The Stateless *Bedoun* in Kuwait Society

A Study of Bedouin Identity, Culture and the Growth of an Intellectual Ideal

Volume I

**AUTHOR'S COPY**

This copy includes minor changes to tables in Chapter 5, to clarify 'undisclosed' or 'unknown' data and minor corrections to Tables 3 and 14.

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Graduate Diploma of Education

Master of Education

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Abstract

This study is about the Bedouin of the main tribes of Kuwait, and the members of their tribes who have never received citizenship, who are called the ‘Bedoun.’ The study was framed within the theory of sociology, including the humanistic approach of Florien Znaniecki, and theories of ethnicity, identity and labelling. The methodological approach was inductive, involving a variety data collection methods including fieldwork in Kuwait, historical research, collaborative methodology, and thematic analysis. I argue that the Bedouin are a distinct ethnic group rather than merely a ‘social group’ in Kuwaiti society, and that the Bedoun are an emerging ethnic sub-group of the Kuwaiti Bedouin. The Bedoun hold multiple identifications, sharing ethnic identification within the same tribes as citizens, but they have also developed to form a new collective identity, characterised by social solidarity and unique national consciousness. This has occurred due to their historical, intergenerational absorption of the national identity as citizens of Kuwait in accordance with government policy, followed by their collective experiences of imposed, restrictive cultural re-organisation of the group since the 1980s, including administrative expulsion, ‘status adjustment,’ a form of identity erasure, and violent ethnic cleansing. The Bedoun have also developed an intellectual identity since their administrative expulsion, when they were expelled from schools and university. They have developed some degree of resistance to the attempt by Hadar intellectuals to prevent the group acquiring the education and political consciousness with which they could remedy their statelessness and deprivation of their human rights. The emergence of new forms of identity have assisted the Bedoun to rationalise their suffering and improve their capacity to articulate their collective experience. These changes indicate that creative, cultural re-organisation is taking place in the community, though they remain extraordinarily vulnerable. Cross-fertilisation has taken place with people from other cultures, especially for intellectuals and community leaders who have worked with international humanitarian agencies, journalists and scholars since the beginning of the Arab Spring. The Bedoun have also experienced marginalisation, stigmatisation and labelling in their daily social interactions with others, due to the prevalence of a deeply rooted nationalist ideology that denies the identity of all Bedouin as ‘Kuwaitis.’ Thus, the group has played a crucial, symbolic role in Kuwaiti citizen culture, and this role explains why statelessness has been imposed on them. The Bedoun population has been reduced by around two-thirds over the last twenty-five years. Without the intervention of international organisations and governments, their population and culture may be destroyed altogether. Recommendations include a call for the investigation of Kuwait’s official identity erasure policies and measures (’status adjustment’), methods of criminalisation and intense cultural restrictions faced by the group, by the United Nations Rapporteurs on Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect. The study also suggests the establishment of genuine mechanisms of representation for the community within the United Nations framework, and the implementation of international development measures that
would enable the UNDP and UNESCO to establish baseline population data on the group to preserve and protect their future development.
Thesis Declaration
I certify that this work contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in my name in any university or other tertiary institution on and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text. In addition, I certify that no part of this work will, in the future, be used in a submission in my name for any other degree or diploma at any other tertiary institution without the prior approval of the University of Adelaide.

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Signature of student:

Susan Kennedy

Principal Supervisor: Dr Margaret Secombe,
The University of Adelaide, School of Education
Co-Supervisor: Associate Professor Hossein Esmaeili,
Flinders University Law School

This thesis has two volumes. The second volume contains the Appendices. Additional materials will be stored online in the Bedoun Archive, at the Australian Data Repository, Australian National University, Canberra. This includes excerpts from the interview transcripts, and an archive of newspaper articles referenced in this thesis. The materials will become available from approximately June, 2018 or upon expiry of the thesis embargo.
Acknowledgements

I wish to acknowledge the contribution of the following friends, research collaborators, colleagues and organisations:

There are many friends who I cannot mention for security reasons. Among those who I can, M. M. al Anezi helped to initiate this project from Australia. I did not know what statelessness was before the Arab Spring. He has performed a fine service to his country. Imam Abdul Kader of the Darwin Islamic Society encouraged me to transform my experience in Australia into something that would benefit the whole community.

The twenty members of the Bedoun community who participated in this study and provided me with their personal data, have shared their extraordinary experiences for the benefit of their community. Their life stories will remain etched in my mind forever. No interviewee ever declined his or her material from being published for my research after our conversations. I thank them for their generosity, for expanding the boundaries of my thinking, and their patience in the ensuing years. I hope that their contribution will inspire others to provide them with Kuwaiti citizenship and its corresponding rights.

Mohammed al Anezi of London and Hakeem al Fadhli are the only two members of the Bedoun community in this work whose names are fully disclosed. This should not be interpreted as their endorsement of the interpretations herein but rather, they are mentioned as important cultural guides and contact points for future researchers in Kuwait and the diaspora. Mohammed was one of the first intellectuals and civil rights movement leaders who worked openly on the Bedoun problem in Kuwait, translating the seminal work of al Waqyan (2009) into English. He is a highly regarded leader of the Bedoun community.

