaiti society, myths and ‘othering’ of the Bedoun particularly related to criminalisation and the ideology of the ‘other national,’ blaming the Bedoun and Bedouin for their marginalisation and lack of urban ‘development,’ stigmatisation and political weakness, and the portrayal of the Bedouin as an inferior race and/or culture. Longva’s (1997) claim that the Bedoun were ‘not be confused with the Bedouin’ (p72, n6) was misleading because the Bedoun were and are Bedouin, and Longva (1997) was aware of this. Curiously, this note was seized upon by future writers and it has been repeated by countless commentators on Kuwaiti affairs ever since, demonstrated by Google search. Subsequently, scholars have developed this line approach further, to the extent that the Bedouin origins of the Bedoun discussed by Human Rights Watch (1995) once often quoted, has begun to be omitted altogether (for example, Peterson, 2012, p.23; Alissa, 2013, n61, p.4 and Beaugrand, 2014b, p.744, n4). Thus, while Beaugrand (2010) previously portrayed the Bedouin as invisible, the researcher has now made them ethnically and culturally invisible in her own texts (2014b), concealing her knowledge about their Bedouin ethnicity with the label, ‘stateless Arabs.’

Criminalisation of the Bedoun was very common, if not the uniform approach taken by scholars in the social sciences the 1990s following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. Through the denial of the groups’ ethnicity and heritage, along with criminalisation, scholars of Kuwait area studies of the 1990s made it very difficult for future scholars to explore the real identity of the Bedoun. While these efforts reflected the detailed theoretical explorations of the Bedouin that had been conducted by scholars of Hadar (Kuwaiti and other Middle Eastern backgrounds), they did not acknowledge them, perhaps due to the probability new scholars would discover the extent of Hadar ethnic hatred of the Bedouin in some quarters. Thus, the ‘othering’ of the Bedoun, utilizing the notion of the Bedoun as
‘foreign migrant national’ and citizen of other Arab states, has underscored the same themes and values projected onto the Bedouin as are directed toward the Bedouin, with criminality providing the rationale as to why new researchers in the field should not believe the Bedouin’s claims of identity. Kuwaiti scholars imported colonialist ideas about Arabs (such direct attribution of ideas to Patai (1976, p.128 in Alessa, 1981, p.2) couched in developmental dialogues indicating the influence of developmental thinkers such as Learner (1958). For broader influence of such theories on ideas about the Bedouin of the Middle East in other parts of the region, see Chapters 3 and 7 of this thesis which outlines the impact of the ideas on ‘tribalism’ theory, and further elaborates on the themes found in this analysis, respectively. Not all Orientalist or Oriental modes of thought should be reduced to Patai (1976) but rather, I have discussed his work as he and Stoakes were cited by Alessa (1981, p.2, 109). It is likely that other thinkers also provided inspiration.

Hence, ‘othering’ of the Bedouin was constructed by the authors in these dialogues. The symbolic shadow cast over all Arabs by Patai (1976) was selectively pushed back onto ‘the native’ Bedouin (Patai, 1976, is famous for presenting one of the most depraved views of the Bedouin, but his theory was projected onto all Arabs). In this context, the Hadar scholarly elite seemed to view themselves less as Arabs than as a mixed race, no longer Bedouin for the purpose of arguing the Bedouin were uncivilised. ‘Arab’ was used as a derogatory label when referring to ‘the nomad,’ who was sometimes also referred to as indigenous to the Middle East, or to Kuwait specifically. Thus, term ‘Arab’ becoming an ambivalent term, plucked out according, it appeared, to convenience. Then at other times, it was also used to emphasise the diverse origins of the Hadar collective internationally, that is, to refer to other Arab nationals of the Middle East living in Kuwait and outside Kuwait, who were by their collective descent, more special and capable than the Arab nomad (sometimes by the same authors, virtually contradicting themselves; see Alessa, 1981 and al Khalaf and al Hammoud, 1987 for example).

Such thinkers then attempted to use the term to ethnically distance the Kuwaiti Hadar from the Kuwaiti Bedouin, as if lack of specificity or the mixing of terms was enough to create a ‘screen’ of uncertainty of the connection between the two groups. Some academics may find this approach quite implausible due to the degrees of Bedouin ancestry among the Hadar, and difficult to believe such a problem could become so entrenched. I suggest that this occurred due to the lack of Middle East Studies academic willingness to critically interrogate their colleagues ideas, beyond the polarising discourse of the ‘right vs left’ camps. This aspect emphasises the seeking of a separate identity by Hadar intellectuals. There was never any consideration, as far as I am aware, that any Hadar might still retain remnants of ‘tribal consciousness’ (al Naqeeb, 1990). Similarly (according to my own
knowledge), discussions of who is a ‘true’ or ‘real’ Kuwaiti in Kuwait, are uniformly projected by the Hadar onto the Bedouin, and not the other way around.

As I discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the ideology of identity negation and ethnic targeting asserting the Bedouin were criminal imposters pretending to be stateless, commenced in Western literature with Crystal (1992) and continued for many years through multiple authors until Shultziner and Tétreault (2012, p.283, 284). The authors claimed the Bedouin were still ‘pretending’ to be Bedouin, despite decades of dedicated reports on the group (utilizing fieldwork data) by international humanitarian organisations such as Human Rights Watch (1991, 1995, 2000, 2004, 2011). There reports challenged the notion of the Bedouin imposter was simply a fallacy and ideological in nature, but scholars in the social sciences all but ignored the empirical evidence put forward by these organisations. Scholars in international law did not; on the contrary, they have accepted it without question, even though such information is not collected in ways that are supposed to reflect the rigour of academic fieldwork studies. Academic writing I have researched over the four years has featured no concrete evidence whatsoever to support scholars’ claims the Bedouin were not stateless Bedouin whose first nation of permanent settlement was Kuwait, but rather, a maze of clever, interconnected arguments have been used to make the Bedouin appear to be imposters and criminals, and the use of colonialist and developmental ideas seems to have been exploited as much as possible, to make such ideas appear to be ‘scientific’ (these findings are somewhat similar to Bocco, 2006, who found the same tendency among Hadar scholars in other parts of the Middle East. He openly argues the case of prejudice of such scholars toward the Bedouin.).

Through the construction of tribalism theory, the seeds for ethnic hatred of the Bedouin may have been laid by European and American colonialists thinkers (Bocco, 2006), but the sentiments were most definitely compounded into a more extreme form by the Hadar, who used their social dominance to exert influence over the fate of the Bedouin in the region (Bocco, 2006). Virtually the same phenomena occurred in Kuwait. Local scholars inculcated the Bedouin in the same ethnic conflict as Bedouin citizens of Kuwait, along virtually identical lines. Themes of blaming the Bedouin for their apparent lack of assimilation into urban society (Ghabra, 1997a, p.62; Tétreault, 2003, p.223; al Nakib, F., 2014, p.7) have been little more than criticisms by the Hadar that the Bedouin are innately different to the Hadar and especially, do not share their ‘origins’ (Ghabra, 1997b). Al Nakib, F. (2014, p.6) stated that the ‘last remaining Bedouin’ had already commenced their transition into urban life, as if Bedouin cultural identity is finite, and in its end-stage.

More importantly, the overall analysis of these studies tends to concur with the findings of Bocco (2006), that researchers merely set about proving their pre-determined assumptions with little regard for evidence that might conflict with their worldview,
claiming to have conducted original ‘scientific’ research. The general uniformity among scholars across multiple countries who worked together for political ends (Bocco, 2006) demonstrated the power of the ‘tribalism’ not among the Bedouin, but by the academic community. Al Naqeeb (1990) is probably the best example of nationalist fanaticism in Kuwait; he was expelled by the ruler. Further information on the connection of developmental theories to Orientalist thought may be found in Lockman (2004) and Turner (1998).

‘Developmental’ Approaches

The ‘developmental’ approach emerged from tribalism theory in my analysis, as a separate meta-theme that portrayed the Bedouin as well as the Bedoun of Kuwait as inferior and having little capacity for development (incapable). Developmental approaches included three especially insidious themes filtered through the social science paradigm, with author emphasis on the ‘science’ of their ideas. This included the ‘psychological development’ approach, the ‘cultural development’ approach, and the ‘resources’ approach. The latter concentrated on rationales and justifications for the deprivation of basic public resources from the whole Bedouin community, as well as from the Bedoun as the weakened, tribal minority group (to this extent, scholars were most attracted to proposing broad national policy on the back of these ‘scientific’ theories).

Where the traditional society was in the process of transformation via the demands of state modernization, particularly the expansion of the national economy and the defence of the state, and ‘technological’ or ‘scientific’ (academic) solutions were sought to rationalise the exploitation and oppression of the Bedouin generally and the Bedoun in particular. Kuwaiti Hadar and other Arab national academics were particularly strong contributors to this area of tribalism theory. As I have argued, their participation in this field of ideas may have reflected the regional trend, but there seems to have been a time-delay before this influence really took hold in scholarship about Kuwaiti society, with its zenith occurring during the 1980s and 1990s (however, it it possible that this is only reflected in the lack of early English language sources, and it may not apply to Arabic language sources of research).

It is through tribalism theory and ‘developmental’ approaches that the ethnic targeting of the Bedoun was revealed as a component of a generalized approach toward the Bedouin of Kuwait taken by scholars (al Khatib, 1978; al Nafisi, 1978; Khalaf and al Hammoud, 1987; Alawadi, 1980; Khalaf, 1992; al Ramadhan, 1995, al Kandiri and al Hadben, 2010). The approach was not developed in isolation within the government of Kuwait, among politicians and/or the so-called merchant elite, the Hadar. That is, the Bedouin in general and the Bedoun in particular were targeted to prevent the spread of mass
education and the development of its own intellectual class, which would be necessary for the development of political thought and nationalist consciousness (Znaniecki, 1952b).

The developmental approach has led in some cases directly, to national policy outcomes linked to mass population transfer and erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing), and the prohibition on expansion of the Kuwaiti public education system in Kuwait in order to permanently deprive the Bedoun of education to stop the growth of ‘tribal consciousness’ (al Moosa, 1976, al Naqeeb, 1990 and Alessa, 1981). Some of these discourses have represented somewhat purist, extreme, nationalist doctrine in their own right, while others focused on the development of more practical eradication policies that were later adopted by government and manifest in the ‘security state’ model and restrictive measures that sought to control and to re-organise the Bedouin culture, discussed throughout these Appendices.

Arab nationalists (of Marxist-socialist and Muslim Brotherhood origins) and Kuwaiti nationalist (so-called liberal, pro-democracy Hadar with mono-ethnic nationalist positions) shared policy platforms that sought to block the Bedouin from being granted any Kuwaiti citizenship at all, since 1965 (al Mdaires, 2010; Stanton Russell, 1989). These policy positions were articulated by intellectual-politicians such as al Khatib (1978) and al Nafisi (1978) through their political interests, which at times shared across party platforms (due to al Nafisi’s’ many changes of political allegiance: al Mdaires, 2010) leading up to the administrative expulsion of the Bedoun (‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003).

The closely connected nature of the themes of tribalism theory demonstrated the coherence of the vast system of ideas elaborated by Hadar scholars (Kuwaiti and other Arab nationals alike) about the Bedouin. Bocco (2006) noted that the ‘nomad problem’ was one way for Hadar scholars to remain indispensable and employed. On the one hand, the ‘psychological development’ approach covered all bases, while the ‘cultural development’ approach covered major areas of social life, as if designed by an anthropologist or sociologist: education, work, recreation and cultural practices related to family and community life (marriage, religion and other communal celebrations). The ‘resources’ approach also discussed cultural life, in particular the role of education in the development of political consciousness and materialism – the desire to ‘get the benefits’ of Kuwaiti citizenship that was undeserved (pertaining to the Bedouin) or high-level thinking and skills that would enhance the economy (pertaining to other Arab nationals) among future generations (Alessa, 1981). Ironically, for one of the wealthiest nations in the world, the resources approach targeted the Bedouin as a burden on public expenditure on education, regardless of the return inputs achieved (such as further integration and contribution to the economy, which the Bedouin were already achieving in the 1970s, as a full reading of al Moosa, 1976, indicates). Thus, the Bedouin-Hadar ethnic conflict may be far more closely connected to the failure of Kuwait to develop institutions nurturing civil society and in
particular, urban public infrastructure, than has been appreciated to date. Certainly, it is more likely to be the cause of bad planning and inequitable resource destruction, than the effect of it (as al Nakib, 2014, maintains), because as I have pointed out, the anti-Bedouin ideology was there first, regionally and then locally.

The ‘cultural development’ approach contained some quite militant strands of argument, portraying the Bedouin as a national security threat. As with the identity ideologies, scholarly discourse was intensely rhetorical and almost entirely devoid of concrete examples. I have called these extreme discourses ‘cultural hygiene,’ as they opened the critical space for the introduction of positive and negative eugenics in new eradication discussions (I address this further below). Two sub-themes were highlighted – the concepts of ‘desertization’ portrayed the Bedouin as dangerous due to their ‘tribal activities’ (Ghabra, 1997a, 1997b and others; Tétreault, 2000, 2003 and others), which built on the misrepresentation of social and cultural activities of Bedouin in desert settlements in the 1970s (al Moosa, 1976). The exclusively ‘tribal’ activities were so generic (narrowly defined issues like ‘prayer, time of prayer, style of dress and so on,’ in Ghabra, 1997a, p.62), and the analyses of them so vague and sentimental (‘The process destroys the hope of a nation-state,’ p.62) that the concept of ‘desertization’ was undermined by scholars’ use of flimsy examples. The style of intellectual debate was disarmingly incompetent, and quite frankly, inviting ethnic conflict. Feminist critiques were continued along very much the same lines by Tétreault with Kuwaiti scholar Haya al Mughni (Tétreault and al Mughni, 1995a, 1995b) and others. The Tétreault (2003) brand of feminism was distinctly white, middle-class and neo-conservative, out of place in the Arabian Gulf but for American and British intervention in the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Unsurprisingly, neoconservative, interventionist values were revealed in analogies of the violent rape of Kuwaiti citizen women’s potential affluence and independence by the patriarchal power of the Bedouin state (Tétreault and al Mughni, 1995a, p.67, 75-76) and complaints the Bedouin did not support missile purchases from Western countries, which would be stored on Kuwaiti soil (Tétreault, 2003). Perhaps unsurprisingly, Tétreault (2000, 2003) jumped on board Ghabra’s (1997a, 1997b) ‘desertization,’ and attempted to develop it even further.

‘New’ Theory – Dialogues of Eradication

The third meta-theme, ‘new’ theory and dialogues of eradication, featured narratives of Bedouin and/or Bedou eradication dialogues and omissions of the 1980s -1990s, which featured erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing), expulsion and killing as well as peacetime eradication talk, and omissions of the Bedouin from texts as if the group were already non-existent. A tendency among some academics to theorise the Bedouin as if their cultural existence as a ‘way of life’ is about to end, giving the impression that the end of the people who comprise the ethnic group itself is also imminent, is well-known (Lancaster and
Lancaster and Lancaster, 1988), but this manifests in a range of different expressions, with some emphasising the inevitability (Cole, 2006) or injustice (Aurenceche, 1993; Chatty, 2006) that have been wrought upon the Bedouin during this process, and others, the desirability of assimilation into the ‘modern’ world (al Nakib, 2014; Salzman, 2007).

Thus, some discourses lament Bedouin eradication, some simply report it, while others urge it, somewhat akin to the previous use of modernisation theories (the ‘for their own good’ approach). The urban planning or urban history theme is also linked to portrayals of the Bedouin as an inferior race/ethnicity/culture, particularly the portrayal of Bedouin ‘squatters’ and ‘slum-dwellers’ who were actually members of the public service, while al Moosa’s (1976) photographs taken in 1974 patently challenge these interpretations (see Appendix H).

As I have mentioned in the thesis, al Nakib (2014) has questioned why complete ‘assimilation’ of the Kuwaiti Bedouin citizen group has not taken place yet, and she has suggested the term Bedu, which is probably the most comment self-identifier of Bedouins regionally, could not have already been done away with in Kuwait. Any continuation of themes reflective of the trajectory of al Naqeeb (1990) (different spelling of the surname, but a close relative), who exploited tribalism theory to its fullest extent, is problematic to say the least.

As I have discussed throughout this thesis, definitions of the Bedoun have been the most troubling a problem area, because when all the different definitions are accumulated Appendix B, ii and Appendix C, i), it becomes clear that the group is being systematically written out of Kuwait’s history as if there were an intent to extinguish the group from the national consciousness. In other words, while some academics may believe their approach is objective and benign, it is worth considering if it is part of a broader tendency which is part of a collective thought movement that has historically exhibited genocidal intentions (Davidson, 2012), whether this has been conscious or unconscious. The discourse analysis points to the existence of such a phenomenon.

Biological sampling and testing of the Bedouin is now regarded as necessary to secure the state, according to well-known representatives of the Hadar community. Regular calls for blood and DNA testing of the Bedouin only from approximately 2010, in order to ‘prove’ their nationality and if they were ‘deserving’ of citizenship to all Kuwaiti Hadar (‘Insulted Kuwaiti tribesmen’, January 31, 2012) is indicative of the level of much of the one-way, public dialogue expressing ethnic conflict. The claims led government to impose DNA testing on the whole population, ostensibly for ‘security’ reasons after recent the bombing of a city mosque by ISIS, although such calls have now been retracted (since the Hadar were also required to submit blood) to return to the Bedoun-only DNA collection policy which includes, of course, ‘security threats’ and Bedoun parents whom the state
demands, must prove parentage with blood samples, implying an unspoken state policy that all Bedoun are illegitimate unless otherwise proven.

Government policy has been influenced accordingly (‘24,000 Stateless residents, 2014’) and the United Kingdom (Harper, February 23, 2013, ‘Equality (Language Analysis – Palestinian, Syrian and Kuwaiti Testing) Authorisation (No.2) 2013). While dehumanisation discourses humiliating the Bedouin have been common in the public arena for some time in Kuwait, government ‘requirements’ of the Bedouin for citizenship have been linked to grossly dehumanising claims masquerading as genuine cultural data, use to pad ‘scientific’ results of DNA profiling (in Johns et al., 2015, the Kuwait Genome Project). Significantly, analytical flaws formed the basis for the researchers allocating the appalling description to – rather predictably - the northern tribal group. The study was an example of the development of (or regression back to) eugenic beliefs about the ‘purity’ of the Hadar (Longva, 2007) and southern tribes as literally, close to God (by virtue of their imagined ‘origin’ in Mecca) and disturbingly, the attempt to institutionalise their superiority, based on ‘science.’ The description of animal mating to describe contemporary marriage practices, though totally inappropriate, may be regarded as an attempt to symbolise the ‘impure’ tribe juxtaposed against the ‘pure’ one, in the most dehumanising of terms.

Within this meta-theme, I included narratives of ethnic cleansing which comprised the area in which I drew mostly on news articles and humanitarian reports, due to the dearth of scholarly activity surrounding this topic. Nevertheless, it provided important context to the other themes arising from the meta-theme of new theorization of the Bedouns’ eradication. New dialogues about the Bedoun reflect settler-colonialist values among and/or about Kuwait’s elite Hadar, similar to contemporary dialogues about Palestinians in Israel, produced by Israeli and pro-Zionist scholars, encompassing eugenic arguments behind radical nationalism.

These dialogues have reduced the concepts of ethnic targeting, terror, violence and population eradication into little more than discursive symbols, undercutting scholarly analysis of the social reality (Rosenfeld, 2002). Abrahamian’s (2015) narrative on the Comoros Plan for the Bedoun (and other similar schemes) was aggressively marketed in Europe and the United States by Columbia University. The loose, discursive and largely unreferenced narrative framed the latest requirements for the Bedoun to obtain citizenship outlined by the state: having their identity sold to the Comoros Islands. Abrahamian (2015) interpreted this as a contemporary, commercial form of homogenized, ‘global citizenship’ rather than human trafficking and potential mass deportation (reported by Kholiaif, August 25, 2014; Rasheedi, January 5, 2015). While the first is rightly ‘commodification’ it also dehumanisation (a feature of genocide, Stanton, 2004). The latter is well-established as a form of ethnic cleansing (Bell-Falkoff, 1999; Mann, 2005).
Recent scholarly work on the Bedouin and the Bedoun has failed to produce substantial new knowledge about the group or to rigorously analyse existing knowledge, while such authors have persisted in attacking the Kuwaiti Bedouin and the Bedoun with old stereotypes. For example, the Bedouin are becoming increasingly Islamist in the National Assembly in Peterson, 2012, p.23; Bedouin public leaders and intellectuals are: ‘the most virulent populist protestors, like Mussalam al-Barrak,’ in Dazi-Heni, 2015, para. 52; there is no such thing as a ‘settled’ Bedouin because they live in ‘urban’ areas, in Maktabi, 2015, p. 2, n. 2; Gulf states including Kuwait have stateless populations for purely political reasons, citizenship is a method of demographic distribution to achieve ‘population-balance’ (the government’s 1992 phrasing for ethnic cleansing including killings), cleverly reconfigured as a Darwinian theory of natural ‘citizenship’ selection in Okruhlik (2016, p.26).

Okruhlik (2016) rationalised the creation of the Bedoun’s statelessness and the group’s suffering as a natural and necessary process of statehood via a return to Orientalist tropes. If we compare these dialogic twists and turns with the development of definitions for the Bedoun among government and in academic circles, it is difficult not to interpret them as contributing to new attempts to obscure the Bedouin identity and culture, while adding to government justifications. In this respect, we see what Hakeem al Fadhli (Chapter 8. Section 8.4.4) predicted – a new wave of generalised attack on the Bedouin citizenry, which attempts to use the same strategies of identity-stripping discourse that was used previously on the Bedouin. And as with the academic discourse against the Bedoun of the 1990s, once again, researchers are busy reflecting (and arguably endorsing) government policy, rather than asking the people.

This recycling of old themes by individual researchers is a concern, given the extremity of ideas that have emerged in this field. Since the Arab Spring, scholars have glossed the historical antecedents to the Bedouns situation. Rather than the overt criminalisation of the past, government policy was reinforced through complicit silence and policy promotion (dissemination of the ideas as if such policy were entirely acceptable, in the absence of critique). They have largely ignored Bedouns’ threatened cultural annihilation, and similarly ignored the cultural patterning of the treatment of the Bedouin in Kuwait (Alhajeri, 2004), which can be traced back to the ideology of Hadar elitism (al Anezi, 1989) and themes of supremacy described herein, embraced by intellectuals.
Appendix C, Part vii
Thematic analysis summaries

Appendix C, part vii, features three tables that illustrate the themes arising from the following meta-themes:

- Contemporary colonialism and tribalism theory (Table C7)
- ‘Developmental’ approaches (Table C8)
- ‘New’ theory - dialogues of eradication (Table C9)

Note on sources: The analysis was drawn from more than fifty authors, the majority of which were Kuwaiti, and authors who specialise in the field of Middle East studies, concentrating on the Kuwaiti context. The authors are not listed in this Appendix, but the analysis and author list was available to the thesis examiners, and it will be stored for future research in The Bedoun Archive, at the Australian Data Archive at the Australian National University.
### Contemporary colonialism and tribalism theory (meta-theme)

#### Negation and selective omission (theme)
- Negating tribal/ethnic identity and heritage
- The invisible Bedouin
- The active/passive Bedouin stereotype

#### Myths and ‘Othering’ (theme)
- Othering to produce ‘foreign migrant national’ ideology
- The Bedoun ‘pretend’ to be stateless and have a false identity
- Criminalisation

#### Blaming (theme)
- Cultural difference is the Bedouin’s problem, leading to lack of assimilation
- New ‘theory’ of the Bedouin as a low status tribe, inferior tribal groups

#### Inferiority (theme)
- Bedouin as an inferior race
- Bedouin as having inferior tribal/cultural characteristics
Table C8

All Themes Derived from the Meta-Theme, ‘Developmental’ Approaches

‘Developmental’ approaches (meta-theme)

The ‘psychological development’ approach (theme)
- Intellectual and personality characteristics
- The Bedouin ‘mind’
- The Bedouin ‘personality’
- The Bedouin ‘attitude’
- Capacity for productivity
- The lazy, ‘underproductive’ Bedouin
- The ignorant, Bedouin ‘illiterates’

The ‘cultural development’ approach (theme)
- Misrepresentations of ‘dangerous’ social activities
- Cultural practices
- Recreational practices
- Educational practices
- Work practices
  - Cultural hygiene – ‘Desertization’ and feminist critiques
  - ‘Desertization’ - urban pollution and the ‘national security threat’
    - More ‘dangerous’ tribal activities
    - Religious practices
    - Personal appearance
  - Scholarly, feminist critique
    - Bedouins with women’s representation are misguided
    - Bedouins won’t support purchase of weapons of mass destruction
    - Bedouins are religious fanatics and terrorist

The (deprivation of) ‘resources’ approach (theme)
- Deprivation of resources targeting Bedouin in desert settlements and popular housing areas
- Delay in state education expenditure on the Bedoun at all levels
- Lack expenditure on Bedouin children’s education by design
- Arguments for the withdrawal of the state education expenditure
- Arguments for the withdrawal of resources from civil society
Table C9

*All themes derived from the meta-theme, ‘New’ theory – eradication dialogues*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘New’ theory - eradication dialogues (meta-theme)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bedouin/Bedoun eradication dialogues and omissions of the 1980s -1990s (theme)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing), expulsion and killing (sub-theme)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Minimisation, understatement, lack of elaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Selective omission and redirecting attention away from relevant and/or substantial issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <strong>Ethnic cleansing directives (sub-theme)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Instructions to ethnically cleanse issued by government officials in the media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Misrepresentation of the Bedouin and Bedoun identity as ‘Iraqi’ citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Dual stateless targets – the Bedouin and Palestinians as the fifth column collaborators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Promotion of Bedouin/Bedoun eradication in peacetime (theme)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Urban ‘history’, ‘planning, ‘space’ approaches - – the Bedouin as basically incompatible with, and antithesis to, ‘urban’ culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tribal ‘culture’ as tribal primitivism, squatting and slums and ‘chaos’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Psychological and spiritual ‘disturbance’/destruction - the ‘need’ for the Bedouin to vacate their homes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Withdrawal of state resources and impoverishment - blaming the Bedouin for physical degradation, filth and refuse</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Bedouin settlements on desert land requiring ‘evacuation’ and ‘eradication’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Population transfer/eradication/offshoring or encampment of the whole Bedoun population</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Contemporary ‘citizenship’ - requirements of the Bedouin (theme)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Bedouin are not ‘Kuwaiti’ or ’citizens’ (sub-theme)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Bedouin are not capable of citizenship and democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The Bedouin are disloyal to the state because they are loyal to the tribe and the Emir</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The Bedouin are not ‘real’ or ‘true’ Kuwaitis</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The Bedouin are not ‘original’ Kuwaitis</td>
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<td>• The Bedouin are not ‘pure’ Kuwaitis</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Enforcement of ‘true’ citizenship of the Bedouin (sub-theme)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Dehumanisation - attack on marriage, founding families and the Bedouin state</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Genetic makeup, sexuality and marriage practices</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Vermin and animals</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Negative eugenics and biosecurity - protecting the Hadar state</td>
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<tr>
<td>o Biological procedures required to prove real/true/pure Kuwaitiness and nationality</td>
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<tr>
<td>o DNA</td>
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<tr>
<td>o Blood</td>
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<td>o Fingerprints</td>
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</table>
- Language testing in the United Kingdom
Table C10

*Themes Arising from the Analysis of Academic and Public Discourse, Concerning the Bedouin and Bedoun*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meta-theme</th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Sub-theme</th>
<th>Minor sub-theme</th>
<th>Minor sub-sub-theme</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contemporary colonialism and tribalism theory</td>
<td>Negation and selective omission</td>
<td>Negating tribal/ethnic identity and heritage</td>
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<td>The invisible Bedouin</td>
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<td>The active/passive Bedouin stereotype</td>
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<td>Myths and ‘Othering’</td>
<td>Othering to produce ‘foreign migrant national’ ideology</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The Bedoun ‘pretend’ to be stateless and have a false identity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Criminalisation</td>
<td>Blaming</td>
<td>Cultural difference is the Bedouin’s problem, leading to lack of assimilation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>New ‘theory’ of the Bedouin as a low status tribe, inferior tribal groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inferiority</td>
<td>The Bedouin as an inferior race</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Bedouin as having inferior tribal/cultural characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ‘developmental’ approaches</td>
<td>The ‘psychological development’ approach</td>
<td>Intellectual and personality characteristics</td>
<td>The Bedouin ‘mind’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Bedouin ‘personality’</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Bedouin ‘attitude’</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Capacity for productivity</td>
<td>The Bedouin ‘ethos’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The lazy, ‘unproductive’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

92
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The ‘cultural development’ approach</th>
<th>Misrepresentation of ‘dangerous’ social activity</th>
<th>Cultural practices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recreational practices</td>
<td>Educational practices</td>
<td>Work practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural hygiene - ‘Desertization’ and feminist critiques</td>
<td>Desertization’ - urban pollution and a ‘national security threat’</td>
<td>More ‘dangerous’ tribal activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious practices</td>
<td>Personal appearance</td>
<td>Scholarly, feminist critique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bedouins won’t support purchase of weapons of mass destruction</td>
<td>Bedouins are religious fanatics and terrorists</td>
<td>The (deprivation of) ‘resources’ approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delay in state education expenditure on the Bedouin at all levels</td>
<td>Lack expenditure on Bedouin children’s education by design</td>
<td>Arguments for the withdrawal of the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education expenditure</td>
<td>Arguments for the withdrawal of resources from civil society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘New’ theory of eradication dialogues</td>
<td>Bedouin/Bedoun eradication dialogues and omissions of the 1980s - 1990s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing), expulsion and killing</td>
<td>Minimisation, understatement, lack of elaboration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Selective omission, and redirecting attention</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic cleansing directives</td>
<td>Instructions to ethnically cleanse issued by government officials in the media</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Misrepresentation of the Bedouin and Bedoun identity as Iraqi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dual stateless targets – the Bedouin and Palestinians as the fifth column collaborators</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion of Bedouin/Bedoun eradication in peacetime</td>
<td>Urban ‘history’, ‘planning, ‘space’ and ‘design’ approaches</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The theoretical triad: ‘tribalism,’ ‘Islamism’ and the welfare state</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tribal ‘culture’ as tribal primitivism, squatting and slums and ‘chaos’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Psychological and spiritual ‘disturbance’/destruction - the ‘need’ for the Bedouin to vacate their homes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Withdrawal of state resources and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impoverishment - blaming the Bedouin for physical degradation, filth and refuse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bedouin settlements on desert land requiring ‘evacuation’ and ‘eradication’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population transfer/eradication/offs horing or encampment of the whole Bedouin population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contemporary ‘citizenship’ requirements of the Bedouin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bedouin are not ‘Kuwaiti’ or ‘citizens’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bedouin are not capable of citizenship and democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bedouin are disloyal to the state because they are loyal to the tribe and the Emir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bedouin are not ‘real’ or ‘true’ Kuwaitis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bedouin are not ‘original’ Kuwaitis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bedouin are not ‘pure’ Kuwaitis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement of ‘true’ citizenship of the Bedouin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dehumanisation – attacking the Bedouin family and the Bedouin state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genetic makeup, sexuality and marriage practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genetic eugenics and biosecurity – protecting the Hadar state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermin and animals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biological procedures required to prove real/true/pure Kuwaitines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s and nationality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: This table shows the analysis of meta-themes through to minor sub-sub themes, arising from the analysis*
Appendix D
Population Control and Physical Segregation

i. Population reduction

ii. Government Ministries, committees and other agencies responsible for the examination, control and management of the Kuwai Bedouin in general and the Bedoun in particular


iv. Citizen eradication – the reduction of those ‘eligible’ for citizenship
# Appendix D, i
## Population Reduction Strategies

### Table D1

*Population and Citizen Reduction Measures Used Against the Bedoun Implemented (1980-)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of implementation</th>
<th>Type of strategies used and sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Legal conversion of second-degree to first-degree citizenship stopped and delayed a further ten years to total of thirty years, via Law 130/1986. Source: Al Anezi (1989, p.235, 244-245, 297-298).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>The policy of administrative expulsion of the Bedoun from the public service, which caused widespread impoverishment, diminishment of social roles and life purpose, including preventing individuals from forming families or having more children. Sources: Human Rights Watch (1995); ‘The Study’ (2003); al (2009).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>The policy of administrative expulsion of the Bedoun and more broadly, Ministry of Interior policy labelling new-born Bedoun children as having other nationalities via the false (fraudulent) nationality labelling on birth certificates, was engineered via the official policy of stating ‘original nationality’ on birth certificates in such a way as to prevent legitimate birth documentation and recording of the population. See discussion below.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1995</td>
<td>Threats of violence (hanging) issued by government impacted Bedoun mothers – pregnant or with new-borns – at Abdali border camp directly, leading to mass deaths of babies linked to the psychological condition of the mothers (1991-1992), although physical conditions at these sites were most arduous (e.g. direct exposure to summer temperatures in excess of 50 degrees) and should also be considered as potential contributors to the cause of death.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1995</td>
<td>Deletion of names from prisoner of war lists (Iraq) to prevent Bedoun repatriation linked to international efforts to repatriate Kuwaiti POWs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The source information is provided in each section of the table.

**The Role of Royal Decree 58/1996**

Al Mdaires (2010) is the only author I located during my research, who discussed this Decree aside from mention in Kuwait government response to Human Rights Watch, 2011. He implied that Decree 58/1996 strengthened the ability of the Executive Committee for Illegal Residents’ Affairs to reject citizenship applications at its discretion, due to its ability to vet all documents submitted by the Bedoun. This occurred in addition or instead of to the procedures of the Nationality Committees established in the Nationality Law (1959), Article 21, and Decree 5/1960. In other words, it was an over-riding function of the Nationality Law (1959) Kuwait. The law gave the Committee the official capacity to reject valid documents that could be used as evidence of valid citizenship claims by refusing to ‘authorize’ such documents (although it seemed that in practice, this had been occurring for decades, for example, Law 100/1980, above). If al Mdaires (2010, p.59) interpretation is
correct, Decree 58/1996 was a second law designed to deprive citizenship of the Bedoun on ethnic grounds. Certainly his approach is consistent with Supreme Planning Council Resolution No.11/1992. Resolution No.11/1992 prohibited the group from being granted citizenship collectively. Decree 58/1996 enabled the Committee to prevent individuals being granted citizenship on an individual basis, even where valid documents were supplied to meet the requirements of the *Nationality Law (1959)*, Kuwait.

**Restrictions on the Founding of Families**

It is beyond the scope of the current study to explore all of the aspects of the administrative expulsion, but these aspects have also tended to be well documented by international humanitarian organisations. However, within the context of population reduction methods as part of the restrictive cultural re-organisation of the Bedoun, it is pertinent to address the manipulation of the Bedoun population’s ability to marry and found families, which was articulated in the administrative expulsion policy document of 1986 (‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003).

As I discussed above, policy of administrative expulsion introduced restrictions on Bedoun marriage (which had been in place for 30 years at the time of writing), leading to immense administrative barriers placed to reduce Bedoun marriage to citizen Bedouins and to other Bedouns, leading to the delay of marriage and non-marriage. Al Waqayan (2009) also documented that some out-migration had taken place for the purpose of obtaining legal marriage contracts from Bahrain and Saudi Arabia (p.31), due to issues associated with the legal recognition of children, for which legal marriage contracts are required under Kuwaiti law (this is likely because the problem of illegitimate children under Kuwaiti law extends far beyond the immediate concerns of ‘unwed’ parents). Based on reports from Bedoun individuals in interview data, as well as the government of Kuwait itself citing statistics on the issue of marriage certificates (in Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011 and intermittent, Kuwaiti newspaper and international, humanitarian reports), the vast majority of the population appeared to continue to be forced into continuing to resort to traditional/informal marriage practices due to the failure of the Ministry of Justice to issue formal marriage certificates to members of the group. Logical deduction leads to the conclusion that the population’s marriage and birth rates would have declined according to these difficulties and certainly the participants in this research indicated that this issue remained problematic for them and contributed to a desire among many, not to even entertain the possibly of marriage. The very low rate of marriage of the participants, while unlikely to be representative of the whole Bedoun population, reflected the participants’ experience (see the results, Chapter 5, section 5.1.5 marital and birth data, tables 5.7, 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10). The intention of the official policy to have this effect was articulated in the expulsion document, in the context of a complaint the Bedouin have families with many...
children, as well as specific measures to reduce marriage (‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003). The document unequivocally sought to impose demographic engineering on the Bedouin, to the extent of grossly interfering with and impeding their right to found families. This aim was aside from other restrictions introduced that also contributed to indirect restrictions on the same rights, such as inducing poverty through expelling public servants from the workforce in order to impoverish families, and simultaneously expelling their children from the public education system, so they would never be able to fully participate to their potential in the workforce, ensuring the same families would remain impoverished into future generations.

Moreover, the impact of these measures on personal and cultural identity may be regarded as dehumanising. The expulsion of the Bedouin and the policy labelling newborn Bedouin children as having other nationalities via the false (fraudulent) nationality labelling on birth certificates issued by the Ministry of Health, was part of the official policy of erasure. Thus, ‘status adjustment,’ specifically the policy of stating ‘original nationality’ on birth certificates (Kuwait government response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.7), not only impaired the state’s function in issuing legitimate birth documentation and recording the national population accurately, it threatened to destroyed the legal and psychological identity and cohesion of families, by recording children as having different nationalities to their parents. The practice was so removed from concrete reality that various siblings were recorded with different nationalities, as well as their parents. Thus, newborn infants were targeted for erasure, along with their parents (as were the dying and deceased, via the failure of the state to issue death certificates, a matter beyond the scope of the present study). It is worth remembering that children were targeted via their enrolment in schools, such that they were also pressured to change nationality if their parents had not enabled this on the birth certificate. They would be threatened with expulsion from schools or prevented from enrolling, if they did not change their national identity according to the ‘status adjustment’ program.

For these reasons, the ‘status adjustment’ program was not limited to calling the Bedouin ‘illegal residents’ and attempting to remove the ethnic and national identity of male heads of household to other nationalities in order to make them appear to be ‘migrants’ who overstayed their work visas (this was largely the approach taken by Beaugrand, 2010 a and arguably, government has become more ‘transparent’ about its erasure program since then). It distorted knowledge about the demographic makeup of the country at a fundamental level.

In consideration of the downward pressures on population from 1991-2015 in Table D2 (above), the policy of stating one’s ‘original’ nationality on official identity documents has been a highly effective strategy. It targeted the Bedouin at all stages of their lifespan, including birth certificates), childhood (enrolment in schools), transition to adulthood (the
driver’s license), maturity (marriage certificates) and old age (death certificates). Thus, the impact of the erasure may be seen as impacting the overall population decline, particularly in relation to pressures on forming families, in addition to the 1986 administrative expulsion, the 1990-1995 violent ethnic cleansing and killing of the Bedoun and the population typing introduced in 2012, tied to administrative expulsion goals.

Table D2

*Approximate Bedoun Population Data (Pre-1991 to 2015)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Population total</th>
<th>Loss in numbers (approximate)</th>
<th>Loss in percentage (approximate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 1991</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After 1995</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>111,000</td>
<td>Loss: 39,000</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Sources include Human Rights Watch (2005); ‘Over 111,000,’ (December 23, 2013).*
Appendix D, ii

Government Ministries, Committees and Other Agencies Responsible for the Examination, Control and Management of the Bedoun

The previous literature concerning the Bedoun has focused almost single-mindedly on the Bedoun’s statelessness and human rights deprivations owing to an apparent policy change around 1986, which marked the administrative expulsion of the group. Beaugrand (2014b) stated that the term ‘illegal residents’ was used to refer to the Bedoun after the liberation of Kuwait, ‘when the state started to handle their case through a specific administrative authority’ (p.737). Beaugrand’s (2014b) has not accounted for the the history of the Bedouns’ settlement in Kuwait as Bedouin tribespeople in the region and the territory of the state. It is beyond the scope of this study to go into all of the arguments for and against the notion that the Bedoun arrived in Kuwait unexpectedly as unwelcome ‘migrants’ looking to exploit the ‘benefits’ of Kuwaiti citizenship, but I have offered new information about this issue from older studies in Chapter 2, that has not been discussed in the context of the Bedoun’s presence in Kuwait, in English, by previous authors or in humanitarian reports. This section focuses on the issue of the Bedoun’s entrapment in the state from as early as 1965 (twenty years earlier than the 1986 expulsion date), though an organised system that sought to control the Bedoun’s population numbers, but equally, the system of tribal culture.

The first departments of government used to ‘monitor’ the Kuwaiti Bedouin settlement programs from 1965 included the Municipality of Kuwait and the Central Statistics Office. Regular ‘investigation’ or ‘study,’ surveillance and monitoring was conducted by Central Statistics Office staff and on the spot identity-checking process involved hundreds of residents at a time (al Moosa, 1976, p.161). Government agents entered individual homes to check documents to ensure the inhabitants were authorised to reside in the camps. Al Moosa (1976, p.161, 306) described secondary processes of registration and identity checks with government; the population had been closely monitored (monthly reporting to municipal offices was required), delimited and managed since 1965, when citizens first complained of Bedouin settlements arising on what had become private land in Kuwait City (al Moosa, 1976, p.161, 306). The group were also registered with government and a range of other agencies from the time of their recruitment by selection committees as public servants, particularly for military and police personnel. Significantly, the Central Statistics Office had found the identity of the majority of the inhabitants of the desert settlements were citizens of Kuwait. After recommendations by al Moosa (1976), they became known as without citizenship, the Bedoun. This aspect of the definitional problems describing the Bedoun was a crucial aspect at the policy level, leading to the administrative expulsion in 1986.
Table D3

**Government Ministries, Committees and Other Agencies Responsible for the Kuwaiti Bedouin (Including the Bedoun) Since 1965**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date Implemented</th>
<th>Name of government departments or formal committees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Municipality of Kuwait and the Central Statistics Office with the Ministry of Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974/1975</td>
<td>Shanty Clearance Higher Committee and the Committee Concerning Illegal Dwellings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Committee concerning Illegal Dwellings was established in 1975, headed by members of all government ministries; for administrative purposes it was designated under the Council of Ministers (al Moosa, 1976, p.305).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Committee for the Study of Illegal Residents, with the Public Authority for Civil Information (PACI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The committee was chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, the Crown Prince of Kuwait, who is today the Emir of Kuwait. Additional information-sharing measures through PACI commenced for the purpose of cross-matching data on the Bedoun in different government departments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sources: The Study of the country’s problem of the category of the ‘stateless’ (‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003); Beaugrand (2010); Kuwait government response to Human Rights Watch (2011, p.2, 3); Salem (March 17, 2012). A full printout of the news report in ‘The Study,’ (August 30, 2003) is in Appendix E, ii).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>‘Reconstitution’ of Committee for the Study of Illegal Residents under al Awadi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unnamed Decree, issued by Cabinet (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abdul Rahman al Awadi reports on post-war ethnic cleansing - the ‘enemy’ murder count (Bedoun and Palestinians) - to the Prime Minister, citing thousands more than official reports, carried out by the second resistance wave (Mason, 201, p.130). He is appointed to head of Bedoun Committee in 1991 while in the same position, as Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.3) (see Appendix F, i).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Supreme Planning Council (SPC), the Population and Human Resources Committee of the Supreme Planning Council and the Academic Team for Population Policy manage administrative expulsion of population embedded in national migration policy

After the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and prior to the resumption of the National Assembly, the Academic Team for Population Policy played a pivotal role in advising the Prime Minister and the SPC directly via its special powers.


1993

Central Committee to Resolve the Status of Illegal Residents

Established via Cabinet Decree 221/1993, issued on October 19, 1993 to March 26, 1996

Source: Kuwait government response to Human Rights Watch (2011, p.3); Beaugrand (2014b, p.737).

1996

Executive Committee for Illegal Residents’ Affairs

Established via Royal Decree 58/1996, March 26, 1996. The decree established individual case files for every member of the population, ostensibly for the resolution of their cases; but actions of the Apparatus indicated this was more likely for surveillance (WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, November 26, 2006). It also demanded that no official papers of the Bedoun could be accepted without the authorization of the Committee (al Madaires, 2010, p.59). Al Mdaires (2010) implied that the Decree formalized the ability of the Committee to reject valid citizenship applications at its discretion, thereby interfering with the application of Decree 5/1960.

Source: Kuwait government response to Human Rights Watch (2011, p.3); al Mdaires (2010, p.59); WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, (November 26, 2006).

2000

Judicial and Administrative Deportation Committee

July 8, 2000


2009

Supreme Council for Planning and Development

Established via Cabinet Decree 906/2009, October 26, 2009 to November 9, 2010

Source: Kuwait government response to Human Rights Watch (2011, p.3).

2010

The Central System to Resolve Illegal Residents’ Status


Established via Royal Decree 467/2010, November 9, 2010 to November 6, 2015. The strategies used to ‘remedy’ the ‘illegal residents’ status (‘status adjustment’) were approved in the Cabinet Decree No 1612 of 2010 (Eman al Nasser in ‘Kuwait Showcases,’ 2015).


Note: See also Appendix H, which shows a photographic record of the areas designated ‘squatter’ areas and ‘slums’ (Al Khatib 1978, in al Zaher, 1990, p.192; al Awadi, 1980; Zhou, 1990) managed by these committees.
Appendix D, iii

Table D4 below, shows the amendment of National Census data, legislated in 1992 (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, p.571). There are discrepancies among sources on this matter, which seems quite odd since a bulk population transfer of over 100,000 people should be one of the more concrete events that researchers could pin down. In the absence of detailed explanations, it appears that some sources may have not been as certain or authoritative as they appeared to be.

Human Rights Watch (1995) stated that the Ministry of Planning’s Central Statistics Office recorded the Bedoun population under the total Kuwaiti Citizen population until the 1989, when the group was transferred on the National Census from ‘Kuwaiti’ to the non-Kuwaiti, migrant expatriate population. Human Rights Watch (2000) stated that the policy to de-nationalise the population from ‘Kuwaiti’ to the generic ‘non-Kuwaiti’ ‘other Arab’ was implemented in 1988. Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan (1994) implied the transfer took place commenced in 1992, backdated to 1985. They showed the data they had collected (Table D4, below). Stanton Russell (1989) was a highly skilled demographer, and had studied Kuwait for some time. Arguably, she pre-empted the transfer. Al Anezi (1989) noted that the program of population transfer commenced with ‘status adjustment’ from 1983, via an unpublished decree.

Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan (1994) explained that in 1992, the Bedoun were transferred from the ‘Kuwaiti’ section of the National Census data and re-allocated to the ‘other Arab’ expatriate section, but recorded without an unspecified nationality (see Appendix C, I for the context of use of this term). The amendments were backdated to 1985. The authors did not refer to the alternative date 1989, as stated by Human Rights Watch (1995). The latter organisation did not clarify whether or not there was a legislative basis to the National Census amendment of 1989 – a decree or resolution – or not. Nevertheless, there were certainly a number of population policy developments leading up to the invasion by Iraq, which were connected to the 1986 administrative expulsion of the Bedoun, that pressured the Ministry of Planning to ‘solve’ the ‘Bedoun problem’ by restricting the population artificially (demographic engineering) (see Appendix F, iii).

Table D4

Statistical Abstracts Showing the Expulsion of the Total Bedoun Population, Backdated to 1985 (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, p.571)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>% Total</th>
<th>% Rural</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>% Total</th>
<th>% Rural</th>
<th>% Total</th>
<th>% Rural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>462,140</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>1,080,100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>1,080,100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>524,300</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>1,340,700</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>1,340,700</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>593,500</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>1,590,400</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>1,590,400</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>753,600</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>1,979,900</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>1,979,900</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>793,100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>2,162,700</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>2,162,700</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>823,700</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>2,451,600</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>2,451,600</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>853,300</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>2,758,900</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>2,758,900</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>883,900</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>3,082,500</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>3,082,500</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>914,500</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>3,420,200</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>3,420,200</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>945,100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>3,781,200</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>3,781,200</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
- Dashes indicate data not available.
- Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding.

Source of data:
Appendix D, iv
Citizen Reduction - the ‘Secret’ Erasure of Those ‘Eligible’ for Citizenship

This Appendix discusses a special group of Bedoun to whom additional commitments to provide citizenship were given by the government of Kuwait shown in Table D5 below, concerning the reduction of the number of Bedoun that government qualified as ‘eligible’ for citizenship. The basis of their being treated as a ‘special’ group by government was their being listed as ‘Kuwaiti’ on the national census in 1965. The group appeared to be singled out in the literature in 1996, by the ‘Academic Team for Population Planning,’ who recommend citizenship be granted to this group, while it simultaneously ensured that the group would not receive that citizenship through the parliamentary process as a whole group, by introducing a prohibition on the Bedouin receiving citizenship *en masse*. The prohibition was called the Supreme Council Resolution No.11/1992 (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994). It was introduced *while* the Bedouin were being ethnically cleansed, and it was coupled with the strategy of expelling the Bedouin from the national census in 1992 (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994) (I illustrate this in Appendix F, iii).

It is uncertain as to whether the size of the group to be prevented from receiving a citizenship grant was stated in Resolution No.11, or if the prohibition simply applied to every individual from the stateless Bedouin (Bedoun) population. However, it was clear that the Kuwaiti Bedouin were the only ethnic group targeted with this prohibition (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994), due to the intervention of the *Academic Team for Population Policy*. The Academic Team was group of intellectuals who had direct access to the Prime Minister and Supreme Planning Council, introduced by the National Council (see Appendix F, iii). No sooner did this group of experts confirm the Bedouns legal right of the group to receive citizenship, it was taken away in a set of prohibitions designed by the same group. This was part of the Academic Teams’ policy design, and was not a plan directly devised by government. Nevertheless, the royal appointment of special committees to develop national policy and report directly to the ruler or his Prime Minister is a basic feature of the structure of governance in Kuwait.

This group appeared again in the 2010 Supreme Council Study published in *al Qabas*, reprinted in Human Rights Watch, 2011. The group were then described in 2012, when the Central Apparatus began to published a series of announcements and conduct interviews with local newspapers about a new system of coloured identity categories. The group was allocated to the green identity green identity type. It was acknowledged that their families had proven they were in residence in Kuwait prior to the 1965 National Census, but had also tended to be formerly employed in the government services, especially in the military, policy and national guard. Therefore, in the news media they were described as
those deemed to have already qualified for citizenship under the *Nationality Law (1959)*, according to Ministry of Interior assessments. Those regarded as a group who had potentially qualified for citizenship were those allocated to the yellow identity category. According to the Apparatus, they did not have documents proving residency prior to the 1965 National Census, but had rendered services to the state via their previous employment in the government service. This meant that they too were qualified for citizenship (MP Abdullah al Tamimi in ‘Hope for non-census,’ 2014, clarifying a shift in definitional terms used for each identity category, apparently communicated to him by the Minister for the Interior directly).

During this research it became apparent that since the Arab Spring, the size of the particular population of this green identity group was diminishing, amidst irregularities in the reported total population of the sub-group (based on my analysis of government announcements in local news sources). Additionally, the main, official justification for the size of group being reduced in size since the Arab Spring (2011-2012) was discussed in local newspapers. It had occurred on grounds of secret, undisclosed ‘security restrictions,’ issued in response to human rights ‘activism.’ The Central Apparatus frequently issued threats this population group was being radically diminished in the local media between 2012 and 2016. On February 9, 2014 the Apparatus revealed that it had issued the ‘security restriction’ to more than half of this group, cancelling the citizenship eligibility of 21,000 individuals over the previous two years (see Saleh, February 9, 2014, below).
Table D5

*Reduction of the Number of Bedoun ‘Eligible’ for Citizenship*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of report</th>
<th>Approximate number</th>
<th>The population regarded as having formally qualified for citizenship according to the <em>Nationality Law (1959)</em> Kuwait</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>The number of applications from Bedoun accepted by government as ‘eligible’ for citizenship, according to the Ministry of the Interior. Source: Human Rights Watch (2001).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>A plan was outlined by the Kuwaiti government in 1999, described by the U.S. Committee for Refugees (despite more than three times that number having qualified for citizenship under the Nationality Law, 1959). The remainder would be given permanent residency. Source: U.S. Committee for Refugees in Doebbler (2002, p.543, para. 2 at n120).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>43,231</td>
<td>The number of Bedouin registered in the 1965 census as at January 29, 2007, quoted by the Assistant Undersecretary for Nationality and Passports, Sheikh Ahmad Nawaf. This condition has always been stated as the defining characteristic of the group. Source: Al Waqayan (2009, p. 49).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>34,000 could qualify for citizenship, but noting only 16,000 Bedouin applications were approved in the last 20 years (but were not followed by citizenship grants), according to ‘local reports,’ in ‘Rights Group,’ 2013. Source: ‘Rights group,’ (2013).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>The number of Bedouin remaining eligible to receive citizenship (in this group) after the application of approximately 21,000 ‘security restrictions’ between 2012 and 2014, quoting un-named, confidential sources, Saleh, 9 February, 2014, para. 2, <em>The Kuwait Times</em>. Source: Saleh (February 9, 2014).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>Those who had been registered in the 1965 census, quoting Major General Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah, Undersecretary of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of Bedoun out of the group of 34,000 above, who had ‘clean files,’ and remained qualified to receive citizenship, according to Major General Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior for Citizenship and Passport (in *The Kuwait Times*, November 30, 2015). ‘Clean files’ referred to those individuals that had not received ‘security restrictions.’ Security restrictions are secret, undisclosed offences deemed equivalent to criminal offences, which government regards as cancelling individuals’ ‘eligibility’ for citizenship, where they would otherwise qualify for citizenship under the Nationality Law (1959) (‘Magnetic cards,’ 2012; ‘Kuwait Plans,’ 2013; see also Appendix D, iv).


Source: ‘80,000 Bedoons,’ (2016).

On May 16 to 17, 2016, news articles reported that Comorian officials had confirmed their government had accepted the agreement proposed by the government of Kuwait, to convert the Bedoun population to Comorian citizenship in *Izzak*, May 17, 2016). The articles implied the whole population would be re administratively re-allocated to the government of the Islands. Within a few weeks, the Foreign Minister of Kuwait published a clarification that the Comoros Plan was not yet implemented because the legal process had not been completed (‘Kuwait’s FM denies,’ June 20, 2016 in *The Kuwait Times*). The news release showed signs of Ministry of Interior vetting, by coupling notification of sentencing and incarceration of Bedoun individuals with Comoros Plan policy announcements, which had also occurred in 2014, during the UN Human Rights Councils’ Universal Periodic Review of Kuwait.


*Note: Sources are included in each section of the table.*

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The application of some 21,000 security restrictions to those who had already proven they had met the criteria of the Nationality Law (1959) to receive citizenship, had made the whole community aware that government had absolved itself of its commitment to provide citizenship to this particular sub-group, as a punitive response to ‘activism’ from the Arab Spring. The first international humanitarian organisation to acknowledge the cancellation of citizenship eligibility of this special group via was Amnesty International (2016), which published their concerns in their annual report on February 24, 2016, at least two years after the government of Kuwait began publicizing the strategy. The organization cited that the new strategy was revealed in a memorandum issued by the Central Apparatus to government in August 2015. I had been in contact with the Bedoun community throughout this period and shared their frustration with the lack of recognition of this problem attracted from international humanitarian organisations who were aware of the problem. Some members of the community had told me in February 2014, that they believed that this outcome of writing off those eligible for citizenship would certainly arise eventually, based on their personal knowledge of how and why the security restrictions were being applied to them. This is one of the reasons I attempted to follow developments in the published data on this group – a number of participants in this study had their identity erased by the state over the duration of my research.

The population reduction strategy forms just one of a range of population reduction methods used by the government of Kuwait to attempt remove its obligation to grant those Bedoun who have met the eligibility criteria for citizenship under the Nationality Law (1959) Kuwait. The approach is part of the broader ‘status adjustment’ strategy which attempts to eradicate the group from Kuwait through criminalization and identity erasure. Based on the data issued by government to date, is appears to have been planned that numerical data will continue to be issued reducing the group’s size, until it declares that not one single Bedoun individual remains eligible to citizenship. However, many Bedoun in this category ask ‘why?’ this group should be targeted in this way, when they are supposed to be the ‘most deserving’ (the symbolic phrasing used for someone ‘good enough’ to be ‘Kuwaiti,’ commonly used by Kuwaitis and government, in the media), and their descendants had, in fact, already qualified for Kuwaiti citizenship according to the law (see comment by P13, Chapter 8, 8.3.3).

There appear to be two grounds upon which this special group received special recognition of their having qualified for Kuwaiti citizenship. First, they had established they had qualified for citizenship by presenting documents showing they were included in the 1965 census. As I mentioned above, those in the 1965 National Census were very likely present in Kuwait during the initial citizenship application rounds, as citizenship applications in that first round were not completed until the late 1960s. They were likely rejected due to
the formulaic approach used for citizenship distribution, whereby exactly 100% of the Hadar group received citizenship with voting rights, while exactly only half of the total Kuwaiti Bedouin population at that time received citizenship, in the second degree (Human Rights Watch, 1995) (see Chapter 7, sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2). This secondary type of citizenship, also called ‘naturalization,’ denied these citizens from obtaining voting rights for twenty years, which was then extended to thirty years in Law 160/1986: al Anezi, 1989).

Historically, substantial efforts had been made by the Hadar elite to prevent Bedouin citizens receiving full political rights via the award of voting rights, vis a vis the grant of first degree citizenship extended to thirty years. This special group of Bedoun appears to have been first isolated as eligible for citizenship in 1976, as Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior personnel, also known as the state security forces (members of the military, police and formerly the National Guard; see al Fayez, 191984; Alhajeri, 2004; and Appendix B, iii). It is not a great leap of reasoning to surmise that this particular group of Bedoun, having been already assessed as having qualified for citizenship by the Ministry of Interior (obstensibly under Clause 4 of the Nationality Law, 1959, Kuwait, service to the state – the same grounds on which the Bedoun had been recruited to join the forces and permanently settle in the country), may also have been assessed as citizens (by first or second degree) when the first citizenship applications had been processed by the Nationality Committees to 1966 (al Anezi, 1989) (either via their own application, or applications submitted by their fathers/grandfathers applications lodged with authorities) and thus they had already been recorded as participants in the 1965 National Census (al Moosa, 1976, found that desert camp occupants had been living in the camps decades over multiple generations, which makes this possibility seem quite reasonable). In other words, I am suggesting that it is highly likely that both groups are the same. I will explain why below, after providing data on both groups.