Hakeem al Fadhli was as a leader of the Bedoun civil rights movement during the Arab Spring. He then emerged as a public intellectual, contributing as an interviewee, field guide, fixer and translator and interpreter, working on at least ten scholarly research publications, as well as countless news-media articles and human rights reports and his own report to the United Nations Committee for Human Rights in 2015. Many scholars who have described Hakeem as a ‘protestor’ have actually relied on him for his local knowledge, interview data, contacts and other practical help required for their research. Hakeem’s efforts were a major part of the Lund-Johanssen (2014) project which later won the UNHCR research prize on statelessness at the Masters degree level. His input was essential to my own theoretical development. Neither could have occurred without his efforts.

Hakeem worked with me on this research in various ways for around half the time this project took to complete, mainly helping me to understand various Bedoun claims against counter-arguments in scholarly circles. This work enabled me to break through the established nationalist ideology and to discover forgotten historical data. I will never forget the day he asked me why, if I did not believe everything I read, did I believe everything I read about Kuwait? One of the most difficult aspects of this research was realising that the
Bedoun were unaware of how negatively they had been represented in the academic literature. Hakeem had absorbed the disappointment of this realisation without prejudice, and remained open to the process of inquiry. His participation in this project helped me to realise the collaborative method. He gave me the courage to openly talk about the Bedoun’s indigenous claims, ethnic cleansing and the possibility of their genocide. He had asked to be acknowledged in this research, come what may. His contribution to the Bedoun community and to Kuwait has been unique, unselfish and heroic.

My third translator and interpreter was, and still is, the most reliable man in the field. He helped me understand the subtle details of Bedoun identity management so that I could make sense of my fieldwork observations. He kept second copies of all the research data as a community custodian. He helped me to accept my failures along the way, reminding me to keep looking forward right to the end. I offer him my deepest respect and gratitude. All of my fixers, translators, interpreters and cultural guides, including my husband Nour al Deen, were the glue that held my fieldwork, and sometimes my whole life, together. I was totally dependent on their unpaid work and expertise to obtain the in-depth interviews and photographs for this research, and much more.

Associate Professor Mohammed al Wuhaib and Professor Ghanim Alnajjar provided assistance and hospitality during my fieldwork. Professor al Najjar was not only one of the first social scientists to offer theorization of human rights in Kuwait (Alnajjar, 2001). He was one of few scholars to have explicitly theorized the Kuwaiti Bedouin as an ethnic group, and tribal ethnic minorities as cultural groups with political significance (Alnajjar, 1984, p. 66, 79). Associate Professor al Wuahaib helped me to learn the Hadar way of thinking, and how Kuwaitis rationalise the situation of the Bedoun, which led me identify the nationalist ideologies essential to understanding the Bedoun’s statelessness.

Others who assisted me in a variety ways included Siri Gamage (University of New England), Karen Block (The University of Melbourne), Janet MacDougall (Australian National University), Sean Ryan (Batchelor Institute), Uttam Gaulee (University of Florida), Hadeel Borqais (human rights monitor), Mona Kareem (journalist), Rania Maktabi (University of Oslo), Scott Brown (George Washington University), Associate Professor Farah al Nakib (American University of Kuwait), Rashid Muddaffar (Majlis al Ummah), and Professor Abdullah al Moosa (Kuwait University) and Professor Abdullah Alhajeri (Kuwait University).

The American University of Kuwait provided a research fellowship during my fieldwork, in 2014. The Researchers for Asylum Seekers group at Melbourne University provided me with a forum to discuss my early research findings, including ethnic cleansing, in 2015. The Australian Data Archive at the Australian National University has provided archive and data curation services site for the storage of all Bedoun community data collected in this project. Their appreciation of the nature of the project, and the value of the
data into the future, is gratefully received. I thank Margaret Priwer and staff at the Law Library at The University of Adelaide for their assistance over the last four years.

My Supervisor Dr Margaret Secombe and Co-Supervisor Associate Professor Hossein Esmaeili provided patient supervision through this unexpectedly challenging and politically sensitive project. I am grateful for Dr Secombe's flexibility regarding my project design, which continued to emerge during the writing-up phase of the project. We could not have foreseen that the factor of educational development was so closely linked to the deprivation of the Bedoun's citizenship, nor that the population was being destroyed to prevent them developing an intellectual capacity and widespread political consciousness. She appreciated the importance of these aspects of the study and the need to document the historical background to the oppression of the Bedoun, making for an extended thesis length. to construct what I hope is a convincing case for the re-organisation of the Bedoun’s culture and the substantial threats to their existence.

Associate Professor Esmaeili assisted me with strengthening the portion of the thesis documenting the involvement of international non-government organisations and appealing to processes and remedies in international law. His advice helped me to balance my argument between past approaches to the Bedouin in indigenous and minority rights law linked to self-determination, with the statelessness approach. I hope that this helps to provide a firmer direction for the Bedoun in international law claims in the future, so that they may be compensated for their suffering and be provided with the support they need to survive and flourish.

I am grateful to my examiners, Professor Elsbieta Halas (University of Warsaw) and Professor Damien Short (University of London), for pointing out the strengths and weaknesses of the thesis, their suggestions for my future work and especially, their support for the arguments put forward. I am very pleased to have encountered the 'plain-speaking' sociological theory of Florian Znaniecki that Dr Secombe has introduced me to, a grand theory that accommodated the realities of this research, and calls state oppression, physical and cultural destruction, and human suffering, what it really is.

Lachlan, Ben, Max kept their faith in my ability to complete this project – thank you for being there. I thank all my friends, family and teachers in Kuwait, Egypt, India, Nepal, Thailand, Indonesia, Switzerland and Australia, who helped me to get through to the end.

I miss my dear friends in Kuwait very much, and especially my husband.

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Dedication

For

Yhaya
Surah al Balad
The City

In the name of God,
the Gracious, the Compassionate.