Over time, the groups’ numbers have been diminished via variations in public reporting by the Central Apparatus, and via concurrent claims by the Central Apparatus emanating from the Iraqi invasion and later from the Arab Spring, that the group has been issued ‘security restrictions’ which cancel their right to receive citizenship from the state (I discuss this strategy further below). When the government of Kuwait and/or ordinary Kuwaitis refer to those Bedoun who are most ‘deserving’ of citizenship, they are referring to either, those registered in the 1965 National Census, and/or those military and police servicemen original promised citizenship by government.

**Families That Participated in the 1965 National Census**

This group was identified by the Academic Team for Population Policy as ‘eligible’ for citizenship in 1992, as they had already proven their eligibility under the Nationality Law (1959) due to the lack of deniability of their National Census (1965) documents. The
Academic Team determined that ‘the rest would be given identification and considered non-Kuwaitis’ (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, p.581). This was a very casual reference to the administrative expulsion and the mechanisms of identity erasure, which were already underway. The group again acknowledged as a special group in 2000 (Human Rights Watch, 2000) and 2010 (the Supreme Planning Council Study, in Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.21). The figure of 43,231 in the group was provided by the Assistant Undersecretary for Nationality and Passports, Sheikh Ahmad Nawaf, January 29, 2007 (al Waqayan, 2009, p.49). Note that the census date is important because it includes the period during which the *Nationality Law (1959)* Kuwait was first implemented, as the first applications for citizenship for all Kuwaitis (including so-called ‘originals’ of the elite, Hadar commercial establishment) were still being processed at this time.

As I mentioned above, the whole Bedoun sub-ethnic group was removed from the ‘Kuwaiti’ column of the National Census in 1992, and re-allocated to the ‘non-Kuwaiti’ ‘other Arab’ column, backdated to 1985. Their nationality was not specified on the National Census at that time. But this occurred at the same time the Academic Team had defined them as qualifying for citizenship (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, p.571). Thus, one of the announced measures was ignored, the other implemented, leading to reinforcement of the expulsion strategy for *all* Bedoun. This strategy indicated that although the group had been distinguished as ‘special’ by the Academic Team, that immediately, the categorisation had no bearing on their prospects for citizenship, because other policies were introduced simultaneously that targeted the whole group on the basis of their ethnicity. The whole-group targeting strategy cancelled out any hopes the group would be given citizenship, since the latter policies also applied to them. This general approach does not seem to have changed since, which explains why sometimes scholars, humanitarian organisations, and the Bedoun themselves, become confused by the policy stance and practical actions, that have historically been implemented to deal with the population.

This matter was discussed by al Anezi (1989) and Human Rights Watch (1995) in relation to the national debate over Law 100/1980, leading to a parliamentary inquiry into the targeting of Bedoun through the citizenship applications process. It was found that the Bedouns’ citizenship applications had been entirely ignored or destroyed by the Ministry of Interior and/or the Nationality Committees. The revelations arose during a parliamentary hearing which led to the collapse of parliament within 48 hours, and the immediate implementation extra-constitutional rule in July, 1986. The extra-constitutional period of rule lasted until after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The administrative expulsion of the Bedoun occurred in on 26 December, 1986, some six months later (Proceedings of the National Assembly, July 1, 1986 in Human Rights Watch, 1995, n13).
Henckaerts (1995, p.89) theorized citizenship ‘registration’ used in relation to Law 100/1980 was a ‘citizenship vacuum’ leading to mass expulsion. The researcher mainly drew on Human Rights Watch (1995), citing that the lack of grants of citizenship to those already identified as eligible to receive it, along with the violent expulsion of the Bedouin after the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait (1990-1995), was an indicator of the direct impact that (non-protective) nationality laws can have on mass population expulsions, and the need for the development of international standards to be applied to nationality laws (p.99). Henckarts (1995) indicated that the nationality law itself had facilitated the expulsion, by virtue of the ability of the state to delay or indefinitely ignore, due citizenship grants. He believed that there was something inherent in the law that enabled the state to create a perpetually stateless population. In this thesis I have argued that Decree 5/1960 in particular, enabled the Nationality Law (1959) Kuwait to be interpreted in a manner that enabled the grants to be avoided, according to the rules contained therein (Chapter 7).

**Those Families Who Gave Service to the Nation**

A second group identified in the literature as eligible for citizenship comprised members of the northern Bedouin tribes, recruited to Kuwait especially to perform public service for the country: the military, police and national guard (prior to the Iraq war) (al Fayez, 1984; Alhajeri, 2004). This group was promised citizenship upon their recruitment to the public services, having been selected by government authorities for their suitability (as discussed in Chapter 2). They were then formally assured that their citizenship would be forthcoming at least three times (for a list of historical commitments, see Appendix B, iii). The pledge was made to the group’s males heads of household or their ascendants, having served in the military services for Kuwait, in:

Government pledges in 1976 that were formulated into Law 100/1980

- Legislation - Law 100/1980

But additionally, aside from public commitments made by government that citizenship would be granted to them, the group also remains eligible for citizenship until this day due their participation in the states’ security services, according to:

- The Nationality Law (1959), Article 4, paragraph 5

The exception to these rules, it the capacity of the Ministry of Interior *vis a vis* the Central Apparatus, to rule out potential citizens of grounds of ‘security restrictions.’

Those who served in the police or armed forces were specifically set out as being identified as qualified to receive citizenship in Article 4, paragraph 4 of the Nationality Law (1959), according to the explanatory note attached to the legislation (al Anezi, 1989, p.193).
Article 4, paragraph 5 stipulated that such people would ‘possess qualifications’ without stating the type of qualification. Al Anezi (1989) emphasised that the explanatory note to the law stated the qualifications as ‘having higher academic degrees’ or ‘having certain expertise’. Those who had rendered service to Kuwait were specifically identified in the explanatory note as those who had served in the police or the armed forces (p.193, including n139).

**Removal of Citizenship ‘Eligibility’ to Prevent Granting Citizenship According to Kuwaiti Law and the Constitution of Kuwait**

The groups’ special qualification under the Constitution does not appear to have been mentioned in previous literature. I located the stipulation by reading the Constitution. These provisions could still override any action that has made the group ‘illegal’ either according to the whole-group expulsion policy of 1986 (‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003) or according to the ‘security restriction’ dicta of criminalisation (see Saleh, February 9, 2014) if the ruler chose to recognize this aspect of the Nationality Law (1959). The problem appears to be that specific reference to these clauses have been not been made in analysis of the Bedoun’s situation. For example, in Human Rights Watch (1995), Ahmed al Nassar, Rapporteur of the National Assembly's Committee for the Defence of Human Rights, stated:

> In the 1970s, when we looked at the problem, there were already two or three generations of Bedoons-parents, children and grandchildren. They were employed by the armed forces and police, and were promised many solutions that were never carried out. (Human Rights Watch, 1995, ‘The National Assembly,’ para. 14)

The reference in the Nationality Law and the Constitution that provided for their citizenship were simply omitted from consideration by such groups, by diverting conversations to the need to find ‘solutions’ for the group, or to work out who remains ‘deserving’ of citizenship, as if the stipulations under which they legally qualified for citizenship, did not already exist in Kuwaiti Law. The mechanisms for the grant of citizenship already exist, as MP Saleh Ashour has pointed out Izzak, May 17, 2016).

Knowledge of an organised approach to preventing the Bedoun who have actually qualified for citizenship under Kuwaiti law was revealed recently by MP Saleh Ashour, reported in discussion time at the National Assembly on the 11 May, 2016:

> There is a group in the country that is more powerful than the National Assembly and which does not want bedoons to be naturalized,” he charged. Can the government naturalize the 32,000 bedoons whom the committee said qualify for citizenship? No, because this influential group is more powerful than the government. (Izzak, May 17, 2016)
This extra-constitutional element (the suspension of parliament and the privileging of special committees advising the ruler and/or the prime minister) intervened for the 1986 administrative expulsion, the ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun, especially around 1991-1992 (with the Academic Team for Population Policy advising the Prime Minister directly), and it may also have been active during shorter parliamentary suspensions during the Arab Spring and 2016, when government appeared to change strategies on the Bedoun (first, increasing punitive security restrictions in response to protests, and second, altering the dissemination strategy for the Central Apparatus’ five-year ‘study’ reporting period, and the rolling back of the ‘final solution’ that had been touted by the Ministry of Interior, in late 2016).

The Central Apparatus allocated the group to the ‘green’ identity type from 2012 (‘8,000 Bedoons,’ 2012), apparently in recognition of their prioritisation by the state, to receive citizenship before other applicants. Yet Table D5 (above) displayed the gradual diminishment of the number of Bedoun regarded as ‘eligible’ for citizenship by the government of Kuwait since 1992, in a programmed, downward fashion. Countless announcements have been issued over the decades since the 1960s regarding the eligibility of the Bedoun for citizenship. These announcements have misled the public, as for the most part, the only concrete actions taken toward the whole group involve making it more difficult for them to access citizenship legitimately (citizenship for which they have already qualified) while restricting the group’s participation in family and social and cultural life further.

Methods Used to Reduce the Groups’ Numbers: Labelling as ‘Traitors’ and Secret, Undisclosed ‘Security Restrictions’

The two main methods have been used to (theoretically) reduce the numbers of the group are:

- Cancelling of citizenship entitlement due to the status of national ‘traitor.’
- Cancelling citizenship entitlement due to Arab Spring freedoms of expression and public gathering.

Cancelling of citizenship entitlement due to the status of national ‘traitor.’

The notion that certain individuals were unqualified to receive citizenship due to their status as ‘security threats’ and national ‘traitors’ was initiated after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq (see Human Rights Watch, 1995). At the time, the state security apparatus (including the special state security court) played a major role in managing the country, especially prior to the resumption of the National Assembly. The use of the term ‘traitor’ by government authorities warrants clarification by way of example, however. During the occupation of Kuwait (1991), the act of buying bread that had been baked in Iraq because it was not available in Kuwait - due to the occupation of the country by Iraqi forces - was
sufficient to attract the charge (Lesch in Lesch and Lustick, 2005, p.170). On the other hand, after the Iraqi forces withdrew from Kuwait, the Bedouin were executed with bullets to their head, tortured, beaten and starved to death in jail, disappeared and were deported *en masse*, to the extent the population was reduced by some 150,000 (Human Rights Watch, 1995) (see Appendix F, iii).

The Bedouin were also symbolically targeted in discourses of ‘purification’ and the need to ‘cleanse’ Kuwait. All Bedouin were blamed for the Iraqi invasion (Alhajeri, 2004). Since the methods of reporting such individual’s ‘crimes’ against the state was entirely dubious (see the activities of the State Security Investigative Police, state prosecutors and the State Security Court, and the role of Abdul Rahman al Awadi, in Appendix F, i), individuals targeted may simply have been symbolic targets representing the masses. Killings of the Bedouin were never investigated by the authorities (Human Rights Watch, 1991, 1992, 1995, Amnesty International 1992, 1994, 1996), and this seemed to be connected to the presumption that those who were murdered, deserved it because they were ‘traitors.’ Thus, if any such individuals were actually regarded as traitors by the government of Kuwait, it seems to be implausible that the government would not have deported them (if not killed them) at the time according to their own system of retribution, which was the ethnic cleansing and killings.

Despite this, hundreds of individuals were reported as having been listed with ‘security restrictions’ on their security files with the Ministry of Interior after the war. Initially the action seemed to be a method of marking out of individuals most wanted by the security apparatus, but over time government began to claim that those with ‘restrictions’ were no longer eligible for citizenship. The Bedouin were facing such grave circumstances, having been dealing with administrative expulsion five years prior to the invasion, then experiencing entrapment in the state during the war and the occupation, then being been claimed to be ‘traitors’ by citizens and authorities returning to the country after the war. Thus, comparatively speaking, the ‘security restriction’ may seem to have been a relatively minor issue at the time. However, note that the ‘security restriction’ is applied to whole families, and across multiple generations. Age does not matter to the Apparatus – restrictions are placed on babies and young children (this aspect has been discussed in both the local news media in Kuwait and international humanitarian reports).

Initially, hundreds of individuals were identified as having ‘security restrictions’ until the number reached nearly one thousand. After that, the restrictions went unreported. The ‘security restriction’ functioned as what is commonly known in Kuwait as the government blacklist. Government regularly announces the number of immigrants blacklisted and targeted for deportation from Kuwait, along with their nationalities. The same treatment is applied to the Bedouin. It is difficult to know how many Bedouin have
been exited from Kuwait in this way, as this an aspect of the parts of the ‘status adjustment’ program that remains well hidden. No journalists or humanitarian agencies have appear to have reported on this aspect, since mass deportations in 2001 (Human Rights Watch, 2001).

Cancelling citizenship entitlement due to Arab Spring freedoms of expression and public gathering.

The notion of the cancelling out of citizenship ‘eligibility’ was recycled during the Arab Spring, when individuals found to be expressing their freedom of speech and gathering in public were subject to undisclosed ‘security restrictions’ due to the ‘national security threat’ of freedom of individual expression. This method was used to reduce the category eligible for citizenship under the Nationality Law (1959) by thousands, to the extent that this announcement showed that if the rate of security restrictions continued without change, there would be no Bedoun left ‘eligible’ to receive citizenship by 2017. This self-fulfilling prophecy was born out by the fact that by 2016, ‘all’ Bedoun were regarded as ‘accepted’ by the Comoros government for identity transfer to Comorian citizenship (Izzak, May 17, 2016), implying that not one Bedoun would receive citizenship after the Arab Spring. In fact the whole population has been ‘illegal’ since 1986 by virtue of the 1986 expulsion doctrine (‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003), which would disqualify them from receiving citizenship under the Nationality Law (1959).

The security restriction is just one level of criminal labelling to which the Bedoun are subjected to by the government of Kuwait, noting that all Bedoun are referred to as criminal, ‘illegal residents’ as a matter of public policy, anyway. It is also worth remembering that the restriction applies to whole families, and that restrictions can be continually applied, although it is not known what additional, punitive measures may be associated with multiple restrictions, aside from extra intimidation and the application of security restrictions to family members including newborns and children. As I mentioned above, between 2012 and 2014, new security restrictions had been issued to 21,000 Bedoun (in response to the Arab Spring). If we add these numbers together with those criminalised in the identity typing system introduced in 2012, we find that approximately 103,000 Bedouns hold ‘security restrictions’ equivalent to criminal offences, or are typed into one of three (out of a total of four) colour categories by the Central Apparatus which apply a criminal status and timeframe for deportation (see the analysis of the Central Apparatus colour typing, Appendix C, iv). That is, nearly the total number of the Bedoun population of 111,000, save a few thousand (8,000), had either been allocated with security restrictions, or had already been listed as a criminal status of refusing to ‘reveal’ their ‘other nationality’ – i.e. submitting to changing their identity via the ‘status adjustment program.’

The group still remains eligible to receive citizenship under the Constitution of Kuwait 1922/1962, Article 25 (see Appendix B, v) as well as the Nationality Law (1959)
(Appendix B, vi) as technically, they have not received criminal offences that have been processed through the court system. If the Ministry of Interior did not exercise such a hold over the Bedoun matters, government might be able to clear the way for concessions regarding this point. When the Central Apparatus indicated that that security restrictions were equivalent to a (conviction for a) criminal offence (‘Kuwait Plans,’ 2013; Magnetic cards,’ 2012; Nacheva, April 6, 2014; Colonel Mohammed al Wuhaib, in The Kuwait Times, February 9, 2014, in Saleh, February 9, 2014), he assumed the Ministry of Interior’s special discretion concerning issues of nationality and citizenship, which bypasses court system and the parliamentary system in Kuwait and indulges in direct reporting to the Emir. In other words, the ‘security restriction’ cancels Bedoun qualification for citizenship because the Central Apparatus says so. It is difficult to perceive how this status of affairs does not diminish the dignity of Emiri authority. The US Embassy confirmed that one of the main functions of the Executive Committee (now the Central Apparatus) was to, track ‘security restrictions’ (WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, November 26, 2006).

Essentially, the US Embassy staff described the management of a government blacklist that was in the process of expanding to include the whole population. This was precisely the strategy adopted by the government after the Arab Spring, via the distribution of the ‘security restriction,’ which began with individual transgressions and have now been issued to tens of thousands, for reasons that are ‘secret.’

As I discussed in Appendix E, v, when considering how the Bedoun were subjected to ‘status adjustment’ and their identity was changed to other nationality labels, in 2006, the Ambassador to the United States reported that one of the main functions of the Executive Committee (now the Central Apparatus) was to track ‘security restrictions’ (WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, 2006, November 26). This function was performed simultaneous to the erasure. I mentioned that the surveillance function oppressed the population so that the state could suppress opposition while continuing to conduct the program of erasure that had been in place since 1983 (al Anezi, 1989).

Government authorities that acted as key sources for a story, Bedoon Draft Laws Upset State-Body Work Plan (February 9, 2014, The Kuwait Times) defined the ‘security restrictions’ as

Conditions by which a stateless resident becomes unqualified for citizenship, including having a criminal record. (The Kuwait Times, February 9, 2014).

Note the emphasis on vague, broad use of the term ‘conditions’ and the definitive, narrow use of the reference, ‘unqualified for citizenship.’ Effectively, security restrictions included having a criminal record – or anything else. The discretionary power of the Apparatus
enabled it to determine, and keep secret, ‘anything else.’ The implication that the security restriction could be applied for any reason, or no substantive reason, or a totally implausible reason, or for any other reason, was quite clear, based on language used by the Apparatus itself.

Why is this group is targeted?

The ‘reality’ of the organisational culture inside the Ministry of Interior’s Central Apparatus was given in the US Embassy Cable (issued in 2006): the Apparatus operates as a surveillance network of ‘state security’ verging on the scale of the Stalinist model, for the purpose of conducting surveillance and issuing ever more ‘restrictions’ to prevent the Bedoun participating in social and cultural life, and to justify the rationale that all Bedouns who were ever eligible to receive citizenship, had caused their own loss of citizenship, by attracting security offences (of a criminal nature) or security restrictions (not of a criminal nature, but deemed to be equivalent to a criminal offense, according to apparatus officials). In other words, it appears that one of the official but unspoken policies toward the Bedoun, introduced after the invasion by Iraq, has been to for the Ministry of Interior to use its Central Apparatus to furnish the government with ‘reasons’ and ‘evidence’ for each Bedoun legally qualified for citizenship (those with proof of census participation and those who gave service to the nation) to be refused the grant, by issuing them with a ‘security restriction’ recorded on the security file of each individual/their family.

This policy seems to have been enacted to compensate for the growth of resistance in the community - their refusal of many tens of thousands of Bedoun to cooperate with ‘status adjustment,’ for example, refusing to sign affidavits to claim they had a different nationality, refusing to provide fraudulent passports through Central Apparatus document traffickers, and refusing to accept their children’s birth certificates with false nationalities stated on them.

Between 2012 and 2014, less than 5.5% of the population showed ‘other nationality’ to authorities, indicating there are few individuals of other nationality among the Bedoun population, and that the vast majority resisted ‘status adjustment.’ I calculated these figures based on two articles that cited the number of Bedoun who had changed their status since 2011 (5746 individuals in Saleh, February 9, 2014 and 5982 individuals in Nacheva, April 6, 2014). This indicated that the population is aware that government is attempting to erase their identity and citizenship claims. Certainly the results of this research indicate that this is the case. Another evidence of this resistance was shown in the rejection of birth certificates stating false nationalities, that parents refused to accept from the state, which was an issue that emerged as contentious during the bans on children commencing school in September, 2014. Government had decided to direct special efforts toward forcing parents to accept the inauthentic birth certificates (see Appendix E, vi and G, ii). It had inadvertantly already
discussed failing to achieve this goal some years prior in *Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch* (2011, p.7) where it pointed out that between 2006 and 2011, the number of birth certificates with pre-filled ‘original nationalities’ on them collected by parents from the Ministry of Health was 3608, and the number of birth certificates never accepted was a staggering 12,471.

Government explained the policy and procedures that had existed from 1986 until 2011, whereby the Central Apparatus or its equivalent had determines the original nationality through ‘secret’ internal investigations and research. The Central Apparatus then instructs the Ministry of Health of the nationality, which is pre-filled on the application for the certificate (*Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch*, 2011, p.7). That the majority of the Bedoun population resisted the intense psychological, financial and other pressures demanding they submit to the program of erasure, is revealed in the relatively low numbers of those recorded as having submitted to ‘status adjustment’ issued regularly by the Apparatus in local newspapers (for example, ‘6051 Illegal Residents,’ 2014; ‘6,860 Illegal Residents,’ 2015; ‘7,828 Illegal Residents,’ 2016).

During this study, I was passed written evidence of the statements Bedouns were asked to sign by the Apparatus, for inclusion in their security files as ‘proof’ of the nationality the Central Apparatus had designated to them. I could not verify the statements with identical second copies, and was only able to collect anecdotal evidence. The statements were equivalent to pledges, whereby the recipient would have to sign to confirm that he or she was aware that they would lose their Central Apparatus privileges (access to basic public services) if they were found to communicate with others, and/or speak in public about, any Central Apparatus procedures. Even if the evidence was not ‘solid,’ it certainly reflected accurately, the rationale of the Central Apparatus, as the sentiment expressed was consistent with the public actions of the Apparatus.

Interviewees explained that they are threatened with not speaking to outsiders about Apparatus procedures, or they will receive security restrictions as sanctions. I have analysed the approach to the restrictions on freedom of expression, which encompass virtually any attempt a Bedoun might make to engage in public intellectual activities, to speak about their own identity, or that of their community (Chapter 8, section 8.2.2, Table 25), so there is little surprise in these statements, or in the existence of the documents I received. As I have mentioned, a number of interviewees had already had these security restriction applied to them directly, and some also had experienced their individual restrictions being applied to other members of their family. Again, we see the program of focusing on the individual, the family, and the whole ethnic group, which is the same blueprint or cultural pattern observed in the approach of removing names (Chapter 2, section 6.2.2, Table 20). And this highly coordinated approach of ‘harm one – harm many,’ is played out in the media constantly,
when Bedouin citizens are stripped of their citizenship, followed by their close relatives, then extended family members (in some Gulf countries, whole tribes are targeted with citizenship stripping (Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2014).

At the end of this spectrum of oppressive measures, lies the grim record of torture by the Kuwaiti state security police enforcement, which has an established practice of targeting individuals that has changed little since prior to the Iraqi invasion:

It is equally concerning that serious discriminations are inflicted on torture victims based on their nationality and their political opinions. In effect, complete impunity is bestowed upon those responsible for torture practiced against non-Kuwaitis or political opponents.

[Citation of the Mohamed al Mutairi case, where a Kuwaiti citizen was tortured to death by police but at least the perpetrators were punished].

The procedures for such cases is different, however, when it relates to Biduns and political opponents. The same rigorous standards are not observed by the investigation and certain cases of torture or death in prison of several political opponents or non-Kuwaiti citizens have been allowed.

… Many other cases of torture were reported over the last years. Abdulhakim [Hakeem] Al Fadhli was arrested in February 2014 during a protest and was tortured by agents of the state security services. After having complained to the Prosecutor, Mr Al Fadhli was sent back to prison and no measure was taken to investigate his allegations. (Alkarama Foundation, 2014, p.4)

It is almost needless to say that Hakeem al Fadhli is a member of the group most ‘eligible’ to receive citizenship under the Nationality Law (1959), Kuwait, and that security restrictions have been applied.

If we consider why government would be inclined to focus more intensively on criminalising and placing punitive restrictions on those Bedoun *most* legally qualified to receive citizenship, rather than those *least* legally qualified to receive citizenship during the ‘study’ period from 2010 (on which the 2012 system of typing was based) to 2016, the answer lies with the issue of the Bedoun who could not prove their basic identity with any papers. According to al Anezi (1989, p.263), the Bedoun who were not employed in the military, police force or national guard at the time, did not have to submit to enforced nationality re-labelling on their identifications cards like the former group, because they did not carry identification cards. Up until at least 1989, the state had never issued them with what he called the National Identity Card (al Anezi, 1989, p.266, n150). After the Iraqi invasion, just two to three years later, the state refused to issue any further identification to
the Bedoun (Maktabi, 1992). In other words, the state had always with-held identification, knowing the group were stateless and had none, certain interests in the state ensured they would never obtain any, from the government of Kuwait – lest it be used as evidence to satisfy the *Nationality Law (1959)* Kuwait, for citizenship (some scholars such as al Nakib, 2014, have suggested this latter group comprise some of the oldest families in Kuwait, which have been present in the territory for longer than most citizens). According to Human Rights Watch (2000),

> Bidun not employed by the government found themselves facing serious obstacles when seeking to register births, marriages, divorces, and deaths, because they lacked the required identification and were typically required to go through lengthy security checks before the Ministry of Interior would issue a letter of no objection. (Human Rights Watch, 2000, iv, ‘background’).

In other words, those not in the two groups stated above, had remained virtually no identification papers at all.

Government was confident that because this second group (non-military/police/national guard personnel) were undocumented, they would never be able to prove their identity, and thus, they were easy targets for ‘status adjustment.’ Certainly in terms of Kuwait’s international reputation, and the states’ responsibility to provide identification for stateless people, the pressure was off in terms of expectations to grant this group citizenship (clearly expressed by by UNHCR Statelessness unit’s Mark Manly regarding his endorsement of the attempt at forced re-allocation to Comorian nationality, contrary to international law, discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis). In the meantime, for those who were more capable - entirely capable - of proving their eligibility for citizenship under the *Nationality Law (1959)* Kuwait, a rationale for them to be stopped had to be found.

This would be the new ‘solution’ or rather, the new focus, to ‘Bedoun problem,’ established over the five-year study project (ultimately, a seven-year project) of the Central Apparatus. After all, it was always the documented Bedoun - those who had long established their legal right of Kuwaiti citizenship due to their *sheer luck* of their parents and grandparents having received and preserved their personal documents which had also survived the war – who had been the ‘troublemakers’ (the term used by the Hadar in Kuwait for Bedouns who speak openly about their citizenship rights). (Note that government had always held these records but chose not to produce them prior to the invasion by Iraq, when government archives were pillaged). This had been established in the mishandling of the Law 100/1980 issue, that had led to the administrative expulsion of 1986 (see Chapter 7 and Appendix B, iii). Just as the Iraqi invasion was used as the rationale for post-war killings and ethnic cleansing, the Arab Spring protests were used as the rational for the increase issue
of tens of thousands of ‘security restrictions’ cancelling citizenship ‘eligibility.’ The group has always had better access to education than the remainder of the population, and hence, they have been more inclined to be the leaders of Bedoun society, to have developed an informed political consciousness, to have had more effective responses and articulate voices.

Here, we see the rationale for escalation of punitive actions toward documented Bedoun, rather than undocumented Bedoun (see the F.C.O. Kuwait letter of 2007, in U.K. Home Office, 2009, 2014, 2016, which has given rise to the United Kingdom’s foreign policy of refusing to acknowledge the discrimination and victimisation of documented Bedoun). The rationale for this escalation was borne out in the data analysis, indicating an intense focus on Arab Spring human rights activists by the Central Apparatus, who were sons of military and police personnel and families who had retained their 1965 National Census registration documents, who could thus prove their eligibility for citizenship – ‘the right to have rights’ – as well as the expansion of their targeting via repression of a variety of forms of intellectual activity by means of which they could communicate their message to the world (Chapter 8).

The Ministry of Interior’s ‘security restriction’ bypasses all aspects of Kuwaiti law that might be used to challenge the deprivation of citizenship, removes access from public services in order to prevent the Bedoun from participating in society and overcoming poverty, and flags individuals as ‘marked’ by the apparatus, increasing their surveillance and the punitive manner in which they are treated by the state. In this case, I suggest the group most intensively targeted arose after the Arab Spring, for the same reason as the group which arose after the invasion of Iraq marked with the ‘traitor’ status. They are the most ‘deserving’ and so they will be the most punished, and due to the obsessive focus of the Ministry of the Interior, one of the ways in which this plays out is that the Apparatus is tasked with building up ‘security files’ with layer upon layer of pieces of paper signed by Bedouns admitting ‘other’ identity, signed statements promising not to speak to anyone about Apparatus procedures, and evidence from unnamed informants, and criminal indictments. This is what is Al Waqayan (2009) had referred to this as ‘the stage of indictment.’ As a local person, perhaps he was privy to this strategy.

The theme of open retribution encapsulated in government policy against the Bedoun, was established after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq (Sokoloff and Lewis, 2005). The ‘security restriction’ is used as an incentive for ‘status adjustment:’ if one is never going to receive citizenship or access to public services, one might as well submit to erasure – at least one will officially receive five years’ access to public services (give or take a security restriction). During my fieldwork in Kuwait I discussed the Bedoun blacklist with both male and female Hadar professors at Kuwait University. They confirmed the Bedoun blacklist exists, discussed how it works, but asked not to be named in this study.
Appendix E
Erasure (Administrative Ethnic Cleansing) - the ‘Status Adjustment’ Program (1983-)

i. Administrative expulsion (1983-1993) - summary from the thematic analysis


iii. Denial of the stateless population by Kuwait government authorities

iv. Denial of the concept of stateless by Kuwait government authorities

v. Main types of ‘other nationality’ ascribed to the Bedoun

vi. Main methods of ascribing ‘other nationality’ to the Bedoun
The administrative expulsion of the Bedoun was reported to commence in 1985 (Human Rights Watch, 1995) or 1986, according to the date of a policy document outlining the measures (‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003). Despite this, al Anezi (1989) documented expulsion and erasure measures changing the national identity of the Bedoun of official documents starting with an unpublished decree in 1983. This policy is now known as ‘status adjustment.’ On 15 December 1988, the Supreme Planning Council issued its *Strategy for Development*. The Ministry of Planning was given task to make Five Year Plans reflecting a long-term population strategy for Kuwait (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994). ‘Kuwaitisation,’ and the policy to de-nationalise the population from ‘Kuwaiti’ to the generic ‘non-Kuwaiti’ ‘other Arab’ was also implemented in 1988 (Human Rights Watch, 2000), likely as part of or connected to, the same process. The initial measures are described according to the year they appeared to be introduced in Table E1, below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Measure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1983 | ‘Status adjustment’ policy began to be implemented without public announcement. The stateless Bedoun population were prohibited from using the widely accepted term ‘Bedoun’ to describe their pre-citizenship status. They were instructed by government authorities to ‘show their original nationality’ on security card applications; the policy was not published but first imposed upon stateless Bedoun military servicemen, and then all adult males. 

Later, letters would be sent by the Ministry of Interior and other government departments to their Bedoun staff, demanding that ‘foreign passports’ be produced by them, and submitted to government agents for the purpose of establishing (changing) their identity (see below, 1986). The point is made here to emphasise that ‘original nationality’ was any nationality, as long as the submitted document was ‘foreign’ – that is, not Kuwaiti. 

Identity cards (military servicemen, others not required to carry identification cards) and drivers’ licences (general population) reissued with ‘non-Kuwaiti national’ (Al Anezi, 1989, p.263, n132; p.266-267, n152) or new nationality labels, which was been interpreted by government as the proper expression of the policy of ‘status adjustment’ (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.7). Al Anezi (1989) believed that an unannounced policy was implemented in late 1983 and carried out starting early 1984 (p.263), evidenced in the statements of authorities in Kuwaiti newspapers. 

These factors would later facilitate deportation according the repeal of the Immigration Law in 1987; see below. 

Mass processing of identity erasure was reported in 2000, using fake foreign passports and affidavits demanded by the Ministry of Interior to change the identity of thousands of Bedoun men, targeting military servicemen. Affidavits were supplied by the Central Apparatus (Human Rights Watch, 2000). |
| 1985 | In 1992, the national census was amended back to this date as part of the development of Kuwait’s Selective Migration Policy. The amendment involved removed the whole stateless Bedoun population from ‘Kuwaiti’ without citizenship to ‘non-Kuwaiti,’ ‘other Arab’ nationality (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, p.571, 581). ‘Kuwaitization’ policy was introduced, ostensibly to nationalise the Kuwaiti economic sector. It was predominantly as a political strategy, rather than a practical one (Stanton Russell, 1989). |
The Study of the country’s problem of the category of the ‘stateless’ produced by/or for the ‘Committee for the study of Illegal Residents,’ December 29, 1986 (reprinted August 30, 2003, in ‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003). The following measures were introduced:

- Registration of civil identification prohibited
- Access to birth, death and marriage certificates prohibited
- Access to employment prohibited, expulsion from positions without identity correction. Note the concordance with Kuwaitization policy.
- Freedom to travel prohibited with limited exceptions
- The Immigration Law is implemented to apply the notion of the ‘valid passport’ introduced to void termination from employment. The Kuwaiti travel document, the A17 is issued to stateless Bedoun – on condition that they relinquish to right to return to Kuwait
- Stateless government employees are issued letters directly from their Ministerial sections requesting they show a foreign national passport (al Anezi, 1989, p.266-267, n152). This point was mentioned above.

Exception to above measures: those working in the security services (military, police, national guard) continued their employment and were issued residency documents, as stipulated in the 1986 The Study of the country’s problem of the category of the ‘stateless,’ (‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003). While this exception was being made by government to prevent direct confrontation with the states own armed forces, this segment of the population was the first that was undergoing ‘status adjustment’ involving changes their civil identification cards from 1983.

1987

Article 25(h) of Law 17/1959, the Immigration Law was an exemption to the Immigration regulations for tribesmen, allowing them to enter Kuwait by land routes to carry out their business; it was repealed in 1987 (Longva, 1997, p.72, n7). The repeal meant that those who could not present a passport to prove they were a ‘valid’ non-national resident, they would be deemed illegal immigrants (Article 1 of the Immigration Law by Emiri Decree, December 14, 1959). This was essential to making the population appear to be legally deportable, according to the proviso that an individual may be granted permission to reside in Kuwait for a period of 5 years at discretion of the Minister of the Interior (Articles 9 and 12) (al Anezi, 1989). The preparation period had commenced in 1984 in relation to changing official identification documents.

Access to drivers’ licences, access to school education only provided in limited circumstances, such as for families in the military service and where the mother of a stateless child is a citizen (Human Rights Watch, 1995). Note that these circumstances have varied a great deal since 1987; uniform access to these basic rights to both these groups has never been provided.

1988

Access to university education and participation in civil organisations generally banned, but some access given in limited circumstances (Human Rights Watch, 1995).

The policy to de-nationalise the population from ‘Kuwaiti’ to the generic ‘non-Kuwaiti’ ‘other Arab’ was implemented in 1988 (Human Rights Watch, 2000). Coinciding the administrative expulsion, the Supreme Planning Council introduced its ‘strategies for Development’ and commenced acquiring United
Nations Development Program funding to aid its programs. The programs involved the strategic population reduction of the Bedouin from society, including illegalising them and implemented specific bans on education and employment (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994; Alessa, 1981).

1992 ‘Population restructuring’ program policy introduced. Ethnic targeting policy introduced to prevent the Bedouin ever receiving citizenship en masse again, singling out the Bedouin. The policy is was introduced via the arrangement of special powers for a group of individual intellectuals, the Academic Team for Population Policy, which superseded all Ministries prior to the resumption of the National Assembly.

The Bedouin were transferred from the National Census as ‘Kuwaiti’ to ‘non-Kuwaiti, other Arab’ with the nationality.

See also ‘developmental’ approaches in Appendix C, vi-viii and population reduction strategies Appendix D, i, and Appendix F, ii.

1993 Stateless Bedouin and citizen Bedouin together expelled from military service by the returning National Assembly (Human Rights Watch, 1995; Alhajeri, 2004). All previous exceptions to expulsion measures for military servicemen are ruled out. Nevertheless, during the war such servicemen were outcast and subject to human rights atrocities along with the general stateless population: they had already been expelled for all practical intents and purposes (see a). See also Appendix B, v, regarding the rights of military servicemen under the Constitution of Kuwait 1922/1962, Article 25.
Appendix E, ii


On August 30, 2003, al Talea reprinted the administrative expulsion policy document in ‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003. The policy was discussed in terms of specific measures that began to be implemented immediately, with 1986 as the start date. The image E1 below was provided by Mona Kareem.

Image E1

تجربة ورؤية مهنية أقرب
سياسات التضييق على البدون في العام 86

البحث عن حلول لموضوعات مثل الهجرة غير النظامية مثير للجدل في جميع أنحاء العالم. في العام 86، شهدت بعض الدول العربية تطورات تتعلق بسياسات التضييق على الأشخاص الذين يتم لجوؤهم إلى تلك الدول. هذه السياسات تресурс في حالة معينة تتطلب التدخل الفوري.

التوجهات العالمية تظهر أن هناك اهتماماً جدلاً للاستجوابات المتعلقة بسياسات الهجرة غير النظامية، والتي تتكبد الأبعاد الإنسانية والاقتصادية والسياسية. كما أن هناك اهتماماً جدلاً للاستجوابات المتعلقة بسياسات التضييق على الأشخاص الذين يتم لجوؤهم إلى تلك الدول.

الحالة العالمية تتطلب من الدول العربية اتخاذ قرارات مشروعة وقانونية في هذا الصدد، وضمان أن تكون السياسات متسقة وفعالة. كما أن هناك اهتماماً جدلاً للاستجوابات المتعلقة بسياسات الهجرة غير النظامية، والتي تتكبد الأبعاد الإنسانية والاقتصادية والسياسية.
Appendix E, iii

Denial of the Stateless Population by Kuwait Government Authorities

The imposed, restrictive cultural re-organisation of the Bedoun by the government of Kuwait has relied on the method of ‘status adjustment,’ which changes the national identity of the Bedoun, as part of an overall program, which removes national and ethnic identity (see Chapters 6 and 7). This gave rise to the imposition of a false identity upon the Bedoun, the ‘illegal resident’ of false (fraudulent) nationality, who is by definition not stateless (a social and legal status created by government through the denial of citizenship). An extension of this logic is the denial of the existence of a stateless population in Kuwait. One of the clearest examples of the ideology of denial can be found in denials that the Bedoun is a stateless population by government authorities. This dialogue of denial is highly repetitive, and tends to be issued with the same, repetitive phrases. Examples are listed below, in Table E2

A further extension of the logic is the denial of statelessness as a concept in international law by government authorities. Al Anezi (1989) first analysed this approach. I then explored these ideas further to illustrate the breadth and depth of the system of ideas that lies behind the cultural re-organisation of the Bedoun by authorities. This is discussed in Appendix E, iii and iv, below. The tables are not an exhaustive list.. More examples can be found in Kuwaiti newspapers and in National Assembly discussion time transcripts.
Table E2

*Examples of Kuwaiti Authorities Who Have Denied of the Bedoun Are a Stateless Population*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Minister</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>‘A source’ at the Central Apparatus in an interview with Colonel Muhammad Al Wuhaib, the Director of the Nationality Authentication Department in the Central Apparatus and Mr Salah Youssef al Fadhalah, Chief Executive of the Central Apparatus</td>
<td>Major steps to solve illegal residents’ limbo to be taken by 2016. <em>Who wants to prolong their problem?</em> (Nacheva, April 7, 2014, p.2) in <em>The Kuwait Times.</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix E, iv

Denial of the Concept of Statelessness by Kuwait Government Authorities

Table E3, below, shows examples of the denial of the statelessness in international law by Kuwaiti government authorities. The denial of statelessness as a concept in international law appears to stem from the inability of government authorities to articulate the logic of the ideology of the denial of the Bedouin as stateless, discussed in Appendix E, part c), above. The denial of the concept of statelessness generally speaking was first explored by al Anezi (1989), drawing on examples of official statements in local newspapers. The notion forms part of the overall program of ‘status adjustment’ program, as a rationalisation of the validity of the idea that the Bedouin have always held another nationality/citizenship from another country. This latter concept is an important indicator of the attempt of the government of Kuwait to extend the acceptance of the program internationally, and an indicator of the extent to which international audiences have enabled Kuwait to conduct the ‘status adjustment’ program.

Ideologist have taken a provocative stance in promoting this aspect of the ideology in forums whose purpose is to create and maintain international law: the United Nations and its various organs, particularly the Human Rights Committee. The denial of statelessness as a concept is not challenged when expressed by the Kuwaiti government in these contexts. The complicity of the United Nations which tolerates these denials in its own forums, helps to explain why no international actor has ever provided assistance to the Bedouin, to stop the erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing) and population reduction of the group or to help the Bedouin retain their collective identity.
Table E3

*Examples of Kuwaiti Authorities who Have Denied the Concept of Statelessness (from al Anezi, 1989)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Minister</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>The Manager of the Nationality Department</td>
<td>Sources: Al Anezi (1989, p269, n162), <em>al Anbaa</em> Newspaper (Kuwait), 11 August 1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Manager of the Nationality Department</td>
<td>Sources: Al Anezi (1989, p269, n162) referred to <em>Yaqda</em> Magazine (Kuwait) vol 757, April 22, 1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Mr al Adsani, President of Parliament</td>
<td>Sources: Al Anezi (1989, p.269, n159) referring to a quotation in <em>The Study,</em> vol 856, p.12, stated August 12, 1984; reported August 29, 1984.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>The Minister of Justice</td>
<td>Sources: Al Anezi (1989, p269, n159 and n163) referred to interviews in <em>al Rai</em> Newspaper, 4 and September 21, 1985 (n159). Also Al Anezi, (1989, p269, n163) <em>al Qabas,</em> September 28, 1985 (n163)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix E, v
Main Types of ‘Other Nationality’ Ascribed to the Bedoun

The documentary analysis showed the following themes of ascribing ‘other nationality’ to the Bedoun, which indicated the country to which nationality was claimed/changed. The nationalities are listed below, in Table E4. The politically significant nationalities listed reflect the locations of traditional tribal lands (dirah) of the Bedouin in Kuwait, prior to the formation of the modern nation state. However, the dirah tended to be transnational and included many areas, from Syrian to Yemen. For a list of nations across which the dirah of the main tribes of Kuwait extended, see Appendix B, i. The countries were associated with Bedoun, either linked to the fake, foreign passports government demanded the Bedoun obtain and submit to the Ministry of Interior from the early 1980s, or stated on affidavits, or other documents.

Table E4

_A List of the Main Nationalities Ascribed to the Bedoun by the Government of Kuwait_

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationalities ascribed to the Bedoun by government authorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group 1: ‘Any’ nationality but not Kuwaiti group</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Eritrea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Dominican Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group 2: Politically significant associations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Iranian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Iraqi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Syrian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Saudi Arabian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There have been countless government announcements since that time, stating that the Bedoun population was a group of foreign nationals, foreign citizens, and/or fifth column spies working in covert operations, for these countries. It is notable that my analysis found major discrepancies in numbers of individuals who were listed as having ‘original nationalities’ associated with these states, especially Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In 2014, the Central Apparatus announced that there were an 58,770 additional Bedoun found to be ‘Saudi Arabian’ citizens, a remarkable increase of 58,770 (Nacheva, April 6, 2014) since the
2010 Supreme Planning Council study had declared there were no Saudi Arabian Bedoun (Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.21 quoting the study released in Kuwait’s *al Qabas* newspaper). The nature of this labelling is discussed in more detail below.

**Group 1: ‘Any’ Nationality But Not Kuwaiti**

From 1984 to 2011, the official policy was for stateless people to have to state their ‘original nationality’ even if they didn’t have one. That is, being stateless, the policy was to force the population to ‘admit’ or ‘reveal’ they had a nationality that did not exist. This was a requirement for the Bedoun to keep the status as legally registered with the Central Apparatus, for the purpose of obtaining an identity card, for the receipt of identity document birth certificate, marriage certificate or drivers’ licences. The introduction of the policy coincided with the policy dropping the official usage of the name ‘Bedoun’ from official documents, and enforcing the use of the term ‘non-Kuwaiti nationality’ (see Appendix C, i). The policy was expressed by international humanitarian agencies very benignly, to the extent that it might be construed as misleading, for example:

> During the year, Kuwaiti authorities escalated pressure on the Bedoons to secure citizenship elsewhere in order for them to remain in Kuwait lawfully. (Human Rights Watch, 1994, n.p.)

How could the Bedoun ‘secure citizenship elsewhere’ when they were prohibited from leaving the Kuwait and returning? The agency was quite aware that this was almost impossible, for authorities refused to allow the Bedoun to return to their homes if they crossed the Kuwaiti border. This information was withheld. It would have pointed to the fact that the group were required to obtain false documentation of ‘other nationality’ from inside the country, which led to the burgeoning fake document trafficking industry operating in Kuwait.

From 2011, as part of Decree 409/2011 reforms, the previous official policy was amended to allow individuals to use the term ‘non-Kuwaiti’ on all government documents instead of Bedouns being required to (untruthfully) list actual states as their nationality (Kuwait government response to Human Rights Watch, 2011; Reply of Government of Kuwait to the Human Rights Committee, 17 October – 4 November, 2011). In 2014, it was reported that government agencies had not implemented this consistently, but instead, had continued to demand that actual nationalities to be listed on documents. However, the allowance of the term ‘non-Kuwaiti’ to be listed (Decree 409/2011) was actually precluded at the outset of Decree 409/2011 by the *satisfaction of proof of non-Kuwaiti citizenship*, rather than simply allowing an applicant to write ‘non-Kuwaiti’ on official documents. In other words, the government response about its own policy to Human Rights Watch, was...

This explained why at the grassroots, there were small improvements for a few, but no improvement for the vast majority of the population, which would enable them to access public services arising from Decree 409/2011 (personal communications with Hakeem al Fadhli, 19 October, 2014, 1 December 2015). Because the Bedoun could not access this policy by showing their ‘real’ nationality (since they did not have one), the previous policy of forced/coerced erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing) and change of identity to false (fraudulent) nationality labels simply continued. In other words, there was no substantive change of policy with Decree 409/2011 but rather, the continuation of the previous policy introduced in 1983. At that time, letters by government forcing the Bedoun to produce foreign passports in order to prevent their expulsion from public service employment and potentially, deportation (Al Anezi, 1989, p.266-267, n152).

Having explained some of the historical and recent events regarding the concept of ‘other nationality’ labelling, I will now examine how that policy works in terms of the government of Kuwait’s involvement in the human trafficking industry, specifically promoting the trade of false identity documents including fraudulent passports. A US Embassy cable in 2006 confirmed that the use administrative erasure and surveillance methods in Bedoun ‘transactions’ with the Central Apparatus (then called the Executive Committee of Illegal Residents), the administrative arm of the Ministry of the Interior that controls the registration of the stateless population, was out of control, remarking, ‘the situation is ridiculous’ (WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, 2006, November 26). The US Embassy confirmed that one of the main functions of the Executive Committee (now the Central Apparatus) was to track ‘security restrictions’ – that is to conduct surveillance on the Bedoun population, in addition to re-assigning their nationality on official records.

My research indicated that the surveillance function oppressed the population so that the state could continue with the program of erasure, with minimal opposition from the population at the grassroots (see my discussion of security restrictions as a method of eradicating the potential population of Kuwaiti citizens, in Appendix D, iv). The approach was a long-term one, still used in 2014, confirmed by government authorities whom provided key sources for a story, Bedoon Draft Laws Upset State-Body Work Plan (February 9, 2014, The Kuwait Times). The term ‘security restrictions’ was clarified as,

Conditions by which a stateless resident becomes unqualified for citizenship, including having a criminal record. (The Kuwait Times, February 9, 2014)
The US Embassy cable had discussed ‘transactions’ between the Bedoun and government agents at the Central Agency Office. These methods necessarily involved stateless people being compelled to obtain false identity documents but also, the coercion of the Bedoun at government offices, forcing them to do so. The cable pointed to overt pressure and coercion took place to ‘convince’ Bedoun individuals to change their nationality during face to face ‘transactions’ with Central Apparatus staff, where the contact details passport traffickers, whom the Bedoun were told to contact, were posted on the walls:

Instead they reportedly try to convince Bidoon that if they declare a nationality, they will find it much easier to proceed with this transaction as well as future transactions. Once a Bidoon declares a nationality, however, he has for all intents and purposes permanently given up his chance to get Kuwaiti citizenship. (US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, November 26, 2006).

The outcome of this policy was that the Bedoun were required to obtain documentation fraudulently labelling their ‘original’ origins with any origin. As a result, many men submitted to purchasing fraudulent passports and/or other documents from human trafficking agents, as they were instructed to do so by the Apparatus. This policy had been in place since 1983, in relation to the official letters issued by government (mentioned above).

Hence, the administrative expulsion of the Bedoun was never simply a matter of listing the Bedoun as ‘illegal residents’ and threatening them with deportation from the country. The program described by al Anezi commencing in 1983, was always a program of erasure. The enforcement not only of the concept of ‘original nationality,’ but of making the stateless Bedoun acquire documentation to show they held any nationality, as long as it was not Kuwaiti, was confirmed again in 1994 by Human Rights Watch (1994); in 2006 by the US Embassy in Kuwait (US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514 at 4, November 26, 2006) and in 2011 by the government of Kuwait (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011). The states involved included the Dominican Republic, Bolivia, Liberia and Nigeria (US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514_a, November 26, 2006, at 7), Eritrea and Yemen (al Waqayan, 2009) and Somalia (Beaugrand, 2010, p.155).

The ramifications were broad, as the process changed not just the individual person who signed the affidavit or submitted a fraudulent passport, it changed the identity of all members of their household under Kuwaiti law. Since its inception, the program has been organised through the Central Apparatus offices, the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defence, and had initially included the targeting of these Ministry’s own employees in the past, when many of the Bedoun were employed there prior to the 1986 expulsion.
The ‘status adjustment’ program comprised the theft of the Bedoun’s collective national and ethnic identity. The psychological ramifications of dispersing the groups’ identity to a range of disconnected, nonsensical and ineffective nationality labels had left the population in a constant state of psychological and social crisis (al Waqayan, 2009, p.35). These issues were discussed further in Chapter 7 of the thesis.

Beaugrand (2010) on the other hand, claimed she believed the process involved covert and illegitimate, human trafficking transactions between the state of Kuwait and a variety of foreign governments affecting thousands of Bedoun men and their family members. That is, al Waqayan (2009) believed the identities changed involved ineffective nationalities, while alternatively Beaugrand (2010) speculated that financial transactions and and effective nationalities were involved (selling the population’s identity vis a vis the Comoros Plan and perhaps a whole range of other nations, giving them a nationality they could ‘effect’ if they were actually residents of those countries, which they were not). However, the researcher did not show any evidence that effective nationality had been obtained, and the matter of whether or not a legitimate grant of nationality given by another state in such circumstances would be an effective one (since the individual could not use it effectively anyway under the current conditions of entrapment the Bedoun experience), would more likely be a contestable point of law. Nevertheless, Beaugrand’s (2010) suggestion is worth considering, as complicity may explain the silence of the other states to whom the Kuwaiti authorities continually claim the Bedoun belong.

Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah al Sabah, the current Undersecretary for Citizenship and Passports Affairs at the Ministry of Interior, believes the program of forced identity erasure is perfectly legitimate. However, he has lamented that some Bedoun could not continuously obtain fraudulent passports for the same countries again and again, without gaps in between:

Some bedoons have already legalized their status and got Dominican, Somali and Yemeni citizenships, yet they have to keep their passports valid to be deemed legal residents.’ (Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah al Sabah in, ‘Bedoons to Get’, 2015).

Interestingly, al Jarrah mentioned one nationality mentioned in each of the group of nationalities discussed in the WikiLeaks cable (US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514_a November 26, 2006, at 7), in al Waqayan (2009) and Beaugrand (2010). Here, the Ministry of Interior openly disclosed its approach that the Bedoun should be forced to acquire fraudulent identity documents, and that there is no regard for the effectiveness of citizenship or nationality attached to the document. Through the statement, the government of Kuwait implicated itself in the organised crime of human trafficking of the whole Bedoun population. Surely this statement gave the game away? The question arises as to why high
authorities can issue such bizarre public statements have never attracted the attention of international human rights agencies, nor academics who study Kuwait or the Middle East.

Sources: WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514 (November 26, 2006); Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch (2011, p.2, 7); al Waqayan (2009); Amnesty International (2013b); Human Rights Watch (2014); U.K. Home Office (2014);

**Group 2: Politically significant associations**

In this section, I will address each country named in Group 2, Table E4, above.

**Iranian.** The ‘Iranian’ fifth column emerged from the alleged involvement of Iran in the assassination attempt on the Emir, which was linked to the stateless population. One individuals involved in the Emiri guard was a stateless person, who was killed protecting the Emir. The assassination took place in in May 1985. Alhajeri (2004) interviewed Ghanim Alnajjar about the matter in November 2002, about the ideas behind the ‘Iran’ accusation, noting that none of the reasons had ever been justified despite the accusation reaching international circulation as a ‘reason’ for the expulsion of the population in 1986.

The ‘Iranian cell’ factor became so significant that it has consistently overshadowed other political factors as a supposed rationale for the expulsion of the Bedoun in 1986, for example the debate over Law 100/1980 or the Bedouin representation in the National Assembly reaching over 50% in 1981 and 1984 (Alhajeri, 2004).

The notion continued to be developed with such certainty that it was later elevated to the level of political ‘theory’ by the US Embassy in Kuwait, classified under confidential ‘political affairs,’ ‘internal government affairs’:

Another theory points to a Bidoon [stateless] cell cooperating with Iran in the Iran-Iraq war that was discovered in 1986. This raised fears that the Bidoon, who made up as much as 80% of the military enlisted ranks, might constitute a fifth column. In any case, the Government began dismantling Bidoon rights… (WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, 2006, November 26).


**Iraqi.** The ‘Iraqi’ fifth column was claimed as a rationale for the abuse of the Bedoun after the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, including killings and ethnic cleansing. The label, sign or symbol of the ‘Iraqi’ enemy has been used to kill the Bedoun en masse and it is linked to a number of ideological motifs of Kuwaiti nationalism, such as ‘defence against a common enemy’ and ‘sins of the fathers’ (Znaniecki, 1952a). To the extent that it was used to implement state-sanctioned terror (virtually equivalent to that
discussed regarding Palestinians, by Mason, 2010), a comparison with Palestinian persecution and ethnic cleansing during the same period, is warranted.

While Palestinians were cited to be collaborators with Iraqis, the Bedoun were cited as both collaborators with Iraqis, and also cited as being Iraqis, in government announcements. For example, state-sanctioned violence was related to attempts to force the Bedoun population into Iraq; partial transfer was achieved. Additionally, at the Abdali border camps, babies died after their parents were advised they were Iraqi and would be hanged if they attempted to return to Kuwait. See methods of violent ethnic cleansing 1990-1995, also called the ‘population restructuring’ program in Appendix F.

I raise concerns about significant population losses of Bedoun between 2010-2014, allocated ‘Iraqi’ through the Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program, in Appendix G, iii, below. The attribution of ‘Iraqi’ nationality to the northern tribes Bedoun remains a significant, ‘live’ issue in Kuwaiti society, which I discuss in Chapter 6 and 7. It may be regarded as the most significant and dangerous label, sign or symbol of ethnic targeting used by authorities and ordinary members of society, to marginalize and stigmatize the Bedoun. The fact that this continues after the state of Kuwait had normalised its diplomatic relations with Iraq, emphasises the problem of the social causes and social maintenance of this sentiment.


Syrian. The royal family of Kuwait, the al Sabah, are apparently derived from the large al Anezi tribal confederation. The tribe are the only main tribe of Kuwait whose dirah (traditional tribal territory) is associated with Syria (see Appendix B, i). The government’s amplification of claims the Bedoun were Syrian coincided with Kuwait’s ‘Pledging Conferences’ to respond to the Syrian war from February 2013 (the first Pledging Conference, Kuwait donated $300 million) and the UNHCRs promotion of stateless Syrian children. In meetings with the European parliamentary group, Kuwaiti authorities emphasised the whole population does not belong in Kuwait and shifted the emphasis of their ‘origins’ to Syrian nationality. I did not observe that this occurred consistently over many years, but rather, the attribution appears to be very recent, taking advantage of the situation in Syria.

I raise concerns about significant population losses of Bedoun in 2014-2015, allocated ‘Syrian’ through the Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program, in Appendix G, iii below.
Saudi Arabian. In Appendix G, iii, I discussed the typing and labelling of the Bedouin by the Central Apparatus. I made a quantitative comparison of ‘other national’ labelling of the Bedouin from 2010-2014 derived from the thematic analysis. Colonel al Wuhaib of the Central Apparatus announced that since 1986, a total of over 58,770 Bedouin were found to be ‘Saudi Arabian’ citizens (Nacheva, April 6, 2014). In 2010, the Supreme Planning Council Study had allocated no Bedouin (nil or zero) as Saudi Arabian, also taking their data from the beginning of the Bedouin’s ‘illegal’ status, December 26, 1986. There were no Saudi Arabian ‘nationals’ believed to be in the Bedouin population at that time. The recent claim of the Bedouin’s Saudi Arabian nationality occurred only through ‘status adjustment,’ which involved coercion.

Note that the Bedouin of the southern tribes are generally speaking, assumed to be of Saudi Arabian background. The claim that the Bedouin are of Saudi Arabian citizens, is closely associated with national debate and National Assembly conflict over Law 130/1986 regarding dual citizenship (see al Anezi, 1989) and previous author’s focus on al Haddad’s (1981) study of the Ajman. That study which revealed some of them held dual citizenship (al Haddad, 1981; repeated by Crystal, 1995, p.89 and others). The Ajman were related to both the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian royal families by marriage. Nevertheless, these issues concerned Kuwaiti Bedouin citizens and not the Bedouin.

One exception to this was Al Fayez (1984, p.249), who noted that the Ajman was one of many Kuwait’s northern tribes, and the northern tribes have characteristically been associated with the Bedouin. However, in this case, the reference does not seem to point to Saudi Arabia, so the point may have little relevance, other than to illustrate the different perspectives that can be taken when categorising the northern and southern tribes.

I raise concerns about the significant population influx of Bedouin between 2010-2014, allocated ‘Saudi Arabian’ through ‘status adjustment,’ in Appendix G, iii, below.

Appendix E, vi

Main Methods of Ascribing ‘Other Nationality’ to the Bedoun

The documentary analysis showed the following themes by which government used a range of different methods to ascribe ‘other nationality’ to the Bedoun. These are summarised below in Table E5, then discussed further. The five-year period of ‘benefits’ so often raised by government as an object of exchange in this program, is discussed below.

Table E5

Summary of the Methods of Ascribing ‘Other Nationality’ to the Bedoun Used by the Government of Kuwait

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Target population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Affidavit program – forced ‘confessions’</td>
<td>Thousands of military servicemen were targeted and forced to commit affidavit fraud. Deportation committees were run concurrently to expel those who would not submit</td>
<td>Bedoun military servicemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Government issued ID cards</td>
<td>Government ID cards</td>
<td>Military, policy and national guard servicemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Drivers’ licences</td>
<td>Drivers licences issued with false nationalities or ‘non-Kuwaiti’</td>
<td>All adult, Bedoun males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Letters program – procuring fake foreign passports</td>
<td>Government employees issued letters with notes. The note required they submit any ‘foreign’ passport from their (unnamed) embassy</td>
<td>All Bedoun government service employees, other than those in the military, police or national guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Mass, bi-lateral population transfer</td>
<td>Multiple bi-lateral, international agreements enabling identity transfers to other states suggested by Beaugrand (2010). See also the Comoros Plan below</td>
<td>Bedoun military servicemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The passports program – fake foreign passports</td>
<td>Pressure on individuals to submit fake foreign passports. Contact details of traffickers provided by Ministry of Interior</td>
<td>All Bedoun male heads of household and their dependents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Marriage and divorce certificates</td>
<td>‘Other nationality’ required to be declared on marriage certificate documentation, with supply of fraudulent identity documents to</td>
<td>Newly married couples; divorcing couples</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
support the application

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8. Birth and death certificates</th>
<th>‘Other nationality’ required to be declared for the acquisition of a birth certificate and subsequently, school enrolment</th>
<th>Newborn babies and young children; the deceased (rationale to change their children’s nationality)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9. Contracts and statements of obligation issued by the Central Apparatus</td>
<td>Letters are sent by the Education Fund setting out their obligation to submit children to the ‘status adjustment’ or they will be issued debts for children’s schooling</td>
<td>Parents of children at school. Possibly older students and/or the whole population attempting to access Decree 409/2011 reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. The Comoros Plan</td>
<td>Comorian passports issued by government providing ‘legal residents’ status for 5 years. The ‘nationality’ is contingent on passport renewal every 5 years</td>
<td>The whole population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Those who resist ‘status adjustment’: The encampment option</td>
<td>Segregation and encampment near Saudi Arabian border. Not yet government policy, but introduced by a member of parliament.</td>
<td>Those who engage in public expression about the Bedoun (intellectuals/social leaders); those who resist ‘status adjustment’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1. Affidavit Program – forced ‘confessions’**

Military servicemen were required to sign affidavits to enable the Ministry of the Interior to change their nationality in a citizenship application program (Human Rights Watch, 2000). The program went for nine months. It pressured Bedoun men sign affidavits to 'admit' they had foreign citizenship, and to renounce their Kuwaiti identity. In return, five years of legal residency and access to public services was promised. Essentially, this provision was the ‘reason’ for official cessation of access to public services for Bedoun after five years, instead of the informal blanket ban on all Bedoun that was already in place. A special deportation committee was established at this time to manage the prosecution of individuals who did not transfer their nationality, due to the expected number of refusals (Human Rights Watch, 2000).

When the applications closed, individuals were threatened with mass deportations although Human Rights Watch (2000) was never able to establish that these deportations actually took place. However, this has certainly been a pattern – mass deportations threatened in 2012 were never documented by the organisation, but nor did they explain their own cutting back of resources to the Kuwait/Bedoun human rights portfolio after the threats were issued. Hence, lack of reporting by international humanitarian organisations should not be interpreted as the events, promised by the Ministry of Interior and other government
officials, failing to occur. Masses of ‘illegal migrants’ who are ‘other nationals’ have taken place since then under migrant deportation schemes. They may well include ‘re-nationalised’ (erased) stateless Bedoun, those recorded as other nationals, as a result of the Program. Humanitarian organisations have never attempted to deeply investigate the nexus of the ‘other nationals’ who are routinely deported from Kuwait in their hundreds and thousands, in order to establish if Bedoun are being deported en masse but listed on government records as expatriate, other national workers. There has never been a historical investigation into mass deportations that government had arranged for, at this time.

Participants in this study discussed the forced ‘resignations’ of their fathers from the military and police services, which included the same or similar pressures on individuals to claim a false nationality (P8, P16, P17). Nearly all of the participants in this study had a father in the military or police services and was forced to sign such resignation papers after they were expelled from their roles after the Iraq war, in order to receive their salaried benefits. They did not receive their entitlements in any case, while authorities added the signed documents of ‘other nationality’ to their security files.

Key sources: Human Rights Watch (2000, 2001); Participants 8, 16 and 17.

2. Government issued ID cards
Al Anezi (1989) helps to delineate the ‘two groups’ of Bedoun (discussed in Chapter 2), and the problem of the Bedouns lack of registration with government and/or lack of ability to prove their identity with appropriate official documentation in the late 1980s. In particular, he addressed policy changes that were applied to the National Identity Card (al Anezi, 1989, p.263) and drivers licences (p.263). Up until late 1983, Kuwaiti public policy regarded the Bedoun as ‘persons without Kuwaiti nationality’ and the term ‘Bedoun’ was used on official documents that stated their identity. That is, the term was used on official documents for those who could register with government and have their identity acknowledged as existing.

At this stage, only those Bedoun employed in the military, police or national guard carried National Identity Cards (al Anezi, p.266, n150, 267, n152). It was later established that other Bedoun could never obtain such documentation (Human Rights Watch, 2000) which the F.C.O. Kuwait (2007) called ‘undocumented Bedoun’ (in U.K. Home Office, 2009, 2014, 2016). As such, they were not initially targeted for ‘status adjustment’ in this program to change their national identity, because they lacked identity cards. They were targeted through the changes to drivers’ licenses and other programs.

From 1984, a policy change occurred, and the Bedoun were no longer allowed to use the term ‘Bedoun.’ According to al Anezi (1989, p.263), the new policy was to call the Bedoun as ‘non-Kuwaiti nationals’ on the identity cards (Manager of the Nationality Department, Ministry of Interior, in al Anbaa, 11 August, 1984; Minister of Justice in al Rai, 4 September, 1985).
However, he did not confirm his sighting of any cards stating this term. It appears that he had to rely on newspaper archives in which government authorities stated the policy (al Anezi, 1989, p.263). The significance of the change was that previously, the Bedoun were not referred to as nationals of any state, because they were stateless. The national policy remained that they would be granted citizenship in due course, based on the assumption that they belonged to the main tribes of Kuwait (al Anezi, 1989, p.263). The new policy referred to the Bedoun as ‘nationals’ of other states.

Two points are salient here, because we do not know if the use of the term was implemented on the cards as the researcher alluded to. By 1986-1987, just two years later, government was pressuring other Bedouns in the public service to supply foreign passports to prove this ‘other nationality,’ as the policy was rolled out to those other Bedouns not in the military services, the police force or the national guard, but employed in other parts of the government service. This action was to enable the Apparatus to label identity documents with a specific nationality label that matched evidence collected in the Bedoun's security files.

The second point is that the Ministry of Interior acknowledged that its practice was that the agency itself determined the specific nationality label to be used on the Bedoun's official identity documents issued by other Ministries, including birth, death, marriage and divorce certificates based on secret investigations and research (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.7). This appears to have been the standard policy from at least 1986 to 2011. Government claimed that the Bedoun could use the term ‘non-Kuwaiti’ national on all of these documents plus drivers’ licenses, from 2011, as part of Decree 409/2011 (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p. 3, 4), as it had historically forced specific national labels on documents. The Decree emanated from Bedoun community protest actions and negotiations with government in the Arab Spring.

For both of these reasons, it is reasonable to conclude that perhaps ‘non-Kuwaiti’ was the policy, but not the actual label that was used on the documents, and that the specific (false) nationality had to be stated from 1984 when the policy was rolled out. But either way, we know that the Apparatus was seeking the specific (but false) nationality label to be stated at all costs, due to the policies contained in the administrative expulsion of 1986 (‘The Study,’ 2003) which sought to switch the Bedouns’ identity to that of illegal expatriate workers (who needed to appear to have arrived recently from another country), and the existence of the affidavits program and the letters program (see Table E5, above).

It is also worth asking, was the policy implemented across all types identity documentation issued by government to this registered group of Bedoun (those in the military, police or national guard and their immediate families)? Al Anezi (1989) did not indicate that the policy did not apply to those documents, or was only limited to the two
document types he mentioned (identification cards and drivers licences) but rather, that he was simply aware the policy was carried out on the two forms of identification that he mentioned.


3. Drivers licences

Al Anezi (1989) discussed the change of policy for naming the Bedoun ‘non-Kuwaiti nationals’ (of other states) on identity and drivers licenses (p.263). The policy was passed through government in 1983, and implanted in 1984 (see discussion of Identity Cards, above). The author did not clarify which group were affected by the change to drivers licences.

I have pointed out that Al Anezi (1989) described two groups of Bedouns, one who were more able to identify themselves due to their registration with government and one who were unable to acquire documents. I am not sure how members of the second group would have obtained the drivers licence in this case, if they did not have other identification for the licence registration process. Therefore, we might tentatively assume that this measure applied only to the first group, those members of the military, the police and national guard.

In any case, the author also noted that by 1989, drivers’ licences were not being replaced (Al Anezi, 1989, p.267, n153) and that other discriminatory measures had been implemented, but did not name them (p.267). By the end of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, the Bedoun could not obtain virtually any kind of documents from government that might state their identity because ethnic cleansing had been implemented in earnest.

Source: Al Anezi, p.263, n132, p.267, n152.

4. Letters program to procure foreign passports

The next program to ‘adjust status’ of the Bedoun, it appears to have commenced some time from 1985 to 1987. Following nationality re-labelling on military servicemen’s identity cards, and Bedoun men’s divers’ licenses, other government service employees were targeted (except employees in the military, police and national guard). According to Al Anezi (1989, p.266-267, n152), all Bedoun government service employees, other than those in the military, police or national guard, were sent letters by the under-secretary of the ministries in which they were employed (Al Anezi, p.267). The notes stated that if they disclosed their ‘original nationality’ and obtained passports from their respective embassies, the government would facilitate their legal residence in Kuwait. If they did not comply, their employment would cease. Al Anezi (1989) left an important two important clues. First, he
stated an ‘original nationality’ (p.266) was required to be stated by the Bedoun, following the policy. However, when he came to explain the letters (p.267 n151) there was no request to state ‘original nationality’ but rather, the note instructed to servicemen to get a foreign passport. Second, he stated that no embassy was nominated on the letter, indicating that government did not know the nationality of the individuals (because they were stateless). The notes were accompanied by a letter from the undersecretary of the Ministry concerned, to the undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior, on behalf of the Bedoun individual. The letters were sent in a strange, back-handed manner. Therefore, it is worth quoting al Anezi (1989):

A letter was sent by the under-secretary of the Ministry concerned to the under-secretary of the Ministry of the Interior asking him to grant the stateless person concerned a residence permit for five years provided that he produced a valid passport from his embassy. The letter was accompanied by a note to the stateless person asking him to obtain a passport from his embassy (no mention of the name of the embassy) and send it to the Ministry of the Interior in order to obtain the residence permit. (al Anezi, p.267, n151)

The letter requested a grant of legal residence permit for a five-year period in return for the production of a valid passport from the individual’s embassy. No particular embassy was named, indicating government had no knowledge of any nationality held by the individual (al Anezi, 1989, p.266-267, n152).

The letter was sent with ‘a note to the stateless person’ requesting them to obtain a passport from his embassy and to send it to the Ministry of the Interior to obtain a residence permit (Al Anezi, 1989, p.267, n152). That is, the government instructed the stateless individuals to obtain a foreign passport to avoid losing their government employment (and associated benefits such as their pension accrual). Clearly, this practice was associated with the text of the 1986 expulsion decree, which claimed to intend to demand individuals ‘show their passports’ under procedures for organising ‘migrant’ residency. The informality of the ‘note’ is curious. What was expected of the Bedoun (men with little formal education) on receiving it? Would they think that the authorities wanted them to go to any embassy? Or would they think that the authorities wanted them to go to a local document trafficker?

Those who attempted to obtain nationality from other country authorities in an attempt to obtain a passport, who were unsuccessful with the attempt because they were Bedoun, were then found guilty of providing false information to the Kuwait government: for having registered as a Bedoun when they were nationals of the country to which they had applied for that nationality, other suitable documents, or a passport (see Beaugrand 2010, p.161-162, who provided a case example given R. H. al Anezi, 13 December, 2005, in personal interview). Of course, the nationality was not ever established by the court, the
nationality was assumed proven by the judge, and the verdict of guilt cancelled out their ‘edibility’ to gain citizenship. It is worth noting that by this time, the Bedoun men began to be directed to fraudulent passport sellers by employees at the Central Apparatus, who became virtually institutionalised there (al Waqayan, 2009; WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, 2006, November 26).


5. Mass, bi-lateral population transfer program

Around 4,000 members of the military services had previously ‘changed’ their identity status under instructions from the government of Kuwait. They seem to have been unaware of their involvement in an illegal scam to change their identity in order to keep their jobs (al Waqayan, 2009; see also al Waqayan in interview with Beaugrand, 2010). If we consider their cultural background, which imbues great loyalty to their superiors, their lack of formal education, and the culture of the military services, this seems feasible, though we cannot be certain. Either way, individuals would have had been given little choice in the matter by their employer. This strategy seemed to apply to the employees of the military forces only. It appears to have been linked to the 1993 National Assembly legislation, which expelled stateless men from the security services (military, police, national guard) (Human Rights Watch, 1995), but not necessarily to the affidavit program which targeted the military servicemen (see above), as both al Waqayan (2009) and Beaugrand (2010) indicated that fraudulent passports were involved.

According to al Waqayan (2009) and Beaugrand (2010), this program appears to have been run some years after the first passport program (based on official letters of demand) that targeted all Bedoun government service employees. It seems to have involved quite some level of in-depth, practical cooperation between the Ministry of Interior and the Department of Defence, and to have been known to the National Assembly, as al Waqayan (2009) obtained was exposed to the program as a government researcher. The actual method of changing nationality was not clear. Therefore, I am not sure if the group were simply listed on government ‘security’ files under different nationalities in a very basic form of administrative cleansing such as the shift of the population on the National Census in 1992 (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994; see also Appendix D, iii), or if there was organised signing of documents, such as the affidavits program, or organised trafficking in fraudulent passports, initiated by the first program that targeted the whole population with letters of demand for ‘foreign’ passports.

The type of identity documentation used for the process is unclear – it seems likely the documents were affidavits, but they may have been any kind of document. I have
collected anecdotal evidence from Bedouns in Kuwait that they are often told to sign pieces of paper with statements printed on them that claim they have another nationality, when they visit Central Apparatus offices. The form of the statements is characterised by its quasi-formality – it does not appear to be an actual affidavit, but the emphasis is on the Bedoun signing documents, perhaps any kind of document, to ‘admit’ their ‘true identity’ or ‘original nationality.’ It is possible that the transfer of identity took place directly on the government database, as even today, it is commonplace for government to claim it holds ‘secret’ data on the Bedouns ‘real,’ ‘original’ nationality in individuals’ ‘security file,’ though no documentary proof has even been provided by the state in a public forum, that such proofs exist.

Beaugrand’s (2010, p.155) analysis regarding bi-lateral government agreements tends to indicate the latter. According to Beaugrand (2010) the negotiations comprised ‘secret,’ bilateral agreements signed between Kuwait and other states including Eritrea, Liberia, the Dominican Republic and others nations to transfer the identity of the Bedoun (p.155). Beaugrand (2010) did not produce evidence to convince readers of her suggestion, and she was inclined to cast aspersions about secret business through her research work (including in the opening statement of her thesis) without much substantiation. Since then, discussion of the Comoros Plan has led to the realisation that any genuine citizenship offered by other states would be ineffective for the Bedoun, and hence legally useless, since they cannot exercise the citizenship due to travel restrictions, re-entry restrictions, and the fact that the citizenship offered bears no relation to their identity.

Additionally, more knowledge about the fraudulent identity trafficking industry in Kuwait has emerged (Abrahamian, 2015; WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, 2006, November 26), which is discussed below under point 4. This gives cause to believe the nationalities are merely labels, since the passports are frauded. Another reason that we can fairly safely assume the nationality labels are ‘just labels’ and not effective nationality - continually overlooked by Beaugrand (2010, 2014b) and other researchers, and perhaps this is the most substantive one, is that nationality labelling is a basic method of erasure programs (administrative ethnic cleansing). The method has been used recently to erase Albanians (Dedic, 2003; Dedic in Weissbrodt, 2008) and Romas (Sigona, 2003), and the method tends to be used precisely for illegitimate identity transfers for whole target populations. The issue wherein al Jarrah outlines the Central Apparatus demand that Bedouns repeatedly engage in the crime of obtaining fake passports or a citizenship that is not theirs over many years – potentially their adult lives - adds to the crime of erasure.

Key Sources: al Waqayan (2009); Beaugrand (2010); Weissbrodt (2008); WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514 (2006, November 26).

6. The passports program for more fake, foreign passports
Another program was run out of the offices of the Central Apparatus offices that dealt directly with the Bedoun population, who are obliged to report regularly to such offices. This seems to be a fairly standard, ongoing program and perhaps the most common approach of all those listed in Table E5, above. Again, the program involved forcing Bedoun men, albeit using a different method, to obtain a foreign passport, and to submit it to the Central Apparatus office for copying and inclusion on the recipients ‘security file.’ The program has led to the proliferation of the fraudulent documentation industry in Kuwait, and it has also promoted the people-trafficking industry. This has led to an expanded relationship with organised crime and the international movement of enslaved labour (Abrahamian, 2015). According to WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, 2006, November 26,

_The situation has become ridiculous_, with many Bidoon holding counterfeit passports from places such as the Dominican Republic, Bolivia, Liberia and Nigeria just so they can get the papers necessary to go about their lives. The Human Rights Society accuses the GOK [government of Kuwait] of _actually posting ads in ECIR [Executive Committee for Illegal Residents] headquarters for shops that provide fake passports_. (WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, 2006, November 26, Kuwait’s Bidoon (Stateless Residents): Background and Update [italics added])

The reference to necessary papers, means birth certificates, marriage certificates, and the other personal identity documents discussed herein. According to the program procedures, these documents would have been listed with the nationality on the fake passport, as the nationality on the official Kuwaiti-government issued documents. And herein lies the irony, that the fake identity documents that the Bedoun are forced to procure, are then used as an excuse by the Central Apparatus, to create more fake identity documents.

These programs in general, were acknowledged at the United Nations speech to the Human Rights Committee at Kuwait’s most recent universal periodic review, on 30 January 2015, by Ms Eman al Nasser, the Head of the Technical Office at the Central Agency for Remediying of the Illegal Residents’ Status. Note that I have already addressed the fact that government was aware the Bedoun were stateless:

Al-Nasser said that the government labels those people as “illegal residents” in accordance with the Central Agency’s foundation decree No 467 of 2010. “They were labelled so because they violated foreigners’ residency law No 17 of 1959 which necessities the possession of a valid passport to get a residency permission. They have concealed their original passports on a false belief that this would qualify them to get the Kuwaiti citizenship,” she said. (‘Kuwait Showcases,’ 2015)
Here, al Nasser provided the official rationale for the program directed to international audiences. The details of the domestic version are somewhat different, but features the same ideology of the ‘illegal,’ ‘other national.’ The domestic version points to the fact that the Ministry of the Interior is constructing the illegality itself (by requiring the Bedoun to engage in document fraud, via a false nationality declaration), by which it claims the Bedoun can become ‘legal’ residents in Kuwait. It blatantly instructs the Bedoun to commit a crime of identity fraud which implicates other states, in order to legalise their identity for its own administrative purposes. What is always absent, is proof government knows the ‘original nationality’ and the existence of an ‘original passport’ – the exception to this is military servicemen who were issued Kuwaiti passports up until the 1980s, which were their ‘original passports.’

A comparison of the international dialogue and the domestic dialogue regarding the Bedouns’ requirement to obtain and submit fake passports is instructive, as it helps to unpack the ideological motifs and strategies of implementation. In this context, the quote shown above can be contrasted with a statement from Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah, regarding the knowledge of the Ministry of Interior and the function of the Central Apparatus, where he sets out the requirement for Bedouns to repeatedly acquire fake foreign passports, in order to keep them ‘valid:’

Some bedoons have already legalized their status and got Dominican, Somali and Yemeni citizenships, yet they have to keep their passports valid to be deemed legal residents.’ (Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah al Sabah in, ‘Bedoons to Get’, 2015).

Note al Jarrah’s reference to some of the same states as mentioned in the WikiLeaks Cable and the other programs above, insomuch as the Ministry of Interior demands proofs of identity with a foreign passport, a document that would obviously facilitate his Ministry’s deportation of a Bedoun. His high position as Undersecretary deems his statement most authoritative. Impressive photographs of Sheik Mazen al Jarrah are frequently printed in Kuwaiti newspapers accompanying his statements, going about his important official duties inside the Apparatus offices with his junior staff, or in military-style portraits, enhancing the official look of the statements. But furthermore, al Jarrah’s statement illustrates the point that the concept of the Bedoun having ‘original nationality’ or ‘original passports’ (al Nasser in ‘Kuwait Showcases,’ 2015) is inauthentic (bogus), because one of the priorities of the program is to force the Bedoun to adopt identities of countries to which the Bedoun have no plausible connection – Libya, Somalia and so on. Additionally, the possibility that effective nationality (one which the said country recognises) or a ‘real’ citizenship is provided by those other states (as al Jarrah alluded to above) does not cancel out the fact that the
statement proves the government was always aware that the ‘original nationality’ concept is false – any passport will do, as long as it is not a Kuwaiti one. The prospect that other states have been complicit in ‘status adjustment’ as Beaugrand (2010) and al Jarrah (above) imply, simply broadens the crime. I discuss this prospect below.

One more point about al Jarrah’s statement deserves attention. He connects ‘citizenship’ to the acquisition of the passport. His claim that citizenship has been obtained in other countries because they ‘legalised their status’ is misleading – ‘legalised their status’ refers to Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ procedures, not the countries attached to the passports (we know this because Kuwaitis MPs complain in the National Assembly that the Apparatus has never shown proof of Bedoun citizenship in other states: see for example, comments by MP Hassan Jawhar in ‘Tough Requirements,’ 2014 and MP Hammoud al Hamdan in Izzak, November 14, 2014, below). Yet al Jarrah seems to have implied that citizenship in those countries flowed from acquisition of the passports (most of us will be aware that it works the other way around for genuine passports). Later, he directly contradicts this view, when it applies to Kuwait rather than to other nations:

Passports provided by Kuwaiti officials to stateless people function just as travel documents, and not documents of citizenship. (General Mazen al Jarrah al Sabah, in MENA Report, May 10, 2016)

Al Jarrah refuted his own statement that citizenship was tied to the country stated on the passport (in ‘Bedoons to Get,’ 2015).

Finally, it should be remembered that due to Kuwaiti law, the targeting of heads of households means that all family members are affected by changes to the identity of the male head of household. Legally, the head of household is responsible for all of its members except adult males. This includes all wives and male and female children under the age of twenty-one, plus any adult females who are unmarried or widowed. Thus, when an individual male is made to submit to ‘status adjustment,’ the legal status of whole families is affected. Future generations of children - the unborn Bedoun - are also impacted.


7. Marriage and Divorce Certificates

Government’s open disclosure of its practice of pre-filling marriage and divorce certificates with nationalities it determined as a result of its own ‘investigations,’ emerged in 2011 (Kuwait Government Response to Human Right Watch, 2011, p.7; Reply of
In this section, I will elaborate on marriage certificates, and the issue’s overlap with the problem of birth certificates.

Al Waqayan (2009, p.30-32, 44) documented the problem for the Bedoun who attempted to marry. Bedoun have to file their applications in court to have their contracts of marriage registered. The process can take years to be processed through the court system, if the contract is recognized at all. Al Waqayan (2009) discussed the situation whereby many Bedoun were compelled to respond to government pressure to adopt false nationalities in order to obtain documents that would be recognised (though they were false or illegally acquired) in order for their marriage to be recognized by the Ministry of Justice in Kuwait. Crucially, the issue of marriage certificates was also connected to health care, leading not only to insufficiently registered marriages, but also to obstacles in relation to the admission/exit/procedures related childbirth (interview with female manager of al Jahra hospital in al Waqayan, 2009, p.30-31). In other words, al Waqayan (2009) described the ‘status adjustment’ program as an incentive to enable children’s births to be registered, where government otherwise interfered with birth registration by refusing to issue a correct birth certificate (Weissbrodt, 2009 analysed this as a breach of international law).

Al Waqayan (2009) described a process of the humiliation was inflicted on Bedoun men obstructed from collecting their wife and child from the maternity department of hospitals after birth, because their marriage certificate had not been granted by the courts due to delays, or due to the certificate containing wrong information – a false nationality. Group (2012) described the inter-connection between marriage and birth certificates and the education system in Kuwait. However, due to the very personal nature of the issue, authors have been quite brief in relaying details of how this system works. Some interviewees assisted me in understanding the complex processes, but few would do so in recorded interview, due to the humiliation they felt describing their own experiences. Understandably, no one wanted to talk about how this problem affected them, as it cut into the cultural significance of the importance of legitimate (official) forms of lineage in Bedouin and Muslim culture. Hence, the high rate of unmarried Bedoun; many interviewees stated that they did not want to entertain this life path, having seen the effects on their older brothers or sisters.

The obstacle of lack of marriage certificate or the dreadful compromise of accepting a certificate stating the wrong nationality, subsequently impacted the child in the course of their life, including enrolment in school (discussed below). In this section, I discuss the connection between marriage and birth documentation impacting immediate, practical concerns raised by al Waqayan (2009) – taking the wife and child home from hospital. If the couple were stateless, or the male spouse stateless, they might not have a valid marriage.
certificate. As I have mentioned, this was most often due to delays in processing (al Waqayan, 2009) or, because the wrong information was recorded on the certificate by the issuing authority, the Ministry of Justice, leading to the couple having to appeal the decision due to a mistake on the certificate or to reject it. If the couple did not have a valid marriage certificate, he could not take his wife and child home from hospital after the child was born. Although this would be the case for any family in Kuwait according to local law, it affected the Bedoun especially, because they are not issued official documents that state their real identity. The Ministry of the Interior determines the nationality, then coordinates with other state departments to ensure that the nationality section of the paperwork is actually pre-filled with the Bedoun individuals’ nationality (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.7). Thus, the Bedoun often have no documents at all, because they do not accept the incorrect documents, or documents stating false nationality. But the case of the marriage certificate is one of the most troubling, as delays in processing it then also affected the ability of the parents to obtain birth certificates.

Al Waqayan (2009) explained that the marriage certificate would not be issued until application to the family court, which set aside time for perusal of the marriage contract. If the contract was not approved by the time the baby was born, a birth certificate could not be issued for the child by the Ministry of Health. The hospital staff would have to make some kind of concession to enable the wife and child to be released by the hospital in lieu of the certificate. Al Waqayan (2009) did not state what the concession was, other than it was humiliating for the male spouse. Thus, the crucial issue that arose was the delay in providing approval of the marriage contract by the Family Court.

P8 provided an example of how this works during her recounting her everyday life, and the hardships of her brothers and sisters. She pointed out that the process of registering a marriage was not guaranteed for the Bedoun. Therefore although she did not explicitly state it, her narrative implied that the traditional ceremony took place and the couple commenced life as a married couple while waiting for the marriage certificate to be processed. The process posed great difficulty if couples subsequently became pregnant. Cultural expectations would have it that the wife should become pregnant as soon as possible after marriage, complicating matters further. P8 recalled her sister having given birth to two children while waiting for the marriage to be recognised. Because the marriage was not recognised, the birth certificates could not be issued (regardless of whether they were correct or incorrectly pre-filled). The first time the court refused the application, and the couple then had to lodge an appeal. The appeal decision was not handed down until the oldest child was six or seven years old.

The failure of the state to provide legitimate marriage certificates in a timely fashion flowed on to difficulties with hospital administration related to at least two areas that I could
discern. First, the ability of the wife to prove her marriage and therefore her right to be released into the care of her husband. Second, the ability of parents to acquire a birth certificate, and therefore the father’s right to have the newborn child released to him (in Kuwaiti law, he is the legal guardian of both wife and child; the guardianship of the child is not shared at this stage).

The reason why interviewees suggested the only possible way to bypass this problem, was to not get married at all, was based on cultural practices. Young adult men and women usually cannot socialise together in private, unless they are close family members and/or married. Study and work places provided alternative outlets for alternative social practices, but these are public and risk observation by onlookers who may report back to family networks. Often children are made quite aware who their parents expect them to marry when they are young, noting that the Bedouin had traditionally preferred early, arranged marriages within the family. For those who attempt to cross these boundaries without parental consent, the consequences can be devastating. They are highly unlikely to secure permission to marry the preferred spouse from their parents afterward, and they may never be approached for marriage by anyone else if anyone outside the family finds out. There may be a call for retribution over lost honour, or reluctant agreement with quarrelling over the bride price. Hence, there is no period of dating or engagement where the couple could develop a socially recognised relationship before marriage.

I wondered about cultural ‘adaptations’ – why were interviewees quite fixed about their viewpoint on this subject but not others, and how could couples get around this problem? Perhaps changing the order of the ceremonies - an engagement period where the marriage contract could be lodged with authorities prior to a traditional marriage ceremony? But interviewees pointed out that sometimes the marriage contract was not approved by the court, and then couples would have to appeal and/or obtain another contract and apply to the Family Court again. Thus the process could go on for an indefinite length of time. The process was not only timely, it was expensive, and most Bedoun could not afford to make multiple applications. Hence, the prospect of marriage and starting a family was most daunting. But only other option, the ‘choice’ not to marry (if the relinquishment of one’s right to found a family can be viewed as a choice) also attracted long term social oppression. Other than killing the Bedoun in the early 1990s, this aspect of population control was probably the most effective in oppressing the community that I have discussed in this research. It was set out in the 1986 expulsion document (‘The Study,’ 2003).

Key sources: al Waqayan (2009); Group 29 (2012)

8. Birth and death certificates

Government’s open disclosure of its practice of pre-filling birth and death certificates with nationalities it determined as a result of its own ‘investigations,’ emerged in
In this section, I will discuss the issue of government’s issue of incorrect birth certificates, and the issues’ overlap with the problem of school enrolment.

Up to 2011, birth certificates issued required a nationality to be provided, but ‘Kuwaiti’ was prohibited from being recorded by stateless people (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.7). Government stated the following statistics pertaining to Bedoun birth certificates over the five year period from 2006 to 2011 (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.7):

- Birth certificates accepted: 3608
- Birth certificates rejected: 12,471

Bedoun claims proper birth certificates were not issued by government were not fully understood in the light of this policy. Birth certificates were issued, but they were intentionally incorrect, as part of the attempt to carry out erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing) on the Bedoun. Parents had to submit to ‘status adjustment’ of their newborn babies in order to have a birth registered. The Ministry of Interior determined the nationality that would be stated on the birth certificate. The Ministry would then advise the Ministry of Health. The Ministry of Health would ensure the ‘nationality’ section on the form was pre-filled with the nationality. The birth certificate issued would state that nationality – incorrectly. Parents were then asked to sign for the document, which was interpreted as ‘acceptance’ of the nationality stated on the document. If the parents had not submitted to ‘status adjustment,’ the child’s birth certificate would state a different nationality to their own.

The phenomenon of resistance to ‘status adjustment’ within the Bedoun community has not been studied before, and warrants further research about the Bedouns’ viewpoints and experiences. As with the issue of marriage certificates, it is a very personal area of discussion which attracts shame, and the community is reluctant to talk about the concrete details which affect them, but less reluctant to describe the system hypothetically or using examples about others’ experience. It may be assumed that many more thousands of parents refused the inauthentic birth certificates going back to 1986, when the measures were first introduced in official policy (‘The Study,’ 2003).

The birth certificate was required for enrolment in school. Thus in late 2014 when undocumented Bedoun children were banned from school, MP Hassan Jawhar linked the program of targeting children for ‘status adjustment’ to their inability to acquire an accurate birth certificate and to enrol in schools (‘Tough Requirements,’ 2014). Where Bedoun parents did not accept a false nationality label on a birth certificate, the certificate was not issued. Staff at the registry filled in the nationality and left the certificate for parents to
collect. In 2011, the government had explained that parents never collected the certificates, leading to the ‘rejected’ statistic cited above.

But the reforms have been used as a means to exclude rather than to include the Bedoun from primary and secondary school in Kuwait. Kuwaiti MP Humoud al Hamdan openly claimed that the requirement set out in Decree 409/2011 ‘human rights reforms’ that any Bedoun must be registered with the Central Apparatus in order to access school enrolment, was used as a pretext to deprive the Bedoun of education. The pretext enabled the Central Apparatus to pressure private schools to reject all enrolment applications from unregistered Bedoun children, and not as a reform through which education was provided (Izzak, November 15, 2014). Why? Because it was virtually common knowledge that Bedoun children were not issued with correct birth certificates, and therefore they had none.

In Kuwait, the knowledge that the Bedoun were rejecting false birth certificates was implicit, which is why it tends to not be clearly stated, even in MP statements. Nevertheless, the MPs refer to the broader program of ‘status adjustment’ as the cause of the problem. Both the accounts of MP Hassan Jawhar and MP Humoud al Hamdan, published in November 2014 (Tough Requirements,’ 2014 and Izzak, November 15, 2014 respectively), were utterly consistent with my personal communications with the Bedoun community about this issue in October, 2014. The Bedouls resistance to ‘status adjustment’ on birth certificates was used to ban children from commencing or continuing primary school; the ‘solution’ posed by government was for the children to be submitted to ‘adjustment’ – all the parents had to do was sign for the birth certificate, and the false nationality (labelling) would be recorded as accepted.

During the national debate over these bans from September 2014, community advocates explained that the previous policy requiring ‘original nationality’ remains is entrenched and continued after the introduction of Decree 409/2011 reforms ((H. al Fadhli, personal communications, October 19, 2014, January 14, 2015; a parent with children affected by the ban in personal communications, October 21, 2014). The procedure whereby departments of government coordinated under the authority of the Central Apparatus to issue of birth, marriage and death certificates with nationalities pre-filled on the form, was described in Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch (2011, p.7, at 2.).

According to the Ministry of Interior, the option of being listed as ‘non-Kuwaiti’ as had been provided for in Decree 409/2011 (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights, 2011) was not available. But the Bedoun explained that this option had not been made available, because as far as the Central Apparatus was concerned, the false nationality had already been determined and allocated.

The practice of the Bedoun being forced to accept a nationality - but not a Kuwaiti one - had always been the general practice since the 1980s, and it remained so. The Central
Apparatus and other government areas still asserted that ‘secret’ files held information about ‘original nationality’ and that the original nationality was selected for inclusion on the official identity documents, without consulting the applicant. The applicants were then given the option of viewing the documents, or not, but Bedoun advocates deny this. Either way, the false declaration of nationality ‘discovered’ by the Central Apparatus, was entered onto the government database and shared with all departments. The Apparatus supplied the nationality to the Ministry of Health for birth and death certificates, and the Ministry of Justice for marriage certificates.

Key sources: Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch (2011, p.7); MP Hassan Jawhar in ‘Tough Requirements,’ (2014); H. al Fadhli (personal communications, October 19, 2014, January 14, 2015); Bedoun parent with children affected by the bans (personal communications, October 21, 2014); Participants 10 and 11 in this study whose own birth certificates were ‘adjusted’ by the Apparatus to different nationalities from each other.

9. Contracts and statements of obligation issued by the Central Apparatus

‘Other nationality’ was to be provided in return for Education Fund support (Group 29, 2012). The rules were ‘bent’ to enrol Bedoun children without nationality. Although I have criticized some aspects of the organisation, Group 29 (2012) provided some sound case studies in their research. The organisation presented evidence that the Education Fund was involved with the Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program by attempting to force Bedoun parents to sign contract-like documents submitting to changing their children’s identity (submitting to ‘status adjustment’) in return for attending school (that should be provided for free by the state according to international law). The parents were then sent letters, reminding them of their obligation to submit children to the ‘status adjustment’ or they would be billed directly for fees by the private schools (who could then sue them) (Group 29, 2012, p.50-51). I have called this the process ‘contracts and statement of obligation.’

Pressure was applied by school administrators, who must collect the document stating false nationality. The funding is a Decree 409/2011 ‘service,’ which is supposed to be a ‘human right’ according to government. Members of the Bedoun community pointed out that this was a common method used by the Apparatus in regards to school enrolment, which entered the equation after parents had negotiated directly with schools to enrol their children. They also emphasised that the Ministry of Interior pressures the schools to pressure the parents, to collect the documents.

It is possible that this method is used for enrolments in other parts of the education sector, or for all types of access to Decree 409/2011, of which there are eleven ‘services,’ ‘benefits, ‘facilities’ or human rights (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights
Watch, 2011, p.7). The example showed what was tantamount to entrapment in debt for education as well as entrapment in the procedures of ‘status adjustment.’ If the child’s family did not subsequently submit to the erasure of their identity, they would be billed directly for the school fees. Again, we see the desperation of government in trying to collect ‘proofs’ of false nationalities, such as the passports and affidavits.

Key source: Group 29 (2012).

10. The Comoros Plan

The Comoros plans proposes that Comorian passports issued by government would provide ‘legal residents’ status for 5 years, including access to a package of benefits, which comprise basic public services. This ‘sells’ Decree 409/2011 human rights reforms to the Bedoun in return for ‘status adjustment’ and a Comorian passport. Recipient are classed as having voluntarily relinquished any rights in law to Kuwaiti citizenship. The passport have to be renewed every 5 years. Government has offered to give out the residents permit for free. Essentially, this is the same system as all the programs which rely on fake passports of any nationality, but it forces the whole population to submit to erasure with one nationality. The key difference is the endorsement by the government of the Comoros Islands. It is the second-generation version of the mass, bi-lateral population transfer that was taken up by the United Arab Emeratis government around 2008, to deport a few hundred stateless Emeratis (above).

On May 19, 2014, an announcement was made that officials in the Central Apparatus and the Citizenship and Passports Department of the Ministry of Interior of Kuwait had met three weeks earlier with representatives of the Comorian government to discuss the Comoros plan for ‘economic citizenship’ in Kuwait (‘Kuwait, Comoros,’ 2014). According to a Central Apparatus official, the plan stipulated that the Comorian government must recognize the Bedoun as their own nationals, and agree to accept all Bedouns deported from Kuwait who had committed crimes. Additionally, the project would commence with a mass transfer of 1,900 individuals on its database, to Comorian nationality. In response to criticism, Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah al Sabah, the Undersecretary for Citizenship and Passports Affairs, announced that there were no plans to deport all Bedouns (‘Kuwait, Comoros,’ 2014). A ‘high level diplomatic source’ told al Rai in May 18, 2014, that Kuwait ‘will not hesitate to take any route that leads to ending this dilemma for once and for all.’ The stipulation that the government of the Comoros would have ‘receive’ transfer (deportation) of individuals deemed to be ‘criminals’ by Kuwait (‘Kuwait, Comoros,’ 2014), implied the Comoros Islands Plan was to be transformed into Kuwaiti penal colony.

In considering the concept of deportation of criminals to the island, the mass criminalisation of the Bedoun since the Arab Spring, particularly of those who are eligible for citizenship under the Nationality Law (1959) of Kuwait and the Constitution of Kuwait
(the green identity type, discussed in Appendix D, iv), is salient. The whole population was deemed ‘illegal’ and having breached Kuwait’s migration law in 1986, when the administrative expulsion was implemented. The colour-typing criminal labelling inherent to the ‘new’ identity types in the ‘status adjustment’ program as at 2012, left all but approximately 15,000 criminally labelled (Nacheva, April 7, 2014), progressively reduced to 8,000 (according to al Jarrah in ‘Bedoons to get,’ 2015). Additionally, between 2012 and 2016, the vast majority of Bedoun eligible to receive citizenship had been issued ‘security restrictions’ (21,000), regarded as equivalent to criminal offences by the government of Kuwait (Kuwait Plans,’ 2013; ‘Magnetic cards,’ 2012; Colonel Mohammed al Wuhaib, in Saleh, February 9, 2014) ‘Security restrictions’ were applied on multiple occasions to the target’s security file, or to any family member of the target. Thus, the Bedoun are subject to multiple layers of criminalisation (see discussion about the targeting this group with citizenship deprivation, criminalisation and potential deportation, in Appendix G, iii). But if we consider the 1986 expulsion measures (‘The Study, 2003), the whole population of Bedoun are regarded as ‘illegal residents’ as a matter of public policy. Therefore, it appears that government may find it well within their means to interpret the provision for the deportation of criminals as applying to the vast majority, if not the whole of the population, if it desired to do so.

The scheme was again widely publicized just a few weeks after the community had been affected by bans on children without birth certificates commencing school, reported in The Kuwait Times by al Hajji (2014) on October 14, 2014, in 600 Bedoon children denied admission to local schools. Government officials spoke to journalists on and off the record about the scheme on November 9, 2014, in MPs Hit ‘Comoros’ Bid to Paper-Over Bedoun Issue (November 9, 2014 in The Arab Times), Few Takers Seen for Costly Comoros Citizenship Scheme: Al Slams Proposal (November 10, 2014, in The Arab Times), and Kuwait’s Stateless Bidoon Offered Comoros Citizenship (November 10, 2014, in BBC News Middle East). In the local media, questions were raised about the level of commitment to this plan, and its plausibility.

On November 5, 2014, MP Faisal al Duwaisan very openly explained that government had now itself proved the implausibility of their claim that the Bedoun had ever had other ‘original’ nationalities and that it had misled members of parliament for decades (‘Government to Offer,’ 2014 in The Kuwait Times). He reminded the government that it had never been able to prove the group had the alternative nationalities it had claimed since the 1980s, and nor had the government been able to acquire the associated deportation permissions from those countries, to return its nationals. He accused government of misleading National Assembly over the past decades, and challenged it to deport any Bedoun individual to the nations it had claimed they were nationals of. Al Duwaisan also declared
that he would file a motion to question the Prime Minister directly if he attempted to
implement the Comoros Plan (in Kuwait, this is known as a ‘grilling’ session, where
members of government or parliament are held to account for corruption in public)
(‘Government to Offer,’ 2014). The Comoros Plan has been linked to business deals among
some of Kuwait’s most senior government officials, including the Prime Minister
(Abrahamian, 2015) and it is quite clear that mass deportation of the Bedoun to the country,
could inevitably become personally profitable for those officials. The business incentive of
mass deportation of the Bedoun warrants was discussed by Sloan (November 11, 2014).

On March 28, 2016, The Kuwait Times reported that two MPs had given conflicting
accounts of whether or not the transfer of the Bedouns to Comorian nationality had been
discussed during a Kuwaiti parliamentary delegations’ visit to the islands one week earlier
(‘MPs Conflicted,’ 2016). The Head of the delegation, Saud al Huraiji, denied the issue was
discussed, but prior to the visit, MP Hamdan al Azmi had claimed that the delegation had
planned to discuss the mass identity transfer of the Bedoun in ‘workshops,’ and that
specifically, ‘the settlement of bedoons in the Comoros’ was planned to be discussed in
those meetings. He stated that a previous delegation had discussed the issue and that as a
result, the negotiations had been ongoing for over one year. Al Azmi had reported that
Comorian officials had ‘agreed in principle’ to the plan (‘MPs Conflicted,’ 2016).

On April 5, 2016, al Jarrah announced that the government had held negotiations
with two other countries for the sale of the Bedouns’ collective national identity in return for
citizenship documents, similar to the Comoros plan. Egypt was one of the countries
(‘80,000 Bedoons,’ 2016). The announcement confirmed an earlier report that the Egyptian
government had devised such a plan (Toumi, July 4, 2014). Al Jarrah had claimed that the
Comoros plan did not mean that the total population would be deported to the islands. But
another report from 2014, published around the time that the Egyptian proposal was first
slated, had stated that:

Maj Gen Sheikh Mazen Al-Jarrah Al-Sabah, the General Director of the
Department for Citizenship and Passport Affairs, said during a televised
interview the previous night that Kuwait was in negotiations with an Arab state
he did not name in order to deport the state’s ‘bedoon’ population there after
they receive the said country’s citizenship. (No Plans, May 20, 2014).

He reiterated all that those not in the green identity category, who had already proved their
‘eligibility’ for citizenship with 1965 National Census documents, must submit to ‘status
adjustment’ or they would be ‘confronted’ and regarded as residency law violators – adding
another layer of criminalisation to their status (No Plans, May 20, 2014). On 16 May, 2016
in The Kuwait Times, Comoros government authorities confirmed the plan had already been
agreed to ‘in principle.’ In a carefully worded statement by Comorian minister of external affairs, Abdulkarim Mohamed, stated that the Comoros was ready to ‘receive’ the Bedoun (Izzak, May 17, 2016), implying the whole populations’ identity would be transferred, including those who were eligible for citizenship under the Nationality Law (1959) who had been provided additional assurances by government for decades, that citizenship would be granted to them as a group (see Appendix B, iii, and D, iv). On June 20, 2016, the Kuwaiti minister of foreign affairs Sheikh Sabah Khalid al Sabah announced in al Qabas, that he had not yet completed the necessary procedures to enable the Comoros plan to become constitutionally valid (‘Kuwait FM,’ 2016).

The report also indicated that local media discussions in Kuwait had suggested that the Comorian citizenship program had already been activated, with ‘scams involving large sums charged for assistance’ (‘Kuwait FM, 2016), implying that the plan was already linked to corruption because the Bedoun remained desperate to access basic public services in Kuwait after the failure of Decree 409/2011 reforms. Nevertheless, this appeared to be a ruse – implying the population were lining up for identity erasure, in contrast to the known facts (the monthly ‘adjustment’ figures issued by the Central Apparatus) that the vast majority of the population has resisted the erasure for decades and continues to attempt to do so.

Clearly, the Comoros Plan has involved discussion and plans for the deportation of the whole Bedoun population. Those who were not in the green identity category (those ‘eligible’ for citizenship) would be forced to adjust their status for potential deportation to the Comoros Islands. The vast majority of those in the green identity group had been issued ‘security restrictions’ equivalent to criminal offences. Due to their criminal status, were also be qualified for deportation. Analysis of the rapid, progressive nature of the labelling program indicated that by the end of 2017, all members of the green identity group who had not yet been criminalised with the ‘security restriction’ in 2014, would have been issued at least one restriction. This latter group would also be qualified for deportation under the stated criteria set out by Major General Mazen al Jarrah al Sabah. In other words, since the issue of the identification system in 2012, all members of the population had been targeted for deportation via ‘status adjustment’ and the ‘security restriction’ that formed part of that program. Countries identified as potential mass population sites (here I refer to identity erasure and/or deportation) included the Comoros Islands and Egypt. One other country is apparently yet to be named; it is quite possibly Saudi Arabia, or the encampment option (an artificial refugee or concentration camp), which is adjacent the Saudi Arabian border (see below).

Key Sources: Abrahamian (2015); al Hajji (2014); ‘Bedoons to get’ (2015); ‘80,000 Bedoons’ (2016). ‘Few Takers’ (2014); ‘Government to Offer’ (2014); ‘Kuwait, Comoros’
11. Those who resist erasure: The encampment option

This option has not been formally presented by government as yet. However, it has been proposed as a policy by a member of parliament. A proposal to move the stateless population to a desert camp, akin to an artificial refugee camp or a concentration camp, was reported in the following outlets:

- ‘Kuwaiti MP Wants Stateless Sent to Desert Camp,’ April 17 2014 in the Gulf News (‘Kuwaiti MP,’ 2014),
- ‘Two Racist Proposals,’ April 22, 2014 in The Kuwait Times (Abbas, April 22, 2014), and

The association of desert camps near the Saudi Arabian border with the Bedoun refugee camps at Abdali near the Iraqi border was obvious to any Bedoun who had lived through the invasion of Iraq and its aftermath in Kuwait (1990-1995) (see Cushman, June 30, 1991, July 16, 1991; Gasperini, August 20, 1991; a, 1992).

The idea of a simulated refugee camp arises from the Abdali refugee camps and the policy of segregation. These camps were called refugee camps in the media and by government, but they were not refugee camps. They were camps which contained Kuwaiti Bedouns, entrapped on the borders of Kuwait. The camps were predominantly filled with Bedoun, and Bedoun babies died en masse in at least one of the camps. There were three camps at Abdali, which had a total, peak population of around 15,000 Bedouns (Gasperini, August 20, 1991).

The locations were on the borders because the government was attempting to push the Bedoun into Iraq, such that the locations were convenient. Government dumped masses of Bedoun presumably located in Kuwait City (in the Central Prison, al Talea deportation centre and other sites) into Iraq simultaneous to the operation of these camps. The rationale was successful, because at one stage, after government threats the Bedoun would be killed, thousands of them fled the camps and literally ran into the territory of Iraq, and disappeared.

Although the compounds of Taima and Sulabiya were never designed to be concentration camps, it is arguable that they have since become concentration camps, due to the relentless nature of the extreme nationalist ideology they are subjected to, which seeks to eradicate the population. The encampment suggested by anti-Bedoun MPs followed two lines of argument, targeting:
• Those Bedoun who engaged in public expression about the Bedoun issue, and,
• Those Bedoun who refused to submit to ‘status adjustment.’

Therefore, all of the community but their intellectuals and social leaders in particular, were targeted. This focus is similar to the government targeting of the same group with ‘security restrictions’ since 2012. Encampment did not appear to be promoted as a method for the standard enforcement of ‘status adjustment’ for the whole Bedoun population, but it was put forward as an option for those who refused to submit. In other words, it was a punitive option, and it was clearly envisaged as another incentive to enforce ‘status adjustment’ on individuals. This aspect reinforces the notion of the encampment option as a concentration camp.

The policy of Bedoun social segregation is a longstanding and historical one developed from the first permanent settlement of the Bedouin in Kuwait, until the Bedoun were separated and abandoned in Taima and Sulabiya (after most citizens residing there had left the compounds due to the difficult conditions). It was part of the Kuwaiti and Arab nationalist policy to deprive the Bedouin of citizenship in Kuwait, and this was accompanied by a strong desire to physically separate the group from the Hadar in Kuwait City. This ‘developmental’ approach was designed and facilitated by academics, many of whom were unashamedly politically motivated. I discussed these ideas and policies in Chapter 2, section 2.6 of this thesis, and in the thematic analysis in Appendix C, vi-viii). The dividing line between policy of social segregation and the establishment of concentration camps is historically, rather thin. It is rooted in ethnic hatred. Intellectuals have tended to contribute to these ideas.


A note on the five-year period of ‘Benefits’

I mentioned the repetitive nature of offers of ‘benefits’ for five year periods in relation to the Comoros Plan above, called ‘economic citizenship.’ The government offer of five years access to a ‘package’ of privileges (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011) and ‘benefits’ (Kuwait Showcases, 2015) appears to have been first mentioned in government propaganda in 1983, when the ‘status adjustment’ program was first introduced. It had involved government using false nationality labels on the Bedouns’ identification cards and drivers’ licences (al Anezi, 1989, p.263, n132), when the Bedoun were first re-labelled as ‘non-Kuwaiti national’ (al Anezi, 1989, p.263) as if the Bedoun were in possession of a nationality rather than stateless. This was the beginning of ascription of a whole range of other nationalities to the Bedoun. The provisions of the five-year
package of benefits and services merely comprised a conditional grace period of five years’ access to basic public services. In the case of primary school education, for example, the state is required to provide such services to all those in its territory under international law, in any case (Human Rights Watch, 2011).

Much poorer states provide such services as a normative aspect of civil society. Language is deployed to make the program appear to be a) voluntary, b) generous and c) efficient. The concept has been repeated and reintroduced for nearly thirty-five years. Note that the ‘package’ is the same length of time that an average passport is valid before expiry. Al Jarrah reminded the Bedoun that they must engage in passport fraud over consecutive time periods to keep the passports continuously ‘valid’ for the purpose of ‘legal residency’ (‘Bedoons to Get,’ 2015), which included in theory, access to the five year ‘package.’ Nevertheless, Bedoun interview respondents denied this off-the-record. Their experience is that some individuals may access the ‘benefits’ while others cannot, because the Apparatus is always endeavouring to invent reasons and ‘restrictions’ to their prevent access.

Sadly, the government of Kuwait also refers to the five-year package of benefits as the Bedouns ‘human rights’ granted in Decree 409/2011. Thus, the Bedouns human rights are an object are to be exchanged as a reward for submission to ‘status adjustment’ erasure. This exchange bargain has been openly flaunted at the United Nations Human Rights Committee (see Appendix G, i).
Appendix F


i. Methods of violence and killing (1990 -1995) - summary from the thematic analysis
ii. Methods of expulsion and other forms of eradication (1990 -1995) - summary from the thematic analysis
iii. Activities of the Academic Team for Population Policy, the National Council and the Supreme Planning Council concurrent to violent ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun

Introduction to Appendix F

This Appendix diverges from others by my inclusion of a joint introduction due to the special nature of the topics discussed herein. In the following three appendices, I discuss the methods of violence and killing used to eradicate the Bedoun population and other methods of ethnic targeting concerning their mass removal from Kuwait (other than by killing), from 1990 through to 1995. Most atrocities occurred between 1991 and 1993. I argued that the first two summaries of evidence constituted the physical ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun from 1990 to 1995, while I attempt to illustrate how the policy for ethnic cleansing developed concurrently to the violent actions in the third appendix.

It is necessary to shed light on this neglected area, because the Bedoun community may be observed grieving from the weight of these atrocities in Kuwait each year on National Day and Liberation Day. Comparatively speaking, the Palestinian population who were ethnically cleansed simultaneously to the Bedoun, though they received inadequate assistance and compensation for their losses, they have received much greater assistance and compensation than the Bedoun. The Bedoun community has received virtually no support whatsoever in compiling information about these atrocities, or bringing those who inflicted such suffering to justice, or to reconciling and recovering from the events.

The purpose of these two appendixes is to provide a preliminary analysis to support the claim of LA Times foreign correspondent Mark Fineman (November 2, 1992), that ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun likely took place after the Iraq war, in the absence of academic claims of the same nature. I previously discussed my initial findings of ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun at the Researchers for Asylum Seekers annual conference at Melbourne University in 2015 (Kennedy, 2015a).

Other authors have indicated that the Bedouns’ indigenous status (and entitlement to Kuwait’s oil resources) is the cause of their statelessness (Castellano, 2008), and they have
discussed the mass population expulsion of the Bedoun contravening international law – whether or not the Bedoun were nationals of other states or stateless (Henckaerts, 1995) (although the author was satisfied the group were genuinely stateless and have never been nationals of other states). Others have discussed the attempt to eradicate the Bedoun as an indigenous population by lowering their birth rate (Weissbrodt, 2008), discrimination leading to statelessness and mass population reduction (Doebbler, 2002), and a multi-faceted policy approach to destroying the group for the purpose of denying them citizenship and to enact retribution for perceived wartime sins (Sokoloff and Lewis, 2005). However, there has been no detailed analysis of these events.

Generally speaking, scholars have not yet attempted to collect information about this period of the Bedoun’s history from a variety of available sources published at the time, to theorise ethnic cleansing or genocide of the Bedoun. I believe that one of the reasons for this is the general lack of studies about the Bedoun but also, the conservatism among scholars who have clung to the flawed concept that Kuwait society comprises only one ethnic group (the ‘Kuwaiti’) made up of two ‘social groups’ (the Bedouin and the Hadar), while the Bedoun were ‘mercenaries’ (Longva, 1997, 2006). This has led other researchers, I believe, to assume the Bedoun were not Kuwaiti, not part of Kuwaiti society, or part of the country. I have discussed the flaws of this approach in Chapters 2 and 7.

In this study, I have attempted to establish the Bedouin and the Bedoun as ethnic groups in Kuwait in their own right which may serve as a starting point for this important aspect of theorisation. I have provided this modest, preliminary analysis of sources regarding ethnic cleansing to support my claims in the discussion, that the group was physically, ethnically cleansed as well as subjected to erasure (which is also called administrative ethnic cleansing, in Weissbrodt, 2008), as well as my tentative conclusion that the group is likely being subject to genocide in the present day. This analysis extends my arguments in Chapters 6 and 7 regarding ethnic targeting of the Bedoun by government and in everyday social interactions, and the nature of the Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program. I hope to extend this work with a more rigorous theoretical discussion against theories of ethnic cleansing and/or genocide in the near future. I believe that this area of study requires further research as soon as possible, to mitigate the current risks of physical and cultural destruction to the Bedoun and to help prevent or reverse the decision for their collective identity transfer to the Comoros government (see Appendix E, vi, section 7).

In my discussion of this thesis and through many of the Appendices, I have attempted to show that joint responsibility for the Bedouns suffering should be shared by a number of different parties or groups in society, not only the government of Kuwait, and/or the ruling family. Regarding the ruling family’s involvement in these atrocities, I have pointed out the scripted statements issued to individuals, and my firm belief that such
statements were supplied by propagandists at the Ministry of Information. This is not because I am adopting an apologist stance, but because I am aware that at least one adviser to the Minister of Information at the time was a highly influential intellectual responsible for key aspects of the development of anti-Bedouin and anti-Bedoun ideology and government policy through the 1980s and beyond.

Most of the material I used for the analyses in Appendix Fi and Fii, was drawn from international humanitarian reports and newspapers. I also referred to some of the very limited publications on the Palestinian ethnic cleansing in the discussion for comparative purposes. A small number of scholars of Palestinian studies discussed these matters in the context of analysis of Palestinian killings and ethnic cleansing which occurred simultaneously to the targeting of the Bedoun (El Najjar, 2001; Mason, 2010; Rosen, 2012), but they largely overlooked the Bedoun. Nevertheless, since many atrocities occurred in mixed groups of the Bedoun, Palestinians and sometimes also other expatriates or Kuwaiti citizens, their analyses are of value. Mason (2010) especially, made a very thorough study from the perspective of theorisation of the crime of state terrorism.