I swear by this land.
While you are a legal resident at this land.
A father and what he begets.
We have created the human being to struggle.
Does he think that no one is able to best him?
He says: "I spent so much money!"
Does he think that no one saw him?
Did We not make for him two eyes?
A tongue and two lips?
We guided him to both paths?
He should choose the better path.
Do you know which the better path is?
The freeing of slaves.
Or the feeding on a day of great hardship.
An orphan of relation.
Or a poor person in need.
Then he has become one of those who
have acknowledged,
and exhort one another
to patience,
and exhort one another
to kindness.
Those are the people of happiness.
As for those who rejected Our signs,
they are the people of misery.
Upon them is a fire closed over.

In classical versions of the Quran, this verse is called 'The Land.'
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[Tribes are] Empty vessels - albeit important, symbolic ones…” (Longva, 2006, p.182)

We have our home. But no one wants to talk about it: ‘They are natives, they are genuine, they are the people of Kuwait.’ (Hakeem al Fadhli, interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 3 August, 2015).

But what they say... They are hiding their nationality to get some [benefit] like Kuwaitis?... Then prove it. There is no difference, we are the same people, the Kuwaiti people, they are same people. (Participant 13, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 2 April, 2014)

As a Kuwaiti, you live in a situation there are Bedoun among you, and you don’t have the right to negate them…. their existence is not up to you… These rights come by existence. They were born on Kuwaiti land, in Kuwait, so you are not Kuwaiti more than them, they are Kuwaitis as much as you are.

They are Kuwaiti and you have to accept this if you want to live in a good and prosperous country. You have to accept this inside you, even if you don’t like their background. The only option you have is to live with them peacefully. (Participant 05, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 15 March, 2014)

Why did all the academic studies till now… why are they coming to some kind of line, like a common idea…? Because the same [kind of] person that is supposed to be helping them to study, they feed it [the same ideas] to the people who come from all over the world, from the outside.

They don’t have… [the] mind to answer the question, because they are not from our society. We are the nation, we are the tribes.

If we are not from Kuwait and we are not Bedouin, then what are we? If we are not Bedouin and we are not supposed to be Hadar, then what are we? If we are not from Kuwait, then we are from where? This is the main issue, it is not academic… it is not analysis. It is pure racism. Nothing more. (Hakeem al Fadhli, interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 5 August, 2015)

They want to put you in the ground and you suffer. You cannot imagine the feeling. (Participant 08, interview in Ahmadi, March 23, 2014)
1.1 Background

This thesis explores the identity and culture of the Bedoun, who are part of Kuwait’s Bedouin community. The Bedoun are stateless, having never received citizenship from any country. They have demanded the restoration of their right to Kuwaiti citizenship, which was previously accepted by the state of Kuwait as a national policy (Stanton Russell, 1989; Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994) used to coerce the Bedoun to settle permanently in the country. They have also demanded that their human rights be restored, and in particular, their right to education (al Hajj, 2014; al Saadi, January 3, 2012; Borqais, November 19, 2014). The Bedoun population is believed to comprise around 110,000 people (‘Over 111,000,’ 2013; 80,000 Bedoons,’ 2016), although it is possible there are unregistered Bedoun in Kuwait who have not been included in this figure.

The term Bedoun means 'without' in Arabic. Sometimes the group has been referred to as Bedoun Jinsiya, meaning ‘without citizenship.’ However, this terminology appears to have been introduced by outsiders trying to explain the reasons for the Bedoun’s statelessness. The findings of this study indicate that the Bedoun are almost always, locally referred without the term ‘jinsiya.’ The term Bedoun is spelt in a variety of ways in English, reflecting the Arabic term. The first spelling used by Westerners was Bedoun (Fineman, November 8, 1992; Lorch, May 12, 1991; Murphy, May 2, 1991; Wilkinson, May 20, 1991). I discuss the different usage of names for the Bedoun in Chapter 2, and the reasoning behind the local use of terms in Chapters 5 and 6.

The term Bedoun is very similar to 'Bedouin,' and this point appears to have confused scholars in the past. I define the term ‘Bedouin’ as Stewart (2006, p.240) applies it, to refer not only to nomadic pastoralists but also to the sedentary descendants of nomadic Bedouin, who retain connections with their ancestral culture and identity in the present day. Some authors have distinguished between the terms 'Bedouin' and Bedoun to caution readers not to confuse the terms, implying that the meaning of two terms have little or nothing to do with each other (Human Rights Watch, 1995; Longva, 1997, p.72, n6). The persistence of this idea only creates further misunderstanding, as the notion that the Bedoun are not Bedouin has been used historically, to justify false claims that the Bedoun are citizens of other states. This distinction of terms has been quite unhelpful, because the Bedoun are very much Kuwaiti Bedouin people (I return to this point in Chapter 2).