Most of the information below has not been previously discussed by scholars who have focused on the Bedoun in any kind of substantive detail. Some of the diverging political narratives from scholars of Kuwait areas studies focused on repeating government policy and discrediting the Bedoun, and omitted the available information on these matters reported from the field. I discussed some of these mainstream authors and their limitations in Chapter 2.
Appendix F, i


The measure of Kuwaiti respect for human rights is not the barbarity of Saddam Hussein but the international standards to which Kuwait has formally subscribed, including the Fourth Geneva Convention and its First Additional Protocol, as well as the requirements of customary international law. By these standards, Kuwait’s human rights conduct since liberation has been nothing short of deplorable…

…The highest levels of the Kuwaiti government are complicit in these killings in that they have yet to arrest or prosecute any of those responsible, in notable contrast to the vigor with which the government has pursued perceived collaborators with the Iraqi occupiers. Nor have exhumations or any other form of investigation been ordered into the mass graves containing unidentified victims of post-liberation violence. To the contrary, the periodic government calls to cleanse Kuwait of a presumed fifth column have, if anything, further inspired this violence. (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, p.2)

The following themes listed in Table F1 below, emerged from the thematic analysis of literature regarding methods of violence and killing used to eradicate the Bedoun during ethnic cleansing from 1990-1995. Each theme is discussed further below.

Table F1

Summary of Methods of Violence and Killings of the Bedoun (1990-1995) Sanctioned by the State of Kuwait

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methods of violence and killing of the Bedoun collective (1990-1995)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Collective targeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Labelling of the Bedoun as national security threats and traitors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Collaboration with enemy agents, the ‘fifth column’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Forced confessions extracted with torture and show trials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Judicial killings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Extrajudicial killings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Other relevant factors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summaries of evidence in the literature from which the above themes were derived that were are discussed in more detail below. I have not summarised judicial killings, as these were extensively reported by Human Rights Watch (1991a, 1992a, 1993, 1994) and
Amnesty International (1992, 1994) and local media outlets and although they attracted concerns from international humanitarian organisations, these processes were subject to a comparatively higher level of due process than the other themes (they were subject to actual reform and the practice was ceased). These matters are also partially covered under the theme of forced confessions and show trials conducted as part of the State Security Court judicial processes, below.

**Collective Targeting**

The Bedoun population was reduced from approximately 300,000 to 150,000 during the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and the years afterward up until 1995 (Human Rights Watch, 1995; Ghabra, 1997b). The state security court of Kuwait had a notorious reputation for acts of impunity and had met in secret and issued decisions not open to appeal, even before the invasion by Iraq (Human Rights Watch, 1991b). It prosecuted the Bedoun for crimes related to the invasion from the end of occupation until it was dismantled in 1995 (Amnesty International, 1996). Therefore, I have designated the period of collective targeting and violent ethnic cleansing as occurring between 1990 and 1995. Minor themes from the analysis are elaborated in the points below.

The notion of collective targeting of non-Kuwaiti nationals by the government of Kuwait has been emphasised in relation to Palestinian population (Roth, June 11, 1991; Mason, 2010). Overall, the Palestinian population was far larger than the Bedoun, but as I mentioned above, in incidents where the Bedoun and Palestinians were victimized, some references showed that there were higher numbers of Bedoun victims compared to Palestinians. In others, Bedoun and other nationals were targeted, but not Palestinians. For example, Reuters, August 1991, Iraqi reports of expulsions including Bedouns and Jordanians (in Human Rights Watch, 1992). Additionally, Human Rights Watch (1992b, para 13, *Iraq and Occupied Kuwait*) cited that most prisoners of war captured by Iraqis during the initial invasion and the seven-month occupation, and sent to Iraq by the Iraqis, were Kuwaiti citizens and Bedouns (and ‘other residents’ – Palestinians were not mentioned in particular). Human Rights Watch stated that most of those captured were repatriated after the war, but it also reported that the Kuwaiti government refused to accept thousands more than government initially cited as ‘missing’ back from Iraq, and it also reported that those Bedouns in particular were forbidden by government from returning to Kuwait, and that Bedoun civilians had been crossed off the ICRC missing lists. In other incidents, Palestinians in particular were targeted.

The omission of details about the Bedoun in discussion by scholars of Palestinian studies may have occurred because the ‘Bedoun problem’ was beyond the scope of their inquiry. However, the omission has downplayed the targeting of the Bedoun, when such scholars had read sources that indicated the Bedoun suffered simultaneous targeting, and the
Bedoun had a smaller total population, and could not leave the country as easily as the Palestinians. In terms of these last three points, it is arguable that the Bedoun appeared were more intensively targeted by the government of Kuwait, than the Palestinians.

Generally speaking, the collective targeting and reduction of both populations reflected the goals of the government planning policy, *Strategy for Development* (1988) (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, p.573). The policy sought to radically reduce the non-Kuwaiti citizen population and expatriate populations. Government’s control of the population ‘balance’ after the Iraqi forces were removed from Kuwait was then celebrated during and after the ethnic cleansing as a sort of policy victory, for example, in al Ramadhan (1995). Similarly, the policy to de-nationalise the population from ‘Kuwaiti’ to the generic category of ‘non-Kuwaiti’ ‘other Arab’ was reported as implemented in 1988 (Human Rights Watch, 2000), or formalised during the cleansing period in 1992 by the Bedouns’ expulsion from the National Census (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994). However, I have not located other references that concur with the date given by Human Rights Watch (2000) and the account offered by Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan (1994) was more rigorous.

The collective targeting of the Bedoun as one of three main ethnic groups (the Bedoun, Palestinians and Iraqi citizens, the latter being present in much smaller numbers) was discussed in reports by international humanitarian agencies and foreign correspondents, such as Human Rights Watch (1991a, 1992a, 1993, 1994) and Amnesty International (1992, 1994, 1996). Scholar Ann Lesch travelled with Kenneth Roth of Human Rights Watch (then called ‘Middle East Watch’). Lesch was part of the organisation at the time. Some of the foreign journalists who covered the expulsion of the Bedoun included Cushman (June 11, 1991; June 30, 1991; July 16, 1991), Evans (February 28, 1991); Fineman (November 2, 1992); Gasperini (August 20, 1991); Macha (November, 1991) and Wilkinson (May 20, 1991).

There seems to be some irregularities in reporting, where the Bedoun were omitted by journalists due to censorship. Roth (June 11, 1991), Hedges (August 2, 1991) and Arundel (June 12, 1991) all omitted the Bedoun from reports of incidents, as if there were no Bedoun involved. In reports by Arundel (June 1, 1991; June 12, 1991) Sudanese people were featured predominantly in reports with Palestinian and Iraqi abuses. However, these incidents corresponded to very similar if not identical reports in Human Rights Watch (1991a, 1992a), that featured the Bedoun as significant victims.

Collective targeting of the Bedoun (explicitly or implicitly identified) was discussed in the context of a desired strategy in editorials of *Sawt al Kuwait* of May 8, 1991, August 6, 1991 and others (a, p.5). The public media played a significant role in indoctrinating Kuwaiti citizens in an ideology of ethnic targeting and hatred, inciting ethnic cleansing (specific statements are listed below).
The long-term strategy of population restructure violating the Bedoun’s human rights continued beyond immediate post war period (Human Rights Watch, 1993). Atrocities committed via the state security court system, which operated along with the State Security Police, included adopted a fairly standard approach of ordering judicial killings for traitors who had been forced to confess their disloyalty to the state (see Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1992a; Amnesty International 1992, 1994; Mason, 2010). The court continued until late 1995 when it was disbanded in September 1995 (Amnesty International, 1996).

Kuwaiti intellectuals worked intensively at this time to legitimise and enshrine the policy of population ‘purification’ (Evans, February 28, 1991) at the official national policy level to justify the violence. While the Bedoun were one of three identified ethnic target populations (the Bedoun, Palestinians, Iraqis) (Human Rights Watch, 1992a), there was also a double-focus on the Bedoun that the other groups were not subject to, which I will now elaborate.

The Bedoun were guilty of ‘being’ Iraqi enemies as well as Bedoun collaborators. Thus, they were perceived not just as ‘with’ the Iraqis, but as actual Iraqi nationals. The ‘collective crime’ of traitor applied to Palestinians, also applied also to the Bedoun, revealed via the similarity of treatment by government authorities and certain groups of citizens. There were some important differences in the official reasoning why the groups were targeted, such as the Palestinians’ connection to Iraq at the political level via the PLO; while this did not apply to the Bedoun, the northern tribal connections were the focus (in Chapter 6 and 7, interviewees openly discussed the sins of the Bedoun identity, as perceived by Kuwaitis, which neatly fit the nationalist ideology). Bedoun were the primary targets of torture, the refusal to accept persons at Abdali refugee camp, the attempt to empty the camps when government threatened the inhabitants with death if they attempted to return to their homes; the highest numbers of death sentences and extrajudicial killings, the most significant proportion of over 600 hundred stateless people left in Talha deportation centre, including those acquitted after 1991 but who were abandoned there indefinitely (Amnesty International, 1994, 1996, 2005). Kuwaiti authorities refused return of babies and their mothers, despite epidemic starvation, growth and development problems attributed to psychological trauma (Cushman, July 16, 1991).

The Bedoun were also targeted collectively to the extent that they were omitted and neglected by international humanitarian organisations such as the UNHCR, much more than the Palestinians and other expatriate nationals. The UNHCR did not attempt to re-settled the Bedoun as a group at this time, regarding them as insufficient for refugee status because they were not displaced, but victims of violent ethnic cleansing and killing which occurred on a similar scale, if not a greater scale (in terms of proportion of the population that went
unaccounted for), than the Palestinian cleansing. A small portion of the population expelled and driven into Iraqi territory was assisted by the UNHCR. The UNCHR re-settled and aided the Palestinian population in a variety of ways (see Mason, 2010). The Bedoun in Kuwait were simply omitted from discourse about non-Kuwaiti national victims, some of whom became refugees if they were not permitted to return home. Those who were at home, were hiding, hungry, homeless, hunted and murdered. No Bedoun inside Kuwait appears to have been assisted – rather, American forces were compelled by their command to stand by and watch (see the United States policy and particularly, the deployment of U.S. forces in Kuwait after liberation, in Human Rights Watch, 1991a, p.58-60). I discuss this problem further in relation to mass expulsion incidents and the manner in which the Bedoun were entrapped, while other populations were assisted to leave, in Appendix F, ii below.

Additionally, the Bedoun suffered in certain, unique ways, such as the burden of their national identity as Kuwaiti being rejected as a mark of being ‘traitors,’ while they had comprised the majority of the military force on the front lines during the invasion, were abandoned without orders by their superior officers, and were taken prisoner by Iraqi forces. The fact that more numbers of Palestinians fled Kuwait during this period was because they could leave, compared to the Bedoun, who could not. Thus, it appears more likely that more Bedoun were killed during the ethnic cleansing compared to Palestinians, who were aided individually and collectively, in their escape from Kuwait. However, the actual ratio of Bedoun deaths compared to expulsions and numbers driven out of the country is impossible to establish, even to approximate, as very few expulsions and ‘voluntary’ exits from the country were ever observed.

Data estimates of Palestinians who fled compared to those who were killed are available (Mason, 2010), because the UNHCR and other agencies were involved in their escape and resettlement. The Bedoun never received this assistance, so there is no estimate available on the number killed or the number who fled Kuwait, and only a general estimate of the appalling, total population loss. Some comparative data showed the Bedoun suffered more than Palestinians in terms of numbers (I elaborate on examples below), but authors who discussed the Palestinian ethnic cleansing did not observe this. The fact that the Bedoun suffered alongside, and sometimes to a greater degree, than the Palestinian population was significantly downplayed or overlooked altogether, by authors such as al Nakib, M. (2014); el Najjar (2001), Mason, (2010); and Rosen, (2012).

In fact, more Bedoun than any other group of non-Kuwaiti nationals (including Palestinians) were detained and killed by Iraqi forces (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, p.3). For example, thousands of Bedoun serving in the military and police forces were detained and held prisoner by Iraqi forces (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1995) compared to hundreds of Palestinians and other non- Kuwaiti national expatriates (Human Rights Watch, 1991a).
Additionally, the Palestinian population was able to continue to function to some extent, as an effective, transnational economic unit within Kuwait during its occupation by Iraqi forces (Human Rights Watch, 1995; Lesch in Lesch and Lustick, 2005; Mason, 2010), while the Bedouin were economically crippled and impoverished, due to government withholding the salaries from security forces personnel, and the status of administrative expulsion for Bedouin, non-security forces personnel from 1986.

This included Bedouin military servicemen who were on duty and available to defend the state. They were not given orders by their commanding officers to enable them to respond to the invasion, because their officers, the Chief of Staff of the military services and his deputy, had abandoned them in the field and left the country (Human Rights Watch, 1995; Alhajeri, 2004, p.92). It was clear that substantially more harm was inflicted on the Bedouin, particularly due to their entrapment within the border of Saudi Arabia, the cruel and overt nature of attempts to push them across the Iraq border, their having been barred from leaving Kuwait via the airport. The only border exit open to them for escape was to Iraq, which was being invaded by coalition forces. While scores of Bedouin military personnel were held in Iraqi prisons as prisoners of war, Bedouin civilians were pushed across that border as enemies of the state and thereafter, were prohibited from return (Gasperini, August 20, 1991).


**Labelling of the Bedouin as National Security Threats and Traitors**

The term ‘fifth column’ is a reference to a clandestine group or faction of subversive agents who attempt to undermine a nation’s solidarity by any means at their disposal (Encyclopaedia Britannica, April 30, 2014). Specific claims that the Bedouin were or Iraqi identity or Iraqi citizens are included under the theme ‘Collaboration with enemy agents,’ below.

After the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi forces, anti-Bedoon policies took a violent turn. The whole group was accused of aiding Iraqi occupying forces, the Bedoons were singled out for retribution, even though many of them had already been killed for resisting the Iraqi occupation (Human Rights Watch 1993, para. 6). Known acts of resistance by non-Kuwaiti citizens were diminished by authorities and the media (Human Rights Watch 1991a, p.5) while the ‘traitor status’ was amplified in order to increase harm done to the Bedouin,
Palestinians and other non-Kuwaiti national populations based on the targeting of the two specific, stateless groups, the Bedoun and Palestinians. The Bedoun, Palestinians and (actual) Iraqis, were the key targets of the ethnic cleansing, while persons of other nationalities were captured during the initial pogrom. Over time, official policy was reformulated to make it appear that all expatriates were welcome to leave Kuwait, so that it might look like no group in particular was more targeted than any other, but this belied the evidence which emerged from the ground, as well as the fine details of the policies (Appendix F, iii). This situation was reflected in a case brought against Kuwait in ‘The government’s repeated accusations that non-citizens constituted an ongoing threat to Kuwait’s security incited its forces to increased abuses’ (Farhat v Kuwait, 1992, III, A).

Despite this form of targeting based on the assumption the Bedoun were of Iraqi identity and/or citizenship, government had already conceded the Bedoun as a whole were not from Iraq at the same time attempting to ‘prove’ the population are non-Kuwaiti imposters, by trying to force Bedouin military employees to take up non-Kuwaiti and non-Iraqi nationalities since at least 2006 (Beaugrand, 2010, p.156; ‘Stateless Arabs,’ 2008; al Waqayan, 2009). The findings of this study show that accusation that the Bedoun population is Iraqi continues until today as a slur of ‘betrayal’ regardless of people’s actual origins used to deny the group citizenship on grounds of their ethnic identity, and it has now been transmitted across generations (see Chapter 7). The very basis of the accusation of ‘fifth columnist’ is not taken seriously by ordinary people in the Middle East, where the concept is de-mystified and recognised for its currency as propaganda. Michael Rubin (14 August 2013), a specialist on terrorism in the region, explained the use of the concept in Kuwait:

Warnings about the so-called Shi’ite crescent reflect traditional Arab Sunni bias that Shi’ites represent a fifth column. (Michael Rubin, Has Kuwait Reached the Sectarian Tipping Point?, August 14, 2013.)

In other words, the ‘fifth column’ accusation is related to age-old sectarian tensions, and was adapted to the ‘Bedoun problem’ to label the group at the convenience of ideologists, dividing the community and inciting ordinary citizens to join in a violent pogrom of eradication, particularly between 1991-1992, and more generally a broad scheme of programmed, violent ethnic cleansing and killing from 1990 to 1995.


**Collaboration with Enemy Agents, the ‘Fifth Column’**

Instructions to ethnically cleanse and ‘purify’ Kuwait of fifth columnists (to murder them) were issued from a variety of sources, and included official statements from individuals at the highest level of government and newspaper editorials, as listed below:
• Address to the nation by the Emir of Kuwait, in KUNA on April 10, 1991, to ‘cleanse’ Kuwait of a fifth column, quoted in Human Rights Watch (1991a, p.5).

• Crown Prince and Prime Minister Sheikh Sa’ad who wished to ‘purify’ elements of society, on July 9, 1991 in Sawt al Kuwait on July 10, 1991 (quoted in a, p.5, n8. In the context of the ‘need to “purify society” of Iraqi intruders, and the need to assess just who deserves to be in Kuwait and who should not’, the Minister for Information, Badr al Yacoub stated that the ‘clean-up’ should commence prior to the resumption of the National Assembly to ‘confront all those who seek to sow doubt in the unity of Kuwaiti ranks’ (Evans, February 28, 1991).

• Minister of the Interior in The New York Times on July 7, 1991, stated ‘The biggest internal security threat is the presence of ‘Iraqi agents’ suspected of hiding in Kuwait.’ Those suspects comprised the three, targeted ethnic groups discussed above, the Bedoun, Palestinians and any Iraqi citizens who happened to be in the country at the time (Human Rights Watch 1992a, n5).

• How can we achieve security when Kuwait is full of hordes of fifth columnists who helped the Iraqi aggression? … Even those who did not directly help the occupation assisted in other ways… they still live inside Kuwait, editorial of Sawt al Kuwait (6 August 1991) in Human Rights Watch (1991a, p.5).

Instructions to cleanse fifth columnists and to purify certain elements in society referred generally to targeted ethnic groups labelled Iraqi ‘collaborators’ in numerous statements by government figures and in news editorials. Thus, Mason (2010) also draws on these statements as evidence of Palestinian ethnic cleansing. However, the fact is that such ‘collaborators’ were known at the grass-roots level as the Bedoun and the Palestinian populations, targeted by the second, organised resistance force, headed by the State Security Police and Kuwaiti citizen youths who were granted special powers to attack the two groups. In a confusing but likely intentional dialogue, this second force also became known as the ‘Kuwaiti resistance,’ which replaced the Kuwaiti resistance efforts of local people trapped in Kuwait during the Iraq invasion. Bedouin military personnel and the CIA were believed to have been part of the first wave of resistance that helped evacuate expatriates during the invasion (Chen and Lamb, 1990). The LA Times (September 4, 1990) featured Chen and Lamb’s (1990) piece lauding the efforts of the Kuwaiti Bedouin at the beginning of Iraq-Kuwait conflict, which was soon forgotten in the mainstream media as the official narrative turned on the Bedoun.

The mention of Iraqi intruders in Evans (February 28, 1991) was virtually identical to the notion of the fifth column, and notions of ‘infiltration’ of the enemy. Some Kuwaiti youths comprised new generations of the Hadar elite and intellectuals, attending universities
in the United States. They were trained by the CIA in the United States to weed out any ‘Iraqi’ intruders they could find. Human Rights Watch (1992a) reported that the young members of this force targeted Bedoun, Palestinians and Iraqis and had such powers bestowed on them by the State Security Police, that they detain their prisoners while reaping retributive justice. These actions formed the informal side of punishment. If prisoners survived this phase, they were then handed onto the State Security Court for mock trial.

The Minister of Information’s reference to the Kuwaiti ‘ranks’ was a reference to the Bedoun-dominated military and police services who were expelled from their posts. The reference to timing the ‘clean-up’ of those ranks, specifically to prior to the resumption of parliament, was a reference to both the practical and theoretical dimensions of the ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun and Palestinian populations that took place between 1990 and 1995. On the one hand, the statement referred to the actual program of implementation of mass, human rights atrocities including the judicial and extra-judicial killing and state-sanctioned terrorisation (Mason, 2010) of the Bedoun and Palestinian populations, that for the Bedoun, resulted in the loss of approximately 150,000. On the other hand, it referred to the development of the new national population re-structuring policy through the National Council, facilitated by the Academic Team for Population Policy (headed by geographer Abdullah al Gonaim at Kuwait University), according to the Academic Team document issued at the time, in al Ramadhan, 1995 which was rushed through both the basic policy development and the legislative stages to become law (see Appendix F, iii, Activities of the Academic Team for Population Policy, the National Council and the Supreme Planning Council concurrent to violent ethnic cleansing.

Human Rights Watch (1992) referred explicitly to the program, explaining, ‘The pretext for these [human rights] abuses was… to restructure Kuwaiti society’ (Human Rights Watch, 1992, Developments Since Liberation), including killing or otherwise driving out with impunity, vast swathes of its members. The role of academics in advising the Minister for Information at this time, and their role in the production of ideological principles and statements promoting the ethnic cleansing and killing of the Bedoun, Palestinians and other nationals in Kuwait, issued by the Minister for Information and other government Ministers in press conferences and to foreign journalists, warrants further research.

Externally, very similar efforts of ideological transmission were undertaken by the government-in-exile in Saudi Arabia and supported by the Hadar ‘Free Kuwait Society.’ Members of the ‘Free Kuwait Society’ were notoriously involved with the purchase of public relations war propaganda via the firm Hill and Knowlton and subsequently scores of advertising agencies, first funded by elite, private individuals and later by the government of Kuwait (Doorly and Garcia, 2015; MacArthur, 1992; Secunda and Moran, 2007). Their role in the ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun and Palestinian population, so far as many individuals
were highly influential over government at the time and operated as adjuncts to it giving ‘expert’ advice, warrants further research.

Sources: Chen and Lamb (September 4, 1990); Evans (February 28, 1991); Human Rights Watch (1991, p.5); see also KUNA (April 10, 1991) and the editorial of Sawt al Kuwait (August 6, 1991) in Human Rights Watch (1991); Human Rights Watch (1992, n5); Mason, 2010.

**Forced Confessions Extracted with Torture for Show Trials**

Most (but not all) of the information below was derived from Human Rights Watch (1992) due to the organisations special access to the Bedoun in Kuwait, after the invasion of Iraq. The justification for judicial killings rested upon the foundation of extracting false confessions as evidence of wrongdoing, which was then used to conduct show trials. Persons labelled ‘enemy collaborators’ were tortured as part of the process of martial law trials in order to extract confessions. Confessions obtained by torture the only form of ‘proof’ required, but also often the only form of proof obtained by prosecutors. The State Security Investigative Police, prosecutors and the court itself conducted the interrogations. The court was not disbanded until 1995.

Trails were fundamentally marred by serious limitations of due process. Death sentences and commuted death sentences characterised by evidence obtained from torture of the accused and others. Legal counsel were intimated and threatened in an attempt to force them to withdraw from representing the accused. At times no legal counsel was obtained before trial (Human Rights Watch, 1992).

The official position was that acquittals only occurred due to lack of evidence, not lack of guilt (Sawt al Kuwait, June 27, 1991 in Human Rights Watch, 1992). Defendants acquitted by the State Security Court in 1992 and 1993 were still being held in long-term detention in 1996 (Amnesty International, 1994; Amnesty International, 1996). The Talha deportation centre was a converted school in Farwaniya, which housed hundreds of the Bedoun in overcrowded conditions. By 1996, 600 individuals, the majority Bedoun, were still held at Talha under deportation orders (Amnesty International, 1996, p.15).


**Extrajudicial Killings**

After Bedoun police and military servicemen had been expelled from service by government during the liberation of Kuwait, they became the victims of state-sanctioned violence. From liberation, until 1993, Bedoun in government custody were subject to summary execution, disappearance or torture as a matter of public policy (Human Rights Watch, 1993, para. 6). State Security Investigative Police was the main force identified with human rights atrocities (Human Rights Watch 1992a). As I have mentioned above, the
Bedoun were collectively targeted and comprised substantially larger numbers of victims compared to other targeted group, including the Palestinians.

The Bedoun were arguably the most targeted group with the highest number of victims of violence compared to other groups, except concerning expulsion from Kuwait (due to the Palestinians being facilitated to leave Kuwait, while the Bedoun were entrapped or driven out into Iraq). Bedoun prisoners in local jails died due to starvation, beatings and torture, inadequate medical care and executions, with shots to the head at point blank range (Human Rights Watch 1992a). Numerous disappearances of prisoners and prisoners kept incommunicado obscure the reasons for disappearance, and the numbers murdered while in the custody of the state, or deported (Human Rights Watch, 1992).

Mass graves were found at Mushrif, Bayan and al Riqqa, Kuwait, but the deaths were not investigated. Because the deaths were not investigated (Human Rights Watch 1992a), it is difficult to tell if these persons were Bedoun or others (Lubbadah in El Najjar, 2001). At al Riqqa, twenty-four mass graves appeared to be dated from the Iraqi occupation, while twenty mass graves were fresh, indicating they had been created during after Kuwait’s liberation. The bodies in those new mass graves showed signs of ‘unspeakable torture’ and many were transferred directly from police stations after liberation (Roth, June 11, 1991). Roth (June 11, 1991) concluded that the mass graves at al Riqqa did not reflect the full extent of killing after liberation, but that their examination would have provided a necessary point for beginning to examine official violence. Roth (June 11, 1991), the deputy director of Human Rights Watch at the time, highlighted the targeting of Palestinians and did not refer to the Bedoun in his article in the New York Times, but his organisation’s reports (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 199b, 1992a and others) established the abuse and killing of the Bedoun occurred on at least a similar scale to that of Palestinians, and that the Bedoun had been special targets of the State Security Court prior to the war. Roth’s information to the New York Times was censored to omit the Bedoun.

Mass graves near Basra in Iraq were also omitted by international agencies investigating mass graves in Iraq (Kirmanj, 2013). Bedoun were dumped in Iraq as part of a regime of deportations, without food and water, in the middle of the night, in mine-infested areas, and in areas frequented by wild dogs. In some cases the deportees had appeared to have been tortured or beaten prior to being abandoned at the border, or over enemy lines (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1992a). The possibility of deceased Bedoun buried in mass graves in Iraq, near Basra in particular (due its closeness to the northern border of Kuwait near to where the Bedoun deportees were abandoned, as well as close to the refugee camps inhabited by around 15,000 Bedoun prior to them running into Iraq due to Kuwait government threats to their life) warrants fresh investigation, particularly given the extent of media suppression of war crimes committed during the first Gulf war.
Kuwait authorities explicitly informed Human Rights Watch (1993) that no torture or killings in relation to prisoners held in detention would be investigated. Only a very small number of disappearances and killings of civilians investigated (Human Rights Watch, 1993). Over seventy disappearances of prisoners in Kuwaiti custody not accounted for 10 years later (Amnesty International, 2002). Lack of interest in investigating killings implicated the highest levels of government (Human Rights Watch, 1992). The state security court that prosecuted the Bedoun and ordered prisoners to be held whereupon they disappeared or were killed or deported in human conditions, was not disbanded until September, 1995 (Amnesty International, 1996, p.3).

Finally, government’s appointment of the Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs during the war was Abdul Rahman al Awadi. Shortly after, he was appointment as head of Bedoun committee in 1991 in an undisclosed decree (Kuwait government response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.3), during the post-invasion wave of ethnic violence. His role as Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs included reporting state-sanctioned, extrajudicial killings of the Bedoun and others carried out by the State Security Investigative Police (SSIP, Mababeth Amn al Dawla in Arabic), to the Prime Minister (Mason, 2010, p.130). Awadi was also the Minister of Planning from 1985 (Rabinovich, 1987, p.401), leading up to the administrative expulsion of the Bedoun in 1986 (‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003). Therefore, it was likely that he was quite closely involved in the development of 1986 administrative expulsion policy, as well as the ethnic cleansing of the Bedouns from 1990 to 1995. In particular, educated, professionals appeared to be singled out for assassination and torture (Lesch in Lesch and Lustick, 2005, p.180, n66). Mason (2010, p.130) referred to al Awadi in the position of Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs and other sources confirm it. However, she also referenced Human Rights Watch (1992a), which cited Dhari Abdalla al Othaman. (I have carefully checked my sources to the best of my ability, to ensure I have referred to the correct persons and not different people in these roles.)

The resistance was led by the SSIP and mobs of hundreds of Kuwaiti citizen youths to whom the SSIP distributed arms and special powers with which they used to redefine the ‘enemy,’ to hunt down, arrest, physically abuse and hold incommunicado for long periods, the non-Kuwaiti citizen targets that were ethnically cleansed, including the Bedoun (as well as the Palestinians and any Iraqis present) (Human Rights Watch, 1992). This ‘resistance’ performed the ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun, Palestinians and other non-Kuwaiti citizens (1990-1995) (Mason, 2010). When a resistance member reported the killings of some eighty individuals by the resistance group, Al Awadi responded that the number of killings was more in the vicinity of one thousand (Lesch, May 29-31, 1991, p.49; Graham Brown, 1999; Mason, 2008 in Mason, 2010, p.130). The combination of the two roles appears to have been crucial in targeting the Bedoun for ethnic cleansing and the mass reduction of the
population, but it does not appear to have been discussed to date, with Awadi’s role on the Bedoun committee of 1991 emerging in English, in 2011 (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011).


**Other Relevant Factors**

The Bedoun made up to 95% of non-officer forces, under order of military command, both Kuwait and Iraqi at different times (El Najjar, 2001; Lesch, May 29-31, 1991). Bedoun civilians were forced to continue to report to work under other authorities, which included Iraqi occupiers (El Najjar, 2001; Mason, 2010). This led to their being automatically accused as traitors to the state. Crystal (2005) provided a scathing account of the Bedoun as traitor enemies of the state, working for the Iraqi occupying army. The fact that the Bedoun were under enemy occupation alongside Kuwaitis and were forced to report to the occupying army as a method of monitoring, or that they were then targeted for killing by the second Kuwaiti resistance, was omitted. She also did not take into account Bedoun government employees were not paid their salaries during or after the war, due to their being accused of being traitors and enemies of the state. Earlier in her work revised to include the Iraqi invasion and post-war events in Kuwait, Crystal (1995) bizarrely implied the Bedoun had attempted to gain inroads to acquiring citizenship during the war, by stealing government citizenship records – while the Bedoun were being hunted down, killed, detained, held as prisoners by both Iraq and Kuwait, and deported. The suggestion was totally implausible, based on readings of the other sources cited herein.

Note that Mason (2010, p.130) did not clarify two troubling points concerning the Bedoun, a) the differences and change-over between first and second resistance forces, and b) the period where the Bedoun military servicemen and police were on duty, abandoned in the field and then targeted along with Palestinians by the ‘new’ army and police working with the second resistance after Bedouns had been expelled from those services. These discrepancies were documented by Human Rights Watch, other international humanitarian agencies and foreign correspondents. Mason (2010) would have regarded the Bedoun as out of scope of her study, but the account of the Bedoun’s role can be confusing. She appears to assume that the Bedoun were part of forces who targeted Palestinians and were then victims alongside Palestinians, but does not explain what happened in the interim. I gathered evidence from a variety of sources to reconstruct timelines and events to trace what happened during these events, which appears to be the strategy used by others to study the Palestinian ethnic cleansing including Mason (2010) herself. The role of the Bedoun as well
as Palestinians may not always be so clear-cut due to the desire to portray them as enemies of Kuwait, but also because it is possible that some did prefer to side with Iraq, and were perhaps used as vigilantes to attack other Bedouns, just as Kuwaiti citizens were trained to attack ‘Iraqis’ which the Bedoun had been labelled. But it is worth remembering that Kuwaiti citizens, including the Hadar, had strong links to Iraq prior to the war though this fact is rarely discussed in invasion-related literature.

More than one third of Kuwaitis were not in Kuwait during the war, but were spending their annual summer holiday in other countries (Hedges, 2 August 1991). Hadar elite and nationalist notables spent the period of occupation in luxury hotels in London and other locations devising plans to reform Kuwait once they returned to their country. Even those that remained in Kuwait during the war had to fend off the suspicion of those outside who rallied together in the Free Kuwait Movement to persuade Western countries to become involved in Kuwait’s occupation by Iraq. Inside Kuwait, the resistance movement, Bedoun and Palestinians collaborated with each other and were at odds with each other, due to their extreme and detrimental conditions.

Lesch and Lustick (2005) pointed out that the resistance movement network did not extend to give assistance Bedoun and Palestinian areas, but some limited essential supplies were provided to them. This means it is likely that the Bedoun had to obtain food to survive from Palestinians, who in turn had obtained loaves of bread from Iraq. Some Kuwait citizens and authorities interpreted eating bread made in Iraq as an act of treason, although such actions were taken by such people to prevent them from starving to death (Lesch and Lustick, 2005, p.130). Other acts of service to the community during the occupation, which appear to have been taken to keep occupied population focused on survival, were also labelled as ‘collaboration,’ for example:

The martial law trials, held in the months following the war, failed to prove the government's often repeated claim that Bedoons as a group collaborated. The prosecutors and the martial law courts utilised draconian measures to convict defendants of collaboration, which was so broadly defined as to include minor acts of association with the enemy. For example, school teachers and nurses who worked during the occupation were charged with collaboration. (Human Rights Watch, 1995, ‘The Iraqi Occupation and the Liberation of Kuwait,’ para.2)

This information is vital to contextualising the definition of the ‘traitor’ and ‘enemy of the state’ of Kuwait at this time. Remarkably, the Palestinians were enabled to run an internal economy inside the state during the occupation by virtue of their transnational connections and other, certain sources of support. The Bedoon were faced with more extreme challenges to their economic and physical survival due to their social isolation.
(Lesch in Lesch and Lustick, 2005), which the participants of this study attested to with their own personal experiences of fear, homelessness and hunger (P8, P16, P17). Their fathers worked for the state security services and hence, after the Bedoun were expelled from those service, they were officially made the targets of the second wave of resistance.

The initial resistance movement from within Kuwait, comprising mostly civilians of all backgrounds, was limited to approximately six weeks, due to instructions from the Kuwaiti government in exile to cease their activities (Levins, 1995). The Bedoun participated in what appears to be a first wave of resistance (Levins, 1995; El Najjar, 2001, Lesch, May 29-31, 1991 and Abu Haider, Sawt al Kuwait, 8 August 1991, in Human Rights Watch Sept 1991a, p3, n4). There appears to have been a very crucial difference between this group and a second wave of ‘resistance’ described in the sources, though I am not entirely convinced they were two different, separate forces, because sources tend to describe one or the other scenario, but not both. Further research, perhaps including fieldwork with witnesses, is required to clarify this matter. Based on the sources quoted above, the first group comprised individuals trapped inside the country during the occupation. Based on the sources cited below, a second group comprised Kuwaiti authorities, the State Security Investigative Police and young, male Kuwaiti citizen recruits who were granted special powers to act on behalf of government to carry out the violence towards the Bedoun and Palestinian populations in particular, and other non-Kuwaiti nationals (Lesch in Lesch and Lustick, 2005, p.170; Mason, 2010, p.130). This second group was organised by the so-called government in exile and/or the interim National Council, prior to the resumption of the National Assembly. The Minister of Information referred to this stage as the ‘clean-up’ (Evans, February 28, 1991). As I have mentioned above, young, male Kuwaitis at university overseas were trained by the CIA to identify ‘Iraqis’ (Chen and Lamb, 1990); this coincided with the importation of young, male Kuwaiti citizens who had been outside the country at the time of the invasion (Mason, 2010), into the second wave of resistance.

By the end of 1992, authorities informed Middle East Watch that they had no plans to investigate persons implicated in the killing and torture of prisoners while ‘only a handful’ of disappearances and killings of civilians had been investigated (Human Rights Watch, 1993). Amnesty International (1992) reported the Minister of the Interior stating that 40 persons had been under investigation for abusing detainees, but the government did not ever disclose anyone actually held to account. The United Nations Compensation Commission process appears to have drowned out calls for the investigation human rights atrocities and gross population losses of the Bedoun and Palestinians from Kuwait from 1990-1995, in preference for paying out large sums to Kuwaiti citizens, corporations and Palestinians.

Human Rights Watch (1995) claimed to have interviewed around 500 Bedoun for their seminal report, The Bedoons of Kuwait; Citizens Without Citizenship. The data has
never been made available to the group. Many respondents in this research felt that Human Rights Watch in particular and a number of other international humanitarian organisations who had promoted the Bedoun’s ‘democracy’ seeking during the Arab Spring were no longer acting to support the Bedoun. Information released since the Arab Spring indicates that human rights organisations, particularly those based in Washington such as Human Rights Watch, may have played a substantial role in conducting surveillance on local populations who participated in Arab Spring uprisings (Cartalucci, December 31, 2011; Doublas Bowers, 2011) and this should be weighed against the significant decline in reporting on the human rights situation of the Bedoun in Kuwait since the Arab Spring, compared to sustained reporting from other Middle East nations. In particular, Human Rights Watch has substantially reduced their reporting on the Bedoun to just a few sentences in annual world reports, since Belkis Willie was installed at the Kuwait/Yemen desk, which marked a post-Arab Spring change of policy to reduce reporting on the Bedoun, compared to the detailed reporting provided from 1991 through to 2011.

The organisation collected important, irreplaceable data on crimes against humanity committed against the Bedoun by the state of Kuwait between 1990 and 1995, of which key points have been analysed above. However, while making limited representations to the United Nations about the group to some committees, the organisation has not made a strenuous effort to use the data on behalf of the Bedoun seek prosecution of the state of Kuwait for its crimes against the Bedoun, particularly to the extent that ethnic cleansing and genocide could have been extrapolated from the themes which emerged from their reports from 1991 to 1995. Rather, the organisation has changed strategy since the Arab Spring and it no longer investigates in detail, much new data about the oppression of the Bedoun available in the local media and from its local informants. In these circumstances, I suggest that the interview data collected by the organisation, and for the 1995 report in particular, should be made publically available to the Bedoun community (with appropriate confidentiality measures in place), so that the group may use it to seek prosecution of authorities using the existing framework of international humanitarian law that is available to them.

Appendix F, ii

Methods of Expulsion and Other Forms of Population Eradication (1990-1995) - Summary from the Thematic Analysis

The following themes listed in Table F2 below, emerged from the thematic analysis of literature regarding methods of expulsion and other forms of population transfer used to eradicate the Bedoun during ethnic cleansing from 1990-1995. Each theme is discussed further below.

Table F2

Summary of Methods of Expulsion and Other Forms of Mass Eradication Sanctioned by the State of Kuwait

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methods of expulsion and other forms of mass eradication</th>
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<td>• Expulsion strategies</td>
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<td>• Mass expulsion incidents</td>
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<td>• Persons deleted from POW and missing persons lists</td>
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<td>• Expulsion of Bedoun via Abdali border camp</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Failure of repatriation of individuals (return to Kuwait)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The UNCC ‘late claims’ process</td>
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Expulsion Strategies

Administrative deportation was a common strategy used to control the size of the migrant population in Kuwait prior to the Iraq war, as well as after it (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1991b, 1992). Martial law trials frequently issued deportation orders (Human Rights Watch, 1992). Administrative deportation replaced court-ordered deportation orders after martial law lifted, June 29, 1991 (Human Rights Watch, 1992). While tens of thousands of formal expulsion orders were issued to Bedoun individuals, the state attempted to drive the whole population from Kuwait in through two mechanisms: terrorisation (Mason, 2010) and preventing re-entry after to the country after border crossings. I elaborate on these points below. The policy of population management at this time was largely blamed on government, however it was also strongly influenced by the production of an extreme nationalist ideology that emerged during the 1980s, which claimed to be geared toward
‘migration’ and ‘population balance’ (Stanton Russell, 1989; Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994). The policy had begun to be implemented prior to the war. It was then installed immediately after the war, during ethnic cleansing and prior to the resumption of the National Council. The Minister for Information had indicated his desire to see the ‘clean-up’ completed prior to the return of parliament (Evans, February 28, 1991).

The ideology was produced by intellectuals with strong political interests. The policy was more highly influenced by Kuwaiti academics than Ministers and bureaucrats due to the installation of a committee of academics, the Academic Team for Population Policy, with direct access to the Prime Minister (see Supreme Council Resolution No.11/1992 in Appendix F, iii). This had the effect of diverting knowledge and theorization about mass expulsion incidents into discourses of voluntary immigration, changes to visa rules, ‘population balance,’ ‘migration flows’ and the like. For example, a dedicated Expulsion Centre was established in Kuwait Central Prison to house prisoners of all ethnic backgrounds, but the Talha deportation centre in Farwaniya was converted from a public school because additional space was needed to detain hundreds of Bedoun prisoners who were abandoned there in overcrowded conditions, indefinitely (Amnesty International, 1994, p.26; 2005).

I have collated information exploring the overlap between violent killing and expulsion methods with government population policy development in the following section, Appendix F, iii. See also Appendix D, i and iii, for other methods of population reduction targeting the Bedoun.


Mass Expulsion Incidents

The government of Kuwait attempted to remove around 24,000 Bedoun with deportation orders after the Iraq war. It is not known how many officially expelled Bedoun were accepted by other governments. However, as Mason (2010) pointed out, the targeted groups were violently killed and driven out, such that masses of the population were forced to leave in fear of their lives. Yet by 1995, although Palestinians had left Kuwait with assistance from the United Nations and its organisations, the Bedoun lived in Kuwait under virtual house arrest. The Bedoun were unable to travel for any reason (including religious pilgrimage and for medical emergencies), unless they never returned to Kuwait. Any border crossing was interpreted as a formal expulsion by the state. Conditions inside Kuwait caused such hardship for the Bedoun, that they were openly encouraged as a matter of public policy, to exit the country (Human Rights Watch, 1995).

The ratio of the number of deaths compared to the number of expulsions is unknown, and the topic of mass expulsion remains somewhat taboo. Scholars who have
explored the mass expulsion of Palestinians at this time, barely delve into or omit entirely, the mass expulsion of the Bedoun that took place simultaneously, often even though they describe events that included both Palestinian and Bedoun victims (for example, el Najjar, 2001; Mason, 2010; Rosen, 2012; al Nakib, M., 2014).

The nationality of victims of many mass expulsion incidents was often not known or approximately only through observation, but ‘Iraqi’ deportations were observed to comprise the Bedoun (Arundel, June 12, 1991; Cushman, June 11, 1991). After the Iraq war, the government issued over twenty-four thousand individual expulsion orders for the Bedoun. However, the population declined by approximately one hundred and fifty thousand persons at this time (Human Rights Watch, 1995). On June 23 1991, four hundred Bedoun were accused on being ‘Iraqis’ by government authorities (Sawt al-Kuwait, June 26, 1991; Middle East Watch interview, July 15, 1991 in Human Rights Watch, 1992, n25). In one expulsion of two hundred and forty-seven persons of multiple origins, Iraqi authorities stated that one hundred and nineteen (nearly half) were Bedoun (AFP, Reuters, August 4, 1991 in Human Rights Watch, 1992, n29).

Other mass deportations of ‘Iraqis’ numbered in the hundreds (Human Rights Watch, 1992, n219-225). The Bedoun identity was so intensively targeted by authorities, that an informal national policy articulated by officials was that the Bedoun were Iraqi (see Appendix F, i, above). Four thousand Bedoun were stranded at Safwan, Iraq (Arundel, June 12, 1991). The very small numbers of mass deportation incidents actually observed compared to those formally ordered, and the general decline in the Bedoun population at the time, as well as the fact that the borders were managed by the Kuwaiti and allied forces, indicate that much of the expulsion activity and/or Bedoun border crossings took place in secret or out of view. It is also possible that there was a far more intense concentration on mass killings than expulsion, since government had articulated its policy that it would not investigate mass killings (see Appendix F, i).

Henckaerts (1995, p.97-99) addressed the right of the Bedoun to be protected from mass expulsion from the state of Kuwait during the war, despite some minor errors in defining the Bedoun identity due to lack of investigation of secondary sources. The author explained that lack of citizenship ‘registration’ had led to a ‘citizenship vacuum’ in Kuwait which facilitated mass expulsion. The author provided one of the most straightforward accounts of Kuwait’s expulsion strategy deployed against the Bedoun: ‘Kuwait erroneously insists that all Bedoon are foreigners and can be expelled at will. Even if this were the case, mass expulsion would not be permissible’ (p.98).


**Conditions of Expulsion**

No personal documents were allowed to be carried by individuals during their physical expulsion from the state of Kuwait, that would enable them to be formally identified themselves across the border in Iraq. Deportees including women and children were abandoned one mile from the Iraqi border in the dark, with no flashlights. They had to cross mine-infested land with wild dogs. They were abandoned without food and without water, and no arrangements were made with any party over the border to safeguard them (Arundel, June 12, 1991; Human Rights Watch, 1992, n24; Wilkinson (1991). The identity of the expelled was unclear, due to government’s insistence that Bedoun were citizens of Iraq (Cushman, June 11, 1991).

Expulsions of people driven into Iraq by Kuwaiti authorities were carried out in front of US Soldiers (Branigin and Boustany, March 17, 1991 and Drogin, March 18, 1991 in Human Rights Watch, 1992) and also in front of UN and International Committee of the Red Cross observers (Arundel, June 12, 1991; Human Rights Watch, 1992, n24). Talha deportation centre contained over 600 detainees in 1996. The vast majority of detainees were Bedoun, held over for years from the war period, prolonging the groups’ misery (Amnesty International, 1996). For example, a Bedoun acquitted by the State Security Court on June 30, 1993, was still in detention in 1996 (Amnesty International, 1996). The situation for the Bedoun was one of entrapment, compared to the Palestinians and other Arab, foreign nationals who were facilitated by the UNHCR and other agencies to exit the country and re-settle (Mason, 2010).


**Persons Deleted from POW and Missing Persons Lists**

Initially government demanded the release of all persons listed on International Committee of the Red Cross lists of persons held as prisoners by Iraq or thought missing in Iraq (Human Rights Watch, 1992). Approximately 1000 people, mostly Bedoun, were later deleted from government records requesting return of persons from Iraqi authorities (Human Rights Watch, 1992). Approximately 3,700 stateless persons registered with ICRC stranded in Iraq. Almost all never allowed to return to Kuwait (Human Rights Watch, 1992), but given that the overall Bedoun population was approximately 150,000 (Human Rights Watch, 1995) clearly much larger groups went unaccounted for. For this reason, the investigation of unmarked and/or mass graves was warranted, which the government refused.
The labelling of the Bedoun as ‘Iraqi’ by Kuwaiti authorities had the effect of obscuring the identity of the Bedoun, making it more difficult for international observers to identify them and to keep count of the number killed, tortured and expelled. The use of the target words ‘collaborators’ and ‘fifth column’ for the Bedoun and Palestinian populations further confused the identity of the Bedoun during and after the invasion by Iraq. These terms were also identifying signals for ethnic cleansing. However, as I mentioned in relation to the comments made by government ministers in the previous Appendix, it is arguable that the Bedoun were targeted more intensively in this respect, because although Palestinians were regarded as traitors also, they were not regarded as the foremost enemy, Iraqis.

The ideology was promoted during the 1990s by Kuwaiti citizen intellectual of Palestinian-American heritage, Sharfeeq Ghabra (1997a, 1997b). He expanded on the ideology as an uncritical research narrative, including erroneous referencing of claims that most Bedoun were descended from Iraqis, which he attributed to Human Rights Watch (1995) report (Ghabra, 1997b, p.365, n33). Additionally, information about second and third refugee camps at Abdali was largely unreported. Gasperini (August 20, 1991) indicated that there were three camps and three times more inhabitants at the camp (approximately 15,000) than were reported by other authors. Others tended to report only one camp existed, presumably because they only visited one camp (see Cushman, June 30, 1991, July 16, 1991, for example). Most, if not all of the inhabitants of the camps, were Bedoun (Gasperini, August 20, 1991; Human Rights Watch, 1992). I discuss the Abdali camp below.


**Expulsion of the Bedoun via the Abdali Border Camp**

While most sources reported just one refugee camp existed at Abdali, a border-town in the north of Kuwait, this was disputed by Gasperini (August 20, 1991), a foreign correspondent who worked out of Kuwait at the end of the war. For example, border post at Abdali became a refugee camp housing up to 5,000 people at one time, almost all Bedoun, according to Human Rights Watch (September 1991a p.54). Nevertheless, according to Gasperini (August 20, 1991) there were three refugee camps sited at or near Abdali, housing a peak population of 15,000. This was three times the number of inhabitants quoted by other sources. If just one source could uncover such a large discrepancy in numbers, the question arises as to whether other camps holding the Bedoun existed, which could be linked to the mass population loss of approximately 150,000.

According to Human Rights Watch (1991a), by the time the UNHCR intervened to attempt to assist the Bedoun out of the camp, there were less than 700 people remaining. Six hundred individuals were allowed to return to Kuwait under the UNHCRs carefully timed involvement. Various estimates from 5,000 to 3,700 were reported to have retreated into
war-ravaged Iraq for better shelter; they were never allowed to return (Cushman, June 30, 1991; Human Rights Watch, September 1991a, p.54). However, this number does not seem to have included information on the three camps (Gasperini, August 20, 1991), but referred to just one camp.

One thousand, two hundred Kuwaitis at Abdali were known to have fled the camp over a ten-day period and entered Iraq, for fear of being accused as collaborators by Kuwaiti authorities (Cushman, June 30, 1991). The inhabitants of camps at Abdali had been forced back to Iraq due to the appalling conditions in the camp including mass deaths of babies, and terrorization by government with threats to hang Iraqi ‘collaborators’ who returned to Kuwait (meaning Bedoun and Palestinians), while those inside the camps were also accused directly, of being ‘Iraqi’ (see the Appendix F, i, above). Babies born in the camp suffered an endemic level of failure to thrive syndrome, due to psychological damage done to families. Diarrhoea and dehydration were also common, leading to mass deaths of Bedoun infants (Cushman, July 16, 1991).


Failure of Repatriation of Individuals (Return to Kuwait)

The government of Kuwait did not allow Bedoun to return to Kuwait after the war. They were terrorized in an effort to persuade them to exit the country and never come back. Even those who were known to have been prisoners of war in Iraq who were later found at the Abdali border camp, attempting to return homes, were not permitted to return to their ho
(Human Rights Watch, September 1992a, Wilkinson, 1991). Kuwaitis ‘in exile’ claimed they were angry at Iraq’s failure to document fully or return the Kuwaitis who are refugees in Iraqi towns, or still in prison, or missing (Lesch, May 29-31, 1991), but this concern did not see to extend to the Bedoun, because most Kuwaitis ‘in exile’ were affluent Hadar who sat out the war in exclusive London apartments (plotting their future political machinations) who had already left Kuwait prior to the invasion (Lesch, May 29-31, 1991; Hedges, August 2, 1991) while Bedouin citizens were trapped in Kuwait when the invasion commenced, and were then driven out of Kuwait during the invasion and its aftermath of ethnic cleansing (Hedges, August 2, 1991). Al Mughni and Tétreault (2000, p.260) later accused the Bedouin citizens of abandoning the country without providing a shred of evidence to support their generalisations. They also played up Hadar support for the country. Their commentary was politically divisive, and they seemed to imply that all Bedouin citizens, along with the Bedoun, were traitors of Kuwait, while the Hadar were true patriots.

The government of Iraq claimed it sought repatriation of all prisoners of war to Kuwait, but the Kuwaiti government rejected the return of all Bedoun, while the remaining
2,900 were stateless Iraqis without legitimate residence in Kuwait who could not re-enter their country either (Iraq) (Human Rights Watch, 1991b; 1992).


**The United Nations Compensation Commission ‘Late Claims’ Process**

While the government of Kuwait rejected the return of stateless Kuwaitis born on its soil and who had defended Kuwait, it accepted the return of gold bars to the value of $700 million from Iraq under UN supervision (‘Iraq Gives,’ 1991) and war reparations of over $52 billion value out of over 352 billion claimed by Kuwaitis (UNCC at a Glance, United Nations Compensation Commission, n.d.). Why were civilian Bedouns rejected? Likely because government knew they could not prove their claims of Kuwaiti identity, due to lack of documentation. As I discussed in Appendix D, iv, government had long-since isolated one group of Bedoun who had possession of sufficient documentation to prove their citizenship right under the Nationality Law (1959) Kuwait, while the the others did not, and would not, because government was not ever going to issue them with any such genuine documentation. For the majority of Bedoun, the most they have ever been offered by government has been incorrect documentation stating false nationalities. Those that were identified as having correct documentation, have been subjected to the intensified issue of ‘security restrictions’ to remove their claim to citizenship.

Some authors (for example Chung, 2005; Vela, 2015) used the inclusion of the Bedoun and Palestinians in the Kuwait war reparations to challenge criticism that the process was set up to monetarily reward the state of Kuwait for the invasion by Iraq, in the light of the extraordinary payments made to Kuwaiti citizens and especially, corporations. It is arguable that these authors wrongly assessed the role of government in the late claims process, because they used the example of the Bedoun and Palestinian populations to promote the process as having been carried out duly, which is somewhat obscene considering the scope of government-ordered ethnic cleansing and the methods used.

There was sufficient literature on the violent ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun in scholarly work in international law, the grey literature of international humanitarian organisations and media articles published by large daily newspapers in the United States (discussed in Chapter 2, Appendix Fi and other sections of this Appendix), for these authors to be aware that the government of Kuwait used methods of state-sponsored terror (Mason, 2010) to kill and eradicate these populations by other means. I would suggest that the author’s failure to observe this is one of the costs in the social sciences promoting the misrepresentation of the Bedoun in the 1990s, which discussed in Chapter 2 of the thesis (it is almost needless to say that, today, some of these scholars hold or have held prominent positions in organisations and/or consultative working groups funded by the oil industry).
One of the worst examples of commentary on the Bedoun case at the UNCC has been Vela (2015), in a study of the United Nations’ Compensation Commission approach to statelessness which assessed the commission’s late claims process of the Palestinians and Bedoun. Vela (2015) glossed over many important details available in the work of international law scholars who studied the whole claims process, omitting crucial but basic facts regarding the treatment of Bedoun claims. Vela (2015) did not discuss any individual issues relevant to the Bedoun claims, such as the majority of the population being barred from applying for compensation by the government, although her study claimed to include the whole Bedoun population. The study, commissioned by the Institute on Statelessness, appeared to be little more an exercise in distraction from important issues, similar to the criminalizing portrayals of the Bedoun in the social sciences, seen in the 1990s (see Chapter 2 of this thesis).

For example, Vela’s (2015) study simplified previous research in this area, which had not addressed the statelessness of the Bedoun in relation to the claims but had provided far more detailed and deeper analysis of the claims process overall. While the wartime suffering of other groups had been taken into account, the wartime suffering of the Bedoun was not. The context of the post-war ethnic cleansing was not regarded as part of the invasion and occupation experienced, even though the violent and pogrom-like response of the government of Kuwait was arguably directly related to the war. If it was not, was the agency and assessors of the damage assuming the pogrom was just a regular government action? Vela (2015) did not observe that the ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun had taken place simultaneously to the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians in Kuwait.

The population loss of approximately 150,000 Bedoun from 1990 to 1995, and the nature and extent of the violence, has never been investigated by any Kuwaiti or international agency. Although stateless people were reported to have been assisted in southern Iraq near Basra following the war (Mason, 2010), it is difficult to know if this assistance was extended to the Bedoun or only to Palestinians who were registered with the UNHCR. While some mass graves in that area have never been investigated (Kirmanj, 2013), Bedoun killings and disappearances in Kuwait were also never investigated (Amnesty International 1992, 1994, 1996; Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1992a).

A report on the profile of internal displacement in Iraq from the Global Internal Displacement Database of the Norwegian Refugee Council (February 19, 2004), confirmed that from at least 1998, there was no information on the Bedoun of Kuwait who had been driven into Kuwait after the war:
Since the war around half of them have fled from or been expelled from Kuwait, mostly to Iraq. Though they are refugees, their statelessness, their displacement and their Iraqi connections mean that their status has much in common with that of other ‘internally displaced' people. Detailed information on their situation in Iraq is, however unavailable. (Dammers 1998, p.184) 

Some of the major concerns that I observed based on my limited study of the claims process, involved the UNCC allowing the government of Kuwait to vet the Bedoun claims, make decisions about their identity and ability to receive money, and then to distribute the claims money for Bedoun claimants. This ‘supervision’ by the government of Kuwait was strictly prohibited for any other group, due to the need for the payments process to remain independent, and free of corruption (Palmer, 2015). The proportion of the amount awarded to military and police personnel on the front lines during the invasion and to civilians who endured the occupation, also warrants questioning. More Bedoun were at greater risk than citizens during the war, due to their employment as military/police personnel but also due to their inability to leave the country, while most Kuwaiti citizens were not even in the country at the time. But the Bedoun claims were miniscule compared to Kuwaiti citizen, migrant and corporations claims, which escalated into vast, multi-million dollar claims to compensate for oil losses. The Late Claims process capped all payments for the Bedoun at a maximum of $2500, which was the minimum amount of all other claims for all other groups (Palmer, 2015; see also ‘Decision concerning the filing of “late” claims of the Bedoun,’ United Nations Security Council, July 2, 2004). 

The method of assessment of claimant eligibility led to the exclusion of virtually all Bedoun civilian households (those not headed by men in the military or police forces who were employed in active duty at the beginning of the invasion) from the claims process, comprising around two thirds of the Bedoun population. The usual circuitous logic was applied, typical of Ministry of Interior decision-making: the exclusion of the Bedoun civilians was automatic, regardless of their case circumstances, due to the role of government in determining identity. As I have mentioned, the UNCC did not allow such vetting for any other group, but did not appear to question the rationale for exclusion of the Bedoun, either. I did not locate any inquiries of this nature in my reading of United Nations Security Council documents, and although as I have mentioned, my research of this area was somewhat limited, I believe I had read all the major Bedoun decision documents issued by Council. 

Other important points are that the UNCC only added the Bedoun at the very last moment before the process was closed when all other claims had been completed, after concerns arose internally within the United Nations that the Bedoun had been omitted from the entire process (United Nations Security Council, July 2, 2004). How the exclusion of
the Bedoun actually came to be raised as an issue, is not clear. Finally, the UNCC was also unable to address the fact that many of the potential claimants were killed or driven out of Kuwait by Kuwaiti authorities or their agents after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq (since the population was reduced by approximately half its size). There appears to have been no attempt by the UNCC to have ever acknowledged this population loss, let alone account for the missing potential claimants or investigating how their relatives might be compensated. It seems strange that the above authors who specialised in the UNCC legal processes, as well as a researcher from a statelessness ‘think tank,’ uniformly omitted these details as well as the UNCC, given that quite a few scholars of international law have published on this topic, and generally speaking they referenced their work more meticulously than other work on the Bedoun in the social sciences (see Chapter 2), and additional information about the topic was freely available online.