The field of study of the Bedoun as a stateless population is still emerging, because prior to 1986, the Bedoun population was known as part of the Kuwait's Bedouin community. They were wholly integrated within the Bedouin community and were not regarded as stateless, because Kuwaiti citizenship was expected to be granted to them imminently, as a matter of public policy (Al Anezi, 1989, p. 257; Stanton Russell, 1989, p. 34). The policy was not retracted until 1992 (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan 1994), after the Bedoun had been ethnically cleansed.
In July 1986, after a parliamentary inquiry over whether or not the Bedouin of the northern tribes (the Bedoun) should be granted citizenship or not, the National Assembly was suspended (Proceedings of the National Assembly, July 1, 1986 in Human Rights Watch, 1995, n13). The population was administratively expelled in December, 1986 (Human Rights Watch, 1995; ‘The Study,’ 2003). This action confirmed the government of Kuwait's intention to make the Bedoun remain stateless. Between 1986 and 1995, the Bedoun were subjected to official policies of population eradication, violent ethnic cleansing and state-sanctioned killings (Appendix C, i, ii, iii, iv, v, Appendix D i, ii, iii, iv, Appendix E, i, ii, iii, iv, v, vi, Appendix G, i. ii, iii, iv). This led to profound cultural changes within the Bedouin community. For researchers, this has meant that the population has been hard-to-reach and vulnerable to retaliation from government authorities for virtually any kind of public activity. Although the Bedoun have formed a social and intellectual leadership group, this group is vulnerable due to their being targeted with punitive measures since the Arab Spring (2011-2012).

Evidence of the Bedoun's existence in Kuwait’s history and culture began to be strategically de-emphasised after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, shortly after foreign correspondents had discovered the group's existence in Kuwait. The Bedoun have been subject to the casting of Kuwait's history in a mono-ethnic nationalist (Gross, 1978) narrative that favours the opposing group, the elite, metropolitan Hadar. A background of colonialist bias toward the Bedoun and their broader ethnic group, the Kuwaiti Bedouin, remains a strong theme in the scholarly literature from a variety of disciplines (Appendix C, vi-viii). This approach has undoubtedly had a long-term influence over public perceptions of the Bedoun in Kuwait and internationally.

Until 1986, the Bedoun were regarded as 'Kuwaitis,' reflecting the government policy and practice of granting the Bedouin citizenship on the basis of their tribal affiliations (Stanton Russell, 1989). The Bedoun were known to have not yet acquired citizenship from any state, and were chosen from particular tribes, for this purpose (Alhajeri, 2004; al Fayez, 1984, p. 248, n13, 257, 258). This may go some way to explaining why the group were successfully integrated into society and readily adopted the Kuwaiti national identity into their culture. The Bedoun were previously subject to special privileges signifying a pre-citizenship status, corresponding with the government policy to provide the group with citizenship (Al Anezi, 1989, p. 257).

The Bedouin of both northern and southern regions of the Middle East had been expected to be granted citizenship by the state of Kuwait according to public policy established in 1965, coinciding with the formal Bedouin settlement program (Stanton Russell, 1989, p.34). The program was part of a broader, regional program to permanently settle all of the native Bedouin of the Middle East, coordinated by sovereign states and international organisations including the United Nations. These practices were a feature of the early development of international law for indigenous people enshrined in the

Due to the influence of the town-dwelling Hadar (the opposing social or ethnic group) in government policy and national affairs during the 1960s, at the same time as the commencement of the Bedouin settlement program in Kuwait, the Nationality Law (1959) provided citizenship for the Hadar, but disadvantaged the Bedouin. All Hadar received 'original' citizenship with full voting rights. Around half of the Kuwaiti Bedouin received citizenship without voting rights (Human Rights Watch, 1995). They were deprived of voting rights initially for twenty years, which was later extended to thirty years due to organised, political action by the Hadar (in Law 130/1986, in al Anezi, 1989). The other half of the Bedouin were deprived of citizenship altogether. Yet they were continually advised by government that the national policy was to grant them citizenship, that their citizenship grants were merely delayed, and would be forthcoming at some time in the near future. This latter group subsequently became known as the ‘Bedoun,’ because they never received citizenship documents confirming that status.

The Hadar believed that they had received ‘original’ nationality, including voting rights, as the mark of an 'elite' status (al Anezi, 1989; Human Rights Watch, 1995). This special status was written into the Nationality Law of Kuwait (1959). From the time of Kuwait’s independence, the Hadar influenced nationality policy in Kuwait, the manner in which it was implemented, and other national policies (al Anezi, 1989, p.175, para. 2). Their political interests aimed at preventing as many Bedouin as possible from receiving Kuwaiti citizenship. Their interests lay in a form of mono-ethnic nationalism (claiming their right to ‘original’ citizenship of Kuwait for perpetuity, to the exclusion of all others) and Arab nationalism (which regarded all Hadar of the Arab world entitled to share in the wealth of the Persian Gulf). Both sets of interests conspired to ensure the Bedouin were left perpetually stateless as a matter of nationalist policy, from 1965 (al Mdaires, 2010; Stanton Russell, 1989). This policy did not manifest formally within government ranks, until 1986 (‘The Study,’ 2003). However, government continued to claim that citizenship would be granted to the Bedoun (Appendix A, iii).

Decree 5/1960 (al Anezi, 1989) had been passed at the outset of Kuwait’s independence. It enabled a small group of the Hadar to determine who would receive Kuwaiti citizenship on utterly subjective and discriminatory grounds. This gave the Hadar virtually, total control over the process of citizenship distribution, which explains why Bedouin citizenship of the northern tribes seems to have not been delayed, but was simply never to be forthcoming. It is questionable as to whether some members of government were even aware of the specificity to which the counter-current of anti-Bedouin policy had been developed by the Hadar (discussed in al Anezi, 1989). Decree 5/1960 could be
implemented to exclude the existing Bedouin settlers from the nation by depriving them of citizenship, even if they had sufficient proof of identity and residence to be granted citizenship, or had performed sufficient service to the country, according to the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait). Alternatively, the Decree could also be implemented to enable all Hadar to receive citizenship whether they had appropriate proof of identity and residence in Kuwait, or not.