Appendix F, iii

Activities of the Academic Team for Population Policy, the National Council and the Supreme Planning Council concurrent to Violent Ethnic Cleansing

I have combined some of the information presented in Appendices F, i and ii, with notes on the development of population policy after with withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. As I mentioned above, the first two summaries of evidence described the violent ethnic cleansing and killing of the Bedoun from 1990 to 1995, which was achieved by physical methods eradication, primarily killings and driving the population out of Kuwait using state terror (Mason, 2010) and deportation. The purpose of the two appendixes was to offer a limited analysis to support the claim by journalist Mark Fineman (November 2, 1991) that ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun likely took place after the Iraq war, in the absence of academic claims of the same nature. This third appendix in the group attempts to show a time-line of development of the so-called post-war ‘population restructuring’ policy and legislation that was implemented in Kuwait after the withdrawal of Iraqi forces. These developments are shown below, in Table F3. The table is long and detailed, but I ask readers to bear with it due to the gravity of the phenomenon it illustrates, which is the planned and intentional ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun, Palestinians and non-Kuwaiti citizens at the policy level, involving academic advisors as well as bureaucrats and Ministers, simultaneous to the violence being carried out on the targeted groups.
Table F3

*A Timeline of the Development of Official Population Policy Toward the Bedoun by the Government of Kuwait and the Violent Ethnic Cleansing of the Bedoun*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Party involved</th>
<th>Description of activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985-1990</td>
<td>Ministry of Planning</td>
<td>The Ministry of Planning introduced its Five Year Plan for 1985-1990 (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994). Kuwaitization policy was introduced, ‘nationalising’ the Kuwaiti economic sector or in fact, merely political sentiment (Stanton Russell, 1989). Coinciding with or stemming from these measures in 1985, administrative expulsion measures were introduced against the Bedoun, to de-nationailse the group (Human Rights Watch, 1995; ‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003). The Plan set out to make the population problem the focus of the country’s development strategy which was to alter the population balance to achieve a 50-50 per cent balance of Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis by 2000 (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, p.572-3), of which the central goal pointed out by Abdul Hadi al Awadi (Undersecretary of the Ministry of Planning) was to alter the population balance (p.573, n9).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 December, 1988</td>
<td>Supreme Planning Council</td>
<td>Issues <em>Strategy for Development</em>. Ministry of Planning given task to make Five Year Plans reflecting a long-term population strategy for Kuwait (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994). The policy to de-nationalise the population from ‘Kuwaiti’ to the generic ‘non-Kuwaiti’ ‘other Arab’ was implemented in 1988 (Human Rights Watch, 2000).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 August, 1990</td>
<td>Iraqi forces</td>
<td>Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October, 1990</td>
<td>Jeddah Conference, Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Approximately 1,000 Kuwaitis representing political groups assembled to express solidarity to the Emir</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Source</td>
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<tr>
<td>October, 1990</td>
<td>Minister of Planning, Sulayman al Mutawa The military resistance ceased its activities due to Iraqi retribution and the Minister of Planning urged the resistance to cease military resistance (Levins, 1995).</td>
<td>(Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 16, 1991</td>
<td>Coalition forces Coalition forces entered Kuwait.</td>
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<tr>
<td>February 26, 1991</td>
<td>Coalition forces Kuwait was liberated from Iraqi forces.</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 8, 1991</td>
<td>Emir of Kuwait, in a National Address circulated by KUNA the government news agency Instructions to ‘cleanse’ the country of internal enemies, called ‘fifth columnists.’ Referred those who required cleansing to be collaborators with Iraq; did not name particular nationality groups (KUNA, April 10, 1991, in Human Rights Watch, September 1991a, n7).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late Spring, 1991</td>
<td>Committee to Organise the Labour Force Duties: to prevent build-up of non-Kuwaiti population (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, n20).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May, 1991</td>
<td>Kuwaiti authorities Government insisted that nationality was not a factor in arrests of people after they resumed control, an official list of 546 detainees as at May 1991 included only 12 citizen detainees, with 534 detainees stateless Bedoun or of other nationalities (Amnesty International, 1992).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 27, 1991</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice spokesperson, Nahess al Enezy in interview Government refers to those put on trial without due process: ‘Just because they were acquitted, does not mean they are not still suspect. It only means there was not enough evidence for their guilt,’ (Sawt al Kuwait, June 27, 1991 in Human Rights Watch, 1992, n218).</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>July 5, 1991</td>
<td>Minister of Defence, in interview Announcement telling Kuwaitis that Iraq had planted a fifth column, which was still in Kuwait (quoted in an interview in Sawt al Kuwait (in Human Rights Watch, 1991a, n9).</td>
<td>(Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, p.577-8 and Human Rights Watch, 1992, n8).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 6 or 9, 1991</td>
<td>First session of the interim National Council (There is a minor difference in dates between Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan 1994, p.577-8 and Human Rights Watch, 1992, n8).</td>
<td>(Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| July 6 or 9, 1991  | Crown Prince of Kuwait, the Prime Announcement advising Kuwaitis it is necessary to ‘purify the country of the evil elements that constitute a...

July 6 or 9, 1991 | Crown Prince of Kuwait, the Prime Announcement advising Kuwaitis it is necessary to ‘purify the country of the evil elements that constitute a...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Event/Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 1991</td>
<td>Ministry of Planning</td>
<td>The Ministry of Planning, following instructions from the Prime Minister to switch social concerns for economic goals in the wake of the invasion by Iraq, introduced the ‘Preliminary View’ policy. Population ‘balance’ (size and composition) was prioritized over economic considerations in determining ‘migration’ requirements. This policy led to the establishment of the ‘Ministerial Committee for Population Policy’ (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, p.578).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 6, 1991</td>
<td>Editor of pro-government newspaper, Sawt al Kuwait</td>
<td>An editorial warns, ‘Kuwait is full of hordes of fifth columnists… even those who did not directly help in the occupation assisted in other ways… they still live inside Kuwait,’ (Sawt al Kuwaiti, in Human Rights Watch, September 1991a, p.5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 6, 1991</td>
<td>National Council</td>
<td>Calls for strategies to deal with the stateless Bedoun population specifically, due to large numbers in Kuwait – that is, to change the Ministry of Planning’s Long Term Plan. The Ministry was required to re-submit the plan. The plan proposed to ensure the Kuwaiti citizen population was 40% of the country’s total population by 2015 (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, p.574). The ‘study,’ management and control of the Bedoun population was thereafter pegged to five year plans. The Central Apparatus mandate from 2010 was expected to cease with a final solution by 2015, which was extended with the development of the Comoros Plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1991</td>
<td>Ministerial Committee for Population Policy</td>
<td>Committee established and headed by Minister of Planning, also Ministers for Social Affairs and Labour, the Interior, Finance, Trade and Industry and the Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs. The committee oversaw all reports and proposed legislation on population, including those of the Supreme Planning Council (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, p.578-9, n24).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 6, 1991</td>
<td>National Council</td>
<td>Several ministers on the National Council express concern over the Bedoun claiming citizenship and calling for immediate plans to control the current situation (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, p.579, n25).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 1991</td>
<td>First Bedoun population loss estimated</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch, 1991: Ministry of Planning provided the ‘unofficial estimate’ of the stateless Bedoun population at over 250,000 prior to invasion by Iraq. The group later estimated the population was at around 300,000 (Human Rights Watch, 1995).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1991</td>
<td>National Council/Ministry of Interior</td>
<td>Decision to prohibit re-entry of stateless Bedoun civilian refugees to Kuwait. Information synthesising different groups deported to Iraq and Abdali Border Camp prohibited entry to Kuwait (Human Rights Watch, 1991a). This is one of first humanitarian reports documenting the population’s existence in Kuwait. Date of decision to prohibit re-entry not stated in the sources (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, p.53).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1991</td>
<td>Ministry of Planning</td>
<td>Re-issues its Long Term Plan. Urges a more gradual approach to be sought and suggests a diverse population base be sought without immigrants of any one nationality to be allowed to dominate (Stanton and al Ramadhan, 1994, p.537-4) and calls for limiting citizenship grants to the Bedoun to those with ‘legitimate’ claims (p.579). Nationality and ethnicity are identified as the factors that should determine the ‘migrant’ population composition, to prevent any one group from controlling the labour market (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, p.580).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 21, 1991</td>
<td>Minister of Defence in interview</td>
<td>Statements to the effect that the entire stateless communities of Palestinians and stateless Bedoun had cooperated or collaborated with the Iraqi occupation: ‘the attitudes of certain communities… they cooperated with the occupation army’ (Sawt al Kuwait, in Human Rights Watch, 1992, Kuwait: Developments Since Liberation, 1992, n8).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 12, 1991</td>
<td>Crown Prince of Kuwait, the Prime Minister</td>
<td>Interview – ‘evil elements’ planted by Iraq were present in Kuwait that needed to be removed. Those who had cooperated or collaborated with the Iraqi occupation must be flushed out (al Majalla (Saudi Arabian weekly) in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Author/Institution</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 30, 1991</td>
<td>National Council</td>
<td>Adopts new measures to admit only those with high-level skills, to limit alien residency to 5 years, to limit marriage of Kuwaiti citizens to among themselves and to ‘resolve the Bedoun question’ (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, p.580).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1991</td>
<td>Academic Team for Population Policy, working for the Supreme Planning Council</td>
<td>Academic Team recommendations: Citizenship for stateless Bedoun only if they prove eligibility under Nationality Law 1959; cease mass naturalisation of the Bedouin (the same group), register those not complying with the Nationality law 1959, to issued a registration card and classified as ‘non-Kuwaiti’ [indicating the reallocation of the Bedoun from ‘Kuwaiti’ on the National Census]. The migration policy contradicts itself, claiming to tighten migrant population controls, it <em>loosens</em> of immigration/employment controls simultaneous to <em>tightening</em> of controls on the Bedoun population who are not migrants (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, n32). Remember that the Bedoun are being ethnically cleansed at this time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs</td>
<td>Abdul Rahman al Awadi, Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs, was appointed as chair to the Bedoun committee in 1991 (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011). Al Awadi’s other role at this time was as a personal advisor to the prime minister (Mason, 2010, p.130). He reported on the post-invasion ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun, Palestinians and others, specifically the number of state-sanctioned, extrajudicial killings achieved by the government-organised second-wave of Kuwaiti ‘resistance’ (the SSIP, resistance members, civilian vigilantes groups and royal ‘death squads’) (Lesch in Lesch and Lustick, 2005, p.171). When initially a member of the resistance gave a report of eighty killings, al Awadi reported that the number was actually around one thousand (Graham Brown, 1999; Lesch, May 29-31, 1991, p.49; Mason, 2008 in Mason, 2010, p.130).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>National Council and the Academic Team</td>
<td>The National Council adopts a policy of increasing the proportion of Kuwaiti citizens in the total population of the country to 70% (National Council position on the Cabinet working agenda published in <em>Al-Rai Alaam</em>, 1992. No. 9684, p. 4, 5, 13, in al Ramadhan, 1995), while simultaneously adopting the policy to remove the Bedoun from that population, which increases the requirement to eradicate a higher proportion of the non-Kuwaiti population. The Academic Team’s recommendation becomes official government policy. <em>Population Policy for Kuwait: Foundations, Goals and Directions</em> by Abdulla</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
---|---|---|
March 1992 | Emir of Kuwait | Emiri speech declaring that the population composition is a matter of the highest national importance (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, p.581, n34). |
April 1992 | Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs | The State Security Court, well known for conducting unfair trials devoid of due process prior to the invasion of Iraq (Amnesty international, 1994, p.2), takes over from the Martial Law Court. It tries cases of ‘collaborators’ detained since early 1991. Amnesty International reported that the court denied fair processes at every stage of proceedings (Amnesty International, 1994, p.2); trials were characterised by impunity and at times, humiliation (Amnesty International, 1992, 1994, 1996). Defendants were not aware of the reason they had been detained or charges made against them by the state (Amnesty International, 1994, p.7). |
April 1992 | Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs | The Ministry begins to issue work permits to the private sector without any submission of labour needs; employers decide who and how many immigrant workers they want. |
---|---|---|
Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan (1994) showed that Kuwait’s urgent priority for unskilled, female Asian
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 5, 1992</td>
<td>Upcoming National Assembly elections were held (Human Rights Watch, 1994).</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1992-1995</td>
<td>State Security Court</td>
<td>‘Scores’ of individuals accused of ‘collaboration’ continued to be sentenced to death by the State Security Court at this time (Amnesty International, 1993). Defendants acquitted by the State Security Court in 1992 and 1993 were still being held in long-term detention in 1994 and many hearings were conducted throughout 1993 and 1994 until the court was closed in late 1995 (Amnesty International, 1994). Some detainees, including those pardoned by the Emir of Kuwait, remained in detention in 2005 (Amnesty International, 2005).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Sources are provided throughout the text.
Appendix G
The Arab Spring-Comoros years - 2011-2016

i. Decree 409/2011 human rights ‘reform’ law
ii. The limits of knowledge about the Bedoun in education
iii. The Central Apparatus System - Key findings from the thematic analysis
iv. Local and international factors influencing the ethnic targeting and population eradication of the Bedoun (1983-)
Appendix G, i  
Decree 409/2011 Human Rights ‘Reform’ Law

The provision of access to basic public services for the Stateless Bedoun was also referred to as the eleven human rights reforms. They are listed below in Table G1.

Table G1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reform number</th>
<th>Description of reform</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Free treatment for illegal residents through the Charitable Fund for the Health Care of Needy Residents of Kuwait.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Free education for the children of illegal residents through the Charitable Fund for the Education of Needy Children of Kuwait.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Issue of birth certificates for the children of illegal residents that list nationality as ‘non-Kuwaiti.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Issue of death certificates for illegal residents that list nationality as ‘non-Kuwaiti.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Issue of marriage contracts for illegal residents that list nationality as ‘non-Kuwaiti.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Issue of divorce certificates for illegal residents that list nationality as ‘non-Kuwaiti’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Issue of driver’s licenses for illegal residents that list nationality as ‘non-Kuwaiti’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Access for disabled illegal residents to services provided by the Supreme Council for the Disabled in accordance with existing conditions. At the same time, this group was and continues to benefit from a set of social, administrative, educational and medical facilities before the issuance of Cabinet Decree 409/2011. They benefit from the services offered by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, access to job opportunities in the public and private sectors, and services offered by the Ministry of Health in government hospitals like those offered to nationals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>The right to obtain any kind of authorization from the Department of Authentication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>The opportunity for appointment in the government and private sectors was opened to illegal residents according to the need for work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Availability of a provision card (the food ration card used by all Kuwaiti citizens) for ‘eligible’ illegal residents.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The eleven human rights reform for the Bedoun were introduced in 2011, as a negotiated settlement to stop the Bedoun community from protesting on the streets of Kuwait City. At the outset of this study in 2013, I assumed the reforms were genuine. But that same year, feedback began to be released indicating the reforms had failed (Amnesty International, 2013; Human Rights Watch, 2014). When I conducted my fieldwork in Kuwait, I soon established that the reforms were piecemeal. Some Bedoun were benefitting from the reforms, but those individuals carefully pointed out that they were rare cases, and that most others had not access to the reforms. Over the course of my research, I came to know some members of the community better and to observe their different levels of access to the reforms, which are simply basic public services. I observed how they managed their lives without access to basic public services. I also observed how they managed the disquieting instances when access was switched on or switched off by the Central Apparatus, according to patterns of surveillance, where ‘human rights’ which in Kuwait, are just basic public services, are held out and taken away from the Bedoun like a cat and mouse game.

The reason for the failure of these reforms and the states’ incapacity to provide the Bedoun with basic human rights was indicated by the lack of comprehension of the human rights concept by the government of Kuwait. My thematic analysis of the Central Apparatus system revealed that human rights were perceived by the government of Kuwait similarly to the Bedouns ethnic and national identity: as an object to be used in transactions, an object that could be gotten by the Bedoun in return for ‘adjustment’ of their identity, and as an object for sale as a ‘package of benefits.’ While Beaugrand (2015) suggested that one of the problems for the Bedoun is that the government perceives citizenship as a commodity, I would suggest that the problem is that the government also perceives the Bedoun people and their human rights as separate commodities.

There is a basic lack of intellectual comprehension of concepts by those put by government on the front line to discuss the Bedoun issue in the media, while behind the scenes, intellectuals who have designed the system behind the policy. This was evident in the denials the Bedoun are stateless, and the denials of the concept of statelessness itself (Appendix E, iii and iv). The policy and its presentation, carefully curated for public consumption, looks unintelligent. This enables the system of re-organisation to be carried out without resistance, because it is described in way that makes it appear to be more foolish than harmful. Decree 409/2011 was designed to fail, as it merely reinforced the necessity of ‘status adjustment.’ First, I will illustrate what government thinks the human rights are,
when speaking to the public. Then, I will illustrate how the Bedoun are told they can access the grant of human rights, that have (in theory) already been delivered to them.

What does the government think human rights are? According to government, human rights for the Bedoun were the items listed in Decree 409/2011. They were merely a list of basic public services, or objects attached to a service, such as a government-issued, plastic card. The basic public services named in the reforms were also called ‘services,’ ‘facilities,’ ‘benefits’ and ‘privileges’ in different sources, but sometimes also in the same document (such as the Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011). These terms were all believed to be equivalent to actual human rights. For example, a human right is a rational card (the object). A human right is a divers’ licence. A human right is an authorization from the Department of Authentication (the department that authenticates the fraudulent passports the Bedoun are forced to submit to it, discussed in Chapter 7, section 7.4.2).

When Decree 409/2011 was discussed by by the government of Kuwait in its Response to Human Rights Watch (2011), it listed the eleven public services set out in Table G1, above. The Apparatus deemed benefits, privileges and basic public services, all to be equivalent to ‘human rights,’ and that human rights are given or not given, on the basis of a transaction, in this case, submission to ethnic cleansing. The Apparatus confused the terms for public services, public facilitates, welfare benefits and elite privileges as a matter of routine. Government then described the bestowing of human rights on the Bedoun as an initiative,

… lauded by the Cabinet, which welcomed it as a way to complement and strengthen existing efforts to extend many benefits, services, and humanitarian, social and civil privileges to this class. (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch)

As illustrated above, the terms were sometime bunched together to make the apparent provision of human rights appear to be very generous indeed. Language such as, human rights are ‘enjoyed’ was often used, as if policy makers were either dangerously stupid, or disquietingly cynical.

How do the Bedoun access their human rights? This problem was illustrated in an article in The Kuwait Times, which recounted the viewpoint of the Central Apparatus describing how the Bedoun would be given access to Decree 409/2011 human rights:

Some 5,982 illegal residents have corrected their status. They will be given more rights after bringing in their (original) passports. (Nacheva, April 6, 2014)
The Bedoun are instructed to present false passports to show their status, so that they could ‘enjoy’ their ‘benefits’ (Nacheva, April 6, 2014). In this passage, Colonel Mohammed al Wuhaib of the Central Apparatus reminded the Bedoun that he knew they had fake passports to bring to his department:

‘The illegal residents who need to correct their status are classified in one group. “We know that some of them have passports from other countries and they need to come forward and bring them.”’ (Colonel Mohammed al Wuhaib in Nacheva, April 6, 2014)

These were the passports required to be handed over to the Central Apparatus for photocopying and inclusion in their security file as proof of their nationality. Once that task was complete, the individual would be asked to sign paperwork submitting the nationality on the passport was their ‘real’ nationality. Then, they would be ‘given more rights.’

But there was a problem in that sometimes the passports expired. The Bedoun were required to keep their fake passports up-to-date, and to submit new a passport when the previous one expired. In December, 2014, the Central Apparatus head of public relations, Salaeh al Saeedi, was reported in MidEastEye denying the program still existed. He stated:

We resolved the issue of fake passports over a decade ago. Those who bought forfeited African passports reclaimed their initial status as illegal residents in Kuwait. (al Saeedi in Kholaiif, December 12, 2014)

Because the author of the article was not aware of the Bedoun’s history, she was not able to counter this claim with other data, beyond quoting a Bedoun individuals’ opposing account. WikiLeaks had published their data in 2006, eight years prior. Furthermore, the higher-ranking Sheikh Mazen a Jarrah contradicted the claim of the public relations manager, confirming in 2015 that the fake passports program was still in place. Note that al Jarrah himself was the highest the authority responsible for the program, after the Minister of the Interior.

Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah, the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior for Citizenship and Passport Affairs, reminded the Bedoun to get new, fake passports regularly:

Some bedoons have already legalized their status and got Dominican, Somali and Yemeni citizenships, yet they have to keep their passports valid to be deemed legal residents.’ (Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah al Sabah in, ‘Bedoons to Get’, 2015).
Al Jarrah, indicated that the Bedoun have to continually re-purchase the fake passports, preferably from the same country, when the old one expired. If they did not renew the passport once expired, the access to basic public services – the Bedouns human rights – would be cut off, until they submitted a valid one. In this way, the eleven reforms perceived by government to be human rights, functioned only as in instrument of the Central Apparatus system. That instrument was used to try to force the Bedoun to submit to the ‘status adjustment’ program. Note that the ‘original’ passport could be from the Dominican Islands or Somalia, it need not bear any relation to any country the individual was otherwise associated with, as long as it was not Kuwaiti.

Another example of the failure of the Decree 409/2011 reforms was in February 2015, at the United Nations Human Rights Commission’s Universal Periodic Review (second cycle) for Kuwait. Government representatives claimed that approximately 56,547 illegal residents benefited by the human rights ‘services’ out of over 111,000 (‘Kuwait Showcases,’ 2015). This was approximately half the population. Being called illegal residents, it was difficult to tell if the government was referring to the stateless Bedoun population alone or a mixed cohort with illegal migrants who were legitimate nationals of other countries. If we assume the announcement concerned only the Bedoun population, it appeared that around half of the population who did not have access to public basic services had resisted participating in the ‘status adjustment’ program, and/or had been issued one or more ‘security restrictions.’

Furthermore, the nature of the access was not disclosed – was the access permanent, temporary or tentative? Were all eleven reform points available to the said recipients at all times, or were only some points accessible while others were withheld? Government had described all Bedoun as having access to basic public services as an ‘enjoyment’ of rights and services (Kuwait Showcases,’ 2015), but only half had received them. The claim was self-contradictory. Kuwait was lauded for the achievement at the United Nations, while around half the Bedoun still could not access their package of human rights, also known as ‘services,’ ‘facilities,’ ‘benefits’ and ‘privileges.’ A number of members of parliament spoke out about the ongoing situation where the Bedoun could not access basic human rights in Kuwait, in 2016:

MP Yousef Al-Zalzalah slammed the government’s treatment of bedoons, saying some of them can’t get married, get an education or get the least of their basic rights. ‘This is a form of oppression and there are people who are deliberately oppressing bedoons,’ he said (Izzak, May 17, 2016).

Within the country, the failure of the Decree 409/2011 reforms is now widely acknowledged as part of the intentional policy of oppression of the Bedoun.
Appendix G, ii

The Limits of Knowledge About the Bedoun in Education

‘Nathir al ‘Ash Laikbar Farkah’
‘Destroy the Nest Before the Bird Grows Up’
(a Kuwaiti Nationalist Slogan)

A social problem is likely to arise from the inevitable existence of poor, ignorant and illiterate groups of persons. The very existence of such persons might be regarded as a disgrace in this modern State, which even before its independence, had committed itself to fight illiteracy, not only within its own borders, but in other Arab countries. (al Anezi, 1989, p.266)

One cannot change people’s behaviour and attitudes through building more schools and vocational centres… Illiterates…the primary reasons for this derive from the naturalization of the Arab nomad, the Badu. (Alessa, 1981, p.83).

The spread of education in the Gulf and Arab countries leads to their becoming more firmly and deeply rooted in what we may call the tribal consciousness… All of this pours into the general channel of the structural crisis which reveals a number of pathological symptoms… undoubtedly the result of the decline of the socialist and Arab nationalist current… when society lost its spirit. (al Naqeeb, 1990, p.127-128)

The present state of knowledge about the participation of the Bedoun in education, particularly quantifiable information about the numbers of participants, is quite dismal. The majority of information available has been released by international humanitarian organisations, and some additional knowledge has been generated in the public media. Some comments on education can also be found in Beaugrand (2011). The predominant theme of quantitative data I have gathered over the duration of this study does not regard restrictions on education per se, but rather, restrictions on information about the Bedouns’ participation in education. One of the reasons that this problem exists due to the history that lies behind the exclusion of the Bedoun from education, and I explain this problem in Example 9 of this section.

Another reason this problem exists is due to the status quo among the various organisations of the United Nations which fund the state for development programs which including monitoring requirements. These organisations have been complicit in allowing the Bedoun population not only to go unmonitored as a whole population on the National Census, but also to go unmonitored for education, social and economic developmental measures (Carr-Hill, 2013) in areas funded by the United Nations, UNDP and UNESCO.
This includes sectors where some of the Bedoun population does participate, such as education. In a nutshell, there is no national data on the Bedouns’ participation in society released by the government of Kuwait, and therefore no information is provided to UNESCO. As the United Nations is well aware that the population exists, one might expect UNESCO or the UNDP to initiate discussion about the need to capture some information about the group, if only to affirm its existence. Clearly, this has an impact on the ability of the Bedoun, and outside parties, to meaningfully discuss the participation of the Bedoun in education. But is also an extremely worrisome situation for the group regarding the lack of acknowledgement of its physical and cultural existence, and it should be regarded as a general risk to the population.

In this section, I provide nine examples of the nature of discussions about the Bedouns’ restricted access to education. I have attempted to cover information about all sectors of education aside from early childhood education, and to cover domestic and international reporting. These examples point to some rather serious monitoring and reporting issues within the state, and communications with international partners involved in Kuwait’s education system: UNESCO, the UNDP and the World Bank. The examples are listed below:

- Example 1: Three ‘official’ bans on Bedoun education
- Example 2: Education Fund expenditures as measures of Bedoun education
- Example 3: Primary and secondary school data
- Example 4: Tertiary education sector data
- Example 5: Domestic reporting to the National Assembly
- Example 6: International reporting – the US Department of State Human Rights report 2014
- Example 7: International reporting: UNDP, UNESCO and the UNHCR Statelessness Unit
- Example 8: Education reform Decree 409/2011 as an extension of the ‘status adjustment’ program
- Example 9: ‘Kuwait’s Strategic Education Planning Policy and Processes

**Example 1: The Three ‘Official’ Bans on Bedoun Education**

Bans on the Bedouns’ education was a core component of the administrative expulsion of 1986 (‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003; see Appendix E, ii). They were implemented in two phases. The first general ban concerned all Bedoun students who did not have fathers working for the security forces (military or police). They were expelled from schools from 1986 according to the first administrative expulsion ‘The Study,’ (August 30, 2003). The second general ban on education commenced in 1992, expelling all Bedoun
students whose fathers had worked for the security forces (military or police), which coincided with their fathers’ formal expulsion from those services following the invasion by Iraq.

A third ban targeting young children commencing school in the academic year 2014-2015 (al Hajji, October 14, 2014; ‘Bedoun Children,’ 2014; Borqais, November 19, 2014; ‘Tough Requirements,’ 2014). The children did not have birth certificates, and had not been submitted to ‘status adjustment.’ The children did not have birth certificates for one of two reasons. Usually, the Bedoun negotiated directly with schools to bypass the birth certificate requirement. Because of the sheer number without documents, the private school system was used to managing the issue. But at the commencement of each school year, the Central Apparatus would pressure the Ministry of Education and the Bedoun population directly, to provide birth certificates for enrolment. In late 2014, the Ministry of Education decided to ban all commencing students who did not have a birth certificate, as well as those already enrolled. The action was an intentional breach of Article 24 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948).

The reason why the Bedoun cannot obtain legitimate birth certificates and marriage certificates is because government attempts to use these documents to effect ‘status adjustment’ leading to the erasure of the Bedouns national and ethnic identity. This issue is discussed further in Appendix E, vi.

**Example 2: Education Fund Resources as Measures of Bedoun Education**

A major aspect of the initial bans on education was the redirection of the Bedoun education sector as a potentially large, commercial market segment to the private sector. This aspect was discussed in the original administrative expulsion document (‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003). It is at this time (after 1992), some form of compensation, or the appearance of compensation, for the expulsion of the Bedoun from the public education sector was needed, lest Kuwait’s treatment of the Bedoun draw too much attention from the United Nations for breaches of the provisions of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (The United Nations, 1948) (by failing to provide free schooling during the compulsory years, primary school and junior high school).

A system whereby the Bedoun would appear to be funded by an outside agency for private education school fees was invented. It goes by a variety of names, but for the purpose of this study I shall call it the ‘Education Fund.’ Ethnic conflict between the Bedoun and Kuwaiti citizen society was at a low point during the years that the Education Fund was introduced, and for this reason, the Bedoun were isolated to study in schools that only comprised Bedoun students. Government has been promoted the Education Fund as a ‘charity’ which ‘reimburses’ parents for school fees, to make the funding appear to be a generous act. But this is not an accurate depiction as the fund is neither a charity and nor
does it reimburse parents, as I will explain below. At the same time, a network of further restrictions related ‘status adjustment’ on the Bedoun was also introduced, to reduce the Bedouns ‘eligibility’ to access the Education Fund, and to increase access by other groups. Hence, the Education Fund developed into a large, bureaucratic system for transferring monies from the Ministry of Awqaf and Ministry of Education, to the private schools sector, and the monetary aspects of this system has been the main focus of government ever since.

In a nutshell, the government of Kuwait has always promoted the existence of the Education Fund as a system of reimbursements, and as a mechanism for ensuring the whole Bedoun population with education according to Article 24 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (The United Nations, 1948). However, the Education Fund has never provided all Bedoun children with education by funding their places in schools. The funding mechanism has never been available to the Bedoun population as a whole, or to primary school and junior high school aged children as a high-priority group (all children must be given free education by the state, according to Article 24). It has never offered reimbursement of 100% of school fees for any Bedoun student, and therefore it has never offered an appropriate level of support to assist impoverished Bedoun children is provided by the state (all children must be given free education by the state, according to Article 24). In other words, it has never been a safeguard to ensure that Kuwait has met its obligations in Article 24 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (The United Nations, 1948), concerning the provision of the Bedouns human rights.

Many young children and adolescents have been unable to attend school, ostensibly due to their inability to obtain a correct birth certificate. This ‘reason’ is used to attempt to force implementation of the ‘status adjustment’ program on children. But it is also because the Education Fund system does not provide for the full, free education of students. The funding system has been created as a mechanism to distance the Bedoun from accessing education while distributing government funds into the private sector market, to implement further restrictions on the Bedoun attempting to access that funding for the purpose of education, in order to force their submission to ‘status adjustment,’ and divert discussion over whether or not the Bedoun can exercise their human rights to access basic education for their children.

The government of Kuwait had persisted with a policy of addressing questions on the deprivation of education to the Bedoun, by issuing data about the Education Fund (U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report for 2009, Kuwait; Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.33; ‘Kuwait Showcases,’ 2015). The government’s primary self-reporting mechanisms regarding the provision of education to the Bedoun, is the flow of funds passed between Ministries and the private education sector and not the actual education of children in school. Regardless of the purpose for which the Education Fund was claimed to have been
established, government dialogue about the role of the fund and its provision of education cleverly avoid government accountability for providing basic, free school education for all children in its territory. Dialogues about the fund have been used as a diversionary strategy for years, evading discussion of real measures of education received by the Bedoun. This is no surprise, given the bans of education issued by government, but it should raise flags to researchers and policy makers about the need for caution, if not scepticism, regarding government claims the Bedoun are provided with education as public policy.

Another issue that has contributed to this strategy though it may have been unintentional, is that great deal of reporting by humanitarian agencies has been devoted to describing the lack of education received by the Bedoun, due to issues arising from inequitable distribution of Education Fund monies, and interference in funding allocation by the Central Apparatus. The strategy has enabled the government of Kuwait to avoid any discussion about the specifics of education policy for the Bedoun and what kind of education has been obtained by the Bedoun, and the processes of obtaining instruction. The Bedoun education issue has been stuck on a polarised debate of claims the Bedoun have access to education vs claims they do not. Concerns that the community has not received education at all have been allowed to overwhelm more detailed discussion of the black hole of statistical data on Bedoun education published by government, which has covered up a) basic information about Bedoun enrolment at each level of schooling, attendance, retention, graduation and employment outcomes, causes of achievement and failure, and b) how education is received, including discrimination and other human rights violations experienced in schools, and the how students are pushed out of the system.

As with many topics concerning the Bedoun, observation of these challenges for students leads to the underlying program of cultural restrictions and enforced ‘status adjustment.’ However, the study of the social processes by which the Bedoun attempt to participate in education point to even more human rights deprivations or violations. Issues include those that may be expected for a victimised minority group, but also unexpected indicators of compromise and adaptation on the part of the Bedoun, and bias and corruption on the part of the authorities who are involved in the system. Issues include ethnic discrimination, verbal and physical abuse by teachers, Bedoun who do not receive government funded places but pay full fees for their children’s education which they cannot afford, impoverishing families, a common method of extortion called the ‘Bedoun levy’ on private school fees, the placement of children by government authorities in inappropriate locations and classes, including at inappropriate times of the day. For example, primary school children are sometimes placed in night time, adult remedial classes. This latter strategy comprises the direct abuse of these children via administrative means, to act as a disincentive for education.
A good example of the diversionary approach was a speech delivered to the United Nations in early 2015 by Ms Eman al Nasser. She discussed a range of data about expenditure flows from the Education Fund to other departments of government, and private schools. She indulged in discussion of the ‘enjoyment’ of human rights by the Bedoun, including education. But only three figures of student enrolment across the country, a total for enrolments in primary, junior and senior secondary schools combined, a total for college programs and a total for university programs (‘Illegal Residents,’ 2015; ‘Kuwait Showcases,’ 2015). Furthermore, the figures were woeful; an unacceptably low percentage of Bedoun students were counted in the system. In any case, the enrolment figures were not necessarily figures of the real presence of students in the classroom. Rather, enrolment figures are the means by which the Education Fund monies are accessed by the private schools. This account comprised the whole of the government’s case that it provided education to the Bedoun in respect of their human rights, according to Article 24 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (The United Nations, 1948).

The rate at which the Bedoun population participates in all levels (each year level) of schooling, their rates of attendance and retention levels across all years of enrolment, their graduation rates and the outcomes of their education such as employment figures, are all unknown. The causes of their success and failure are largely unknown, aside from data collected in this study. It is unsurprising then, that not only are comprehensive measures on Bedoun education not available, population-wide data regarding Bedoun unemployment and poverty is not published, either. It is government’s role to provide this information. It is a concern that this approach has been the main approach since at least 2009, and that UNESCO’s and the World Bank’s active involvement in Kuwait’s education programs has made no positive impact on the culture of Bedoun exclusion and the omission of real education measures about the group. UNESCO has hidden behind the fact that only ‘citizen’ rates of education need be reported to it for its schools programs, leaving reporting of stateless populations to go unmonitored.

International human rights organisations and Kuwaiti politicians have previously tried to address the issue of Bedoun education through dialogue about a ‘Charity Fund’ for education (Human rights Watch, 2011; Group 29, 2012; ‘Tough Requirements,’ 2014). Other agencies, such as the United Nations Human Rights Council (at their two universal periodic reviews) and the U.S. Department of State (see below) have also been involved. None of these parties have been willing to recognise and challenge the Kuwait government’s approach, by acknowledging that information about the Education Fund does not provide valid information about the education of the Bedoun population that the state is obliged to provide to demonstrate it is complying with international law.
As I have mentioned, the Education Fund does not attempt to provide funding exclusively for the Bedoun, but instead disperses the funds to others. This policy works in concert with Central Apparatus restrictions which reduces Bedoun access to the Fund. This seems to have the advantage for other groups, of minimising the amount of money flowing to pay for Bedoun education, while increasing the amount of money other groups can access. For example, Human Rights Watch (2011, p.35, n102) reported a school administrator had observed a decrease in Education Fund provision for the Bedoun and an increase in Education provisions distributed to foreign national residents, affecting school enrolments. The report also noted that the Education Fund monies were not exclusively directed to Bedoun students. It was somewhat difficult to verify this information, but not impossible. A government document called the National Report on Education 2004-2008 (2008) demonstrated that the Education Fund did not actually provide financial support for the provision of education exclusively for the Bedoun, but was used for the education of any children it deemed ‘needy,’ including students from at least 34 different nationalities. The purpose of the Education Fund, when it is touted as a charity, is not ‘for’ the Bedoun, but for low-income children of any background. This example illustrated that the Education Fund had never been distributed solely to the Bedoun, but had always been distributed to pay for the education of foreign nationals as well; nor did it cover education costs in full (National Report on Education 2004-2008, 2008).

The Kuwaiti public had been told the Education Fund was for the purpose of the Bedoun only, in response to the reinstatement of education for the Bedoun in 2004, after the Bedoun had experienced more than a decade of education bans on all levels of education (Group 29, 2012). This remains a common, though mistaken, belief in the community and it is little wonder, as humanitarian organisations did not seem to have discovered the information that the Fund was not set aside for the Bedoun either, until 2011 (Human Rights Watch, 2011). The U.K. Home Office (2009, p.4 at 3.6.3) also cited the charity fund was set up by the Sheikha, a member of the royal family who felt sorry for the Bedoun. The Bedoun also believed that the member of the ruling family had donated her own money to this cause. This story made the Kuwaiti public believe that the Education Fund was established for the Bedoun. However, in another account, the government of Kuwait stated the Education Fund was established along with a similar fund to subsidize health costs, which appear to be linked to the Ministry of Awqaf in Cabinet Decree 855, meeting number 2003/2/29, of September 7, 2003 (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.4). There is no doubt that this is reflective of the need to justify Kuwait’s social segregation policy in education, which the Education Fund is promoted as positively maintaining, even though it does not fully fund Bedoun education.
Most arguments about the education of the Bedoun inevitably return to the basic fact that the state of Kuwait has not satisfied its obligations under Article 24 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948). Distracting dialogues about the Education Fund have led to a situation where very little is known about the Bedouns level of participation in education. It appears that government has placed many obstacles in the system that reduce their inclusion, and increase their exclusion, in order to prevent them from accessing education at all, and then, push them out of the system as soon as possible, once they access it. This includes using the provision of education to attempt to force Bedoun children to be submitted to ‘status adjustment.’ The confusion around the purpose of the Education Fund, as well as its inadequacy providing a means for education of the Bedoun, is an example of the culture which surrounds the education of the Bedoun in Kuwait. This problem has had flow-on effects such as enabling the government to fail to publish data on Bedoun education in its national data statistics, and enabling UNESCO to fail to monitor of the population through such education measures. This has only assisted the state to cover up its breaches of international law concerning the right of the Bedoun to access basic education.

Example 3: Primary and Secondary School Data

As I discussed in the example above, in January 2015, Ms Eman al Nasser reported to the United Nations Human Rights Council during its universal periodic review on Kuwait, that 15,105 Bedoun children benefited from education ‘services’ provided by the state in relation to Decree 409/2011:

She pointed out that the government is keen on providing education services to the children of the illegal residents, noting that 15,105 of students of this category are benefiting from this service. Up to 5,758 people were also enrolled in the University of Kuwait and 3,347 others were enrolled at the Public Authority for Applied Education and Training, she said. (‘Kuwait Showcases,’ February 1, 2015).

The report did not clarify what ‘education services’ the children actually received, leaving it for audiences to assume she meant ‘school.’ This is a strategy that is used by Kuwaits official news agency, KUNA, to distance the government from speaking about what it actually provides to the Bedoun (KUNA, January 30, 2015). Similarly, the Bedoun are referred to ‘illegal residents’ though it also refers to other nationals who have overstayed their visas as ‘illegal residents’ who are also commonly discussed in the same human rights forum. However, as the discussion led to mention of those illegal residents having to ‘rectify their status’ to access to the education services, we can safely conclude that the group of illegal residents referred to the Bedoun (KUNA, January 30, 2015). Here again, we see the
obsessive focus with ‘status adjustment’ openly flaunted, this time at the United Nations Human Rights Council, as the incentive for access to the human right of education as occurred with the education bans. Clearly, government does not see the right of education detached from the program of identity erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing), when it pertains to the Bedoun, nor does it find it distasteful to promote the program at a forum of international law. This is typical of the government strategy: its public face appears incapable of the cognition of the notion of human rights and the statelessness of the Bedoun (the public face is dumbed-down). This belies the intelligent (and cynical) design of the program, in which it gets away promoting ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun at the United Nations, and its segregation policy in education.

The figure of 15,105 out of a total registered population of around 111,000, meant that less than 14% of the population were attending receiving ‘education services.’ Approximately 20% of Kuwait’s total citizen population are school-aged children enrolled in school (Kuwait Education Indicators Report, 2007, p.4-7), while legislation making school compulsory for children aged 6 to 14 years was passed during my fieldwork (I attended the National Assembly for the discussion). This data indicates that around 6% of the total population, nearly 7,000 individuals, a significant portion of the Bedoun populations’ school-aged children, are not schooled. This figure is derived from government’s figures based on enrolment, which as I have argued, is not a true indicator anyway – it is likely the figure is larger, due to the enrolment figures not being offset against the negative retention rate. Certainly the Bedoun community already made great efforts to articulate this problem through international humanitarian agencies and the media (Bourqais, November 19, 2014; Human Rights Watch, 2011; Refugees International, 2007).

It is worth considering that the vague mention of education ‘services’ comprised the entire case of the state’s response to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, regarding the lack of provision of basic school education to the Bedoun. In contrast, the state directed has a great deal of attention to achieving the UNESCO Millennium Development Goals (MDG) for its citizens, including the two MDGs regarding education, ‘Universal Primary School Education’ and youth/adult literacy for 15-24 year olds. Kuwait shows such near-perfect scores in these domains that they beg belief. The historical pattern of improvement should be regarded very cautiously if we consider that al Nakib (2014) admitted that the first generations of mass-educated Kuwaiti Bedouin are only beginning to go through university, now, and that this has been due to under-resourcing by the state.

The states’ progress (National Report on Education 2004-2008, 2008, p.9) was been measured across three areas of performance:

- Net enrolment in primary education (the total number of children enrolled).
- Proportion of pupils starting Grade 1 who reach the last grade of primary (the
retention rate).

- literacy rate of 15-24 years of age (the adult literacy rate, another MDG).

These measures could be used in future, to ascertain the participation rate of Bedoun primary school-aged children in education and the literacy rate of youth and young adults. However, it would also be necessary to plausible population measures for the whole group, and the size of the population at each age level, to establish comparative rates of enrolment compared to non-enrolment. The population was expelled from the National Census in 1992 (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994) and no official data of this nature for the Bedoun population appears to have been published ever since. This point is certainly not meant to imply the government does not collect such data, but to emphasize that it is never published.

The issue of primary school education was taken up in the National Assembly just a few months prior to this report of the United Nations Human Rights Councils’ universal periodic review. The dialogue was replete with and hinged on, incorrect ‘unofficial’ figures issued by government authorities, because of the lack of published measures. This issue is discussed below, in Example 5. Where great efforts are invested in education measures for the citizen population as above, it is quite obvious that the same measures are within the capacity of government to provide for the Bedoun.

A note on the age of the data in the National Report from 2008 is useful to provide context of the overall system in Kuwait. The report I sourced appears to be the last detailed report on Kuwait’s education system in English (National Report on Education 2004-2008, 2008). Hayden et al (2015, p.539) recently used the report as a main source in The Sage Handbook in Research in Education, which tends to substantiate this possibility. A subsequent report appeared to have been sponsored by the World Bank (Kuwait Education Program Achievement Report, 2010-2014). The report appeared to be partly modelled on the previous national report, but it was of a much lower standard and provided much less information to readers. It is possible that the most recent reports are not being translated into English, but certainly the World Bank report shows a ‘slowdown’ in the competency of the Ministry, which already appeared to be struggling, to account for its operations. The standards of national reporting in the national report and the World Bank report publication were both rudimentary at best, and in no way reflect the huge financial resources provided to the state by international agencies to assist with education reform (even though Kuwait is one of the most affluent states in the world, which can very easily fund its own weak areas of national development).

Moreover, these reporting efforts do not reflect the capacity of educators employed by the state at Kuwait University, or the capacity of educators in the private system, or the even the data that is available. Kuwait has a strong system of National Census reporting pertaining to Kuwaiti citizens and expatriates, and the Central Apparatus also has a strong
system of data collection on Bedoun education. It is unfortunate that the Ministry of Education cannot access the expertise of local professionals to obtain better statistical data and produce a higher quality of research. Shah (2013) showed this potential but excluded the Bedoun from the research inquiry, even in a context where Bedoun students would have been present in the classroom researched. The ethnic conflict in Kuwaiti society comes into play as a factor here, so that the omission of the Bedoun from education measures is never challenged.

Regarding previous attempts to research education in Kuwait, Crystal (1995, p.78-79), observed that during the 1950s, ample schools were built in Kuwait to enable all Kuwaitis to attend schools. But she did not consider whether or not Kuwaitis actually did attend schools, or the social, environmental and structural factors that prevented them from doing so. Crystals’ (1995) elaboration of limited statistical indicators about education did not account for the Bedouin in desert settlements who had not been able attended schools up to the mid-1970s (al Moosa, 1976). Among these children were the Bedoun, who were then formally banned from schools in 1986. The group was still impeded from returning to school up to 2000 after the bans were officially lifted, as the Central Apparatus restricted access to identity cards and documentation enabling enrolment in schools (Human Rights Watch, 2000).

By 2015, children’s education was still one of the most, if not the most, significant problem for the community (al Hajj, 2015). One example of the complexity of the Bedouns’ situation demonstrates the lack of reliability of ‘new data’ published about Bedoun education reform in Kuwait. In May 2015, there was a reported transfer of some 5,000 Bedoun children from (fee-paying) private to (free) public schools due to their family’s service in the military (U.S. Department of State, 2015, p.18) (due to a renewed intake of Bedoun into the services). Although the U.S. Department of state reference to this reform was repeated in United Kingdom Home Office (2016), neither government agency referenced the claim. There was no confirmation the new policy idea was implemented, despite the pattern of policy failure relation to Decree 409/2011 education reform (Amnesty International, 2013b; Human Rights Watch, 2014).

Since the Arab Spring, more than thirty thousand Bedoun (allocated the green identity type from 2012) who had performed service in the military, and tens of thousands of other members of the group, had been targeted for removal of all access to public services including attendance at public schools, due to ‘security restrictions’ (see Appendix D, iv and Appendix G, iii). This means that while government has been reporting the inclusion of the Bedoun in education, it has been busy trying to push the Bedoun out of the system. Until the government of Kuwait develops models of transparency regarding the Bedouns presence in the state’s National Census, and includes Bedoun children in its UNESCO programs.
(Education for All/Children Out of School), speculation about the provision of education to the Bedoun will remain almost meaningless. UNESCO already provides the statistical resources within its division. The UNDP has funded the government of Kuwait for Ministry of Education computer systems and training. The World Bank has provided monitoring systems and training since 2003 (‘Kuwait Launches,’ March 27, 2015, The World Bank). The state of Kuwait has refused to disclose the population to UNESCO, and international agencies have been complicit in enabling governments to omit them (Carr-Hill, 2013). The state has more than sufficient resources to provide education to the Bedoun, and to monitor it, to equivalent standards of that which is provided to its citizens and expatriates.

Example 4: Tertiary Education Sector Data

Continuing from the quote in Example 3 above, in January 2015, Ms Eman al Nasser also reported to the United Nations Human Rights Council that 5,758 Bedoun students (referred to as ‘illegal residents’), attended Kuwait University (‘Kuwait Showcases,’ 2015) and around 3,347 attended college. Prior to that announcement, the policy had been for the institution to enrol just 100 Bedoun per year (Oskay, 2010) and only Bedoun with Kuwaiti citizen mothers were accepted (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.11). Despite this, The National Report on the Development of Education 2004-2008 (2008, p. 76) sited thirty-one scholarship places for the ‘needy’ to Kuwait University were provided each year between 2004 and 2008. The Ministry of Awqaf awarded seventeen scholarships to the ‘needy,’ while the Ministry of Education awarded fourteen. Multiple scholarships were awarded to thirty-four other nations. Perhaps we may cautiously assume that those described as ‘needy’ rather than nationals of a particular country, were Bedoun.

On the basis of these figures, the Education Fund/Charity Fund had provided financial support to just 31 Bedoun students at Kuwait University each year, almost exactly one third of the Bedoun student quota at Kuwait University. The figures also indicated that generally speaking, around half of the funds monies allocated for student expenses were used for foreign national students, while an unknown but significant other portion was used to fund administrative programs and other types of costs that were not directed toward students. The Education Fund was supposed to exist as a funding pool for student tuition fees, and not for administrative expenditures which should be covered directly by the Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Awqaf and the Ministry of Education perform the administrative duties.

As I have mentioned, the The National Report on the Development of Education 2004-2008 (2008) is one of the most thorough government reports published on education in Kuwait that is available in English. Yet this style of reporting attracts criticism for the Ministry of Educations unwillingness to transparently account for the Bedoun population in its system, particularly the children and disabled students under its care. We should not have
to comb through such reports looking to find ‘clues’ for reference to the Bedoun who are represented under other terms or types, because government does not want to identify them as participating in the system because they are a stateless minority group. This points to yet another way in which the Bedoun are being written out of the national history of Kuwait.

I will now turn to efforts to improve the participation rates of the Bedoun in the tertiary education sector by local advocacy groups. Media reports issued during the Arab Spring sited that Kuwait University was working with government to expand the number of Bedoun admissions. This was reflected in changes in the university’s online admissions policy (Kuwait University Admissions Policy, 2011-2012 and 2012-2013). During the Arab Spring, members of Group 29, a predominantly Hadar advocacy group that worked specifically in the area of Bedoun education, became associated with the change in admissions policy at Kuwait University, which they claimed to have achieved by organising sit-ins at the university with the Bedoun community. They also claimed to have organised 100 fully funded scholarships for Bedoun students to attend the university (‘Everybody has the right to education,’ The Arab Times, n.d.). Therefore, I made arrangements with the group to visit them in Kuwait and to gain access to the student community through their working scholars.

When I made contact in Kuwait, the group was unable to introduce me to a single Bedoun student who was enrolled at Kuwait University. The organisation had over one years’ notice of my request to work with them on this research, and they had made assurances that they could provide me with genuine opportunities to meet Bedoun university students who were their scholarship recipients (see the discussion of methodology, Chapter 4). In Kuwait, the organisation was unable to show me any written or other type of concrete evidence that any Bedoun student attended Kuwait University. When I asked one of the Group 29 representatives, Ebtihal al Khatib (Professor of Literature at Kuwait University) to help me arrange appointments with education administrators at Kuwait University or the Minister of Education (I had access to their office via an official press pass to the National Assembly), she refused, claiming that the no one would never release accurate statistics on the Bedoun in any case, and therefore, there was no point to attempting to collect such data. Al Khatib had nothing to fear from helping me to meet with officials, as they were quite aware of her public activity as a Bedoun humanitarian advocate, the Ministry and the university had apparently facilitated her efforts in the past to enrol the Bedoun, and she regularly appears on Group 29s own television show as a quasi-celebrity in the humanitarian field. I asked if there was any follow-up to the enrolment of additional Bedouns at Kuwait university, she said no. It was as if the ‘campaign’ had never occurred.

Similarly, Group 29s research officer, Dr Sheikha al Muhareb, a well-known specialist physician in Kuwait, also believed that there was no accurate information available
from any government agency regarding Bedoun education. This made me wonder how Group 29 ever came to have such data. When I investigated Group 29’s own claims that their efforts had led to some one hundred students being admitted to Kuwait University (Everybody has a right to quality education, n.d., *The Arab Times*), I discovered that the campaign was run alongside an almost identical campaign on twitter, run by Bedoun social leaders. The only difference in the campaign was that they had gained admission for Bedoun students into private institutions, not Kuwait University. The organisation was only able to put me in contact with one individual who had been admitted to a private college for a diploma. They were not able to put me in touch with any university student that had benefitted from their scholarship campaign to increase Bedoun student numbers at Kuwait University. Muhareb confirmed the organisation had not performed any follow-up to their campaign by early 2014 to check on student progress, and they were unable to site which students in their scholarship program, were still enrolled or had completed a program of study. I would suggest that during the Arab Spring, the greatest gains for the Bedoun at Kuwait University were made in the admission policy changes. However, my experience is that it is very difficult to know if these students provided for in the policy, have actually ever been enrolled, or completed a course of study.

This ambivalence was reflected in the policy itself, which only provided places once all places for citizens were provided, and if there are any places (called ‘seats’) left over. It seems anomalous that the Bedoun must rely on spare seats in a classroom, to fulfil the admissions policy. This provision appears to be an ad hoc mechanism for exclusion, enabling justification for the policy not being implemented at all, in case such issues are ever raised in public forums. Thus, the inclusionary policy featured a ‘way out’ to prevent policy implementation, enabling exclusion rather than inclusion, similar to Decree 409/2011.

This outcome to fieldwork in Kuwait was woefully disconnected to the enrolment over five thousand Bedoun students at Kuwait University, claimed by government at the United Nations in January, 2015 (‘Kuwait Showcases,’ 2015). It also bore virtually no relationship to the claims Group 29 had taken credit for the public media, for helping to achieve over one hundred enrolments at Kuwait University (‘Everybody has the right to education,’ *The Arab Times*, n.d.). Group 29 staff navigated this contested ground with positivist rhetoric about education deprivation and little else. All but one of the authors of the Group 29 (2012) report on education had left the organisation by the time I arrived in Kuwait, and I met them separately.

Lund-Johanssen (2014) conducted a Masters level research project on the group just weeks before I met with the group. The researcher criticized Bedoun social activists and endlessly promoted the efforts of Group 29. While the group has produced some good-quality reports that have indeed, provided new and important information about Bedoun
issues (Group 29, 2012, 2013) this research has tended to be carried out by other researchers on a commission basis. Lund Johanssen (2014) failed to observe that Group 29 was unable to substantiate its basic claims about its advocacy for Bedoun higher education, or that the group had fallen into serious disrepute during the Arab Spring, not only with the local community, but with many of its own members over its treatment of the Bedoun issues, and Bedoun individuals with whom it came into contact.

The situation of lack of information on education measures for the Bedoun is concerning. The government in general is unable to account for Bedoun participation at the international level in its reports to the United Nations, including reporting on its human rights obligations to the Bedoun, and reporting of national data on education. The Ministry of Education and Kuwait University are unable to account for Bedoun participation at the national level, beyond rhetoric on seat allocations that are unable to be substantiated with further information. Local civil society/humanitarian organisations that claim to have helped the Bedoun directly with entry into local public and private institutions, are unable to account for Bedoun participation at the local level. Highly regarded, local academics are unable to obtain data on Bedoun education at the policy level (Alkhandari, 2013, whose work I discuss below), nor are they able to include the Bedoun in comparative studies of participation in education. Instead, they exclude the group for political reasons, as feature of their methodology (Shah, 2013). This situation does not help to protect the marginalised community, but increases its vulnerability of the Bedoun given that the population is omitted from the National Census and all education, social and economic development measures that are reportable at the international level, to the United Nations (Carr-Hill, 2013).

**Example 5: Domestic Reporting to the National Assembly**

The monitoring of the Bedoun’s participation in education has become virtually impossible due to the ‘status adjustment’ program run by the Central Apparatus in the Ministry of Interior. This includes the participation of children in the compulsory years of school – primary and junior high school - which the state of Kuwait is obligated to ensure according to international law, as discussed above. Even if there was an attempt to include the Bedoun in official statistics, the manner in which the ethnic group’s identity is re-allocated under the ‘status adjustment’ program, may make it impossible to establish the segment of the population who are Bedoun but who have been recorded with a false identity by the Central Apparatus, erasing their national and ethnic identity and replacing it with an alternative identity, of the Apparatus’ choosing. The group was transferred from ‘Kuwaiti’ national section – without citizenship – to the ‘non-Kuwaiti’ ‘other Arab’ section of the census in 1992. The population transfer was backdated, showing there was little apprehension in ascribing the Bedoun incorrect identities or forthright about when it occurred.
The ‘status adjustment’ program has obscured comprehension of the national development, such that it is not known if the Bedouin are recorded as other nationalities as part of an incremental, mass transfer, or if they simply struck off the census altogether, or when this has actually happened. The Central Apparatus has indicated that the immigration department is intimately involved in the reporting of ‘status adjustment’ the Bedouin, but this does not really confirm the extent to interference with the National Census. Obviously this has flow-on effects, such as the inability or unwillingness of government to provide national education data on the Bedouin (I have argued that government has this information, but chooses not to disclose it). In the matter of education, the ability of people to identify themselves as individuals and as cultural collectives is important. Access to education in a culturally appropriate environment is important, and this is a reason touted as a benefit of the development of such a strong private schools sector in the country. This value also explains why international monitoring of education occurs under the UNESCO mandate.

As the Appendices section of this study shows, there is a whole network of strategies used to cover up the Bedouin lack of access to education, and these confound efforts to accurately report on their situation. The following example regarding bans on children commencing primary school in September 2014 because they lacked birth certificates is a case in point. In this example, we see how some issues about education of the Bedouin have advanced in the National Assembly, though they have been marred by incorrect information (particularly for Chairman Dashti, who leads the government’s human rights committee). The process was actually initiated by Bedouin intellectuals, who emerged from the Arab Spring to generate public debate on the bans. This led to the development of public knowledge of the new bans on children’s education by the Central Apparatus (the third bans in example 1), and to improved knowledge about the potential number of Bedouin children who are not educated. This case arose just a few months prior to the government’s unusual release of Bedouin enrolment data to the United Nations Human Rights Council, discussed above in Examples 3 and 4.

The requirement that Bedouin children show birth certificates to schools on enrolment was part of Decree 409/2011 ‘human rights’ reforms in education, and this stipulation existed independently of any consideration of the Education Fund, the Fund’s seven ‘facilities’ (U.S. Department of State, 2015), etc. The requirement of registration of births is normally connected to government programs which include the population, and therefore it is of benefit for people to register. In the case of the Bedouin, government attempted to register them incorrectly, changing their national identity in the process in order to exclude them from citizenship and the state, claiming they would relinquish their legal right to citizenship in the state, even if they qualified for citizenship under the *Nationality Law (1959)* Kuwait. Remember that sometimes, the nationality recorded on the birth
certificate did not even reflect nationality assigned to the parents or to their siblings, by the Apparatus. This is called ‘status adjustment.’