This point is an important, new finding of the study. Al Anezi (1989) believed the policy was used against the Bedouin by the Hadar. I explain further, that the Hadar could equally use the Decree to gain citizenship for themselves when they lacked documentary proofs of residence, to bypass the qualifying provisions of the nationality law. This helps to explain the continuing victimisation of the Bedouin since the 1980s (something Al Anezi could not have foreseen at the time), as it provides a motive for the abuse of the Bedouin’s human rights and political status. As I have mentioned, the targeting of the Bedouin for deprivation of citizenship affected the members of tribes from the northern regions more that the members from the southern regions, relative to each tribal dirah (territory).

The deprivation of education formed a crucial component of the plan to deprive the Bedouin of citizenship (Alessa, 1981, p.108-109; a policy later developed further by al Naqeeb, 1990, p.129). The Bedouin were deprived of education and the capacity to develop intellectually as an ethnic collective, in order to prevent them from discovering knowledge and awareness of their statelessness, and human rights deprivations. It was believed that the indigenous culture was ‘barren’ (Stoakes in Alessa, 1981, p.109) unproductive (Alessa, 1981, p.2) and lacking in intelligible ideology (al Naqeeb, 1990, p.135). It was believed that if future generations of the Bedouin who were deprived of citizenship (from 1986) found ways to access education, this knowledge would lead to their political participation in the state of Kuwait, and would undoubtedly lead them to seek to recover their promised citizenship and human rights (Alessa, 1981, p.109) that had been offered as conditions of their settlement.

In order to ensure that the group remained ignorant and easy to control, a policy was formulated to radically reduce, if not cease, expenditure on the Bedouin’s education (Alessa, 1981). The policy also involved depriving Bedouin citizens of quality education (al Moosa, 1976), but not to the same extent as the Bedouin of the northern tribes, who were the main ethnic target due to their statelessness (Alessa, 1981). This policy became reality just five years later it was articulated by Shamal Alanessa (1981, p.108-111), when the Bedouin were administratively expelled and banned form participating in education (‘The Study,’ 1986; a copy of the policy document, published in Arabic by al Talea, is provided in Arabic, Appendix E, ii). Four years later, Khaldoun al Naqeeb (1990) published an extended form of the anti-Bedouin doctrine, setting out the ideological rationale for the policy.

This previously hidden feature of the Bedouin story, underscores the salience of this inquiry into the education of the Bedouin, and the remarkable emergence of the group banned
from education in the 1980s as the community’s leadership group in the Arab Spring. The community’s leaders could not have been aware of just how specifically their intellectual development as a whole group has been targeted, amidst their expulsion from the state in 1986 (‘The Study,’ 2003) and again in 1991 (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, p.50). However, since the Arab Spring (2011-2012), they have certainly become aware that they have been targeted due to their intellectual expression (Amnesty International, 2015a; see Table 26). They have responded to the policy of Bedouin annihilation according to the initial warnings of one of its designers, Shamlan Alessa (1981, p.109), with an extraordinary degree of clarity.

This study reveals that the deprivation of education has led to the growth of an intellectual and educational ideal among the Bedoun interviewees. New values have supplemented their ethnic identity with an intellectual identity, and an increasingly shared sense of collective consciousness. In other words, the Bedoun have found the ideology that al Naqeeb (1990) accused the Bedouin of being incapable of developing due to their 'tribal consciousness' (p.128-127). This process of cultural change appears to have led the Bedoun to begin consolidating into a new sub-ethnic group within the existing, Bedouin collective. Despite the restrictive system of cultural re-organisation (M. Secombe, personal communications, January 22, 2016) and oppression faced by the group, research participants displayed a strong sense of social solidarity and inter-group cooperation with the Bedouin citizen community in Kuwait. Their culture showed signs of positive and creative, cultural re-organisation, despite the Bedoun having endured a decades-long program of ethnic targeting (including violent ethnic cleansing and 'status adjustment' – the erasure of their national and ethnic identity). Ultimately, the research explored the development of Bedoun’s increasingly public, intellectual engagement with their situation, as they began to expand their participation in citizen society and to more openly challenge the Hadar-dominated narrative of national identity.

1.2 Gaps and Limitations in the Previous Research

The field of study of the Bedoun as a population group is still developing, because prior to 1986, the population was part of the Bedouin community in Kuwait, and they appeared in academic studies as the Kuwaiti Bedouin. Since then, the population has been hard-to-reach (Atkinson and Flint, 2001), because it has been subjected to violent, mass human rights atrocities (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1992, 1993, 1994; Amnesty International 1992, 1994, 1996) and an unprecedented level of human rights deprivations experienced by a stateless group (Weissbrodt and Collins, 2002). Although they have produced social and intellectual leaders within their community, Bedouin intellectuals have been targeted with oppressive, punitive measures since the Arab Spring (Amnesty International, 2015a; see also Chapter 8, Table 25).