Therefore, the Bedoun have had to avoid registering births of their children, in order to preserve their identity, and in their eyes, their legal right to citizenship. The stipulation the Bedoun had to provide a birth certificate on enrolment in any education program, was connected to resistance in the Bedoun community to the ‘status adjustment’ program. The stipulation was a method of forcing the Bedoun to submit to ‘status adjustment’ which would issue them with a false identity on the document, and on the government database. I discussed this issue in terms of the different ways the program worked to enforce false identity and conduct administrative erasure on the Bedoun, in Appendix E, vi.

As I have mentioned elsewhere, in 2011 the government reported that over 12,500 birth certificates issued to the Bedoun population from 2006 to 2011 that were never collected by parents (Kuwait government response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.7). They were never collected by parents because the Central Apparatus had determined a false nationality, which was then pre-filled onto the forms under their instruction, by the Ministry of Health. The 12,500 parents in this five-year cohort, did not accept the determination, nor the certificates. It may be assumed that many more thousands of parents refused the inauthentic birth certificates going back to 1986, when the measures were first introduced in official policy (‘The Study,’ 2003). The figure of 12,500 was around four fifths of the Bedoun births reported by government - a very large proportion of the population was resisting ‘adjustment’ of their identity.

Thus, over 12,500 Bedoun children born from 2006-2011 did not have birth certificates, which government was highly aware of – it had emphasized this cohort in 2011, in its responses to Human Right Watch and to the United Nations. It was one of the reasons why government intervened to more strictly follow the new policy set out in Decree 409/2011 in late 2014. By 2014, the children were between 3 and 8 with a median age of 5. This is the age when children commence school. Hence, the timing of the bans. In 2011, government had stated the problem as:

The concerned party’s refusal to complete the procedures for obtaining a birth certificate by stating their original nationality. This indicates the Ministry of Health’s commitment to producing birth certificates in accordance with the law. (Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.7)

Here, government emphasised that the law actually required the Bedoun to ‘state their original nationality,’ as long as it was not Kuwaiti. The Bedoun were being forced to state a nationality that was not theirs, according to the law (Beaugrand, 2010, p.154; MP Hassan Jawhar in ‘Tough Requirements,’ 2014). But moreover, the statement was not
accurate. The Bedoun were not required to state their original nationality. They were required to state the ‘original nationality’ that the Central Apparatus had determined, as a result of its secret investigations and research (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011). This was clearly explained by government, in exactly the same document as the one above.

MP Hammoud al Hamdan asserted that the requirement for children to be ‘registered’ with the Central Apparatus was a pretext, when such children could not receive official registration from that agency (at least not an accurate one), which undercut the state’s obligation to provide education to all Bedoun children in the state according to international human rights charters (Izzak, November 14, 2014). The government’s refusal to register the Bedoun, and government’s inclination to delete Bedoun from the states’ administrative system, has been documented by international humanitarian agencies since 1991 (Lorch, May 12, 1991; Human Rights Watch, 1995). Although initially the number of children affected was reported as around 600 (al Hajji, 2014), the very brief data government issued in early 2015 indicated that the scope of the problem was much larger (community leaders had always pointed this out).

The community had no way of counting such children, so they suggested the number as a modest estimate of cases they were aware of (H. al Fadhli, personal communications, October 19 and January 19, 2015). I looked to the government’s statement of the numbers of children without birth certificates to attempt to find out the likely numbers using that data. For example, based on the figures of the number of children who went without birth certificates between 2006 and 2011 (in Kuwait Government Response, 2011, p.7), over twelve thousand children born during the five-year period did not have birth certificates. I calculated the number of children who would have reached school age, and those in different grade at school, as at 2014. The number out of the cohort without birth certificates, due to start school in 2014, would have been approximately 2,000 children (see below, Table G2).

The issue became contentious in the National Assembly, when Chairman Dashti of the Kuwait government’s Human Rights Committee reported on the bans on education to the National Assembly in late 2014, after the problem was reported internationally (al Hajji, 2014; ‘Bedoun Children,’ 2014; Borqais, November 19, 2014; Elgayar, 24 November, 2014). Dashti claimed the figures of just forty-four children were banned from starting school in the National Assembly (‘Khatabib Bedoons,’ 2014). Hakeem al Fadhli explained that Dashti was misinformed; the figure of forty-four children that Dashti reported was merely the number of children assembled in two classrooms at the Kuwait Teacher’s Society, which had allowed a temporary classroom to be established to enable the media to access the teachers and children involved in the bans. The figure was taken form the report in The Kuwait Times, which explained the schooling of children at the Kuwait Teachers’
Society in al Jahra, involved just a few children – a room of boys and a room of girls, totalling forty-four altogether. The school was called the *khatatib* school, which means ‘community school’ in Arabic (‘Khatatib Bedoons,’ 2014).

Dashti also provided an estimate of undocumented children already in school, which showed a disproportionately higher number across each grade level than he had estimated in relation to the class of 2014-2015 that was prohibited from starting school. For this reason, I compiled the Table G2 below, indicating the various sources regarding the number of undocumented children who could not start school in 2014. Another issue was that government not only banned these children from starting school. It threatened to expel all other children without birth certificates already in school. If the government had been true to their threat and had expelled all students from their classrooms that did not have birth certificates (al Hajji, 2014), this would have actually revealed the real number of Bedoun children who did not possess a birth certificate. Hence, it never happened.

In any case, Dashti’s numbers did not remotely reflect the limited data available on Bedoun birth certificates issued (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011; Reply of Government of Kuwait to the Human Rights Committee, 17 October – 4 November, 2011), and education enrolments (‘Illegal Residents,’ 2015; ‘Kuwait Showcases,’ 2015). And this raises another issue for the government of Kuwait, as to why Chairman Dashti and the government’s Human Rights Committee have grossly underestimated the number of Bedoun children in school, compared to figures offered by other departments? The incongruence of the figures points back to the problem on inadequate monitoring of the population’s size and development, attempts to avoid reporting, attempts to obscure reporting, and the nation’s avoidance of meeting its obligations to provide the Bedoun with basic education as a human right, as a matter of public policy.
The number of Bedoun children without birth certificates who were expected to be in school or commencing school in the academic year 2014-2015

| Source data |
|-----------------|---------------------------------|
| Number of Bedoun children without birth certificates | Number of children without birth certificates |
| Figure stated by Chairman Dashti, Human Rights Committee, 17/11/2014 ('Khatatib Bedoons,' 2014) | 44 at entrance level banned from starting school |
| Figure released by Chairman Dashti, Human Rights Committee, 17/11/2014 ('Khatatib Bedoons,' 2014) | 4,656 in school in 2014 |
| Figure estimated by the stateless community’s khatatib school (al Hajji, 2014) | 600 at entrance level banned from starting school |
| Figure released by government 2011 (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011) | 12,471 from 2006-2011 inclusive – half now school age across the lowest 3 grades |
| | Average of 2078 starting school each year 2014-2016 and at each year level Prep-Grade 2 |

Note: Sources are provided in the text.

The number of Bedoun children prohibited from commencing school in 2014 represented a new generation of children banned from attending school in Kuwait. Kuwait is obligated in international law to provide free public schooling to all children in its territory (and according to Kuwait’s participation in UNESCO programs such as Education for All), regardless of their background or status (UNESCO, n.d., Education for all goals). While the undocumented group due to commence school in 2014 were the first group explicitly isolated and banned from participation in school since 1986, this number not represent the true scope of the problem.

The 'status adjustment' program removes children’s access to education as it reconfigures their families’ identity. Once nationality is recorded under other countries, as ‘illegal migrants,’ the children will not be able to access school or the Education Fund due to conditions related to their so-called migrant status, unless their fathers continue to obtain false identity documentation every five years. This aspect of the system recently explained by Major General Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah (‘Bedoons to Get,’ 2015; see Appendix C, iii, and...
In other words, the ability of Bedoun children to stay in school once ‘status adjustment’ has been affected, is dependent upon their fathers taking al Jarrah’s advice, to become repeat passport fraud offenders. This last point underscores that the erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing) that is called ‘status adjustment’ must be factored in to any serious consideration of the provision of education to the Bedoun by the state of Kuwait.


This example highlights the nature of international reporting of the Bedouns education, which reveals serious issues of focus and gaps in knowledge. The U.S. Department of State reported the bans on children commencing school in late 2014 in detail in its Human Rights report on Kuwait (2015). The Department of State (2015) focused on access to the so-called Education Fund, rather than the process of school enrolment, attendance, and retention across year levels and graduation. The report authors stated these issues in the positivist manner, but failed to evaluate the outcome of the issues. The measures introduced to deal with the problem did not address the issue but merely created new obstacles for the children and their families, and therefore, the problem had not been resolved at all.

The issue of Bedoun education bans was addressed via a description of the seven requirements for receipt of Education Fund sponsorship:

- Individuals must hold an identification card by the Central Apparatus for Illegal Residents, hold a civil identification card with a national number, have a birth certificate, receive a salary from the Social Insurance Public Authority, be serving in the armed forces, be a child of a bidoon who fought for Kuwait in previous wars, or be the child of a Kuwaiti woman and a noncitizen father. (Kuwait: U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014, p.18)

The approach seemed to be respond directly to the government response issued by the Kuwaiti government on the matter, rather than to attempt to independently investigate and evaluate the Bedoun claims about the bans. Following the trend of international humanitarian organisations reporting on Bedoun education, the U.S. Department of State report authors focused on Kuwait government policy and the conditions under which government claimed education was provided, rather than establishing whether or not Bedoun were actually participating in education, and to what extent. Reports on the Bedoun issued during the Arab Spring Human Rights Watch (2011) and Refugees International (2011) report have contained the most comprehensive summaries on Bedoun education to date from Washington-based humanitarian organisations, but due to their context, the focus remained
on whether basic access to schools could be achieved. Similarly, this was the focus of the U.S. Department of State (2015) human rights report.

The U.S. Department of State (2015) report described the solution that government claimed had been implemented in response to the ban of children starting school in the 2014/2015 academic year, as the ‘integration’ of children assigned to schools by government there (U.S. Department of State, p.14). This was a policy statement issued by bureaucrats, not a statement of what happened next. The ‘integration’ was more accurately interpreted as a cynical disincentive for young children go to school:

- The schools allocated were not local schools,
- The schools were too far from their homes for parents to be able to reasonably drive them there each day,
- Where the youngsters had brothers or sisters already in school, they were not allowed to go to the same school and,
- Students were also assigned to night-time school classes, which comprise older students
- Students were put in inappropriate classes, such as adult remedial classes and classes for adult expatriates of other cultural backgrounds (including adults).

This last option was totally inappropriate for young children attempting to commence primary school, most of whom were around four to six years old (H. al Fadhli, personal communications, February 9, 2014). The children had prepared to start the year with other kindergarten students. The Bedoun community leaders who attempted to advocate for the children with agencies including the U.S. Department of State were issued security restrictions; some were charged with criminal offences.

Furthermore, the structure of the Education Fund, such that is does not pay for all private education fees, and the informal imposition of additional fees via the ‘Bedoun levy’ was not observed. There was no account of those students left out of the qualifications cited in the report (government’s conditions for funding education) or an estimate of their number.

The implication of ‘status adjustment’ in the provision of education to the Bedoun was confirmed by Kuwaiti MP Hassan Jawhar (in ‘Tough Requirements,’ 2014). But the report also omitted this very important point of the education bans - perhaps the most crucial point - which had been reported in the mainstream Kuwaiti media.

Despite the efforts of international human rights organisations and the U.S. Department of State (2015) with regard to reporting on the deprivation of education, the culture of human rights reporting seems to have followed or worked in tandem with, the state of Kuwait. These parties have all tended to produced texts pre-occupied with the Bedouns access to the Education Fund and the payment of school fees as the measure of education.
delivery, rather than actual school attendance and other measures of education. Where the Bedoun have demonstrated they suffer from discrimination and persecution on grounds of their ethnic identity (U.K. Home Office 2009, 2014), clearly there is far greater scope for deprivation of human rights in the education arena, than basic access to schools. Moreover, as I have explained in Examples 3 and 4, Education Fund data does not actually indicate if the Bedoun are in school, or actually being educated.

**Example 7: International Reporting in Education: the UNDP, UNESCO and the UNHCR Statelessness Unit**

Al Anezi (1989, p.266) pointed out that the existence of illiteracy groups in Kuwait due to the withholding of national funding to these groups, was a disgrace to the nation (see second quote at the beginning of this Appendix). He highlighted that Kuwait had funded other states directly to enhance their development programs in education, or had accepted their students and educated them in full at no cost, absorbing the costs within the Kuwaiti budget. Referring to the Bedoun, he stated, ‘The existence of this group may well be an obstacle to the implementation of development programs.’ Alessa (1981) seemed to respond directly to this statement, in arguing for the removal of education resourcing from all Bedouin in the state, and planning for the removal of the state’s education resources from the Bedoun population altogether. Once the removal of the Bedoun from the population on the National Census (introduced 1992, backdated to 1985) was accomplished and justified as a genuine and sound economic policy knowns as ‘Kuwaitization’ (introduced in 1985), this would ‘fix’ the problem of developmental program reporting. Kuwait would still accept the money for developmental planning from the UNDP. Kuwait’s developmental statistics would instantly begin to recover to reach remarkable, near-perfect levels after severing the Bedoun from the national population data, and the national(ist) consciousness.

In the examples in the above sections of the Appendix, concerning the lack of accurate information released about the provision of education for the Bedoun across all levels of schooling, I discussed information presented to the UN Human Rights Council by the government of Kuwait in January 2015. The government challenged complaints made in numerous submissions to the Human Rights Council, which had claimed that the state did not provide basic education for the Bedoun population to an adequate level. Two points are worth noting here. The UN Human Rights Council sitting was called for the purpose of Kuwait’s second universal periodic review. During proceedings, the government of Kuwait issued an arrest warrant on January 27, 2015, for Nawaf al Hendal, a young Kuwaiti representing the Bedoun community at Geneva for the Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review. Simultaneously, a range of twelve members of the community including Hakeem al Fadhl were detained, arrested and sentenced in Kuwait (Amnesty International, 2015), after having helped to promote the dissemination of information about the bans on
primary school children due to lack of birth certificates, in October 2014. Al Hendal’s arrest warrant was withdrawn by authorities just four days after it was issued (Amnesty International, 2015), he was re-arrested and beaten by authorities one month later, on March 23, 2015. This incident is an indicator of the kind of climate in which the Bedoun community attempt to assert the right for their young children to attend schools including reporting to the United Nations.

The government of Kuwait carried out these punitive actions in response to the community’s attempt to exercise freedom of expression, and their coordinated attempt to exercise their collective right to acquire education according to Article 24 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights. It is well within the resource capacity of the state of Kuwait to provide basic education to all Bedoun in the public education system, where the majority of the Kuwaiti Bedoun citizen community are schooled. I discussed why schooling in the public school system among other Bedouin is desired by the community, in Chapter 7. In addition to the punitive responses, the government failed to present data to the Human Rights committee on the actual education of the Bedoun, due to the preoccupation with dialogue directed toward the budget of the Education Fund. As I have mentioned, the complicit silence around this issue at this the level has been disappointing; other states parties and international organisations who have been in a position to help Kuwait’s authorities to better understand its obligations, have under-reported the issues.

I will now refer to international reporting in research on education only briefly, as the Bedoun are excluded or barely mentioned. In the Sage Handbook of Educational Research, the authors accounted for the Bedoun’s education as, ‘In 2011, the Kuwaiti government granted them access to education and health services’ (Hayden et al, 2015, p.533). The authors very quick reading of a human right report referred to the introduction of a policy that was never adequately implemented, Decree 409/2011, and therefore it was inaccurate. The failure of the reforms had been announced by international humanitarian organisations (Amnesty International, 2013b; Human Rights Watch, 2014). Educational researchers at the international level have no real understanding of the Bedoun’s participation in education because the government of Kuwait excludes the Bedoun from all developmental measures sent to international agencies such as UNESCO (Carr-Hill, 2013). But where they have lacked specific data on educational measures, it seems somewhat odd that researchers would rely on such brief, blanket statements without checking their facts.

While children out of school is a significant issue that must also receive attention, there is a capacity for reporting on the Bedouns’ education in Kuwait right now, because government has the data. The problem is that it chooses not to disclose it. But it is also difficult to tell if the omission of the Bedoun from educational and virtually all other forms of research is due only to government repression, or also to attitudes of the local Hadar
population (Kuwaiti and other Arab nationals) who dominate the higher education and research sector, and determine education policy (see Appendix C, vi-viii).

International agencies such as the United Nations, the UNDP and UNESCO are implicated in the maintenance of the status quo of the state of Kuwait, in failing to ensure the state provides free, basic education to the Bedoun. UNWRA and the UNDP appear to have made a greater contribution to perpetuating myths about the Bedouin as ‘squatters’ and ‘slum-dwellers’ used to obtain funding for the eradication of the Bedouin from urban land space (Alawadi, 1980; Zhao, 1990), than to the Bedouins’ development in education. Recently, the UNDP funded the state of Kuwait’s Supreme Planning Council five-year development goals commencing with $16 million USD for ‘efficient and effective administration’ (that is, for just one goal in a multi-goal plan – to support ‘capacity development’ of the Supreme Planning Council) over two years (United Nations Development Program Kuwait, Kuwait Project Document, 2011-2013). These goals have been produced by the Planning Council since the 1980s and they have enabled the government to implement at the bureaucratic level, the planning of this system. The result has included virtually the wholesale exclusion of the Bedoun at the policy level (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994; al Ramadhan, 1995; see Appendix F, part iii). This warrants calls for increased accountability from the United Nations, concerning its funding of Kuwait programs which have arguably facilitated the planning of the Bedouns administrative expulsion, and the ongoing maintenance of the system of restrictive, cultural re-organisation including bans on Bedoun education, the restriction of Bedoun education, the diversionary education funding system claimed to provide the Bedoun with education, and ‘status adjustment.’

No statistics on Bedoun participation in education are published – the offering of Ms Eman al Nasser to the UN Human Rights Committee in 2014 (abovementioned) did not address whether or not the Bedoun actually go to school and of the cohort that does, how many there are in school. The Bedoun are not included in any international development measures by the state of Kuwait (Carr-Hill, 2013) including a range of education development programs funded by UNESCO and the UNDP. The Bedoun are excluded from all reports on education that I have located that are issued by UNESCO including the Millennium Development Goals (reporting on adult literacy), the Education for All and Children Out of School (reporting on children’s education). The UNESCO mandate requires states to report only on citizen participation, carefully avoiding the monitoring and reporting of the developmental status of stateless populations. Examples of reports in which the Bedoun are omitted include, ‘State of Kuwait, The millennium development goals progress report, 2010,’ (State of Kuwait and UNDP Kuwait, 2010), ‘Education for all, 2000-2015, Achievements and challenges: the education for all program monitoring report’ (UNESCO,
2015) and ‘Fixing the broken promise of education for all: findings of the global Initiative on out-of-school children (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2015). Although the Bedoun were omitted even from the second report, the report provided an indication of areas that future researchers and human rights advocates may target in the future, for the purpose of drawing attention to this problem.

There is no requirement for states of Kuwait to report to the UNDP or UNESCO on development of stateless populations within their territories, even if they are indigenous to those territories, due to the mandates of those organisations only requiring reporting of citizen data, according to their reports (refer to the reports I have mentioned above) and according to state practice (Carr-Hill, 2013). This begs the question of what the role of the UNHCR statelessness unit in eliminating statelessness by 2024 is, in ‘the fight against statelessness’ (UNHCR Central Europe, n.d., ‘Statelessness Conventions’). The UNHCR statelessness unit headed by Mark Manly, has no relationship with the Bedoun community.

Additionally, the Statelessness unit does not promote any joint working arrangements or communications with other sections of the United Nations, particularly in the area of arguably the greatest relevance to it, the Human Rights Council. There is no joint liaison between the stateless unit and the stateless Bedoun community, the state of Kuwait, the UNDP and UNESCO, to promote the inclusion of the stateless population in the funded UNDP Kuwait and UNESCO Kuwait education programs. Given that the overall policy tenor of the United Nations, supporting sovereign states cooperatively may mean that the Human Rights Council is not disposed to make real progress on such issues as the exclusion of stateless populations from civil society. Yet there is still scope for the monitoring of such populations, which could be achieved via a broadening of UNESCOs mandate to better reflect international law: requiring member states to submit national development measures on whole-state populations, rather than merely only citizens, with special provisions for the collection of data and reporting on stateless communities who are not included under any states’ monitoring programs, such as occurs for other types of non-native citizens.

Example 8: Education Reform Decree 409/2011 as an Extension of the ‘Status Adjustment’ Program

On the surface, governments’ failure to disclose meaningful information about the provision of education to the Bedoun seems to be due to a short sighted preoccupation with budget finances. Despite appearances, a more thorough study of the development of the restrictions on the education of the Bedoun indicates that the program has been thoroughly designed to stop the stateless ethnic group from receiving a quality education, in line with the basic standards of international law (United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations, 1948). Careful planning of the deprivation of education has been carried out to the extent that the both primary and secondary level restrictions built into the system. For
example, even if a Bedoun individual is technically able to access education on a policy basis, the secondary level restrictions are designed to prohibit participation in practice, such as unemployment, poverty, homelessness, inability to access required, specialist medical care, confiscation of the identity card, the issue of security offences, blacklisting, erasure from the Central Apparatus system, and so on.

This problem was key to the nature of prohibitions on the Bedouns education, explained by international human rights organisations from the 1990s (Human Rights Watch, 1995, 2011) until the Arab Spring, which documented the various issues of many Bedoun unable to access the Education Fund. A small group of case studies were presented by Group 29 (2012) researcher, which demonstrated the idiosyncrasies of the corrupt system. While some examples may appear to be confusing to outsiders unfamiliar with the nature of the Kuwaiti bureaucracy, these instances were certainly united by the common outcome. The goal of depriving the Bedoun of education was achieved on a case-by-case basis approach. The policy and practice around identity documentation forms part of a network of prohibitions, which restrict the Bedouns’ participation in society in a number of areas, of which education is just one area. These areas were outlined in the 1986 administrative expulsion document (see Appendix E, part ii).

From the beginning of the Arab Spring, the Bedoun community complained that it was deprived of education and other basic human rights. The community claimed that secondary factors had led to the community being prevented from participating fully in education, despite the assumptions they had received the restoration of their right to schooling when education bans were lifted, in 2004 (Refugees International, 2011, p.8). In response to this complaint, the government of Kuwait implemented Decree 409/2011, which was designed to provide basic human rights including education to the Bedoun. The government released information about the Decree in the Government of Kuwait Response to Human Rights Watch (2011) and Reply of Government of Kuwait to the Human Rights Committee (17 October – 4 November, 2011), describing how the decree worked.

The requirement for the Bedoun to have possession of a birth certificate was stated as necessary for school enrolment. Meanwhile, the document claimed that the government policy of forcing the Bedoun to state their ‘original nationality’ on those birth certificates would no longer be enforced. The reforms were later found to be ineffective (Amnesty International, 2013b; Human Rights Watch, 2014). The existing policy had remained in place – ‘status adjustment’ was built into the process of acquiring a birth certificate. Thus, children had to either submit to changing their identity in order to attend school, of families used wasata to make direct arrangements with schools, and paid for the school fees directly. Decree 409/2011 had never been intended to provide access to education to the Bedoun, without ‘status adjustment,’ which is a form of erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing).
There has continued to be an organised attempt to force the Bedoun population into submitting to ‘status adjustment,’ which was held out by the government of Kuwait as a requirement the Bedoun must satisfy, in order to enable their children access to basic school education. This includes access to the so-called Education Fund (Hassan Jawhar, ‘Tough Requirements,’ 2014). The erasure is carried out by parents being forced to sign their acceptance of birth certificates pre-filled by the Ministry of Health, under the instruction of the Ministry of the Interior, who determines the country that is placed in the ‘nationality’ or ‘citizenship’ section of the form. Once the child’s identity has been changed permanently, they are supposed to be able to receive five years of access to basic public services under Decree 409/2011, regarded by government as a package of human rights. The child then will never be permitted to receive Kuwaiti citizenship, even if he or she is qualified to do so under the Nationality Law (1959) Kuwait. The child does not have a nationality, and they may never obtain one but remain perpetually stateless. Similarly to the erasure performed on adult males who are heads of households (WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, November 26, 2006), the strategy involving birth certificates and enrolment in education targets individual Bedoun children with erasure, directly.

This close link was documented in Group 29 (2012), which illustrated a range of different types of cases. One case that I have called the process of ‘contracts and statements of obligation,’ showed a contract-like document issued to families by the Education Fund (Group 29, 2012, p.50-51, including Figure 38). The case illustrated that the Education Fund was directly involved in the enforcement of the ‘status adjustment’ program with the Central Apparatus and the Ministry of Education. The parent was requested to sign the document confirming they would ‘adjust the status’ of their children, by changing their nationality with the Central Apparatus. The consequence for not doing so was also stipulated: that the Education Fund would withdraw support and the family would be charged for the school fees directly. In this case, the failure to ‘adjust status’ would result in the family incurring a debt. This scenario was confirmed by Kuwaiti MP Hassan Jawhar (Tough Requirements, 2014), who referred to the Central Apparatus forcing children to be listed under nationalities that did not belong to them.

The Group 29 (2012) study of education had shown that the Education Fund, established in 2004 simultaneous to the reinstatement of education to the Bedoun, had been used to pressure the Bedoun into participation in the ‘status adjustment’ program of erasure. Education was not the only pressure point where the Central Apparatus pressures the Bedoun to participate in status adjustment, but the targeting of children at this level, forcing them into subjection to erasure or to go without education, deserves special attention as a method of state-sanctioned ethnic cleansing. Ultimately, all roads seem to lead the Bedoun back to ‘status adjustment.’ For further discussion of the program, see Appendix G, iii.
Example 9: ‘Kuwait’s Strategic Education Planning Policy and Processes’

In 2013 Dr Eisa Alkhandari completed his thesis at the University of Leeds London, entitled ‘Perceptions of the Effectiveness of Kuwait’s Strategic Education Planning Policy and Process’ (Alkhandari, 2013). As a Kuwaiti with ‘insider’ access to the Ministry of Education, Dr Alkhandari accessed personal at the highest levels in the government sector. The title of the thesis indicated that from this topic, we could expect to see a very detailed picture of who the national education policy and program. The researcher conducted a qualitative study, collecting interview and survey data leaders of the Ministry of Education, local government district leaders, and school leaders. Data collection was followed by followed by policy analysis. The study sought interviews to ‘investigate the nature of the current policy that controls the education system in Kuwait.’ This first phase of the study was a concern: why would policy information – that policy content - need to be collected from face-to-face interviews, rather than data obtained from government policy reports?

The second phase was the collection of survey data on interviewees perceptions of the policy ‘issues that result from policies that control [the] strategic education plan’s formulation and implementation.’ The third phase was an investigation of how the Ministry of Education’s policies might underlie such ‘issues,’ that is, if the actual policies were strengths of weaknesses of the strategic education plan. The findings of the thesis indicated that the design and implementation of public education policy was ‘centralized’ within the Ministry of Education offices to the ‘extreme’ level, due to a focus on controlling resource allocation (spending) (Alkhandari, 2013, p.iii-iv). Centralization was over-wrought despite one of the key goals of the Ministry of Education’s vision for the future for 2005-2025, was decentralization. This was because the Supreme Planning Council conducted such heavy oversight of the Ministry of Education directly, the highest levels of management could do little more than simply follow instructions (Alkhandari, 2013).

These points provide a sense of the nature of government organisation in Kuwait, but my concern during my own research was my inability to get past gatekeepers to locate concrete information on Bedoun participation. However, on viewing Al Khandari’s (2013) study, I realised that the researcher, an insider with the right name in Kuwaiti academic circles, had accessed very few documents himself. This was revealed in the reference list. After many years of study and attempting to access appropriate policy and programming literature from the Ministry of Education, the thesis references list included only eight references to Ministry of Education documents. One document was a book published by the ministry’s press. Three documents were annual statistical records. There was one internal study on teacher training (from 2000), one annual report (2005), one policy document for the
‘quantitative development of learning’ (1998), and one policy document, a statement of the general education strategy (2003). In other words, the researcher could obtain only two standalone policy documents from the Ministry of Education for the study, at best three, if we include the annual report.

Nevertheless, the system of organisation surround the Ministry was most revealing. The Supreme Planning Council held the most influencing in advising the Ministry of Education, but it was not the only department. The National Centre for Education Development, also instructed the Ministry. The Ministry was subject to top-down supervision from authorities who attempt to manage the Ministry from above the Education Minister. There was always constant lateral oversight from liberal ‘experts’ who work in far more comfortable conditions, in research institutions ‘studying’ the under-resourced government departments. This a common pattern in government and privately organised bureaucracy in Kuwait, and it is a reflection of the Bedouin-Hadar cleavage within public institutions. Bedouins work in ordinary public service jobs; the Hadar fill the upper echelons and advise in consultancy roles. Finally, the Ministry was also shadowed by the Ministry of Interior’s Central Apparatus, which holds oversight over it with regard to the Bedoun. The Apparatus can (and does) intervene in the Ministry’s affairs at any time to block individuals and groups from accessing education.

The country is now in the second, five-year phase stage of its development plan, the School Education Quality Improvement Project, linked to the longer-term Kuwait National Education Development Plan. The plan is funded by the World Bank and the National Centre for Education Development, entitled (‘Kuwait Launches,’ 2015). Clearly, the Ministry of Education faced resourcing issues and obstacles developing autonomy, however, the World Bank had funded their data reporting systems, which helps to collect data on Bedoun participation, which is shared with the PACI, which then distributes the information across Ministries.

These structural, political factors influenced the culture inside the Ministry and help to explain why information is difficult to obtain. Despite this, the capacity to report on the Bedoun is already in place, and occurs. Therefore, it should not be difficult for the government to release the information to the UNESCO/UNDP statistical reporting divisions.
Appendix G, iii
The Central Apparatus System - Key Findings from the Thematic Analysis

Table G3 lists the major themes arising from the analysis of Central Apparatus data from 2012 to 2014, mainly extracted from media reports. The main themes and sub-themes arising from them are listed below. The Central Apparatus tends not to publish regular, detailed updates of official policy. Some brief policy announcements are made in KUNA, the official government newsagency, but more detailed information is often released to local journalists through the National Assembly and personal interviews given to journalists. The style of this official and unofficial communication is common practice among government ministries in Kuwait, due to the presence of the press core at the National Assembly.

Table G3

Summary of Themes Regarding the Central Apparatus System 2012-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary of Themes – the Central Apparatus system 2012-2014</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Central Apparatus perspective and processes</td>
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<tr>
<td>• ‘Status adjustment’</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Security restrictions and surveillance</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Criminalisation</td>
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<td>• Substantial population fluctuation indicative of mass deportations or deaths</td>
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Central Apparatus Perspective and Processes

The Central Apparatus is also known as the Central System to Resolve Illegal Residents’ Status. It is a section of the Ministry of the Interior. The ‘system’ has actually been in place since 1965, when it was used to manage all Bedouin who lived in the traditional manner in the territory of Kuwait (see Appendix D, ii). In the 1960s, the aim of the system was to entrap, exploit, restrict and remove all Bedouin from Kuwait. In the 1970s, when it was realised that that goal was too ambitious, it was modified to the more achievable goal to entrap, exploit, restrict and remove all Bedouin from Kuwait. Various committees and departments have been named to manage the system. In 1985, the Committee for the Study of Illegal Residents adopted more extreme goals and methods, such as resorting to mass population expulsion, first administratively, and then physically. In the 1990s, the anti-Bedouin ideology had become so successful, that it erupted into a
government-sanctioned resistance movement, killing and ethnically cleansing to destroy the Bedoun. After the Bedoun were decimated, the 1990s and 2000s marked a period of growth in legislated prohibitions and restrictions including the development of the more technical side of the ‘status adjustment’ program and the security apparatus within the Ministry of the Interior, which would ensure that the oppression and control of the population was strictly maintained. Status adjustment is the program which functions to change the Bedoun national identity on official records; it removes reference to ethnic and national identity and replaces national identity with a false nationality label (another country’s name).

By 2010, when the Central Apparatus was established, the Bedoun were a physically and psychologically weakened community. They were almost forgotten due to their showing almost no signs of life to the outside world for around eighteen years, aside from a small but steady stream of humanitarian reports. Marking the 25th anniversary of the policy to deny of the identity of the Bedoun and the administrative expulsion which followed shortly thereafter, the ‘system’ was put into the permanent care of the Ministry of Interior, alleviating high ministerial councils of the burden. It was their turn to ‘study’ the Bedoun, the term used to refer to hyper-surveillance of the group. From the outside, it might have appeared that community resistance was so low that ‘status adjustment’ could be enforced by the Ministry of the Interior fairly swiftly and firmly from this stage, and perhaps the group could even be quietly exited from the country. The Bedoun problem would be ‘resolved’ forever.

On the ground however, the Bedoun showed signs of a mass national consciousness that has been present since at least the 1970s, if not earlier. In a nutshell, this manifested in a refusal by the collective to submit to ‘status adjustment,’ for re-allocation with a false nationality. Although many thousands of families had already been affected (based on data of identity transfers of military men, and data of refused identity documents), in the 2000s, this comprised only around 25% (based on data of refused identity documents), with around 75% refusing to comply. If trouble was brewing, it was just as well that the Ministry of Interior had the portfolio as the Central Apparatus, as they could confront the Bedoun with the security state. After all, there were only around one third of the Bedoun left, compared to their population in the early 1990s.

What makes the system unique is its strength and longevity, which lies in its extreme ideology that has been present in Kuwait since the states’ independence, and probably before. The system has outlasted and outgrown the multiple, ministerial committees that have attempted to manage it. This is because the ideology has been quite vigorous and persistent, and it has continued to grow, fed by the intellectuals who have created and maintained it for decades while advising the highest levels of government on how to solve the problem. The ideology has been so successful that the whole of the Central Apparatus
has been indoctrinated into it. The system was born with the state of Kuwait. It is a manifestation of what extreme nationalists believe is democracy – their right to be ‘original’ citizens, and their right to annihilate the Bedoun. That is their end-game. For the ideologists, the reason why the system is still in place is that is hasn’t been able to get rid of all the Bedoun, as yet. At the same time, owing to the resilience of their community and some degree of positive social relations within the Bedouin citizen collective, the Bedoun have managed to survive, although they are in much smaller numbers today.

As I have mentioned, the Central Apparatus as a social institution, appears to have been thoroughly indoctrinated. This is quite clear from an analysis of statements issued by staff at the Apparatus. They explain their tasks from the point of view of the internal logic of the system, with little reference to objective reality or standards. Individuals who carry out the Apparatus functions, including high-level officials, deploy language in ways which illustrate they have absorbed the nationalist ideology that the Bedoun are not Kuwaitis and are enemies of the state that need to be removed. ‘Status adjustment’ is the way to return the Bedoun to their origins, wherever they might be, or to any other country if necessary, so Kuwait does not have to deal with them. This mistaken belief guides their ideas and actions in the Apparatus, as they carry out tasks that they believed were in service of the nation, which imposed re-organisation on the Bedoun population and its culture.

Staff at the Central Apparatus are not aware of the history of their department, or the consequences of their actions. How could we expect them to be, when academics cannot even detect the ethnic cleansing, after being warned by Fineman (November 2, 1992) and other foreign correspondents who encountered it in the field? They are indoctrinated in an ideology that they believe to be true, that the Bedoun are not who they say they are. This ideology has convinced scholars in the past, who have reinforced it. A few have created it, and convinced others. They are exposed to it daily. They are not the first. Bedoun community leader Hakeem al Fadhli pointed out that generations of bureaucrats have been taught the same ideas. If any doubts arise, and perhaps they might even have some Bedoun in their own families, they will be influenced by all those around them who firmly believe in the ideology. They are outnumbered, and complying with the ideas is part their job, and they must carry out their duties. Loyalty is important in Kuwait, and they serve important roles for their country. In the following paragraphs, I present two arguments that I believe are representative of the perspective of the Apparatus on the Bedoun, at both the official and grassroots levels.

The strength of the ideology outweighs the lack of sense-making of many of the policies and procedures. Circuitous logic and nationalist motifs are used to explain away the facts of the matter that might point to violent removal of identity, cruel and inhumane treatment of individuals targeted for ‘security’ reasons, or ethnic cleansing. Human rights
are bargained. Access to basic public services, which government believes comprise the Bedouns human rights (reasoned as ‘that is all they are getting, and nothing more’) in exchange for participation in the ‘status adjustment’ program. However, the Bedou are losing this bargain over time, which is evident in the population numbers in serious decline, and the ability of government to conceal accurate population statistics on the group from the public and international agencies.

Another way of looking at the the Central Apparatus perspective is to explore the nationalist narrative and the ethnic backgrounds of the parties involved. But first, we should acknowledge that the government of Kuwait was always aware that the Bedou were always stateless, and intentionally brought the stateless Bedouin to Kuwait for permanent settlement, citizenship and engagement in the economic and political sectors (see Chapters 2 and 7). The state’s interpretation of ‘original nationality’ by Hadar elites and intellectuals is a fundamentally tribal interpretation, as it assumes that ‘original nationality’ is in fact, the traditional, transnational, Bedouin tribal dirah (land). It imposes this ideology upon the much smaller modern state, in order to justify the policy of eradicating the population. It is this fact that makes the states’ conception of the Bedou incompatible with modern statehood.

This may be a reason why we see the state denying the Bedou exist as a stateless population and denying the concept of statelessness in international law, since international law arises from the context of the modern state and the tribal dirah existed before modern borders were drawn. ‘That other place’ that the Bedou ancestors may have come from, was simply not a country or a nation in the modern sense of the word, when their ancestors came from there to settle in Kuwait. Therefore, the Bedou are stateless and have no nationality. Yet the Apparatus claims that the Bedou must obtain proofs of nationality that match the locations of the tribal lands of their ancestors. This notion is equivalent to asking Queen Elizabeth of England, who belongs to the House of Windsor, to produce a document proving she has German citizenship.

My analysis of the system was based mostly on secondary newspaper sources which included government announcements and interviews with Ministers and senior Apparatus officials. My understanding of this data was enhanced by the interview data and follow-up conversations with some my interviewees about specific issues. Two major themes arose concerning the Apparatus interactions with the Bedou, which was a surveillance function, and an identity management function.

The surveillance function included items such as: issuing criminalising restrictions, prohibitions and hyper-surveillance regulation of individuals’ identity card, their ‘security file’ and ‘security restrictions,’ and the deprivation of human rights (WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514 (November 26, 2006). The identity management function included
items such as: the management of ‘status adjustment,’ a program concerned with the transfer of Bedoun identity to false nationality labels (and presumably to the same nationality entries on the National Census) (‘8,000 Bedouns,’ 2012; ‘80,000 Bedoons,’ 2016; ‘Hope for non-census,’ 2014; ‘6051 Illegal Residents,’ 2014; ‘6,860 Illegal Residents,’ 2015; ‘7,828 Illegal Residents,’ 2016).

Both of these areas, ‘status adjustment’ and ‘security restrictions’ and other aspects of surveillance linked to identity card validity, involved other Ministries and departments of government, such as the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Education. In some cases, it included the Family Courts (within the Ministry of Justice). In all of these areas, except the family court, the Central Apparatus was able to exercise its powers of oversight over other ministries to determine any Bedoun individual’s identity.

The deprivation of human rights was mediated by the Ministry of Interior through its oversight over other departments. In this context, I refer to the government’s definition of the Bedouns human rights, which are the eleven ‘facilities’ in Decree 409/2011. These eleven items were just basic public services that government also deemed were the Bedouns human rights, including items such as personal documentation, the identity card, a drivers licence, access to schooling and health clinics (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011).

As for other human rights, such as freedom of thought and speech, freedom to move in public, and so on, these were the subject of intense interest of the Central Apparatus. These areas were managed through its surveillance function, in order to prohibit and restrict their expression, to manage via ‘blacklisting,’ to apply ‘security restrictions’ or the more serious security offence, or criminal offences. Note that the police and its intelligence unit State Security Investigate Police are also run under the Ministry of the Interior.

There was constant pressure on the Bedoun to submit to ‘status adjustment’ to obtain some measure of access to resources in order to survive. But additionally, the surveillance function of the Apparatus was managed in a fashion to add additional pressure to coerce compliance with ‘status adjustment.’ This was done by the Apparatus’ ability to regulate the identity card, which gave access to public services – the Bedouns very narrowly defined, human rights. The Apparatus controlled individuals’ access by turning the card access on and off across various government departments, to control whether or not the individual could access public services.

If the card was switched off to block access, the individual could not receive access to one or many or all public services. If they approached a government counter at a particular agency where they needed to use the card to access a service, they would be told the card was not working or their access was blocked, according to information on the government database. They would be turned away. In some cases, the card would be
confiscated, cancelled or expired on demand (by the Apparatus) which had the same effect, although this was a more serious, general and long-term problem. When individuals reported the problem to the Central Apparatus, or when they were required to report to the Apparatus, they would be told that they had to submit to ‘status adjustment’ in order to ‘rectify their situation,’ or a similar phrase of this nature (a range of fairly stock-standard phrases were used). Thus, the surveillance function of the Apparatus was used to coerce or force submission to the Apparatus’ identity management functions. Similar scenarios applied for individuals who were blacklisted or those with ‘security restrictions’ or criminal offences, although these were more serious contexts and tended to be accompanied by more personal ‘communications’ such as phone calls, visits, interrogation or detention.

This brief summary described the background to the Central Apparatus, and the perspective and procedures with which it carries out its functions to manage the Bedoun population. I discussed some aspects of the ideology with which the institution and its workers have been indoctrinated. I also discussed their interactions with other government departments, through which the Apparatus communicates its determinations of individual’s identity, their need to submit to ‘status adjustment.’ Finally, I also discussed the approach to human rights, the methods of regulation of the Bedouns access to public services, which are very narrowly defined by government as the Bedouns human rights, and the methods of oppression used to restrict other rights, namely freedoms of expression.

Status Adjustment

In this discussion of the status adjustment program, I will outline the foundation ideology on which it has been based, the definition of the Bedoun as having ‘original nationality.’ I will then address rational counter-arguments to the ideology which help to contextualise the program as a system of erasure and administrative ethnic cleansing that prepares the Bedoun for mass deportation. I will discuss how the program of ‘status adjustment’ operates to achieve these goals (how the program works), and conclude the section by mentioning some important forms of resistance that has risen response to it from inside the community, and from Kuwaitis MPs.

The definition of the Bedouns original nationality.

The concept of the Bedouns ‘original nationality’ was discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. The notion that the Bedoun have an original nationality from another state had been a key feature of scholarly definitions of the group since the 1990s, when the ideology was applied in earnest. The concept is a false concept, but it has been used by government as the central pillar of the ideology justifying the Bedoun are not ‘Kuwaiti’ and therefore, are unfit for, or not deserving of, Kuwaiti citizenship. The ideology has then been exploited further, to deny citizenship to Bedoun who have historically, since the 1960s when citizenship
applications were first processed, actually qualified for citizenship under the Nationality Law (1959).

The ideology has also been used to justify the population makeup of the country, the exclusion of the Bedouin of the northern tribal dirah of the main tribes of Kuwait (the Bedoun) and the mono-ethnic Hadar monopoly over ‘original’ citizenship. This latter aspect has guaranteed their group’s 100% acquisition of citizenship, diluted by the absorption of new foreign national members into their group likely to similar proportions, as they chose. Because the concept of the Bedouin having ‘original nationality’ that is not Kuwaiti is not true because the Bedouin are stateless according to the norms of international law, government has had some difficulty in applying the concept. Certainly it has received virtually uniform support from scholars and policymakers over the last three decades. In fact, the concept is a basic one used by scholars to define the Bedouin at present.

However, the approach to maintaining this policy relied upon by government since 1983 has been ‘status adjustment’ or ‘regularizing one’s status.’ This approach is the enforcement of other nationality by fraudulent means, via administrative erasure involving chiefly, false identity labelling on its own official documents, and forcing the Bedouin to supply it with false documentary ‘proofs’ of other nationality. This is called the ‘status adjustment’ program.

Counter-arguments to the notion of the Bedouns foreign, ‘original nationality.’

In order to counter this concept, I analysed previous scholarly definitions of the Bedouin in Chapter 2 and discussed their laws, namely the lack of substantiation of claims by scholars, including a lack of concrete evidence. I also expanded upon more specific lines of arguments, including some more serious, lesser known arguments or evidence, in Chapter 8. Some of these arguments included,

- The implementation of the Nationality Law (1959), carried in a discriminatory fashion to keep the Bedouin out, including targeting of the northern tribes via provisions than enabled subjective qualification to be applied to reach a rationalised ratio of Bedouin 50% citizenship. The implementation of the same measures to ensure all Hadar received citizenship, to a rationalised ratio of 100%.
- The lack of account for those Bedouin who did not inhabit Kuwait City, who occupied the territory of Kuwait either permanently or seasonally, in the application of the Nationality Law (1959). This lack of accounting for the right of people who lived in the country to receive citizenship is so ingrained, scholars continue to apply the reasoning today, and claim Kuwait is a city state, as if it is like Singapore or Hong Kong, which is not an accurate depiction, and discounts a) the homeland of the Bedouin and b) oil resources. The Hadar interpreted ‘residence’ in the country of Kuwait, as residence only within the narrow confines of the city wall.
• Other evidence included a statement by the Minister for the Defence department, a member of the ruling family, who was aware that the Bedoun in the military forces were stateless.

• The founding ideological motif of ‘they Iraqis are stealing our identity’ was used during the invasion of Iraq, and circulated in newspapers. The possibility it was aided by advertising consultants in the West, akin to the Hill and Knowlton scandal. The idea was subsequently, skilfully applied to the Bedoun, to steal their identity.

• Lack of evidence presented by scholars that the Bedoun had nationalities or any other ties to other states resembling nationality or citizenship.

• The common ideological motifs and patterns among scholarly writings applied to the Kuwaiti Bedouin, which could be initially linked to Orientalist and developmental theory stereotypes, then branched out to specifically isolate the Bedoun. The government policy on the Bedoun appeared to be crafted into an ethnographic account by Western scholars, embellished with academic authority to convince others that the ideology used to displace the Bedoun’s identity, was their ‘real’ identity.

The workings of the status adjustment program.

The status adjustment program is the enforcement of other nationality on the Bedoun, by fraudulent means, via administrative erasure involving false identity labelling on Kuwait government official documents and forcing the Bedoun to supply the Apparatus with false documentary ‘proofs’ of other nationality. The evidence of ‘other nationality’ is gathered via secret investigations and research conducted by the Central Apparatus, PACI (the information-sharing agency of government) and other ministries. PACI has assisted with the program since its inception in 1985. However, government also produced its own false personal documentation after an individual submits to erasure. These state the false nationality determined by the Apparatus on Kuwait government birth, death, marriage and divorce certificates, drivers licences and any other form of official document that states the individual’s nationality. Other evidence includes fake passports, false affidavits and paperwork describing contract-like undertakings to submit to status adjustment, that are be signed by the Bedoun under Apparatus coercion and/or force. This has included agreements that subject the individual concerned to debts to pay for the provision of ‘services’ that have, by definition of the government itself, been regarded as their ‘human rights.’

The so-called evidence is then attached to each individual security file of each member of the registered Bedoun population, on the Central Apparatus database. Those who are not registered are not regarded as part of the population – in fact, they are regarded as non-existent, despite intensive surveillance and various some attempts (genuine and not) to
absorb them into the program. The evidence gathered in each security file is used to coerce and/or forced the Bedoun to provide further items of evidence. Each security file is attached to the male head of household, and the family group is recorded on the database. Each file is connected via information-sharing, so that evidence collected on one file, is used to impact other files in the family group. Though the evidence would be regarded by objective standards as fake, false or fraudulent, it is not only fake, false or fraudulent, but it is also gathered by coercive, manipulative and/or forced means.

The process is approached individual by individual, until the whole collective has been subjected to status adjustment. This is one of the goals that must be achieved to ensure mass population transfer or total destruction, evidenced in the transfer of the whole group on the National Census in 1992, although partial cleansing is already acceptable, such as the physical ethnic cleansing of around 50% of the population from 1990-1995, and further mass deportations that appear to have occurred in the early 2000s. This is one of the reasons why Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah al Sabah was intensively involved in a public relations campaign in 2015 and 2016, in an attempt to sell the Comoros Plan, normalising it to the non-Bedoun citizen public, and communicating its inevitability to the Bedoun.

Key to the program are two other, overlapping aspects of population management conducted by the Central Apparatus, identity function, and the surveillance function. I named some of the related points of these functions in the section above. Through the identity function, the Apparatus has been in permitted to ‘manage’ the Bedouns access to basic public services, which government has claimed in a rather narrowly conceived definition, are the Bedouns human rights. Since 2011, these have been called ‘the eleven facilities,’ a package of benefits and/or services, which government claimed, were contained in Decree 409/2011. It then offered use those human rights as an exchange incentive for the Bedoun in return for submission to ‘status adjustment.’

The identity function deems the Bedoun nationals of other countries and then appears to redistribute them to individual country data on the National Census. Hypothetically speaking, once adjustment has occurred, the Bedoun are then directed to the immigration department, to report as nationals of other countries (even though they are not). Bedoun report that when this occurs, they are cut off government databases and are not acknowledged at by this department, but that they remaining under the hyper-surveillance of the Apparatus. However, government has claimed the Bedoun must report to immigration. There is some element of double-speak here, as the same officials have also said that the Bedoun continue to submit fake passports every five years, to the Apparatus and not to the immigration department. This indicates that some procedures are not entirely clear. What is clear is that this aspect of the program has been promoted relentlessly in the local media since the Arab spring. Monthly totals of Bedoun identity ‘conversion’ (submission to status
adjustment) have been published by KUNA (the Kuwait government official newsagency) and daily newspapers in Kuwait since the Arab Spring, around the same time that Decree 409/2011 was introduced.

Prior to 2011, the labelling of the Bedoun with other nationalities occurred through the many different methods of ascribing nationality to the Bedoun, linked to the different nations (nationality labels, not actual/effective nationality) to whom nationality is attached. This included certain mass-intake programs, where thousands of Bedouns public service employees were submitted to having their identities erased as Bedouns, and reallocated as ‘other nationals.’ Despite the massive size of the programs, they all involved the same obsession with the collection of ‘proofs’ that are a hallmark of the program, mainly fake affidavits and fraudulent passports. I have identified at least ten different methods used to create ‘evidence’ the Bedoun have other nationalities, which are described in Appendices E, v and E, vi. The number of methods to ascribe false nationality and the number of different nationalities involved, are testament to the scope and history of the program, as well as the success of its ideological foundations.

Through the surveillance function, the Apparatus has used psychological and physical pressures to enforce the program. This area of function is connected to the means by which evidences of other nationality that fake, false, and/or fraudulent are procured by the Apparatus. This includes various restrictions on public activity and criminalisation, for example the issue of tens of thousands of security restrictions targeting those whose families have already proven their eligibility for citizenship under the Nationality Law (1959), the new identity colour typing system that introduced a timeline of deportations, the notion that human rights in Decree 409/2011 are only available in five-year batches, linked to the validity of fake passports, blacklisting, detention, imprisonment for public expression, specifically for discussion about the Apparatus policy and practices and other aspect of hyper-surveillance. The program has been theorised in this research as pertaining to the management segregation and oppression of the Bedoun population since 1965 as a form of controlled, restrictive cultural re-organisation.

**Forms of resistance to status adjustment.**

Another way of describing the program is through resistance to the program. The study of resistance to the program has enabled me to understand the insidiousness of the program, and the finer details of the ideology, rationale and procedures behind its implementation. I have analysed information on two broad types of resistance, including resistance from within the Bedoun community, and resistance from among members of parliament in Kuwait, who also know about the program. Understanding the serious nature and overwhelming scope of the program, some members of parliament have been unable to maintain their complicit silence with it, and have occasionally spoken out and released
important details about the purpose of the program, and/or how it works. This latter form of resistance, along with WikiLeaks cables, has been extremely helpful in assisting me to verify the reality of the program, and its interconnection with other government departments.

Resistance from within the population has been is indicated by three forms of data published by government:

a) The rejection of birth certificates

b) The very modest tallies in status adjustment (identity conversions to a range of different nationality labels), and

c) Failure of Bedoun men to renew fraudulent passports

The rejection of birth certificates pre-filled with ‘original nationalities’ was revealed in Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch (2011, p.7). In that report, the basic procedure whereby the Apparatus secretly determines each Bedoun individuals’ identity and ensures this is pre-filled on any identity documentation requested by the Bedoun (basically, any government form that requires a nationality to be named on it). Between 2006-2011, Bedoun parents rejected four fifths of the birth certificates issued for their children due to their disagreement with the nationality pre-filled on the form (12, 471) while only one fifth were accepted (12, 471) (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.7). The birth certificate is among other things, necessary for enrolment in school. For those parents who accepted the birth certificates, their child’s would be recorded as having had their status adjusted.

The second form of resistance was slightly more general, in that the governments overall tally of ‘adjustment’ figures were relatively low compared to the whole population. Accumulative totals of adjustments achieved for different countries by the Central Apparatus were published on a rolling basis (I did not observe these prior to 2012). For example, ‘6051 Illegal Residents,’ 2014; ‘6,860 Illegal Residents,’ 2015; ‘7,828 Illegal Residents,’ 2016. These headlines provide a feel for the kind of dialogue that is used.

Most of analysis concerned the years 2012 to 2014 leading up to the announcement of the Comoros Plan. I calculated figures based on two articles that cited the number of Bedoun who had changed their status since 2011 (5746 individuals in Saleh, February 9, 2014 and 5982 individuals in Nacheva, April 6, 2014). Between 2012 and 2014, less than 5.5% of the Bedoun population submitted to the program by signing for acceptance of the nationality allocated to them by the Apparatus. This rather tawdry progress indicated that although conditions for the Bedoun involved great hardship and suffering, they resisted the organised program to change their identity. The data, combined with the birth certificate data, quite soundly indicated that the population is aware that government is attempting to erase their identity and citizenship claims.
The third form of resistance was discussed by Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah al Sabah in ‘Bedoons to Get’, 2015. Bedoun men who had previously obtained fraudulent passports from countries that bore no relation to their identity whatsoever, were instructed by al Jarrah to renew them to maintain their access to basic public services. In other words, the Bedoun were instructed to repeat the offences. The instructions were issued by al Jarrah in the Kuwaiti newspaper, indicating that access to the services, also deemed the Bedouns human rights (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011), remained subject to Bedoun repeating offence.

A fourth form of resistance has included statements issued by members of parliament which have also shown there is a certain level of insider knowledge in Kuwait, about the true nature of the program. Any doubt about the true nature of the program has been dispelled by these brave individuals, who have openly spoken up not only about the abuse of the Bedoun by the state, but also about the ‘status adjustment’ program itself. They have included MP Faisal al Duwaisan (‘Government to Offer,’ 2014; Toumi, 2014, November 10), MP Hassan Jawhar (‘Tough Requirements,’ 2014), MP Hammoud al Hamdan (Izzak, November 14, 2014), MP Saleh Ashour (Izzak, May 17, 2016), and MP Yousef Zalzalah (Izzak, May 17, 2016). Although commentators such as Tetreault (2003) have observed that MP support for the Bedoun has piecemeal, temporary and self-serving, this is definitely not the case when we consider the personal danger that these individuals have attracted by speaking out against a system which ably conducts hyper-surveillance and detention, and has been associated with torture through the Ministry of Interior, and has the power to criminalise all who it targets with ‘secret,’ undisclosed offences. Additionally, the danger of speaking out about the system is also indicated by the extremely low numbers of those who have spoken out, and usually from high-ranking positions (members of parliament and/or professors).

Although I have discussed their quotes elsewhere in this research, these criticisms by Kuwaiti MPs warrants repeating together here. This is because their commentary helps to explain various abstract concepts of the program linked to real events that have occurred in the community, leading them to make comment. Thus, they have helped to create a historical account of the program, along with Apparatus officials themselves who have regularly discussed the program in the public media. The MP commentary provides a sense of the reality of the program faced daily by the Bedoun since 1983, and reveal a great deal about the extent to which the enforcement of false nationalities on the Bedoun it is known and discussed in the National Assembly. These MPs have also served the invaluable duty of dispelling the notion of false nationality of the Bedoun, which to the detriment of the academic field of Kuwait areas studies, has not yet been sufficient to motivate other scholars.
to stand up and take notice of the purpose and functions of the status adjustment program, which is a form of ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun.