In the past, scholars have usually only written a few paragraphs or pages about the Bedou, and have not studied the group in depth. The group has tended to be studied only
very briefly by Western scholars, theoretically framed as a group separate to Kuwaiti society, as foreign migrants or citizens of other states. Since the Arab Spring, they have been theoretically framed as 'protestors' (Beaugrand, 2014a, 2015) and 'activists' (Abrahamian, November 10, 2014). This framing has mirrored government policy, and reflected previous the previous approach of 'othering' of the Bedoun according to myths about their origins that claimed the Bedoun were others who were criminal ‘infiltrators’ (such as Longva, 1997, p. 51) with a false identity (Crystal, 1992, p.75-76), specifically an ‘Iraqi’ fifth column who were enemies of the state (Ghabra, 1997a, 1997b; Tétreault and al Mughni, 1995), wrongly blaming the Bedoun for not defending the nation during the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq (Alhajeri, 2004). Since the Arab Spring, researchers have limited their theorisation of the population to ‘protestors’ (Beaugrand, 2014a, 2015) and ‘activists' (Abrahamian, November 10, 2014) in increasingly narrow representations. These approaches have obscured the identity of the Bedoun who are an indigenous, tribal people of the Middle East, intentionally settled in the state, by the state, of Kuwait. While their other family members and tribal kin were slowly granted citizenship over a number of decades, the Bedoun were left ‘without’ (*Bedoun* means ‘without’ in Arabic).

**1.3 Aims and Purpose of the Study**

The aims of the study were as follows:

- To explore the personal and cultural identity of the Bedoun, through their own eyes
- To discover experiences that have helped the Bedoun to form their identity and maintain their integration in society, and experiences that have involved social exclusion and/or barriers to participation in society
- To explore in particular, their experiences in education (especially post-secondary education), the benefits and challenges of participation, and the context in which they interact with other groups
- To investigate the impact of their identity status, as ‘Bedoun,’ on their interactions with other groups, such as Kuwaiti citizens (Bedouin and Hadar) and other nationals
- To discover thoughts and feelings of the Bedoun about their achievements, obstacles, rights, obligations and duties within their family, the Bedoun social circle and in citizen society

There were a number of purposes for the study. Most of the literature identified the Bedoun as having an identity that was not genuine. On the one hand, they were accepted as Bedouin people to a limited extent, but their relationship to Kuwait could not be pinpointed; on the other hand, they were concretely labelled ‘citizens’ and ‘infiltrators’ of other countries pretending to be stateless (Longva, 1997, p.51), and/or people who were not Bedouin, but pretending to be Bedouin (Shultziner and Tétreault, 2012, p.283 – 284). An academic consensus has formed around the notion that the Bedoun are criminals from ‘somewhere else,’ which conforms with government policy the group are 'illegal' due to their identity.
Therefore, the main purpose of the study was to establish the identity of the Bedoun, through their own eyes (Znaniecki, 1982; Smolicz and Secombe, 1981).

One of the reasons that a cultural perspective was taken, was to learn more about the Bedoun as a whole group. A cultural perspective views people as usually identifying on the basis of their belonging to a cultural group (Znaniecki, 1952b) and with their local social groups rather than national or transnational cultural groups (Gross, 1978) although there may be exceptions to this in view of globalisation. The perspective is particularly helpful for framing a collective that has been expelled by the state in which they live and are therefore, are not defined as belonging to a nation by others. In Kuwait, the ‘official’ version of the national identity belongs to the dominant ethnic group, the Hadar. The Hadar oppose the presence of all Bedouin in Kuwait, and resent their participation as citizens in the state (al Anezi, 1989; Alhajeri, 2004; Dashti, Khandari, and al Abdullah, 2014). Therefore, another purpose of the study sought to better understand the Bedoun as part of the broader cultural collective in which they live, beyond the state's attempt to sever the stateless Bedouin from the citizen Bedouin population.

Most academics writing about Kuwaiti society have only contributed a few paragraphs about the group, or they have not had direct or sustained contact with the Bedoun. Exceptions to this general rule include Abrahamian (2015), Beaugrand (2010), Lund-Johanssen (2014) who have had conducted field research. Only Beaugrand (2010, 2011, 2015a, 2015b) and myself (Kennedy, 2013, 2014, 2015a, 2015b) have attempted doctoral studies on the Bedoun. Alternatively, two humanitarian groups have been in contact with the Bedoun for some twenty-five years (Amnesty International, 1992; Human Rights Watch, 1991a), but these contacts have tended to have been disconnected by changes in staff and fieldwork respondents, and limited to the collection of data about human rights violations. Human rights reports have performed a very important role to date, but they have not indicated the nature of the Bedoun’s everyday interactions in society with their own families, social circle or other groups, nor do they tell us why the Bedoun were mistreated, or how they came to be made stateless. Therefore, another purpose of the study was to better understand the nature of the Bedoun’s everyday social interactions through their participation in education, and to explore some of the deeper questions arising from their social exclusion and victimisation.

Another purpose of the study was the social justice prerogative, to help the Bedoun to voice the concerns they have about their capacity to survive as a cultural group, and as targeted individuals. This prerogative was aligned well with the final research question (see Chapter 4), which sought to explore the research participant’s social relationships, and to provide them an opportunity to speak about their experiences in social roles in everyday, ordinary contexts. This personal and nuanced data provided a counter-narrative to the recent, narrow framing of the entire Bedoun population as ‘activists’ and ‘protestors’ (Abrahamian, 2015; Beaugrand, 2014a, 2015b; Lund-Johanssen, 2014).
1.4 The Theoretical Framework

This thesis uses a sociological framework, principally based on the humanistic sociology and cultural theory of Florian Znaniecki (1924, 1952, 1952a, 1952b). The humanistic sociology of Felix Gross (1978, 1998) provided the framework for ethnic social structure, multiple identifications, tribal identity and tribal social solidarity. Nationalist ideologies formed an important aspect of theorisation (Znaniecki, 1952a; Smith, 1983, 1986, 1991, 1999), elucidating the nature of ethnic targeting of the Bedoun across multiple spheres, including at the social and intellectual levels. Znaniecki (1952b) and Gross (1978) framed the production of knowledge in a nationalist context, which was highly relevant to the Bedoun’s situation.