MP Faisal al Duwaisan (‘Government to Offer,’ 2014) openly challenged the status adjustment program and its flawed basis, founded on the notion that the ‘original nationality’ of the Bedoun is not Kuwaiti. The awareness of this myth of the Bedouns identity was reiterated in relation to the announcement of the Comoros Plan in late 2014, which set out the new strategy replacing the Bedouns national identity en masse to the Comoros. Al Duwaisan accused government of providing false information to the National Assembly by claiming the Bedoun had nationalities of other countries. (‘Government to Offer,’ 2014). He told the assembly,

The announcement means the government has been providing false information to lawmakers suggesting that stateless people hold nationalities of other countries. (‘Government of Offer,’ 2014)

He also criticized the Comoros Plan to reallocate the whole group’s nationality to the Comoros Islands, emphasising the gravity of the plan was,

… A very dangerous development that has not been studied carefully and could lead to the fall of government. (‘Government of Offer,’ 2014)

Finally, he pointed out the connection of the Comoros Plan to the false notion that the Bedoun had ‘original nationality’ from other states:

There is not the slightest doubt that there are fallacies about the claim that most Bidoons had another nationality. (MP Faisal al Duwaisan in Toumi, November 10, 2014)

MP Hassan Jawhar (‘Tough Requirements,’ 2014) also openly objected to the status adjustment program as the cause of the bans on children commencing school. He challenged the Ministry of Interior’s attempt to force young children to accept the issue of incorrect birth certificates for the purpose of acquiring enrolment in school, as it forced them to submit to a false identity. He viewed this as an abuse of their human rights,

On his part, head of the Bedoun Committee, MP Hassan Jawhar was reported to have said, ‘We hope that MOI [Ministry of the Interior] stops its pressure on the Bedouns to acquire nationality other than theirs; these pressures have victimized the students who have every right to an education.’ (‘Tough Requirements,’ 2014)

MP Hammoud al Hamdan in Izzak (November 14, 2014) also contributed to the debate on children prohibited by the Apparatus from commencing schools in September 2014.
He drew connections between the ‘status adjustment’ program with the new bans on education against the kindergarten-aged children and the Apparatus’ refusal to register them at all with the agency, in the absence of the birth certificate (forcing them to remain what the FCO Kuwait (2007 in U.K. Home Office, 2009) describes as ‘undocumented’ Bedoun. He explained the rejection of registration of the children by the Agency was simply a pretext:

Hamdan said he has learnt that private schools have rejected to admit a number of Bedoon students under the pretext of not being registered with the Central Agency for Illegal Residents, the government name for bedoons. He said those pretexts are in violation… (MP Hammoud al Hamdan in Izzak, November 14, 2014)

The purpose of the pretext was to force the them to submit to a false nationality, which Hassan Jawhar had pointed out in the same debate (in ‘Tough Requirements,’ 2014; see above). Hamdan’s statement illustrated that not only were the children not able to obtain correct birth certificates, that their parents refusal to accept the ‘status adjustment’ of their child meant that the Central Apparatus refused to register those children at all. Hence, they remained no only without personal documentation (regarded in some quarters as ‘undocumented’ Bedoun), government did not count them in their population statistics. Such unregistered Bedoun could not access any of the Decree 409/2011 public services unless they submitted to status adjustment, allowing the Apparatus to assign a false nationality.

More recently, in relation to the yearly citizenship grants which would give Kuwaiti citizenship to 4,000 individuals, (but none of whom are Bedoun), MP Saleh Ashour emphasised the ineffectiveness of the National Assembly to carry out any Central Apparatus recommendations to grant citizenship to those tens of thousands of Bedoun who had already proven to be qualified to receive it under the Nationality Law (1959). He believed that this was due to the interference of group more powerful than government,

There is a group in the country that is more powerful than the National Assembly and which does not want bedoons to be naturalized… Can the government naturalize the 32,000 bedoons whom the committee said qualify for citizenship? No, because this influential group is more powerful than the government. (MP Saleh Ashour in Izzak, May 17, 2016)

Previously, al Anezi (1989) had identified that group as the Hadar elite, who had influenced the implementation of the Nationality Law (1959) without requiring representation in the National Assembly. Note that there is does not seem to be any referenced to the law that was proposed by the Academic Team for Population Policy, which prevented Bedouin grants
of citizenship to large numbers that was passed in 1992 (Supreme Planning Council Resolution No. 11 of January 8, 1992).

The debate had been conducted against the backdrop of the Apparatus’ promotion of the Comoros Plan, which would allocate their national identity to ‘Comorian’ instead of to an Arab country as was the standard practice since 2012. During the same national debate, MP Yousef Zalzalah (in Izzak, May 17, 2016) confirmed that the Bedoun were still unable to access the Decree 409/2011 reforms in 2016, that were supposed to give them access to the appropriate identity documentation. At that time, government claimed it would allow Bedouns to register as ‘non-Kuwaiti.’

MP Yousef Al-Zalzalah slammed the government’s treatment of bedoons, saying some of them can’t get married, get an education or get the least of their basic rights. ‘This is a form of oppression and there are people who are deliberately oppressing bedoons,’ he said. ‘Bedoons must be allowed to live a dignified life.’ (Izzak, May 11, 2016)

Al Zalzalah’s statement emphasised that neither of these reforms had taken place, at least not to a reasonable extent across the whole population, such that generally speaking, the Bedouns situation appeared to have changed little since the administrative expulsion measures of 1986 (‘The Study,’ 2003) were first introduced.

In this section, I have presented part of my analysis of the status adjustment program run by the Central Apparatus, a department of Kuwait’s Ministry of the Interior. Initially, I collected data on the new colour typing system introduced in 2012, and gained a clear picture of the program via its internal procedures. However, this information was complex and maze-like, and therefore it required a large amount of detail to be described and theorised (my first write-up of the analysis was over seventy pages long). In order to make the program easy for others to understand, I have adopted a broader view than my first analyses. I have instead outlined the definition of ‘status adjustment,’ the ideology on which it is founded, counter-arguments to that ideology that reveal the nature of the program as one that enforces false identity and erases genuine ethnic and national identity. I also provided a fairly general overview of how the program works, and important examples of resistance to the program from within the Bedoun community and from Kuwaiti members of parliament who have provided confirmatory information about the rationale behind the program and the details of its implementation, enhancing understanding of what the program looks like to outsiders, and how it is experienced by the Bedoun themselves. I reiterate that the offerings by members of parliament have been made not without personal cost and deserve the attention of scholars of Kuwait area studies.

Security Restrictions and surveillance
The security restriction is a type of punitive measure issued against the Bedoun which is recorded on their security file by the Central Apparatus. The security restriction was part of the Apparatus surveillance function which included general surveillance, blacklisting, investigating and sanctioning security restrictions, security offences and criminal offences. Similar to its function of determining the Bedoun’s ‘original nationality,’ which was established with secret research and investigations (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011) the security restriction was also established through secret investigations. The restrictions were regarded as a lesser sanction of the security offence, as the offence was more commonly assumed to reflect genuine national security threats, such as terrorism and organised crime. However, based on discussions by authorities in local newspapers, the security restriction appeared to be designed primarily for sanctioning the Bedoun on grounds of their ethnicity, and to remove their capacity to be granted citizenship after they had qualified for it under the *Nationality Law (1959)* decades earlier.

Some data on the security restriction had already been discussed in reports on the Bedoun by the U.K. Home Office (2009, 2012, 2014). The Bedoun are the only ethnic group actually listed as the sole ethnic group of concern in the title of any of the U.K. Home Office country information and guidance reports; the reports are solely devoted to their claims. It is not clear from the Kuwait country information and guidance notes, why this is the case. This data was of quite some assistance in researching the Central Apparatus, because using a comparative approach within my thematic analysis, I recognised commonalities between Bedoun asylum/refugee applicant data, the interview data from members of the community still living in Kuwait, and the newspaper data drawing on policy and other information from Central Apparatus staff. Therefore, it is worth diverting for a moment to observe the kind of data compiled in these reports which tell us much about the surveillance function of the Apparatus which issues the security restrictions, before returning to the important nexus between security restrictions, the deprivation of human rights and the 3 ‘status adjustment’ program.

From 2009 to 2014, the U.K. Home Office published data that showed a pattern of gross surveillance, personal interference and restrictions imposed on the Bedoun population in Kuwait, by the Central Apparatus. Britain was receiving a steady asylum flow of Bedoun refugees from Kuwait citing tribal persecution on the basis of this data. The following is an account of an analysis of case testimony from the U.K. Home Office (2014). Refugee applicants had reported to have lost access to ‘basic amenities’ including education, healthcare and employment in return for collaboration with Iraqi forces and/or social activism during the Arab Spring:
These are red flags on the files of some members of the Bidoon community – the number of Bidoon flagged in this way is unknown. Once flagged, their access to basic amenities – employment in particular - is severely curtailed and often removed completely.

The Bidoon Committee have said that these flags are attached to the files of those who have been convicted of a crime, or who collaborated with Iraqi forces during the invasion.

Human rights groups and members of the Bidoon community claim that they [security ‘blocks,’ ‘flags’ and so on] are used arbitrarily by the Kuwaiti government, and that they are often used to disincentives members of the community from political activism. The allegation is that those involved in protests, activism or advocacy for Bidoon [stateless people’s] rights have such flags attached to them within the system; and that these extend to their families as well, meaning that if an activist is ‘flagged’ in such a way, their entire family will be denied the right to work, and will find access to healthcare and education much harder.

Removal of such flags is at the discretion of the Bidoon committee and the security services, does not appear to be time-limited, and is not open to judicial oversight. (UK Home Office, 2014, p.27)

This data coincided with Central Apparatus announcements regarding the status adjustment program and the issue of security restrictions. The announcements were part of a dialogue that began in earnest after the new identity typing system (based on colours) was introduced in 2012, and became more intense in early 2014, while I was conducting fieldwork in Kuwait. The account above described not only similar phenomena to newspaper articles published from 2012 to 2014 in which Central Apparatus authorities described their system of punitive actions to force the Bedoun to reveal their ‘original nationality,’ it also coincided with far more detailed information I received on and off the record from interviewees and other contacts in Kuwait, including Hadar intellectuals who explained the system from their perspective. The following correspondences emerged:

• The ‘blocks’ and ‘flags’ (above) were delivered in informal ways, mirroring blacklisting, and formal ways, mirroring the security restriction. Central Apparatus authorities had discussed a hierarchy of restrictions and offences that were issued against the Bedoun, such as the security restriction, the security offence and the criminal offence (Nacheva, April 7, 2014; Saleh, February 9, 2014). Another term used by the Central Apparatus is ‘security holds’ (‘Kuwait’s Cabinet,’ 2012).
• The blocked access to education and health services, was equivalent to blocked access to Decree 409/2011, the eleven so-called facilities (Kuwait Government
Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011) that had ostensibly provided the Bedoun with human rights via access to basic public services.

- The application of ‘blocks’ and ‘flags’ to whole families, resembled accounts from interviewees about the ‘security restriction;’ it also conformed to the methods of citizenship stripping used by the government of Kuwait (Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2014).

- The mechanisms of the ‘flag’ or ‘block’ on access to basic public services coincided with the information-sharing policy conducted between different Ministries, overseen by the Central Apparatus, through PACI (see Table D3). This capacity was in place from 1985. The new identity cards issued in 2012 had enhanced this process with new security and surveillance technologies.

- The interference with work practices also reflected mirrored blacklisting, not based on specific information I discussed with some interviewees (noting that five of the interviewee respondents in this study were issued with security restrictions). This also coincided with my collection of data concerning interference with work practices particularly related to the performance of professional roles including public speaking, publishing writing, journalism, research and even reporting to the United Nations directly (Chapter 8, section 8.2.2), but also other types of employment.

- Targeting for protests, activism or advocacy coincided with targeting of the Bedoun in other areas of intellectual expression and social leadership abovementioned. Methods other than security restrictions and blacklisting were used, such as suppression of the spread of ideas in novels and poetry by blocking publication and stealing the work for prior publication, and suppression of communications online via the legislation of new media laws (Chapter 8, Table 25).

- These aspects also coincided with a range of additional discriminatory practices targeting intellectual activity in the education sector (Chapter 8, section 8.2.2), hence the study of themes of suppression of education, intellectual activity and social solidarity in this thesis.

What were the key patterns arising from this data? My analysis of the news announcements by Apparatus officials on both status adjustment and the issue of security restrictions, indicated that since 2006, government had become aware that resistance to status adjustment had spread within the Bedoun community. When status adjustment was first introduced, thousands of Bedoun men had been taken in by the program, with the assistance of organised programs involving government letters, affidavits, fake passports and passport traffickers. After the community gained knowledge of the consequences of the
program first-hand, the information was disseminated throughout the community, and less identity transfers took place. This was evident in the data that the Central Apparatus had published, which pointed to such resistance (see the discussion on status adjustment above, regarding resistance to incorrectly labelled birth certificates, the uptake of fake passports and accumulative totals published in the newspapers of number of ‘adjustments’ achieved). From 2012, the security restrictions had become main method used to reduce the number that had already been recognised by government as ‘eligible’ for citizenship. This appeared to be used to counteract the lack of uptake of false nationality.

Additionally, government had repeatedly offered a ‘package of benefits’ to the Bedoun in return for status adjustment. The deal was to trade in their identity via ‘status adjustment’ in return for these benefits (basic public services), even though they were supposed to be equivalent to the Bedouns ‘human rights’ (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights, 2011) which should have been available at least in principle, unconditionally according to the international law of human rights. While there was virtually no proof that these human rights services were being accessed in increasing numbers by the Bedoun, reports from the Bedoun continued to emerge about access to the services being withdrawn. On the ground, the Bedoun reported that the blocks on services was due to the ‘security restriction,’ just as the Bedoun refugee applicants had reported to British immigration authorities in their case data, in the U.K. Home Office (2014). Government had warned the security restriction would block access to Kuwaiti citizenship, but not basic human rights. It still claimed it was providing these to the Bedoun and somewhat obscenely, that the Bedoun were ‘enjoying’ these rights (‘Illegal Residents,’ 2015; ‘Kuwait Showcases,’ 2015). In other words, the Decree 409/2011 ‘human rights’ had been promoted as an incentive for ‘status adjustment’ (and loss of a legal citizenship claim) while also being withdrawn (along with the legal right to citizenship) as a consequence for the security restriction. It is a very short leap of reasoning to suppose that the security restriction was being used as punishment for resisting ‘status adjustment.’ ‘Human rights,’ access to basic public services was the carrot for ‘status adjustment,’ the ‘security restriction’ was the stick. All roads led back to ‘status adjustment,’ administrative ethnic cleansing. The application of security restrictions and criminalisation appeared to be an increasingly frequently applied method to remove citizenship eligibility compared to changing individuals’ nationality via ‘status adjustment’ program, due to the ongoing resistance within the stateless community to change identity. The development of the Comoros Plan (Sloan, 2014; Izzak, May 17, 2016) confirmed this, to the extent that government had acquired a new plan for mass identity transfer to replace the former, relatively unsuccessful attempts to transfer whole-group identity to a range of different Arab states.
The security restriction has been used as an excuse not to grant those most eligible under the Nationality Law (1959), Kuwaiti citizenship. Ultimately, it was also used to deprive the Bedoun of human rights that were purported to be delivered in Decree 409/2011. Previously it was associated with ‘traitor’ accusations following the invasion of Iraq. After the Arab Spring it was aimed at ‘protestors’ and ‘activists’ as a punitive measure issued against who spoke about their identity, culture and persecution including claims of deprivation of citizenship and human rights. Both generations of targeted groups happened to be largely allocated to the green identity group according to the new identity typing system announced by the Apparatus in 2012. Some were also in the yellow group, which also contained some members of the military services according to government (‘New Hope for Non-Census,’ 2014). It is quite possible it is also used as a sanction against all other Bedouns - those in other identity colour categories. But since those groups have already been issued with criminal offences for presentation false identity (ironically due to their participation in ‘status adjustment’), and their citizenship claims have not been regarded as strong, dialogue about the security offences issued from the Apparatus has mostly concerned those who would be eligible for citizenship, in the green and sometimes the yellow identity categories. For further discussion on how the citizenship claims of this group in particular have been reduced to virtually zero via the application of tens of thousands of ‘secret’ security restrictions for between 2012 and 2014, see Appendix D, iv.

**Criminalisation**

Criminalisation of the Bedoun did not start within the Ministry of the Interior. It commenced at the level of urban planning. The security apparatus was necessary to impose criminalisation for the purpose of erasure. The ‘need’ was created by scholars in the 1970s, who circulated the ideology of the Bedoun as foreigners and imposters. They had become targeted by Kuwait and Arab nationalists as members of the northern tribal *dirah*, to be omitted from citizen grants in the 1960s. This means Bedoun were not managed by the Central Apparatus or its equivalent body commencing in 1985, as Beaugrand (2010, 2014a) also suggested. The Bedoun were initially managed as part of the Kuwaiti Bedouin population, with whom they were integrated.

In order to emphasise this continuity, I have included earlier government agencies responsible for the management of the Bedoun, below. This point also serves to underscore the point that the Ministry of Interior committees for Bedoun management inherited their duties from the Municipality of Kuwait with the Central Statistics Office and the Ministry of Planning from 1965, which led to the criminalisation of the Bedoun in the 1970s, when they were still regarded as indigenous tribespeople. A summary table of the strategies imposing administrative erasure via criminalisation is provided below in Table G4.
Indigenous Bedouin settlement recast as ‘illegal dwellings’ housing ‘migrant,’ ‘squatters’

Initially, the Bedouin were managed by the Municipality of Kuwait and the Ministry of Planning, with assistance from the national statistics office. In reference to the Bedouin desert settlements, academic labelling as ‘squatters’ and ‘slum’ dwellers and demands to ‘eradicate’ the settlements, was applied first to Bedouin homes, then to Bedouin people, and then to the Bedouin in particular, selected for segregation. Academics portray the Bedouin as ‘migrants.’ Successful uptake at national policy level, leading to the creation of the security apparatus to manage the ‘illegal’ population. This was evidenced in the transition from the Committee and the Committee Concerning Illegal Dwellings to the Committee for the Study of Illegal Residents in 1985. Recent authors have continued in this way, but have not cited the previous sources.


‘Illegal residents’ and ‘status adjustment’- demand Bedoun produce foreign passports, committing fraud

The intention to shift all Bedoun into an illegal residents category via retrospective application of the Immigration Law, was discussed in the expulsion policy document of 1986 (‘The Study,’ 2003). But from 1983, the Bedoun had been pressured to ‘produce foreign passports’ (al Anezi, 1989) for status adjustment.


Enemies of the state, fifth column, ‘Iraqi’ etc.

The Bedouin were deemed to be enemies of the state along with Palestinian population in a series of scripted announcements by Kuwait’s ruler and government Ministers. Bedoun identity is no longer symbolically interpreted as ‘foreign’ but literally interpreted as ‘Iraqi.’ Mass deaths, deportations and exits. Those never charged, acquitted of charges, or who had finished their sentences, are retained in prisons or deportation centres indefinitely. Non-renewal of ‘registration’ of Bedoun by the Ministry of interior indicating administrative erasure alongside National Census shift indicating expulsion.

Sources: Human Rights Watch (1991a, 1992); see also Appendix Fi and ii.
2000

**Thousands forced to commit affidavit fraud.**

**Mass deportations of Bedoun mixed with deportations of migrant nationals**

Affidavit program adds to production of fraudulent documents. Thousands of Bedoun are forced to sign false documents to ‘admit’ they have another nationality. Affidavits supplied. Committees of mass deportation set up adjacent renewed to calls for the group to ‘register’ their citizenship claims and crackdowns on illegal residents migrants (nationals of other states who had violated visa laws). This merged the two groups. Along with ‘status adjustment’ already in progress since 1983, the numbers affected were impossible to tell. Status adjustment continues.


2006

**Status adjustment targets directed to passport traffickers.**

U.S. Ambassador to Kuwait reports ‘the situation is ridiculous,’ indicating ‘status adjustment’ is out of control. Those identified as having to submit to status adjustment are directed to passport traffickers by Central Apparatus staff. This is causing the purchase of fraudulent passports bearing no relationship to the recipient’s identity, threatening exposure of the erasure and involvement of Apparatus in organised crime.

Sources: WikiLeaks (US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, 2006, November 26).

2010

**Status adjustment goals published.**

Population numbers allocated to different nationalities are published. Major discrepancy in numbers indicating continued National Census manipulation, e.g. over 50,000 Bedoun are suddenly listed as Saudi Arabian nationals. Integrity of the National Census data is implicated in the Ministry of Interior’s ‘status adjustment.’


2011

**Status adjustment procedures published.**

Central Apparatus takes responsibility for identity documents by Ministry of Health, Ministry of Justice citing enforced nationality labels. Ministry of Interior takes full responsibility for determining the identity of the Bedoun, based on secret, undisclosed investigations and research. It determines all Bedoun nationalities stated on documents issued by government, including birth, death, marriage and divorce certificates and drivers’ licences. Continues to deny concepts of statelessness and possibility Bedoun may be statelessness as a pretext for claiming ‘other nationality’ and assumption of criminal identity.

2012

Status adjustment procedures streamlined to intensify submission to erasure.

Security restrictions applied. Targets identified and oppressed.

Dual focus emerges:

a) Those possessing some form of genuine identity documentation are subjected to security restrictions and intense surveillance. Applied en masse to tens of thousands to prevent citizenship acquisition under the Nationality Law and oppress and punish the Bedouns intellectual and leadership classes. New media laws shut down Bedoun publishing.

b) Those with no access to genuine identity documents are pressured more intensively with ‘status adjustment.’ Four categories of identity are given different criminal statuses and different capacities to qualify for citizenship.

Contradictory statements issued by Central Apparatus. Confusion over concept of citizenship and concept of passport by Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah. Ministry of Interior begins to firm up its view that citizenship will never be forthcoming to the Bedoun, even for those who prove their qualification to receive it, under the Nationality Law (1959). Access to public services in Decree 409/2011(equivalent to ‘human rights’) are offered in five-year parcels as an exchange incentive for submission to status adjustment (identity erasure).

Sources: Color ID Cards for Bedoons Soon’ (2012, April 21), ‘8,000 Bedoons’ (2012); ‘From Discriminating’ (2012); ‘Judicial Recourse’ (2012); Nacheva (April 7, 2014); Saleh, (May 12, 2012).

2014

Bedoun children targeted to submit to false nationality declarations for ‘status adjustment’ in return for access to primary school.

Bedoun children targeted to submit to ‘status adjustment’ by declaring a false nationality on birth certificates. Kuwaiti members of parliament speak out in protest. Comoros Plan emerges with caveats for prioritisation of criminal deportation and whole population deportation.

2014

The Comoros Plan is introduced - 5 years’ access to human rights to be exchanged for whole-group erasure.

Access to public services in Decree 409/2011 (equivalent to ‘human rights’) are offered in five-year parcels as an exchange incentive for submission to status adjustment (identity erasure) specifically attached to Comorian nationality.

‘Only’ criminalised Bedouns are identified as targeted for deportation to the Comoros (all are criminalised). Policy for Comoros to ‘receive onto the territory, all those deemed ‘criminals’ by Kuwait. 1,900 Bedoun are identified as targeted for mass deportation. Kuwaiti MPs attend workshops to discuss settlement of the whole population on the Comoros Islands. Other MPs introduce ‘policy’ to send Bedouns to desert camps for those who are charged with criminal offences, or speak out about their community’s situation

Sources: ‘Bedoons to Get’ (2015); 8,000 Bedouns’ (June 18, 2012); 8,000 Bedouns’ (June 19, 2012); Hope for non-census,’ 2014; Kuwait, Comoros’ (2014); Kuwait Priorities Protection’ (2014); ‘Kuwait Showcases’ (2015); ‘Judicial recourse’ (2012); ‘Kuwait MPs,’ 2016; ‘Kuwait Plans,’ (2013); MENA Report (May 10, 2016); Nacheva (April 7, 2014); ‘MPs Conflicted’ (2016); ‘Kuwait, Comoros’ (2014); ‘MENA Report’ (May 10, 2016); ‘Kuwait Showcase,’ (2015); ‘MPs Conflicted’ (2016); ‘Kuwait, Comoros’ (2014); ‘6,860 Illegal Residents’ (2015); ‘7,828 Illegal Residents’ (2016); Toumi (August 11, 2014).

2015

Bedoun instructed by Ministry of Interior to repeat fraudulent passports offences to maintain access to public services/’human rights.’

Expired fraudulent passports clogging up the system as Bedoun fail to renew them. Renewal of fraudulent passports called for by al Jarrah. Bedoun show resistance to committing identity fraud as awareness of the program increases. Access to public services in Decree 409/2011 (equivalent to ‘human rights’) are offered in five-year parcels as an exchange incentive for submission to status adjustment - Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah confirms this is contingent on committing repeat offences of passport fraud to make their identity and residency ‘legal’ under Ministry of Interior procedure.

Sources: ‘Bedoons to Get,’ (2015); Kholaif (December 12, 2014); ‘Kuwait, Comoros’ (2014); MENA Report (May 10, 2016); ‘MPs Conflicted’ (2016); ‘No Plans,’ (20 May 2014).

Note: Additional data on criminalisation via the construction of names for the Bedoun, and the deletion of names, can be found in Appendix B, ii, Table B2 and Appendix C, i, Tables C1, C2, and Chapter 6, Table 20 respectively.
Appendix G, iv

Local and international factors influencing the ethnic targeting and population eradication of the Bedoun (1983-)

This Appendix lists the confluence and convergence of broad, local, regional and international factors, around the development of the Bedoun problem, the suppression of information and failure to prevent the escalation of the crisis in Kuwait. The factors are summarised in Chapter 9, Figure 3 in the conclusions and recommendations of this study. The factors attempt to illustrate the complex nature of the problem and to argue for an investigation by the United Nations Special Rapporteurs on Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect, in order to stop and/or prevent all measures of ethnic persecution, including ethnic cleansing, population reduction, and other factors which may comprise indicators of the genocide of the Bedoun.

Regional Level - International Agencies and Academic Research

- Development of knowledge about Bedouin society was generated from the Middle East Bedouin settlement programs research programs during the 1950s and 1960s.
  - The process involved discrimination by Hadar academics producing and disseminating anti-Bedouin ideologies that enhanced their domination over the group as they were required to facilitate the permanent settlement of the Bedouin through their development plans and their implementation in the region (Bocco, 2006; Fabietti, 2006; see Chapter 2).
- Racist theories observed by Bocco (2006) and Aurencje (1993) involved major themes that essentially, form todays’ ‘tribalism’ theory in Middle East studies.
- This site of knowledge production and political control over the Bedouin, appears to be linked to the development of anti-Bedouin nationalist policy platforms in Kuwait from 1965 (al Mdaires, 2010) as well as the origin of anti-Bedouin academic discourses later expanded by scholars in Kuwait studies (see Academic, below).

National Level

Known government policies enabling ethnic targeting

- Nationality Law and its implementation via Decree 5/1960) (see Table 22, Chapter 7)
- Royal Decree 58/1996, March 26, 1996 (see analysis, Appendix D, i)
- Supreme Planning Council Resolution No. 11/1992 (see analysis, Appendix D, i) and Appendix F, iii)
• Administrative expulsion (‘The Study,’ August 30, 2003) (see analysis, Appendix E, ii)
• Ethnic cleansing (1990-1995) (Fineman, November 2, 1991; see analysis, Appendix F)
• Erasure via ‘Status Adjustment’ (administrative ethnic cleansing: Weissbrodt, 2008; prepares for physical eradication via population re-allocation on the National Census) (see analysis, Appendix E)

Hidden government policies

• Removal of Bedouin ethnic identity from the Bedoun (every level of the ethnic structure, 1983-2012) (see Chapter 6, Table 20).
• Ethnic targeting of Bedoun intellectual activity – speaking, literary products, online communications, punishment of intellectual leaders in particular (see Chapter 8, Table 26).

Political

• Kuwaiti Hadar and Arab Nationalism (‘the Nationalist bloc’) articulated a policy position to deprive the Bedouin of citizenship from 1965, on the basis of their ethnicity.
• The northern tribes became the easiest targets, mediated through their employment in the public service (which was used by the Municipal Council and Ministry of Planning to control their physical segregation) and domination of Arab nationalists in the Municipal Council (Bedouin desert settlements/‘urban planning’) and Education Council (al Mdaires, 2010).
• The influence of the nationalist domination over the Municipality of Kuwait was seen in the chain of committees, which have monitored and conducted close surveillance of the Bedoun, and organised the physical segregation of the population, since 1965. This was a new finding. For a list of the committees, see Appendix D, ii). For brief discussion of the nationalist policies, see Chapter 7.

Academic

• In the academic arena, nationalist ideology was embedded in ‘tribalism’ theory, extending the regional academic themes discussed in the first item, above.
• A range of anti-Bedouin ideological themes, called ‘tribalism’ theory, offered ‘scientific’ explanation for the biological, social and cultural inferiority of the Bedouin. The same key, anti-Bedouin themes were copied into literature about the Bedouin with little variation, a practice, which Western academics have perpetuated as much as Kuwaiti ones, while variations on the key themes continue to expand.
• These themes were very much present at the social level, and experienced by the Bedoun on a daily basis when they interacted in citizen society (see below). Hadar identity themes increasingly feature supremacy motifs, which can be linked to eugenic theory (see discussion, Chapter 7, see also analysis, Appendix C, vi to viii).

Social

• Anti-Bedouin ideology disseminated to the public from the academic-political arena, through political discourses in the local media scene, social institutions such as the national education system, and likely cultural institutions, such as the diwanniya.

• This research described the experience of the Bedoun with these ideologies encountered during interpersonal transactions in public spaces, and set out the cultural patterning of these encounters related to established anti-Bedouin ideologies, in Chapter 7.

International Governments

• Both the governments of the United Kingdom (United Kingdom Home Office, 2014, p.18, n62, 63, 64) and the United States (WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, 2006, November 26) are cogently aware of the ‘Status Adjustment’ program.

• The United States embassy in Kuwait has described some of the practical aspects of the program of erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing), while the government of the United Kingdom has collected data from Bedoun refugees, who have described an accurate picture of how the program works. The United Kingdom has cooperated with the Central Apparatus directly to return Bedoun asylum seekers. The developments were publicized by the Central Apparatus.

International Agencies

• Regional settlement program for the Bedouin in the Middle East (1950s-1960s) enforced the permanent settlement of a variety of tribal groups, distributed across all states (Bocco, 2006; Fabietti, 2006).

• Kuwait's national settlement program from 1965 (purported to provide citizenship and land as a national policy) (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994) was part of regional development programs sponsored by the U.N. Today, the U.N. has ‘forgotten’ these historical antecedents, and only responds to inquiries through its various treaty review processes, that are put directly to the state of Kuwait. If these questions are not raised, the Bedoun do not exist at this level, due to lack of formal monitoring mechanisms (Car-Hill, 2013).
• The Bedoun appear to have been unreported in UNDP and UNESCO statistics since their expulsion from Kuwait’s National Census in 1992 (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994).

• UNESCO excludes the Bedoun from education data, particularly children in school (in the ‘Education for All’ data), and children out of school (in the Children Out of School data) and youth-adult literacy statistics aged 15-24 (in the ‘Education for All’ data). This is because UNESCO commits states to report only on citizen participation, leaving it ‘optional’ to report on stateless groups, in particular, the Bedoun of Kuwait (Carr-Hill, 2103).

• The UNCHR Statelessness Unit has no relationship whatsoever with the Bedoun community in Kuwait, and has actively attempted to repress information on the group being disseminated.
Appendix H
A Photographic Record of the Bedouin Desert Settlements, Tent Accommodations and Popular Housing Compounds Kuwait (1974 -2014)

Appendix H includes the following sections:
Images H1-H8 The Desert Settlements (1974)
Images H9-H14 The Popular Housing Complexes (1974)
Images H15-H22 The Popular Housing Complexes (1990)
Images H23-H36 The popular Housing Complexes (2014)
Images H37-H48 Bedoun Living and Recreational Spaces (2014-2016)

Explanatory Note
The popular housing settlements at Mina Abdullah in al Moosa (1976) and Um Elhiman in al Zaher (1990) were both located southwest of Ahmadi and appear to be placed at the same location according to maps in al Moosa (1976, p.298, Map 7.1) and al Zaher (1990, p.235, Figure 6.1). Additionally, al Moosa (1976) took photos of Saihed al Awazim, which al Zaher (1990) referred to as the approved area of Shedadiya, while al Moosa (1976) showed they were located adjacent each other in the same compound.

Al Moosa (1976) two items named ‘Mina Abdullah,’ the shanty settlement and a seaside location. Based on the above, it appears that this settlement which was the same as Um Alhiman in al Zaher (1990). In many respects, the two studies (al Moosa, 1976 and Al Zaher, 1990) can be regarded as two parts of a longitudinal study).

A summary of captions for each image, follows.
Appendix H, i
Images H1-H8 The Desert Settlements (1974)

The following photographs of Bedouin desert settlements at Saihed al Awazim and al Jahra, Kuwait, 1974, were taken by Professor Abdulrasoul al Moosa (1976) in *Bedouin Shanty Settlements in Kuwait: A Study in Social Geography*.

Image H1 Aerial view of the Saihed al Awazim desert settlement

Image H2 Close-up aerial view of a desert dwelling at the Saihed al Awazim settlement
Image H3 Aerial view of the comparative spacing between dwellings

Image H4 The desert settlement at Magwaa with stock grazing nearby
Image H5 Traditional and contemporary (temporary) housing at the al Jahra desert settlement

Image H6 A brand new ‘shanty,’ prefabricated timber hut
Image H7 Mixed materials used for housing construction in a desert settlement

Image H8 Bedouin children playing football at the Magwaa desert settlement
Appendix H, ii

The following photographs of the ‘popular housing’ compounds at Mina Abdullah and al Jahra, Kuwait, were taken by Professor Abdulrasoul al Moosa (1976) in *Bedouin Shanty Settlements in Kuwait: A Study in Social Geography*.

Image H9 Popular housing complex showing space at front centre for prayer area.

Image H10 (above) A tin partition used to screen the front door of a dwelling from open desert.
Image H11 Children walking by a house, with goats grazing

Image H12 The main shopping strip in Saihed al Awazim, with goats
Image H13 Modest house ‘extensions’ at Mina Abdullah

Image H14 A ‘Popular housing’ street, showing the virtually uninhabitable conditions at Mina Abdullah
Appendix H, iii
Images H15-H23 The Popular Housing Compounds (1990)

The following photographs of the ‘popular housing’ compounds at Taima, al Jahra, Sulabiya and Um Elhiman, Kuwait, were taken by Ajeel al Zaher (1990) in Housing Conditions and Aspirations of Popular Housing Tenants in Kuwait.

Image H15 A street in a ‘popular housing’ compound

Image H16 Rapid deterioration of homes in popular housing settlements due to environmental conditions
Image H17 Streetscape at the popular housing settlements

Image H18 Housing ‘extensions’ required for shade and to accommodate families
Image H19 Tent housing at a popular housing settlement

Image H20 ‘Illegal’ house extensions at a popular housing settlement
Image H21 Lack of public facilities at a popular housing settlement

Image H22 The relative size of a car compared to popular housing dwellings
I took the following photographs of the ‘popular housing’ compounds at Taima, al Jahra, and Sulabiya, Kuwait, between February and April 2014. My cultural guides and translators assisted me to visit the area several times, including for interviews.
Image H25 An unmodified home in the popular housing compound, Taima

Image H26 A sequence of homes cemented together due to lack of inside space, in Taima
Image H27 Lack of maintenance to public roads in Taima

Image H28 A housing area with a concentration of adult, citizen females (Sulabiya)
Image H29 A renovated home with a second storey, in Sulabiya

Image H30 An impoverished area where Shia residents live
Image H31 An unmodified home in a Shia Area

Image H32 The front gate of a smaller home in Taima
Image H33 An unmodified home in Sulabiya

Image H34 A home with an uncovered courtyard
Image H35 The Public Authority for Civil Information property labels Taima

Image H36 Improvements made to homes
Appendix H, v
Images H37-H48 Bedoun Living and Recreational Spaces (2014-2016)

These images were taken inside an interviewee's home in Taima, al Jahra, with the permission of the interviewee and his family members who lived there.

**Interior of a ‘popular housing’ dwelling in Taima**

![Image H37 The kitchen of a home in Taima (1)]

![Image H38 The kitchen of a home in Taima (2)]
Image H39 The kitchen sink and laundry area

Image H40 The front entrance of a home in Taima.
Image H41 The inner courtyard of a home in Taima
A homeless Bedoun man

Image H42 An impoverished Bedoun man selling goods on the roadside
Image H43 An automobile used as a home in al Jahra

Image H44 Fresh fruits are sold to make ends meet
Photographs of recreational tents in Kuwait, exterior and interior

Image H45 Tents on the fringe of built-up areas

Image H46 A large, ceremonial tent in a public space, al Jahra
Images H47 and H48 were taken by my cultural guide and translator, T3.
Summary of image captions

Image H1 Aerial view of the Saihed al Awazim desert settlement.
This was on of the sentiments officially designated by government, along with sites at al Jahra and al Shedadia (adjacent Saihad al Awazim). These homes have large settlement with five or six wood huts. Some scholars such as al Nakib (2014) still call these huts ‘shanties,’ although one hut was equivalent to a ‘shanty’ in what was normally known as a shanty settlement. (Plate No. 2.1, in al Moosa, 1976, p.62).

Image H2 Close-up aerial view of a desert dwelling at the Saihed al Awazim settlement.
Dwellings of different sizes with roaming livestock, which are closed in at night. Tin was a sand-proof material, but hot, while the timber was not sand-proof, but provided a breathable shell. Sand storms are frequent in Kuwait, while temperatures reach over fifty degrees in summer. (Plate No. 4.1, in al Moosa 1976, p.112)

Image H3 Aerial view of the comparative spacing between dwellings.
Compare to Plate 1 at Saihed al Awazim, showing that the Bedouin’s homes were brought closer together and in a more organised fashion at the large, formal settlements. Large, metal boxes contained water. Small, separate buildings serve as diwanniya, the kitchen, and rooms for sleeping. (Plate No. 4.2, in al Moosa, 1976, p.112).

Image H4 The desert settlement at Magwaa with stock grazing nearby.
The combination of timber and wood is clear. Initially huts were constructed with sheets of corrugated tin and other, found materials. Later, they featured poured concrete slabs and pre-fabricated timber rooms were sold, making the dwellings fit for longer term use. (Plate 6.2, in al Moosa, p.172).

Image H5 Traditional and contemporary (temporary) housing at the al Jahra desert settlement.
Two traditional, tent homes with prefabricated housing, behind. The grey, striped materials are thick, woollen blankets that were the basic material used for traditional housing. Jahra settlement. (Plate 6.5 in Al Moosa, 1976, p.177).

Image H6 A brand new ‘shanty,’ prefabricated timber hut.
The concrete slab floor can be seen under building to the left. Note behind is a wood hut with tin roof and a second-storey building constructed with corrugated tin. Kuwait Oil Company first began providing the concrete, perhaps after it was realised that the temporary homes would have to withstand decades of harsh desert conditions, due to state housing shortages. (Plate 6.6 in al Moosa, 1976, p.181).

Image H7 Mixed materials used for housing construction in a desert settlement.
The author claimed this was a home with poorer inhabitants, but it appears to be an older prefabricated wooden dwelling like many others, with a gate (and with a sign on it) to the right, a tin roof and behind to the left, other buildings with tin roof and sides. This was likely required to protect from sand storms, given the dwellings were permanent. (Plate 6.7 in al Moosa, 1976, p.181).

**Image H8 Bedouin children playing football at the Magwaa desert settlement.**

Al Moosa (1976) explained that the settlements were too far from schools for the children to attend, but criticized their parents for not attending city sports clubs as an example of anti-social ‘tribalism. (Plate No. 6.3, in al Moosa, 1976, p.173)

**Images H9-H13 The Popular Housing Compounds (1974).**

The following photographs of the ‘popular housing’ compounds at Mina Abdullah and al Jahra, Kuwait, were taken by Professor Abdulrasoul al Moosa (1976) in Bedouin Shanty Settlements in Kuwait: A Study in Social Geography.

**Image H9 Popular housing complex showing space at front centre for prayer area.**

Mosques were not built by government in the popular housing areas, although provision for them along with other facilities (also never built) was made by planners (al Zaher, 1990, p.194). Similar to the misnomer ‘shanty,’ the concrete, windowless, brick boxes behind this area were called ‘popular housing’ or ‘low income’ housing. The white boxes on top of the homes are water tanks. (Plate 4.6, in al Moosa, 1976, p.126).

**Image H10 A tin partition used to screen the front door of a dwelling from open desert.**

The automobile offers a sense of scale – the house is as long as the car is. Each compound contained a ‘monitoring’ office dedicated to destroying additions to the homes (al Zaher, 1990, p.191), such as the makeshift corrugated iron fence, required to keep the sand out of the house during wind storms. (Plate 4.8, in al Moosa, 1976, p.128).

**Image H11 Children walking by a house, with goats grazing.**

Al Moosa noted the animal pen was ‘attached’ to the house. The size of the children can be compared to the usually small rooms of the homes. (Plate 6.11, in al Moosa, 1976, p.234).

**Image H12 The main shopping strip in Saihed al Awazim, with goats.**

This picture shows a resident taking his goats for exercise. Al Moosa (1976) pointed out that most desert settlement areas were not close to any shops of community facilities. This shopping strip is for the mainstream community. Planners included these kinds of facilities in the popular housing compounds, but they were not
constructed until decades later. Once schools and health clinics were built, they operated only briefly before being shut down in the 1986 administrative expulsion. Today, citizen children have been placed in the public schools in the popular housing areas, to replace the local Bedoun children, who are prohibited from attending those schools. (Plate 4.3 in al Moosa, 1976, p.117).

Image H13 Modest house ‘extensions’ at Mina Abdullah.
This picture shows a small, white cement wall constructed to give privacy and to protect from the environment, which may have become an additional room, later. (Plate 4.7 in al Moosa, 1976, p.127).

Image H14 A ‘Popular housing’ street, showing the virtually uninhabitable conditions at Mina Abdullah.

Image H15 A street in a ‘popular housing’ compound.
Note that nothing has changed with the drainage issues, even after the roads were paved. Compare with Image 26. (Appears to be Plate 7.1 in al Zaher, 1990, p.274 (plate number omitted).

Image H16 Rapid deterioration of homes in popular housing settlements due to environmental conditions.
Al Zaher (1990) showed that gross deterioration of the homes had occurred due to weather conditions, while some homes had been abandoned after holes had been knocked out in the brick walls, as if the occupants had attempted to construct windows. (Plate 7.2, in al Zaher, 1990, p.274).

Image H17 Streetscape at the popular housing settlements.
The author complained about the water on the road and the state of ill-repair. Not only was no maintenance performed on the homes by the government owner, the residents were prohibited from making their own adaptations to the home by authorities located in offices on the housing sites, while no maintenance to the public areas of the housing sites was ever carried out. This fact remains evident today (see Images 26, 27). (Plate 7.6, in al Zaher, 1990, p.284).

Image H18 Housing ‘extensions’ required for shade and to accommodate families.
By 1990, there was still enough space outside the homes to erect tents for family visits, outdoor diwanniya and celebrations. Al Zaher noted this was necessary due to the small size of the homes. (Plate 7.7 in al Zaher, 19090, p.287).

Image H19 Tent housing at a popular housing settlement.
I cropped some of the photographs, such as this one. Some of Al Zaher’s (1990) photographs indicated he did not leave his car, in order to take them. (Plate 8.1, in al Zaher, p.301).
**Image H20 ‘Illegal’ house extensions at a popular housing settlement.**
Image 18 and 19 were used by al Zaher (1990) to demonstrate illegal house extensions, such as areas for shade (on the left), and tents used as additional rooms. (Plate 7.7, in al Zaher, 1990, p.287).

**Image H21 Lack of public facilities at a popular housing settlement.**
The only large spaces like this that remain in Taima and Sulabiya today are located near the local shop, shown in Plate 22. However initially, such planned facilities were not built for the Bedouin occupants. (Plate 7.7, in Zaher, 1990, p.287).

**Image H22 The relative size of a car compared to popular housing dwellings.**
Al Zaher (1990) recorded this picture as an example of ‘luxury cars’ at the popular housing sites. This car was parked between two houses, showing the relative size of the tiny rooms. Today, these spaces are covered with tin due to the space issue, giving each home an additional half room. (Plate 7.1 in Zaher, 1990, p.258).

**Images H23 The local convenience store, Sulabiya.**
I took the following photographs of the ‘popular housing’ compounds at Taima, al Jahra, and Sulabiya, Kuwait, between February and April 2014.
The only shop in a housing block in Sulabiya from the original architectural plan. A car is needed to travel to the main shopping areas beyond the compound. Each block has only one local shop, according to the first urban designs. There are no other facilities for the public in both Taima and Sulabiya.

**Image H24 Car shelter at the front of a home in Taima.**
This image illustrates the front of the original ‘popular housing’ dwellings. ‘Illegal’ extensions built with tin are still constructed due to there being no garages and no public transport in these areas. The carport appears to be very similar to the one in Image 19.

**Image H25 An unmodified home in the popular housing compound, Taima.**
Many homes have satellite dishes, as there is no provision of cable television, unlike in other areas of Kuwait.

**Image H26 A sequence of homes cemented together due to lack of inside space, in Taima.**
The back of the homes is joined by the next home, behind it. That is, there is no access behind the homes and no backyard.

**Image H27 Lack of maintenance to public roads in Taima.**
Asphalt was laid between the homes but there appears to have been no maintenance performed since it was first laid, leading to flooding during seasonal rains. Compare the condition of the road to Image 16.
A housing area with a concentration of adult, citizen females (Sulabiya).

A rare, yellow brick home at the end of the street is next to the house with an additional storey in Image 29. Some Kuwaiti citizens still live in Taima and Sulabiya, as originally some citizen men and their families from the same tribes as the Bedoun were settled in Taima. Bedoun families with female citizens spouses who were encouraged to move to Sulabiya under a welfare scheme prior to 1986.

A renovated home with a second storey, in Sulabiya.

New rooms are built on when sons marry, as traditionally they bring their wife and remain in their fathers’ house as their family grows. Although there is a well-established history of government authorities destroying any new rooms built as additions to these homes, there is now an increasing number of second story dwellings at Sulabiya, although most homes remain single-storey and constructed with additions made of tin, as the previous photographs show. This home with new, yellow brick and a new front wall and gate is a somewhat unusual example of an affluent home in this area, indicating that it may belong to a citizen (which would also explain why it has not yet been destroyed by authorities). This kind of example is not seen at Taima. The little flags on the home have pictures of the Emir, likely to show housing. Authorities they do not want the top storey of the house removed by them.

An impoverished area where Shia residents live.

Some areas of Taima are in worse condition than others, due to the impoverishment of residents. In particular, there are pockets of Shia residents who have difficulty accessing work and House of Zakat support. The Shia mosques in al Jahra and Sulabiya exist in a particularly impoverished, vandalised condition, unlike Shia mosques in central Kuwaiti City, which are among the most luxurious and affluent, appointed buildings in Kuwait.

An unmodified home in a Shia Area.

There are Shia areas in Taima, which are a poorer than the Sunni areas, which go without modifications or decoration. Sulabiya is characteristically slightly more affluent looking, as there are more trees and house decorations. I have tried to show the typical characteristics of each area.

The front gate of a smaller home in Taima.

Unmodified homes are smaller than ones that have been modified, due to the covering of the middle courtyard area of the house, and the sequestering of the small space between the outside of some homes, which were frequently converted to an additional room.

An unmodified home in Sulabiya.
Some side streets still open up to open land, which can be seen on the left. These free areas are prohibited from further construction or the parking of cars. Sometimes temporary carports are built because there is insufficient space for cars at the front of homes, which other photographs show. However, they are periodically destroyed by housing authorities.

**Image H34 A home with an uncovered courtyard.**

Sulabiya. This home shows the small courtyard, where the front of the space between the homes was walled in, but a roof could not be added. It appears to be the side of the home from the original structure. Compare with Image 15 and Image 23, which show front extensions made into front rooms that are usually transformed into an enclosed diwanniya.

**Image H35 The Public Authority for Civil Information property labels Taima.**

The Public Authority for Civil Information registers all houses, as government owns and collects rent on the dwellings. The authority’s plate can be seen on the upper right side of the door.

**Image H36 Improvements made to homes.**

Sulabiya features many homes painted the patriotic colours of the Kuwaiti flag with decorations. Many homes have Kuwaiti flags and pictures of the Emir strewn across them, to discourage authorities from raiding and destroying parts of the dwellings. Other homes appear to be more neglected, because the occupants cannot afford to improve them, while any modification deemed unsuitable by authorities is destroyed, including additional rooms.

**Images H36-H48 Bedoun Living and Recreational Spaces (2014-2016).**

The following photographs show the interior of Bedoun living and recreational spaces were taken by the researcher in 201. They include the interior of a ‘popular housing’ dwelling in Taima (Images 36-40), images of a Bedoun man with his car, which is his home (Images 41-43), and images s of recreational tents in Kuwait (Images 44-47). The images were taken by the researcher and her research assistant, from 2014 to 2016.

**Image H37 The kitchen of a home in Taima (1).**

There is a recently purchased stove for the family, which is used to feed not only the main householders but the extended family (the sons’ families), who rent small dwellings outside the home, due to lack of space. Separate gas bottles are still required (on the right), due to lack of public infrastructure. In terms of the permanent, basic facilities provided to tenants, compare this image to Image 40, showing the kitchen sink. Note the blankets left over from the night before – members of the family have to sleep in the kitchen to obtain privacy, because there is not enough space for married
couples with small children, to stay together, or for older single siblings to sleep in males-only and females-only bedrooms.

**Image H38 The kitchen of a home in Taima (2).**
Part of the kitchen, showing the same room as Image 35, above. The kitchen is too small for a table.

**Image H39 The kitchen sink and laundry area.**
The third wall of the kitchen and twin-tub laundry near the sink. The plumbing is fragile, similar to the kind of set-up found in Asia. But the water supply is plentiful there. Spare water is in the blue tub.

**Image H40 The front entrance of a home in Taima.**
This photograph shows the front entrance, from the inside. The *diwanniya* is to the right.

**Image H41 The inner courtyard of a home in Taima.**
The inner courtyard, which is partially covered, facing the front of the house. One bedroom window is on the right. The second bedroom was adjacent to me on the right and the kitchen was to the left. The bathroom was in the picture, on the left.

**Image H42 An Impoverished Bedoun man selling goods on the roadside.**
Police often target roadside sellers to remove them from the public eye. Begging is illegal in Kuwait and can lead to deportation, but nevertheless it is quite common. Impoverished Bedoun men sell goods by the roadside, attempting to engage in a dignified business activity rather than seeking charity. This man kindly provided his permission to be photographed for this research.

**Image 43 An automobile used as a home in al Jahra.**
The inside of the car has deteriorated over time, due to the heat and sand. It gets up to 50 degrees in summer in Kuwait and there are seasonal sandstorms. Kuwait’s ruling family comes from this suburb, and members of the Emir’s family still live in al Jahra. This man spends much of his time avoiding the authorities, as homelessness is illegal in Kuwait, and another layer of ‘illegality’ faced by the Bedoun.

**Image 44 Fresh fruits are sold to make ends meet.**
The man has obtained fresh fruits to sell in al Jahra. Some individuals are so poor that they sell tiny packets of seeds on the roadside, inside tiny, home-made paper bags, with dimensions of around 7cm x 7cm. Street-selling persists in Kuwait because most Kuwaitis are sympathetic to the activity, because accepting charity is regarded as undignified by comparison. Twitter accounts show many pictures of homeless and working men and children selling goods by the side of the road.

**Image 45 Tents on the fringe of built-up areas.**
Many tents can be seen on empty lands on the fringes of housing developments. Kuwait City has many pockets of undeveloped land, and the common academic image of the nation as a city-state is quite far from the reality. During winter, hundreds of these tents can be seen, and hundreds of larger tents can also be seen on the fringe of Kuwait City going south and especially to the north of the state. Further beyond that, in rural areas, much larger tent compounds with full-service facilities (security fences, stadium lighting, additional mobile sheds for storage, water tanks, stock yards and semi-trailers for transporting the dwellings, and so on) can be seen. These are used as second, seasonal homes for affluent Bedouin citizens, who still keep animals (goats, sheep and camels), that graze on the steppe under the care of shepherds.

Image 46 A large, ceremonial tent in al Jahra.
The tent in Image 44 is a tribal tent, located on a small, empty block on the side of a road in Al Jahra. These tents are used for large, public celebrations such as elections or marriage parties for affluent, local people who are expected to provide a venue for well-wishers to attend them.

Image H47 The interior of a small, family tent.
This tent features the requisite Kuwaiti coffee, tea, shisha and internet facilities.

Image 48 The interior of a larger, communal tent.
The interior of a larger tent, with a large television, used for communal gathering. As the original form of diwanniya, these spaces are used often, but not always, as social spaces for men. Bedouin families share these facilities communally and therefore, many (but not all) of the Bedouin have access to them just as citizens do, as they comprise the same families.
Appendix I
Documents Supplementary to the Methodology and Analysis

Appendix I includes the following parts:
   i. Development of the research questions
   ii. Main and supplementary interview questions
   iii. Interview data sheet
   iv. Ethical review letters
   v. Techniques used to enhance validity and reliability
   vi. Audit trail document
   vii. Transcription and data management protocol
   viii. Codebook
   ix. Codebook analysis chart
   x. Excerpt from a transcript
   xi. Data extraction summary sample
   xii. Excerpt from participant observation notes
## Development of the Research Questions

### Table I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposal stage August 2013</th>
<th>Changes in the field February-April 2014</th>
<th>Changes during data analysis August 2014</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What is the extent of personal participation of the Bedoun <em>Jinsiya</em> in higher education?</td>
<td>1. What is the extent of personal participation of the stateless Kuwaitis in higher education and in society in general?</td>
<td>1. What are key aspects of the personal and cultural identity of the Bedoun?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. What factors – positive and negative - impact on personal participation of the Bedoun <em>Jinsiya</em> in higher education?</td>
<td>2. What factors – positive and negative - impact on personal participation of stateless Kuwaitis in higher education and in society in general?</td>
<td>2. What are some of the key experiences that have helped to form the development of identity of the Bedoun?</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. How has participation in higher education influenced student’s formation of personal identity and culture as part of the Bedoun <em>Jinsiya</em>?</td>
<td>3. How has participation in higher education influenced student’s formation of personal identity and culture as part of stateless Kuwaitis? What other factors influence the formation of their identity e.g. family, employment, relationships with citizens?</td>
<td>3. What are the personal benefits and challenges that arise from participation of the Bedoun in Kuwaiti society? What are the challenges for those who are excluded?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. What are the personal benefits and challenges that arise from participation of the Bedoun <em>Jinsiya</em> in higher education?</td>
<td>4. What are the personal benefits and challenges that arise from participation of stateless Kuwaitis in higher education, in primary and secondary school?</td>
<td>4. What are the personal benefits and challenges that arise from participation of the stateless in post-secondary education? What are the challenges for those who are excluded?</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. What are the thoughts and feelings of Bedoun <em>Jinsiya</em> students in higher education in relation to achievements, difficulties, their rights, obligations and duties as members of their families, the stateless community and as members of the student community alongside Kuwaiti citizens and other non-nationals?</td>
<td>5. What are the thoughts and feelings of stateless Kuwaitis students in higher education in relation to achievements, difficulties, their rights, obligations and duties as members of their families, the stateless community and as members of the student community alongside Kuwaiti citizens and other non-nationals?</td>
<td>5. What are the thoughts and feelings of the Bedoun in relation to achievements, difficulties, their rights, obligations and duties as members of their families, the stateless community and as members of the student community alongside Kuwaiti citizens and other non-nationals?</td>
</tr>
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Appendix I, ii
Main and Supplementary Interview Questions

The main interview questions in this study are listed in bold. Supplementary questions are listed underneath them, which provided guidance to topic areas as required. Not all of the questions were posed in the course of interviews as the interviews were loosely structured.

1. What is the extent of personal participation of the Bedoun in higher education? (Such as full/part time, subject load, attendance at lectures/non-compulsory activities)
   1.1 What is the nature of the participation of students in the higher institution they attend? E.g. full time, part time, pay fees, scholarship
   1.2 What courses and qualifications are they studying?
   1.3 How much of the course have they completed?
   1.4 What subjects have been passed or failed?

2. What other factors – positive and negative - impact on personal participation of the Bedoun in higher education?
   2.1 How did students gain admission to the institution where they are studying?
   2.2 What challenges were faced gaining entry to the institution?
   2.3 What challenges have been faced since commencing studies?
   2.4 What factors helped them gain entry to university?
   2.5 What factors have helped them since commencing studies?

3. How has participation in higher education influenced student’s formation of personal identity and culture as part of the Bedoun?
   3.1 Do Bedoun students see themselves as having an identity and culture that is specific to the Bedoun group and separate to Kuwaiti citizens?
   3.2 How are Bedoun students regarded by other students, such as Kuwaitis and other non-nationals, in the institution?
   3.3 How to Bedoun students regard other students, such as Kuwaitis and other non-nationals, in the institution?
   3.4 Have Bedoun students’ sense of identity and culture been strengthened or weakened as a result of higher education studies?
   3.5 Do Bedoun students find their patterns of thinking, feeling and living changed in any way since they began their higher education studies?

4. What are the personal benefits and challenges that arise from participation of the Bedoun in higher education?
   4.1 Do students believe their higher education will lead them to better job prospects, better salary?
4.2 Do students believe their higher education has led them to having a different outlook, a different role in the Bedouin or Kuwaiti community, becoming a role model/leader for others?

4.3 Do students find their family or friends have treated them differently since commencing studies? How/why?

4.4 Do students find they think of feel differently about their personal status and their community status since commencing studies? Or, do they believe the completion of studies will change their personal status in the community? How?

4.5 What challenges do students believe they have been subject to because they are Bedouin? I.e. challenges that citizen/non-national students would not experience.

4.6 Is participating in higher education worth the effort personally, and in terms of the increasing the education of the community? Why/why not?

5. What are the thoughts and feelings of Bedouin students in relation to achievements, difficulties, their rights, obligations and duties as members of their families, the Bedouin community and as members of the student community alongside Kuwaiti citizens and other non-nationals?

5.1 What has been the greatest achievement of academic studies? How did it make them feel?

5.2 What has been the biggest challenge of academic studies? How was it overcome?

5.3 To what extent are Bedouin students conscious that only a minority in their generation is achieving access to higher education that others missed out on since the 1980s? What advice would they give to members of the Bedouin community who are not students, based on their experience in higher education?

5.4 How important is the right to higher education to them? Compared to other rights?

5.5 Have Bedouin student’s obligations and duties as members of their family, the Bedouin community and the larger community in Kuwait changed since they commenced studies?
## Appendix I, iii

### Interview Data Sheet

Table I2

**Table of Interview Data: the Date, Location, Interview Number and Language/s Used in Interviews**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview Number</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Respondent Code</th>
<th>Location</th>
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Ethical Review Letter, December 10, 2013
10 February 2014

Dr M Seacombe
Education

Dear Dr Seacombe

PROJECT NO: H-2013-087
Participation of the Stateless (Bidoun Jinsiya) in Higher Education in Kuwait

Thank you for the revised ethics application dated 20.1.14 and 29.1.14 requesting amendment to the above project. I write to advise you that on behalf of the Human Research Ethics Committee I have approved the request to expand the participants and study methods as described in the submitted documents. Thank you for the response dated 10.2.14 to the matters raised regarding the revised protocol.

The ethical endorsement for the project applies for the period until: 31 December 2016

Where possible, participants taking part in the study should be given a copy of the Information Sheet and the signed Consent Form to retain.