Znaniecki’s (1952a) theory of cultural disorganisation and re-organisation accounted for the processes of ‘othering’ expressed through the increasing value conformity of citizens, policies of prohibition and criminalisation, and specific population eradication practices. I drew on other theorists to support my explanation of stigmatisation and ethnic targeting in personal, social relations, including labelling theory and stigmatisation in addition (Becker, 1983; Ginsberg, 1996; Goffman, 1963; Sigona, 2005, 2009, 2011), and theories accounting for ethnic targeting, ethnic cleansing and genocide (Fein, 2007; Lemkin, 1944; Mann, 2005; Short, 2016). The reason for my applying the latter, was due to the gravity of the Bedoun’s collective history and ongoing experiences, which I believed, demanded theorization about the physical and cultural destruction of whole population groups, but also due to a desire to account for the social causes of the conflict that arose in personal interactions, that were related to and sustained the Bedoun’s statelessness, about which the interviewees provided rich data. The need to delve into interactionist theories of social relations was evident from the first days of my fieldwork, when I began to encounter the problem of the secluded Bedoun who consciously managed their identity and public exposure, due to the levels of stigma they faced. I selected interactionist theories (thus, compatible with Znaniecki, 1952a), informed by successful studies in the field of statelessness. Still, this new cultural pattern was inevitably tied to the broader sweep of historiclal, ethnic cleansing and genocidal intent, which the theory of cultural systems (Znaniecki, 1952a) might help me draw together.

Theory of creative re-organisation (Znaniecki, 1952a) framed the growth of the educational ideal, intellectual identity and the impetus toward self-education. These positive inputs into culture are an expression of the value that a cultural group holds for its own membership (Halas, 2010; Znaniecki, 1952a, 1986). Halas (1989, 2007, 2010) and Znaniecki (1939, 1952a, 1955, 2007) also explained the formation of new relationships within and between groups, including cross-cultural fertilisation as part of creative and innovative expansion within cultures, and communications between cultures. I engaged briefly with some additional ideas to speculate as to how these expansive influences might have been introduced into the local context, since the Bedoun’s description of social actions were characterised by an unspoken, non-violent philosophy and a flexible, cooperative
attitude toward other groups, including their oppressors. I framed the group’s self-education and growth of collective consciousness in terms of their active citizenship (Bayat, 2012, 2013), true generosity (Freire, p.91, 120, 121), and steadfast perseverance (Shehadeh, in Said, 1986). These theories contain a good dose of idealism. The Bedoun interview data attests to role of idealism in the liberation of the mind and the strength of the human spirit.

1.5 The Methodological Approach

This thesis draws on multiple empirical research methods including fieldwork with the Bedoun in Kuwait, participant observation, photography and historical documents discussed in the previous literature. I used thematic analysis (Guest, et al., 2012; Guest, et al., 2013) to analyse the interview data, which formed one the key parts of the discussion. I also used thematic analysis to analyse literature from a range of primary and secondary sources. This enabled me to consolidate additional information spread across a number of disciplines and genres (in Appendices B-G), which I then used in the discussion to account for gaps in the literature and to support the interviewees’ accounts. There was a necessarily strong focus on fieldwork and access to the Bedoun population in Kuwait, which was characterised by being hidden (Spren, 1992) and hard-to-reach (Atkinson and Flint, 2001) due to their marginalisation and intergenerational suffering. I interviewed respondents during fieldwork in Kuwait in early 2014, and until mid 2016. I sought to interpret the interviewee’s descriptions as the Bedoun’s ‘social reality’ (Halas, 2010) from their own perspective, through the dynamic of the humanistic coefficient (Znaniecki, 1934; Halas, 2010, p.55).

1.6 The Findings and Main Contribution of the Thesis

The discussion of findings is set out in four chapters. Chapter Five sets out the results derived mainly from the interview data, but some participant observation data is also featured. The chapter is divided into two sections, the demographic data and the thematically analysed interview findings. The demographic data comprises new findings, as Bedoun data derived from interviewees does not seem to have been presented systematically in previous studies, beyond a schedule of interviews shown by Beaugrand (2010).

Chapter 6 concerns the ethnic identity and culture of the Bedoun, which is essentially a tribal culture, indigenous to the Middle East, but also uniquely 'Kuwaiti.' To some extent, the traditional cultural values of the Bedoun have remained preserved due to the Bedoun lacking in nationalist indoctrination as citizens participating in state institutions, and due to their integration in their tribal families and communities, which acts as a natural compensation for the absence of provision of state protection and state resources (Gross, 1998). I explore the processes of ethnic identity development and ethnic change and development described by the interviewees. This includes their absorption of the national identity and connections to the Bedouin community as a whole.

Chapter 7 describes the process of social exclusion and ethnic targeting of the Bedoun in Kuwaiti society. I discuss the experiences of the interviewees gained in their
social interactions in citizen society, and describe the cultural patterning (Znaniecki, 1952a) of these interactions. The interviewee data pointed to an anti-Bedouin ideology experienced by the Bedou at the social level symbolized by Goffman’s (1963) tribal stigma. The social environment generated an acute consciousness of identity management strategies required by the Bedoun interviewees, in order to avoid conflict. This was due to the vulnerability that their statelessness attracts in everyday social settings in citizen society.