Please note that any changes to the project which might affect its continued ethical acceptability will invalidate the project’s approval. In such cases an amended protocol must be submitted to the Committee for further approval. It is a condition of approval that you immediately report anything which might warrant review of ethical approval including (a) serious or unexpected adverse effects on participants (b) proposed changes in the protocol; and (c) unforeseen events that might affect continued ethical acceptability of the project. It is also a condition of approval that you inform the Committee, giving reasons, if the project is discontinued before the expected date of completion.

A reporting form is available from the Committee’s website. This may be used to renew ethical approval or report on project status including completion.

Yours sincerely

Dr John Semmler
Convenor
Human Research Ethics Committee
Ethical Review Letter, March 5, 2015

Dear Dr. [Name],

The University of Adelaide

[Letter text]

Professor [Name]
[Department]
[University]

[Signature]

[Date]
### Techniques Used to Enhance Validity and Reliability

Table I lists techniques used in this study to enhance validity, reliability and the interpretation of data were suggested by Guest et al (2001, p.99-101). The examples describe the ways I incorporated the techniques into this study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technique</th>
<th>Example</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Use of multiple methods and/or data sources</td>
<td>Methods included interviews, participant observation (see analysis of this data in Appendix A), research of documents and secondary literature sources (Appendix B-G), photography (Appendix H).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusting the structure of instruments to fit the goals and structure of the study</td>
<td>Loosely structured interviews, participant observation and a range of possible questions were used to explore a range of topics and to adjust the focus of interviews; see the excerpt from a transcript, Appendix I, part xi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring data for theme development as they emerged</td>
<td>This was reflected in the development of the research questions and the code book in Appendix I, i and part h.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eliciting feedback from the participants after summarizing the interview</td>
<td>The researcher stayed in touch with participants to ensure that they were able to feedback any issues or concerns. Development of the research was member-checked a number of times (see Chapter 4, Methodology) for discussion of the research collaborative approach used with some participants).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcribing data using a transcription protocol</td>
<td>See Transcription protocol and data management protocol based on Guest et al (2012); see Appendix I, vii.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish translation expectations established at the beginning</td>
<td>I discussed expectations prior to interview. Three translators were used. I discussed translation in Chapter 4 (Methodology) and the transcription and data management protocol (Appendix I, vii).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop and use a precise code book</td>
<td>See the audit trail and code book analysis chart (Appendix I, vi and part i).</td>
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<tr>
<td>External or peer review of coding and summaries</td>
<td>My Principal Supervisor checked my code book and data analysis.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Create an audit trail</td>
<td>See the audit trail in Appendix I, vi.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Triangulate data sources</td>
<td>Methodological triangulation was not a main priority in the methodology, but it emerged naturally over the course of the study. This was because a lack of previous consolidation, analysis and evaluation of data about the Bedouin across every thinly spread sources led me to use multiple sources of information checks. For example, literature sources were spread across a variety of disciplines and fields (for example, anthropology, political science, sociology, international law, medical research, newspaper articles, activist and academic blogs (e.g. the MER and Jadaliyya blogs in Middle East Studies), grey literature reports (of international humanitarian agencies) which I cross-checked with some participants, seeking explanations for information gaps, inconsistencies, or to extend knowledge further. The analysis of documentary and secondary sources is in Appendices B-G. This provided a systematic base of information that had not yet been consolidated in any publication, which helped me to illustrate convergence of data with interview themes and quotations, and participant observation notes included in the thematic analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative case analysis</td>
<td>Negative cases helped to inform the change in focus of the research questions, and enhanced specific areas of data such as the processes by which the Bedouin interviewees’ families were left perpetually stateless, the manipulation of the Bedouin population via the implementation/failure to implement government policy, identification typing, and those who experienced bans on education. * See example below.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Support themes and interpretation with interview quotes (for interview-based research) | Quotations were integrated throughout the Discussion. There was a generous use of quotes, which is characteristic of studies that have employed the humanistic coefficient in sociology (Chapter 4, Methodology). I attempted to show explicit links between themes and their interpretation, in the thematic analysis in Appendix A:  
  - Thematic analysis summaries (Appendix A, i).  
  - A full list of themes and participant numbers (Appendix, ii).  
  - Quotations and/or participant observation notes linked to each theme (transcript evidence) (Appendix A, iii).  
  - A visual organiser showing the met-themes and all other themes arising from them (Appendix A, iv).  
and by providing the following supporting documents, as recommended by Guest et al., (2012), in various parts |
of Appendix I:

- Code book (Appendix I, ix)
- Code book analysis chart (Appendix I, x)
- Sample transcript excerpt (Appendix I, xi)
- Sample data extraction summary (Appendix I, xii)
- Excerpt from participant observation notes (Appendix I, xiii)
Appendix I, vi
Audit Trail Document

The following Audit Trail topics are based on Guest et al (2012, p 93-94).

Individuals Involved with Specific Data Points and Analytic Activities

The Researcher completed all steps of the analysis independently except for translation. The steps included interviewing, making participant observations, transcribing, coding and analysing the data. For translation, see Methodology (Chapter 3) and the Transcription Protocol (Appendix I, part vii).

Data Included/Not Included in Analysis

The interview data was considered the primary data for the project. The interview data was subject to the systematic thematic analysis. Information on what was included and not included from the interview transcripts is in the Transcription Protocol.

Rationale Behind the Decision of What/What Not to Include

Regarding the interview transcripts, see Transcription Protocol (Appendix I, part vi). Participant observation data and photographic data systematically because the methods to collect that data were considered supplementary. The data from these methods were incorporated during the write-up of the Discussion and referenced accordingly.

Units of Analysis

Methods used to find themes and apply codes.

Themes were discovered and codes applied through the interview data. Themes emerged from the first interview. The researcher commenced listing themes accordingly. Codes were not assigned to the data immediately, but made a separate code list was made. This was due to the nature of the fieldwork process, where there was not enough time to transcribe after each interview. Codes were added to the list up until the last interview and during the analysis phase.

The data was more abundant that what had been expected, even up until half way during the fieldwork. Some themes were not only noteworthy but also novel or reflective of negative cases (Guest et al, 2012, 68). There was also a possibility that some codes might be dropped as issues were clarified and misconceptions corrected, or new information was discovered through the transcription process.

Researcher notes were made during transcription process in the interview texts to explain the application of codes and to reference important points with similar or different data from other participants. This helped in the identification of negative cases and significant quotes. See examples in the Transcription Protocol.
Transcription was performed manually to ensure that the meaning of the text was preserved as much as possible by the researcher. The decision not to apply software analysis tools was made tentatively before the fieldwork, and confirmed after data was collected.

The basic typology and emergent codes were applied again to all text, to extract all relevant data systematically. The sources of the typology are discussed in the Methodology under Research Design (Figure 1) and the code book (Appendix I, ix).

During the transcription phase, I decided not to analyse the data according to the research questions, but to analyse all the data according to the code book developed. This would ensure all relevant data recorded in the loosely structured interviews would be captured and not only direct responses to particular questions. This decision stemmed from the decision to try to establish a basic sociological typology if the data was sufficient, to fill existing gaps in the field.

A ‘3 x pass’ method was used for transcript coding (see Guest et al., 2012 and the Transcription Protocol). It was decided that it was better to leave intact some larger interview quotes assigned to multiple codes rather than trying to reduce them by splitting up the chunks of data, so that the context of all data assigned to particular major codes could be read and interpreted together (i.e. so as not to reduce the meaning of passages).

**Changes made to the code book.**

The code book emerged during the fieldwork. When I returned from the fieldwork, I had noted nineteen basic codes. One major code, *Code 19 Educational Experience*, and additional sub-codes emerged during the transcription process. A total of 20 major codes emerged. Different numbers of sub-codes were generated during the analysis according to the nature and richness of the data around each major code. These are shown in the Code book analysis chart (Appendix I, x).

**Reasons for the changes to the code book.**

The only change worthy of note that occurred was during the transcription and coding phase, was the separation of a separate, major code for educational experience. In the field, I had tentatively assigned certain issues under existing codes until I established if they would warrant another key code as below. This related to the development of educational experience as a code (Code 18).

Complex issues related to primary and secondary school experience emerged unexpectedly. Initially I allocated this as a sub-code of higher education experience. Over time, I found that as data expanded the whole area of educational experience needed to be separated from all levels of education (primary, secondary and tertiary) and treated as a major code. Because the experiences were so important to the research, it was better to group this body of experience separate to other educational matters rather than to split and group it according to educational level. I recoded the completed transcripts accordingly.
Data Reduction and Organisation Techniques

The data were reduced and/or organised in the following ways:

- A brief summary of participants’ demographic data was extracted and used to create a ‘basic profiles’ sheet. This helped me keep a snapshot of the basic characteristics of each participant and to help collate summary data tables for the basic sociological types, such as gender, age, marital status, parents, siblings, children and so on.

- Key quotes from each transcript were highlighted in red to make their identification easier on sorting the data according to codes. According to Guest et al (2012) ‘Quotes lay bare the emergent themes for all to see. They are the foundation upon which good qualitative data analysis is based’ (p.95).

- Data was copied onto separate documents, collated under each major code. This data was not reduced, as I did not want to remove any contextual relevance including the researcher notes added during the transcription phase, but the quotes remained highlighted.

- Different organisational levels of the data emerged in the codes. Some concepts split off from both the basic types and types specific to the local population. First, I noted the issues specific to the interviewer related to the interview questions. This involved locally specific concepts such as identity type, concealment of identity, separation, discrimination, monitoring, travel restrictions, desire for escape by migration, bans on education, difficulty paying for education. Second, I created the basic typology, leaving out irrelevant sub-types and including the locally relevant ones I had collated and began to apply it.

- Over time, I added new codes as the data expanded and I gained new insights. The basic sociological types allowed me to focus on and extract other relevant but not necessarily novel information from the data. This information increased in importance over time as participant numbers grew because no basic typology had ever been published on stateless Kuwaitis, and it helped to contain the exploration process (see Chapter 4, the Methodology).

- This led to the realisation that the research questions would need to be refocused for the thesis. Some questions had become more important, rendering others less important. This was documented in Development of the Research Questions (Appendix I, i). Because the interviews were loosely structured and the approach exploratory, it was to be expected that the data would not conform strictly to the research questions. There was plenty of data from the field because the data had been collated from ‘street-level’, which gave scope for different levels of abstraction to be applied (Guest et al, 2012). I commenced analysing and writing up the data.
systematically according to the code book, starting with descriptions of the basic demographic data shown in Chapter 5, the Results, followed by more abstract themes about identity, culture and marginalisation).

• Although I have described a top-down arrangement of themes above in the presentation of my analysis (Appendices A-G), the inductive nature of the analysis was maintained throughout the study. This means that each portion of data from respondents was analysed from the ground-up at the level of sub-themes, by grouping the quotes derived from the minor codes across interviews 1-17, together. Themes were constructed from the data sequentially via the coding process and then in a back and forth motion across the data as commonalities and differences were analysed. Where noticeable gaps in the data appeared (usually because I did not ask questions that would elicit such information in the interviews) and I observed different characteristics during the fieldwork or relevant literature filled such gaps, I explained this in the analysis and/or discussion sections.

• Some topics seemed to work better together than apart. For example, I joined Code 1 Geographical data and Code 7 Housing Data together during the write-up phase to form a chapter on Geographical and Housing Data, which due to word count limitations, was not included in the discussion section. Code 4 Family and Code 5 Parental data overlapped and formed another chapter that extended beyond the scope of the present study, but some of the parental data concerning fathers’ employment and data on gender roles, was included in the Results (Chapter 5) and Discussion (Chapters 6 and 7). After analysing the data on identity, I noticed that the participant’s viewpoints were highly informed and were supported by some historians of the Arabian Gulf. This prompted me to begin systematically gathering secondary data that I consolidated for thematic analysis, comprising Appendixes B-G.
Appendix I, vii

Transcription and Data Management Protocol

Note that the protocol provided by Guest, et al., (2012) was written in the future tense. I have written the text in the past tense, to reflect what I have done.

General Instructions

I transcribed all interview audio files according to the following format:

1. Times 11 point font
2. Standard page margins
3. All text was fully blocked with no indentation, beginning on the left hand margin, justified to the left.

Source Labelling

The source ID for the interviewees was indicated by a P and two digits. Single digits were preceded by a zero, for example: 01. For example, the first participant interviewed was P01. The source IDs were allocated chronologically according to date of interview. Some interviewees were interviewed on more than one occasion, due to the in-depth nature of discussion. Interview numbers were indicated by a slash and a single digit number, for example: P01/1 referred to the first interview of participant one.

The source ID for the interviewer was SK. The source ID represented the conversational style of the interviews, comprising interviewer and participant talk. Not all of the interviewer talk comprised questions, while not all of the interviewee talk comprised answers, strictly speaking.

The source ID for the translators was a T and two digits. Single digits were preceded by a zero, for example: 01. For example, the first translator was recorded as T01.

Labelling for Individual Interview Transcripts

1. Participant number, see source labelling above
2. Date
3. Interview number
4. Site/Location
5. Number of audio files

I inserted three blank lines between the labelling information and the interview text. The source labelling preceded my questions and the interviewee’s responses (see above). The interview conversation was typed in standard text. The interviewer’s notes were italicised and preceded by the term ‘Interviewer Note.’

I kept a separate data-recording sheet with the participant’s basic demographics, called the Interview Data, to identify the participants and the dates of interviews. This was required to prevent data errors. The data sheet can be found in Appendix I, iii), with identifying information removed to protect the confidentiality of the research participants.
File changes

I indicated changes in audio files in uppercase letters.

Time Labelling

I indicated periods of time rounded to ten minutes or to indicate significant quotes, for example 5:00.

End of Interview

I indicated the end of the interview in uppercase letters, as: END OF INTERVIEW.

Interpreters and Interview Data Translation

Arabic interview data was translated into English during the interview. The process of translation was one where trusting was required. I did not have access to resources at the University of Adelaide to have interviews in translated into English. However, I also preferred to trust the translation of Kuwaiti Arabic (and Bedouin, tribal dialects) to the local translators, which I would transcribe directly in English, rather than to ‘objective,’ third-party translators from other cultural backgrounds who had no familiarity with the Bedouin’s context. There was the possibility that cultural biases toward the Bedouin might influence the interpretation of the oral texts (as I have mentioned in the discussion of this thesis, this seems to be a cultural issue among some metropolitan Arabs).

I was required to trust that the interpreters and interviewee were translating with integrity. I did not question this process, as the whole interview was based on the presumption of trust between the parties concerned. I observed it is common for social science researchers who are fluent in English and Arabic, to translate their own Arabic interview data into English, as if such translation enhances the authority of their claims. This does not make the integrity of the data translated into English greater, because the process is no more transparent. I have never seen an example excerpt of transcript data or translation of transcripts for research in the social sciences related to any literature I have cited in this research. I have read countless research publications and theses in English, relying on the researcher translating from Arabic personally, and no translation or interview transcription data has been disclosed, and this appears to be the gold standard in the field. Certainly the ability of researchers to use both Arabic and English languages has done little to contribute to the growth of knowledge about the Bedoun, and almost all the literature sources I have drawn upon to consolidate basic facts about the Bedoun in Appendices B-G were from English language sources.

Protection of Sensitive Data

Square parentheses were used with three full stops to indicate data not transcribed due to sensitivity. This was used for longer parts of text such as a sentence or more. For example: [...]
The text was blacked out to indicate sensitive data transcribed because the research might need to access it later, after the audio recordings were destroyed. This was used for shorter parts of text, such as a word or a few words omitted due to sensitivity. For example:

Deletion of Irrelevant Data

Square parentheses were used with three full stops to indicate data not transcribed due to irrelevance. This method was chosen to coincide with the method for protecting sensitive data, so that it would be more difficult for sensitive data to be identified prior to the audio files being destroyed.

Content

Audio files were transcribed verbatim (word for word), exactly as said, without additional nonverbal or background sounds. If words were mispronounced, the words were transcribed as the individual said them. If any incorrect or unexpected pronunciation results in difficulties in comprehension of the text, the correct word will be typed in square brackets. If explanations of the text are required, such as implicit meanings that may be difficult for readers to interpret, an explicit meaning was provided within the quote in square parenthesis. Filter words were transcribed if they are contained within relevant text and were meaningful. Word or phrase repetitions were transcribed.

Inaudible Information

Pauses were marked by three full stops. I identified portions of the tape that are inaudible of difficult to decipher, by noting the occurrence in square brackets. Where there was a long period of silence, the researcher identified the pause and noted the time on the audiotape in square brackets.

Queried Text

I noted text to be queried text for reasons of questionability/authenticity/veracity. A question mark in bold was inserted before the statement. Interviewer notes were made in italics, as discussed above.

Reviewing for Accuracy

I proofread all the transcripts against the audio tape and revised as necessary. The researcher adopted a ‘three pass per tape’ policy to ensure the full audio file was been listened to three times before submission, but some parts of the text were listened to more often.

File Labelling

The Files are kept under files named ‘audio files’ and ‘transcripts’ and numbered according to the source identifier with the date the recording took place, for example: P01_04Mar2014. Participant observations were entitled with a descriptive title and date.
Photographs were labelled by number. A photograph index listed each set of pictures with a descriptive title and date. They key file types and their extensions include:

- Audio files: .m4a extension.
- Transcripts: .docx extension.
- Participant observation notes: .docx extension.
- Photographs: .jpeg extension

**Backup Files**

All files containing field data accept the audio files were backed up on a duplicate file in the digital repository.

**Storage of Data**

A digital repository at the University of South Australia was arranged for final deposit of data after thesis examination. The University of Adelaide School of Education only provides hard-copy storage of data. The university of Adelaide library does not provide any facility to hold student data on their digital research database.

**Audio Files**

The audio files needed to be destroyed due to the risk they could be used to identify the research participants. A specific timeframe for this aspect of data management was not discussed in Management of Research Data, University of Adelaide Student Research Handbook, leaving the matter up to the researcher and supervisors. Audiotapes were be destroyed after review for accuracy and the transcription files are saved and backed up, according to the protocol in McClellan et al., (2003), also recommended by Guest et al. (2012).

**Ethical Considerations**

*Regarding sensitivity of information and confidentiality of research participants*

First, issues discussed in the application for ethical clearance highlighted the vulnerability of the research participants:

- Confidentiality of research participants was absolutely essential, aside from the community leader who is a public figure
- Participants had no or limited legal rights as stateless persons
- Participants may be subject to targeting and blacklisting by government
- Participants providing sensitive information that may include human rights violations

The University requirement to keep sufficient data for thesis examination and defence and to consider the lasting value of the data to the field:

The central aim is that sufficient materials and data are retained to justify the outcomes of the research and to defend them if they are challenged. The potential
value of the material for further research should also be considered, particularly where the research would be difficult or impossible to repeat. (Management of Research Data, Research Student Handbook, The University of Adelaide, para. 3)

The ethics committee provided permission to record consent for interview on the audio files, but urged written consent to be kept - where possible. This was not possible, as it was a security issue to do so, which I discussed in the application. The extensive transcript data was supplied in Appendix A, iii) in order to provide benefit to the field. All full transcripts were deposited in the electronic storage repository.
Appendix I, ix

Codebook

Figures I4 to I8 below, display the major and minor codes developed in the code book during the fieldwork interviews and analysis. These codes were applied to the interview transcripts during the thematic analysis. Themes abstracted from the analysis and quotations and/or a limited number of observational notes, were collated. All of the themes and quotes can be found in the Appendices, Part 1.

**Major Codes in the Code Book**

Table I4 (below) lists the major codes were included under the topics of demographic data, identity and socialization, education and others.

Table I4

*Major Codes of the Code Book*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Code Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Geographical data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Personal Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Family and Household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Parental background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Economic data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Access to public services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Social Stratification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Freedom of Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Social Deviance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Social Capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Formal Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Higher Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Access to (and bans on) education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Experiences and values in education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Bedoun culture, Kuwaiti culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>The research process</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Major and Minor Codes in the Code Book**

Table I5 (below) lists the codes organised under the sub-head of demographic data, including geographic data, personal status, employment, Family and household relationships and factors, parental data, health, housing, economic factors, access to public services, social stratification and segregation.

Table I5

*Minor Codes Linked to Demographic Data*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1 Geographic data</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
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<td>1.3.1</td>
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<td>1.3.1</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2 Personal status</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3 Employment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1.1</td>
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<td>3.2</td>
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<td>3.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.4.1</td>
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<td>3.4.2</td>
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<td>3.4.3</td>
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<td>3.9</td>
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<td>3.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.11</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4 Family and household relationships and factors

4.1 Respondent marital status
4.1.2 Married
4.1.2 Widowed
4.1.3 Divorced
4.1.4 Single
4.2 Issues in marriage, sustaining a family (re: statelessness, consanguineous, genetic disease, divorce)
4.2.1 The decision of a partner, marriage proposal, dhoury, negotiations (including parents pressuring for an arranged marriage)
4.3 Mixed Bedoun/Citizen household and/or extended family
4.4 Relationship patterns - contemporary, traditional (Bedouin)
4.5 Gender issues in relationships
4.6 Children
4.7 Live at home with parents
4.8 Live in new home apart from parents
4.9 Relationship issues parents – good/bad/support/discord
4.10 Siblings/their children - relationships, experiences (note, respondent’s siblings under 5, below)

5 Parental data

5.1 Marital status
5.1.1 Married
5.1.2 Widowed
5.1.3 Divorced
5.1.4 Number of wives in household – father’s
5.1.5 Number of children (respondent’s brothers and sisters)
5.1 Parent’s education
5.2 Parent’s occupation
5.3 Military service and termination of service
5.4 Parent’s status Bedoun/citizen
5.5 Grandparents
5.6 Male relatives and martyrdom
(Note that is an error in numbering above; at 5.1 above, there is a repeated code. I discovered this in the last interview, and made manual amendments)

6 Health

6.1 Health characteristics of the Kuwaiti population
6.1.1 Lifestyle disease affecting Bedoun
6.1.2 Genetic disorders susceptibility
6.2 Physical health of respondents
6.2.1 Physical health of respondents family or others
6.3 Mental health of respondents (including negative e.g. depression, immobility, but also positive factors of resilience and determination)
6.3.1 Mental health of respondents family or others
6.4 The restriction of health services to the Bedoun and its impacts
6.5 Discrimination regarding delivery of health services to the Bedoun
7 Housing

7.1 Ownership/rental/Srent (Bedoun are prohibited from ownership)
7.2 Type of housing
7.3 Number of family clusters/generations living in the household
7.4 The primary family group,
7.5 The extended family - wives and offspring
7.6 Size of housing - factors influencing crowding
7.7 Interrupted housing – factors influencing frequent movement, instability

8 General economic factors

8.1 Residence (owns, rents, boards)
8.2 Consumer goods (auto, TV, car)
8.2.1 Own business
8.3 Pre-Post war economic situation
8.4 Economic positioning within the Bedoun society
8.5 Economic positioning within Kuwaiti society
8.6 Roles of economic provider of self, immediate and extended family (e.g. including citizen partner)
8.7 Salary
8.8 Card-related factors – frequent registration, bank accounts, time off work etc. reducing ability to sustain
(For economic factors related to acquiring a spouse, see 4.2.1)

9 Access to public services

9.1 Citizen wife social benefits and payments
9.2 Citizen wife education benefits and payments
9.3 Military social benefits and payments
9.4 Others – e.g. lack of? No security card, Bedoun-Bedoun husband/wife
9.5 The ‘education allowance’ (partial government subsidy for private fees)
9.6 Green card reimbursement of fees
9.7 The Education Fund
(See employment and wage disparity for rental subsidy, education)

10 Social stratification – segregation

10.1 Stratification within Kuwaiti society
10.2 Stratification within Bedoun society
10.3 Stratification based on eligibility for citizenship - identity cards
10.4 Stratification based on religious background Sunni and Shia
10.5 Stratification based on having a citizen mother
10.6 The potential for mothers to transfer citizenship
10.7 Citizen men/women partners of Bedoun or vice versa
(Stratification within Bedouin society – intermarriage in families/tribes – see families and household)

Table 16 (below) lists the codes linked to identity and socialization including freedom of movement, social deviance, identity and social action.
Table I6

Minor Codes Linked to Identity and Socialisation

11 Freedom of Movement

11.1 Freedom of travel for leisure, education and health related issues
11.2 Domestic travel and the policed state
11.3 Access to the Article 17 travel document
11.4 Factors influencing access/non-access/acceptance of the Article 17 travel document

12 Social deviance

12.1 Labelling factors preventing citizenship and social mobility
12.2 Criminality and the situational definition – e.g. criminality due to poverty
12.3 Protest as an offence against public order
12.4 Disenfranchisement and the threat to national security
12.5 Blacklisting/security offence listing to prevent citizenship
12.6 Punitive arbitrary removal of citizenship, and/or threat of
12.7 Other threats/danger to self/family/friends/Bedoun community
12.8 Iraqi collaboration during the war

13 Identity

13.1 Pre-war identity and issues
13.1.1 Citizen registration process, historical within a family
13.1.2 Parent/grandparent identity
13.2 Post-war identity and issues
13.2.1 Bedoun registration process, contemporary – self and others – e.g. administration, documents, birth certificates, marriage, including business registration
13.2.2 Citizen registration
13.2.3 ‘Illegal’ typing through false passports
13.3 Identity cards
13.3.1 The card or Bedoun status as a marker of deviant ‘illegal’ types
13.3.2 The card as a marker of eligibility for citizenship/public services
13.4 Ascribed, achieved, master status. (Ideas, experiences and values on identity not directly linked to the educational context)
13.5 Concealed identity – hiding, not passing (passing, see 13.10)
13.5.1 Factors in concealment – tradition, religion, national security, hatred and blacklisting, prohibition of freedom of thought, speech
13.6 Kuwaiti identity and Bedoun identity
13.6.1 Kuwaiti (citizen & Bedoun) identity and migrant identity
13.7 Tribal identity and tribalism
13.7.1 Northern/southern tribes
13.7.2 Language/dialects spoken
13.8 Ascription of other nationalities by authorities or citizens, Iraqi/Saudi/other
13.9 Arabism, pan-Arabism, Islam and the global Ummah (as inclusive ethnicity and religious values, a home for Arabs in the Gulf states)
13.10 ‘Passing’ citizen
13.11 Religious values and identity - Shia/Sunni sects, atheism, faith, destiny, lack of information etc.
14 Social Action

14.1 Informal and formal activism
14.2 Physical and online activism
14.3 Voluntary associations and political organisation
14.4 Determinants and impacts of activism (e.g. security offence)
14.1.1 Family discord/disapproval/fear due to activism/freedom of expression outside the family i.e. related to social identity
14.5 Activism and everyday social interaction
14.6 Tribal social capital, and ‘tribalism’
14.7 Bedoun identity, Kuwaiti citizen society and the mutual threat/danger to society
14.8 Failure to capitulate on the Arab Spring
14.9 Social mobility - inertia for the Bedoun/citizen partners
14.10 Wasta
14.11 Withdrawal of wastā
14.12 Self-education
14.13 Migrant experience, identity (including potential migration)
14.14 Political issues in activism – e.g. competing groups, false activism

Table 17 (below) lists the codes linked to education, arising from primary and secondary school, higher education, access to higher education, and values and experiences in education.
Table 17

Minor Codes Linked to Education

15 Primary & Secondary School

15 Primary and Secondary Education
15.1 Primary
15.2 Secondary schooling
15.3 Years of schooling
15.4 School types
15.4.1 Kuwaiti schools for Kuwaitis – citizen and stateless, later citizens and stateless children of Kuwaiti mothers only
15.4.2 Attendance at both Kuwaiti and private schools
15.4.3 Private school only
15.5 Interrupted/stopped schooling
15.6 Bans on education – re primary/secondary education
15.7 Parent’s/grandparent’s education
15.7.1 Illiteracy of parents/previous generations
15.8 Results, outcomes
15.9 Enrolment type – hours at school – e.g. morning/afternoon/evening
15.10 Ownership, management, teaching staff, facilities in the private schools
15.11 Presence of ‘other Arab’ and Asian population in private schools
15.12 Affordability of private schools before/after reimbursements came in

16 Higher Education

16 Respondents enrolled in higher education (current) – or their siblings, children (R2)
16.1 Respondent enrolled at university
16.1.1 Respondent enrolled at college/vocational and technical education sector
16.2 Respondent (or other as stated) never enrolled in university/vocational or technical education
16.3 Current University enrolment
16.4 Type of qualification enrolled in (currently)
16.4.1 College diploma
16.4.2 Bachelor degree
16.4.3 Master degree
16.4.4 PhD
16.5 Institution enrolled in
16.6 Past qualifications enrolled in
16.6.1 Respondent was enrolled at university
16.6.2 Respondent was enrolled at college/vocational and technical education sector
16.7 Areas of study
16.8 Online and distance education
16.9 Participation in student activities – including allowed/limited
16.9.1 Student support services
16.10 Past enrolment - Level achieved
16.10.1 College diploma
16.10.2 Bachelor degree
16.10.3 Master degree
16.10.4 PhD
16.11 Enrolment type – hours at school e.g. morning/afternoon/evening
16.12 Fee-paying, private institution
16.13 Scholarship
16.14 Mature age entry – anyone
16.15 Enrolment numbers – Bedoun

17 Access to Higher Education

17.1 Bans on education – re higher education (including transition between schools – years lost - except for experiences – see 18 below)
17.1.1 Overseas allowances/restriction on stateless in education (e.g. Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Syria)
17.1.2 Kuwaiti mothers’ children special access [not economic, moved to 9]
17.1.3 Green identity card access through public institutions (this needed to be reflected in social benefits section for fee reimbursement)
17.2 The admissions policy gaps
17.3 Kuwait university system/PUC/PAAET/general higher ed policy, admissions, places, etc.
17.4 Activism in education in Kuwait during the Arab Spring protest period
17.5 The monitoring and suppression of activism in education in Kuwait
17.6 Other barriers accessing Higher Education
17.6.1 Family
17.6.2 Does not wish to leave home country for study
17.6.3 Did not achieve good enough marks
17.6.4 Did not receive an offer
17.6.5 Rejected an offer or discontinued a course
17.6.6 Not able to take up course preference/alternative offer
17.6.7 Private education system & government subsidy access – false economy
17.6.8 Materials, resources, quality and access

18 Experiences and values in education (all levels)

18.1 Human rights in education
18.1.1 Bans on education & school public/private school transition
18.1.2 Experiences of direct physical/emotional abuse in schools or university
18.1.3 Abuse ascribed to forced poverty
18.1.4 Abuse ascribed to religious and tribal background/racism
18.1.5 Abuse ascribed to poor quality/neglect
18.1.6 Other emotional factors/other difficulty due to bans/transition (e.g. emotional impact of themselves or siblings interrupted schooling, positive impact of peer support, motivation) – this may need to be divided into sub-categories later
18.1.7 Mark fixing – high school, university
18.2 Barriers to participation (while enrolled). Participation barrier due to bans – see bans.
18.3 Other challenges/negative factors in education e.g. illness, isolation
18.3.1 Work/education balance e.g. working and studying, multiple commitments
18.3.2 Negative influences on education – overcrowding at home, lack of support
18.4 Benefits of education
18.5 Effort in education
18.6 Achievement, grades
18.7 Opportunities afforded by education - further education, employment, salary, marriage prospects, other.
18.7.1 Opportunity afforded by education – personal fulfilment, self-motivation, self-determination, independent thinking
18.7.2 Opportunity afforded by education – role model, leadership, inspiring others
18.8 Education opportunity afforded by migration – or vice versa
18.9 Education and identity
18.10 Experience participating in student activities
18.11 Experience participating in student activism – beyond Kuwait higher education access protests/Arab Spring specific
18.12 Advice on education and society from the Bedoun
18.13 Other experiences in higher education – e.g. peer relations, mentors

Table I8 (below) lists the codes related to culture and the research process including the culture of Bedoun and Kuwaiti citizens, Bedouin (including Bedoun) and Hadar, and discrimination arising from cultural differences and three minor Issues related to the research process
Table I8

Minor Codes Linked to Culture and the Research Process

19 Bedoun culture, Kuwaiti culture

19.1 Similarities between Kuwaitis – citizens and stateless (social stratification)
19.2 Differences between Kuwaitis – citizens and stateless (e.g. as below for Nomadism, Bedouin, Hadar) (social stratification)
19.3 General discrimination, marginality, repression, poverty and abuse of the stateless (education experience)
19.3.1 Freedom of expression, individual thinking, empowerment as part of the collective (education experience)
19.3.2 Materialism, greed, lack of altruism, other negative characteristics (education, negative experiences)
19.4 The divided Bedouin culture, political tribalism and the Bedoun (social stratification)
19.5 Claims to equality as a human right, human rights abuse per se (identity, education experiences)
19.6 Nomadism, segregation, Bedouin culture (social stratification)
19.7 Claims to citizenship: indigeinity and homeland (genealogy, traditional culture)
19.8 Migration, seeking asylum as Bedoun (family, social action, educational experience)
19.9 Generational differences among Bedoun, contemporary (family, identity)
19.10 War Narrative (see also 12.8)

20 The research process

20.1 Research process/method/participation
20.2 Potential over-research of community
20.3 Unwilling to participate in the research process due to fear, marginality, blacklisting
Appendix I, x

Codebook Analysis Tables

The following tables show the major and minor codes from the code book (Appendix I, above) generated from the interview transcript data for participants 1-17. Table displays the codes for Participants 1 to 8. Table I10 shows the codes for Participants 9 to 17. This analysis did not include Participants 18 to 20 (see Chapter 4, Methodology).

Analysis of Data from Participants 1-8

Table 19

*Code Types Derived from Analysis of the Interview Data, Participants 1-8*

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## Analysis of Data from Participants 9-17

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March 7, 2014
Participant: P03
Interview: 1 of 1
Location: American University of Kuwait, Salmiya, Kuwait

[2:00 minutes]
SK: What was the extent of your education and the subjects you studied?
P03: I finished my high school in Kuwait. Then I did my Bachelors in Bahrain in computer [science], and then I immigrated to Canada, and completed my Masters and PhD at

SK: Can I ask your age?
P03: Yeah I was born [37 years]

SK: …Did you do all of your primary and secondary schooling in Kuwait?
P03: Yes.

SK: And where abouts did you do that?
P03: Jahra, in Jahra.

SK: Was that in the public or private school system?
P03: No. It was in public only, primary school... High school was in private, because all the stateless people were not allowed to continue in the public [school system] after 1991. So nobody from stateless people from 1992 was allowed to study in public schools, so they did it in private schools.

SK: Ok, so what year were you in at the time of the change-over?
P03: I was in Grade 8.

SK: Grade 8? Ok, so your parents were able to send you to the private school?
P03: No. It was very difficult at the time. Luckily because my father works in the Ministry of [ Defence], those people in the Ministry would pay for the kids in private schools.

It’s named a private school but actually it was only a kind of business that was created because so many kids were banned from public schools. So many businesses came at the time to take these customers as private schools, but it was not close to any standard to the private schools.

SK: […] Who owned and ran those schools?
P03: I forgot the name of the company, it was a private company.
SK: Of Kuwaitis?
P03: Yes, Kuwaitis.
SK: Did they rank the results of students?
P03: Normally those schools are the lowest ranking schools.
SK: Oh, so they do measure the ranks of those students?

P03: Yeah, compared to, in Jahra I’m talking about, because you imagine, the results are based in Grade12, how many graduate with more than 90% for example. Their quality of teaching - there was a complete absence of science labs or any kind of field trips, for example, it was completely absent, just teaching from there.

SK: So very bare basics?
P03: Yeah.
SK: Not very engaging?
P03: Not at all.

I went to Bahrain in 1996, because Bahrain was the only country at the time, which allowed stateless people to enter without visa.

SK: In the whole Gulf?
P03: Even in the whole world at that time. So it was extremely, terribly difficult, to get a visa to any country at the time, or even to get a passport was very difficult. So it was the only open country. And there, we were not allowed to study medicine or engineering. It was just possible to study literature or science. And that’s why I studied computer science.

SK: So you didn’t have an Article 17 to travel in those days? [the Article 17 is a specific travel document issued to the Bedoun; it is no longer issued].
P03: It was, it was, it was an Article 17, but nobody [not many countries] at that time accepted it. Many countries [now] they give it a visa, but at that time, it was just Bahrain and Egypt. Syria too... Bahrain, Egypt and Syria. In Egypt they have a different style [of education]. I’m talking about the 90s, when I finished my high school.

SK: How did you manage to get into university then, if you were just at a very basic school? Was it just due to your studying?
P03: Yes I was personal effort. It I scored 94.7% in my high school and at the time it was a good grade that would allow a university to be convinced to accept me.

SK: You got very high marks. You must have worked very hard…
P03: Oh, yeah, it was all my life you know, until now… I’m an Assistant Professor. So I have been studying all my life.

[...]
SK: Did you ever have any problems with your studies? [...]

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P03: No, I never got less than a B, I think once I got a B minus, only one.

SK: [...] How has the education on the Bedoun affected you in Kuwait? We touched on where-about you were able to study, is there anything more you would like to tell me about that.

P03: If you are talking about us as a family, one of the things that touched me the most was in 1992 when we were forced out of public schools. We were ten brothers... 9 brothers at the time who were at the age of going to school, so 6 brothers and 3 sisters, but because we did not have the means of study, only the boys went to school. The girls were forced to skip their school.

SK: The three of them? For the entire period?

P03: So, 2 years after that, when we were eligible to get the scholarship from the Ministry of Defence, two were able to [go to school]...

[10:00]

but my sister that was ah, just younger than me, she was not able to. She was eleven I think. And that was one of the things that touched me the most, that she was never allowed to continue her studies.

SK: And your other two sisters... ?

P03: They were 7 and 8. They caught up and they were able to continue to finish their high school... on the scholarship [2 years later]. My sister was elder at the time. It was she who was held up. [that is, she could not catch up to recover her schooling like the younger sisters]

They were able to continue, to go on and continue.

SK: So the scholarship covered how many children? Eight children at the time?

P03: I forgot the details of that. But it was my sister because she was the elder at that time.

SK: What do you think was the impact of that at the time?

P03: It was terrible, because you see all your brothers go every day to school and she stayed home.

SK: Do you think that led to feeling pressure to marry early?

P03: Possibly.

SK: How is she doing now?

P03: She’s good. Yeah, she is good. At the time it was difficult, but now she went [got] over it.

SK: Can you tell me what positive and negative factors have impacted on your participation in education – the good things and the bad things?

P03: The good thing is that I always felt that I was studying on behalf of thousands of kids who were not allowed to enter into school, so this was one of my main motivations.
That’s why… in my Bachelors I got the Award of Excellence. So at the university, the University of Bahrain, I got the highest GPA at the university of Bahrain. Then I graduated. I was awarded…there was in the Graduation Ceremony but unfortunately, I wasn’t able to go there. Because by the time, the law changed, and the stateless people were not allowed to enter into Bahrain.

Only those who were there, they stayed there until they finished their school, because they cannot go out and come in. And us, who finished just before that and exited, were not allowed to enter inside. So that was one of the things that touched me also because I was the top student, but I was not allowed to attend the ceremony and to get my prize.

Then I continued my masters and my PhD. So at the time, the only exit to Bahrain was closed to, stateless people so no one was able to continue their higher education, so, I felt the responsibility more and more to continue my education and to dedicate it to all of those who were not allowed to… [study] So I continued to excel and in my PhD I got the award of excellence too. My GPA was 4.1 when I graduated in PhD.

SK: Congratulations.
P03: Thank you.

So that was, if we can say, the positive, encouraging part, that continued my high esteem to pursue my education.

SK: And the negative?
P03: Never, I never had… I wasn’t one of those who would be depressed due to life’s circumstances. I would also take it as a force that would push my life forward. So, I don’t recall any negative impact on my education. I always took it as a force that would make me detach from everybody and everything, distractions, and just focus on my studies.

[15:00]

SK: So you were very determined and resilient. You weren’t going to let any negative thing get in the way?
P03: No. I really love and I still love education, that’s why nothing was able to distract me from it.

SK: That’s wonderful to have that motivation.
P03: I was lucky.

SK: Have you found the challenges have become less over time as you continued to do well with your studies and then to become successful in your career? Or do you find that as a Bedoun you still have life challenges relating to the discrimination or limited opportunities to the Bedoun.
P03: I immigrated [redacted] and I got [redacted] citizenship in 2007, which means I was 30 years old. So I adapted to the life of [redacted] and I’ve been living there every since. I just come only once per year to visit my family. So it’s just a lucky time that I was here.
SK: Yeah, I appreciate that.
P03: I was invited to a conference in Jeddah, so I went to the conference and I am just passing by. I’m leaving on Sunday morning.

SK: So can you describe for me that change that you felt of experienced when you gained citizenship?
P03: It’s difficult to express because all your life you have been discriminated [against], without any support at all. Now [that he has \underline{Canadian} citizenship] you feel that you have a country that can stand for you, that can give you some essential services. And also there is a feeling of belonging for the first time ever, that you \textit{belong} to a country… so that has a remarkable effect, and appreciation to the country itself and trying to contribute toward it.

I volunteer my time there, so I work for free in the university. I graduated one PhD and seven masters, for free. I work as a consultant in a company and there I’m paid, but I continue to do services in education for people because I value what the opportunities that were given to me to continue my education.

[…]

SK: A lot of people would just move on… their life journey without looking back…
P03: I feel… it’s hard for me to leave university especially after graduating. And I find the teaching positions a little bit boring. But I want to contribute, so I have my research lab.

SK: How has the participation in higher education helped for your identity, your sense of identity as a person? This is a bit of an abstract question, but please let me know any thoughts and feelings that come to mind.
P03: Especially engaging into research when I started my Master’s degree, it’s like you said - I found that this is me, this is my identity. I’m somebody who loves education and learning, and identifies himself as a life-long learner. I still take Coursera and MOOQ courses all the time [online university course delivery]. I spend most of my midnights and driving time listening to lectures and stuff. So, I feel that this is my… I identify myself with research and learning.

And that was build mostly during my PhD research. Because in my Masters [degree], I did it very quickly – I did seven courses and one master’s thesis in one year. So it went very fast. I couldn’t even get much of it.

[20:00 to 45:00 omitted in this sample for brevity]

[45:00]

They would tell their kids, ‘be like you can make it.’ And that touched me a lot you know, because whatever I succeed in, there are many people who are looking into hope you know, for their kids. Yes, the situation is very difficult, but you can succeed, you can be
who you want, and you can make it. And it had positive effect on many families, many of my friends and of my cousins.

SK: Because there is an example, you are the example?

P03: There is an example, yes, yes… So nobody can constrain you, unless you accept to be constrained. And life can give you chances so work hard now and don’t think about when you finish school that there is no opportunities. Because if you succeed, doors will open to you.

So this is one of the things that also motivated to me to always excel and give these kids an example that they should never surrender to this situation.

[...]

SK: So then I’m interested… I know that you have moved on to Canada to move on professionally. How do you feel about yourself becoming a role model or a leader for others in relation to what you’ve just mentioned?

[48:00]

P03: I continued even in the immigrant community or the Muslim community over there. I continued to take that role, that position because you are aware of people looking up to you. So ah, even my, among the Muslim community I gave chances to many people to, because I work in the industry… take people from the university to give them chances in the industry to try to help them.

And to maintain good character and ethics and moral behaviour, because I am aware of the fact that when I succeed, it’s a responsibility, and many people are looking up to that. Even if they are not stateless any more, because I am dealing with citizens, but because of the accumulation of experiences, so my participation in student activities… I was for whatever lucky reasons I was able to give contributions to the student movement and in my specific University of Concordia, one of the special things about it is that it encourages student movements and activities and associations. So I participated in that and I was successful, perhaps because of my long experiences. And so I was elected as one of the main Board of directors of the student movement… so it continued. And I like it.

It’s not that it’s pressuring me to be a good person, I feel I should be. Because I lived through difficult times,

[50:00]

and I value life. I don’t take it lightly.

SK: And what about in Kuwait? Do you feel like you have the capacity to take on a role like that in Kuwait? Or is it still difficult because of the restrictions for example on public assembly and people’s ability to express themselves in a public fashion.

P03: It is difficult, because when I felt freedom being a Canadian, I can’t go back and be constrained by families or certain discriminatory laws. Or people not acting on whatever
they talk about in the General Assembly (government), all these things. So I cannot accept it any more and I cannot tolerate it any more.

And if I come here, I will be a burden on my family because my family is stateless. And if I take any decision or make any voice because of my lack of tolerance, this will affect their life, you know? Maybe even seriously. So if I come here to be silent, I just have to hide somewhere and not to be, voice my opinion, I cannot do that. Because I felt freedom. So the best way for my family is for me to be away. And that was difficult too for me. I cannot live with them before because I cannot accept the way they are treated. I don’t know how I… I was tolerating it before, but now I can’t. And it’s not fair for them that I can express myself openly and affect them, not me. Because I am a [REDACTED] citizen, the embassy can defend me. But them, nobody. 

[...]
P03: You also mentioned your personal status in the community. Do you find that when you come back to Kuwait… are you able to visit in a low-key way, or feel like there are any demands from other people in the stateless community… are people relying on you for information on how to do similar things for how to do similar things to what you have done in your life?

SK: Yes, if I come here for one or two weeks. And every night The youth come and ask me to talk to them, to motivate them… some of the elders bring their kids… And I make myself available… I give all of my time. I give people appointments… So I try to make myself available myself… That’s why I lose my voice when I come here, because I talk so much.

SK: Did you find participating in higher education worth it personally, in terms of increasing the prospects of your community?
P03: Yeah, yes.

[SK: But this is challenged by the problem of not being able to tolerate living in Kuwait any more.]

[...]
SK: What has been the greatest achievement of your academic studies? Is there one thing that you can pinpoint, or is it a series?
P03: The greatest thing is graduating Masters and PhD students. When I graduate [supervise] them, I take it very seriously. And I teach them that the least important thing is your dissertation or the way it goes.

[55:00]
Higher education is about understanding life. Having a broad view of life. And being able to explore things deeply. And then come up with your own thoughts of how they should be. Ah and hopefully they will be genuine in you.
So understanding that has been my highest achievement I think. And being able to communicate it with people. The accumulation of all my experience has led me to that. It’s not winning all the scholarships of the keynotes I get invited to… it’s the understanding of life and the role of research and how to do research and how to be like a self-trainer to Masters and PhD students, not just like a professor who gives reading materials and discusses results.

SK: What advice would you give to members of your community who are not in higher education… to stateless people and even Kuwaitis… regarding higher education in an increasingly competitive world?

P03: I feel in this day and age we are living in and this specific region we are living in, higher education is essential. People one of the problems in this region is that people are unable to form independent opinions.

That’s why I even support some research centres in Saudia, and try to support ones in Kuwait. Because doing higher education will help people learn how to do their own independent study, literature survey, understand the subject matter deeply and form their independent opinion about it. And people lack this… people just follow still the tribal way or follow just the government…. There is always an authority who will think on behalf of them, and they think they are obliged to or will just subconsciously just follow it. I feel higher education and research is essential for their region, because it will help people become independent. [When] they become independent, I think they will be able to face the challenges and they will understand what they have done to us. Because I just don’t think they pause and ponder about it. We are from the same country and from neighbouring tribes and everything, but we are discriminated [against] because our parents came at different times to the city.

But they can’t think about it, it’s not easy at all, because… of the collective, community-thinking mind.

SK: You mentioned … many people were out of town looking after their livestock [at time of citizenship registration] as you mentioned? Do you think… many people weren’t too far away in fact when those first registrations were being done?

P03: Because they were illiterate, you know. For example my grandfather, when they told him that so and so, he went and registered and got a paper. And they told him, paper? Where should I put this paper in my tent… I don’t have a closet in my tent, you know? To this extent he was illiterate about the effect of having that registration paper… that he don’t have a drawer or thing in his tent… that was the only problem he had at the time.

[1:00:00]

So not being educated, being illiterate and not enough education or whatever they would call it [when] the government would [should] do it to let the people know the
importance of what they should do, or how [it would] impact on their life, not only on their
life but on the generation that would come later… made them take it lightly.
SK: How would they know?
P03: Yeah, how would they know?
[1:00:30]

[End of interview]
Appendix I, xii
Excerpt from Participant Observation Notes

Participant Observation notes, 04.03.14
I have been in the field 6.5 weeks. There are 3 main approaches to developing the study:

• Collecting audio interviews and beginning to make written transcripts from the audio. I have not had time to type transcripts lately as I have enough interviews to keep me going

• Contacts, and schedule sheet that is a working word doc, off which I run paper copies of calendars. The paper copies are frequently amended and replaced due to the rate of rejection after initial discussion.

• Another working document is variables and theorising – the code book. After each interview I revisit this document and based on my key impressions from the interview, make notes on new/expanding areas of data/amendments to the key social variables I have listed in my code book.

The main unexpected variables include the secret society elements: passing, denial of identity, hiding, self-monitoring, peer-monitoring, institutional-monitoring and potentially, government-monitoring. Obviously, these include my involvement, somehow.

No one declines from participating at the outset. Quite often people make a time to see me then leave me waiting to see them and don’t answer the phone again, or text me to make another time, and so on. This is after the ‘gate-keeping’ process. I am given the number from a special group of contacts to phone and mention the gatekeeper, or the gatekeeper arranges it and brings them to me directly, or sometimes the gatekeeper gets the person to phone me. This is the general pattern. This seems to reflect the above elements in the data – the secretive or subversive aspects.

There is a tension between activists who wish to be open about themselves and those who wish to conceal their identity. It is not so much that some don’t wish to participate in my research. It is that they have strong online/public identities but weak private/offline identities. They are online activists but not physical, embodied activists. There seems to be 2 groups: some older ones from Taima, like [redacted] who have had presence since 2011 and have been in prison and received security violations. There are others, younger ones, who have online presence but don’t seem to be willing to meet outsiders. [redacted] is somewhere in the middle, I am still not sure if he is a helper or minder. The whole notion of what an ‘activist’ is contestable but it’s a very popular concept. Is it merely a bunch of students running some twitter accounts and having conversations with other students in Arabic? Or is it someone who is doing something physically and being active in the
community as a real person – i.e. outreach work? I have the impression the word is used to
attract credibility of some sort, but it does not really apply to many.

[Hadar contact, academic] explains that this is due to the desire for ‘passing,’
there is the constant tension between authentic identification and the performance of
‘activism’ – even if it is simply being who you are, or stating who you are, with assimilation,
warta and rewards for being compliant and well-behaved ‘citizen’ even though the Bedoun
are not citizens. Thus, compliance and assimilation seem to be the same as ‘passing’ due to
external pressure from the Hadar or other citizens – to shut up, behave and not to be
identified as a Bedoun. That is, I am not sure who is in control of this practice – the Bedoun,
or their oppressors. For example, [Hadar contact, academic] claims the Bedoun choose to ‘pass’ but clearly he
expects them to, because he disdains ‘activism’ as a form of social disharmony.

But he also mentions casually in relation to another matter, that he has anyone’s
background checked into, because he has plenty of money to do make it happen, to make
sure he is not being fooled about anyone’s identity. That is, he will do security checks
including accessing the Central Apparatus system, to make sure someone is not an
‘undesirable’ – e.g. a Bedoun. Not because he has to, because he can. He sees it as a form
of personal security, keeping his family safe. He seems to like this idea, there is an ego
attachment, he enjoys the idea. This comes from a Bedoun ‘activist’ in the Hadar
community. Is this a ‘security’ attitude or a liberal attitude? Why are these kinds of values
present among groups who publically perform roles of supporting the Bedoun, when clearly,
they don’t? Are they the best of the Bedoun haters, meaning the social experiences for the
Bedoun may be much worse than I could imagine, or are they infiltrators indicative of
Apparatus values? I find it difficult to tell.

But certainly it explains why Bedoun would not want to disclose their identity. The
notion of the Bedoun as a ‘threat’ is not genuine, but related to an ego attachment to the
abuse of power over others, as a form of entertainment. There value is in finding out this
side of the transaction – it shows me a lot about the process of trying to establish trust. In
the meantime, my observations are teaching me that the pearls of this process are located in
the spaces in between the solid information I am searching for, it is a much more intuitive
process. The social dynamics between Bedoun and citizen, particularly the Hadar citizen, is
where the inequality, oppression and exploitation can be observed in subte communications
cues, words, tones of voice, ‘looks’ and physical behaviours. The process can be detected in
the uncensored description of the Bedoun and in the social interaction.

[End of Sample]
Appendix I
Part xiii
Sample data extraction summary

Education – thematic analysis – data extraction summary 31/10/2015

Institutional Issues

Quality of education.
I later changed the theme header to ‘institutional discrimination.’ I then split into issues with Central Apparatus and issues within educational institutions

• Schools – Teachers did not care – no teaching - cultural issues (Egyptian national teachers) – P05, P06, P15
• Many young men’s school education was ruined by cultural discrimination at school, abuse, neglect and stigmatisation by the staff and institution itself – e.g. P03, P05, P08, P11, P14 – some of themes directed to experiences of overt abuse
• Could not work in area trained as Bedoun, due to deletion of identity file on Central Apparatus system – P10
• Has very good relationships with teachers/Professors at Kuwait University – P05 (now a citizen)
• But cannot join student clubs (P05) – collated under Bedoun unable to join student clubs at Kuwait University
• Bedoun cannot join student clubs at Kuwait University – but wasa led to inclusion a once-off event - – collated under Bedoun unable to join student clubs at Kuwait University
• First Bedoun schools were a business, no education – P03, P14
• Students abused due to fee issues - school P08
• Brothers/friends could not go to school/receive tuition due to fee issues - 0P8, P16, P17 – I regarded this as an issue related to segregation – the unschooled Bedoun, omitting P8 as not sibling but a friend

Other – administrative, resources, course options.
• University - Bedouns tend to be allocated to courses they didn’t apply for/want - not only the last choice, the opposite choice – they think its intentional – P02, P6, P7, P10
• Central Apparatus interferes via the Card and can delay education indefinitely – P17
• Books and materials poor P08, P13, – difficult to get a Western-standard textbook due to restrictions on publications P13 (i.e. Islamic element in the Ministry of
Interior). Building facilities also poor – gave me photographs of the schools, but they were abandoned, so they are not so useful.

Access to Education

Informal system.

• Use of teaching profession to give access to relatives P08 – later collated under wasa access
• Wasta is used to get in to public education P07 – later collated under wasa access
• Direct negotiation w/ schools for education for those without documentation – later added to individuals’ range of intellectual activities for the improvement of civil society
• Sponsored by public/private scholarship – P06 – later collated under sponsorship
• There is an active community including private citizens who help fund education, at the informal level – P09 – later collated under sponsorship
• A great deal of struggle to save up for fees to stay in private education system – P4, P14, P16, P17 – dropped as economic issue
• P14 cannot afford to attend private education; no access to allowance - dropped as economic issue
• Accessed private citizen support to go to school P15

Formal system.

• Marks required are exceptionally high for the Bedoun to enter Kuwait University
• Got in due to re-sitting exams and getting required marks – P05
  But his father works for and had become a citizen first – to legitimately ‘qualify’ for participation

I split some of the below themes into cultivation of self and identification with a higher purpose, improvement

Poverty alleviation and financial independence grouped into fulfilment of basic needs

I grouped the following interview extracts into the theme of ‘positive experiences in education’

Positive social experience – peers and staff.

• Positive experience w/ friends – P03, P04, P09
• Positive experience, until realisation she could not attend university P04 (learned she was Bedoun at this time
• Positive experience, until realisation he could not attend university P09
• Private college – as student and teacher – best experience in life, and key motivation P03, P08
• Part time study enables more social contacts over time P13
• University is a permissible location for gender mixing with minimal religious policing, despite ‘liberal’ the Ministry of Education is dominated by Islamists. I.e. the latter element is overblown (but it affects textbooks). Even at Kuwait University where classes and cafeteria are gender segregated, there is plenty of social mixing in the grounds - PO

Persistence, resilience pursuing education.
• Education bans mean for some ten years wait prior to attending university, and enrolment/Central Apparatus barriers P16, P17 – allocated to impact of education bans
• Became a citizen – re-sat Year 12 and entered Kuwait University P05
• ‘A force that would push my life forward’ P03

High achievement and lifelong learning.
• One respondent completed his PhD – still learns online – inspires others P3 (a great deal of information here)
• Doing PhD and teaching - P11
• Patterns of repeat qualifications and lifelong learning – split into themes of aspirations/love of learning

Creativity and intellectual life.
• Published poet (and journalist) P09
• Experience invited to KU by ‘clubs’ who are not allowed to accept Bedoun members, where he joined his friends – desire for civil society participation
• Experience of helping youngsters find scholarships to university at the informal level, has been a creative outlet P09
• It is the duty of young people to participate in society and to do well P9 – moved to identification with higher purpose
• Discussing philosophy and changing your ideas to accept your life and status P05
• What they have done to us – now intolerable P03

Aspirations.
• Ambitions – want better life - related to multiple course completion P04
• New generation not content with what parents had P05
• My biggest dreams are the their basics in their life P06
• Just to enter university P14
• I want to be the good guy P13 – to be a good person P03

Perception of purpose of education
Themes arising around self-improvement, purpose of self-improvement – goals related to self-concept e.g. hope, self-worth, confidence, awareness, God, higher purposes.

- Poverty alleviation for self and family – P06, P15 – regarding younger generation
- Self-esteem, intellectual growth, participation in civil organisations and career – P03 – later allocated under self-worth – self-esteem, intellectual growth
- No one can constrain you. Higher education is about understanding life. Having a broad view of life. If you succeed, doors will open to you – P03 – later allocated under self-awareness, personal awareness, transcending limitations
- Continuing education to maintain hope for the future – P11
- Achievements – academic prizes and life-long hard work – P03 – personal excellence
- Always doing your best – P10, P11 – later grouped with 0P3 under personal excellence
- It is worth waiting for the intellectual engagement, even after bans – P16, P17 – later allocated to dignity, self-awareness (P16), life purpose and self-confidence, identification with higher principles (P17) by unpacking the concepts within quotations
- Socialisation – a key permissible site for gender mixing – see above – but Bedouins don’t talk much about that – there are too many other social problems around it, but it may influence ideas about early marriage practices – i.e. avoidance of partnering in the hope of discovery of a romantic match
- Some room for freedom of thought beyond the Kuwaiti situation – access to other thoughts and values, experience of not being stigmatised through direct identification w/ intellectual work

I later analysed these themes at deeper level (abstract concepts) and grouped under a theme header, ‘Cultivation of Self.’

[End of Section]