As part of this chapter, also considered the program of government actions, prohibitions and punitive restrictions, including ethnic cleansing (1990-1995) and the ‘status adjustment’ program of identity erasure (1983-) in depth. These government actions were understood through the lens of local, nationalist ideologies that attempt to force an alternative identity onto the group, which can be observed in representations of the Bedouin produced by previous authors which stigmatised the group's identity and promoted notions of cultural hygiene (see Chapter 2). I conclude that the Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program is likely a program of incremental ethnic cleansing, or worse (I support this conclusion with in-depth data analyses, provided in Appendices).

Chapter 8 is concerned with the creative re-organisation of the Bedouin culture. It describes the growth of intellectual ideal and identity indicated in the interview data, and the development of educational experience and intellectual leadership. The Bedoun’s ideal of genuine citizenship is explored, including the research participants consciousness of their collective oppression. I explain that the high value of the tribal, cultural collective persists because it offers the group protection that the state cannot provide, and connects their values based in traditional society with the universal values of human rights. I argue that this process has given rise to a new vision of society.

Chapter 9 summarises the contributions of the thesis to a variety of disciplines and areas of study, and recommendations for future researchers exploring the Bedouin community in Kuwait and the diaspora. I suggest how the Bedouin can be included within the United Nations framework to ensure their protection, including specific efforts to ensure that the United Nations and Kuwait’s international partners begin to share some degree of responsibility for the future social and cultural development of the Bedouin within Kuwait, as other states have witnessed the breach of international norms of human rights norms by Kuwait for decades, while the majority of the Bedouin population has been eliminated by the state.

This study also contributes newly organised and synthesised secondary source information in the set of Appendices. There has been very little sharing of raw data collected from the Bedouin by previous researchers and/or investigating international humanitarian agencies, particularly Human Rights Watch (1995) who claimed to have conducted in-depth interviews with around five hundred Bedoun. For this reason, I included the transcript data used for the thematic analysis in Appendix A. Cultural themes representing the Bedoun can be found there.
Additional secondary data was collated attempting to establish a more detailed collection of facts and analyses about the Bedoun population, required to substantiate the historical accounts of interviewees and to develop my arguments. This provided new findings separate to the thesis discussion, such as, demonstrating the entrapment of the Bedoun by the state of Kuwait from 1965, confirming that the ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun of the early 1990s actually took place, and that it was a staged implementation of population policy rather than merely a post-war 'reaction' to the invasion by Iraq, as well as my analyses of the 'status adjustment' program of identity erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing: Weissbrodt, 2008).

This data may be of use to the community, future researchers and agencies, particularly for future claims in international law. The background data from which I drew this information was also collected and organised systematically, although some of it reflected an in-progress status recommended by Guest, Mac Queen, and Namey (2012). Data from this project, including the interview content used for thematic analysis, will be archived at the Australian Data Archive at the Australian National University, after the thesis examination. This will preserve the data and to prevent future loss of information about the Bedoun's cultural and physical existence (see the Acknowledgements section).

1.7 The Thesis Outline

The thesis is arranged according to the following Chapters:

Chapter One introduces the background of the topic, previous approaches by other authors, and the issues arising from that work. It describes the aims and purposes of the study, the theoretical and methodological approaches and the structure of the thesis document.

Chapter Two analyses the previous literature about the Bedoun. I analyse very briefly, some of the important definitions of the Bedoun, including representations of the group that may have mystified readers in the past, the settlement of the Bedouin and some aspects of international human rights law pertaining to this process, Bedoun segregation policies (depriving the Bedoun of land, citizenship and education), and destructive policies deployed against the group (including administrative expulsion and ethnic cleansing).

Chapter Three explores the different theories discussed above, in greater detail. I mainly utilise the humanistic sociology of Florian Znaniecki (1934, 1952a, 1952b), Elzbieta Halas (2006, 2010) and Felix Gross (1978, 1999), with the addition of some other theories to compare, contrast or reinforce these ideas in the discussion.

Chapter Four refers to the methods used in the research from the qualitative paradigm, including data collection via interviews, participant observation, photography and documentary research and the thematic analysis method.

Chapter Five included an overview of the results derived mainly from the interview transcripts, along with limited participant observation data.
Chapter 6 discusses the multiple ethnic identity of the Bedoun from the interview data. This included multiple levels of identification and an emphasis on traditional Bedouin values and strong family relationships. The Central Apparatus 'status adjustment' is introduced as a factor impacting the ethnic and national identity of the Bedoun.

Chapter 7 discusses marginalisation, social exclusion and ethnic targeting of the Bedoun. It focuses on the Bedoun's experiences of social interactions in Kuwaiti society, and the influence of anti-Bedouin ideology, government programs and restrictions on cultural patterning including 'status adjustment' as a form of administrative ethnic cleansing.

Chapter 8 discussed the growth of intellectual ideal and identity and the development of educational experience and intellectual leadership, pointing to the creative re-organisation of Bedoun culture. The emergence of a collective national consciousness and the Bedoun's awareness of their human rights deprivations through self-education, is also discussed.

Chapter 9 summarises the contributions and recommendations for future researchers, including the community in Kuwait and the diaspora.

Appendix A includes the thematic analysis data derived from the interviews. Appendix B-G includes consolidated historical information and additional data analysis. Appendix H includes photographs of the areas where the Bedoun have lived in Kuwait. Appendix I includes additional methodological data discussed in Chapter 4.
Chapter 2

The Kuwaiti Bedoun in the Literature

In the collective imagination as it is perceived through the documents available to the historian, the world of the steppe (and/or the desert) is opposed to the world of the city as nature opposes culture. No wonder that, since most of the documents appear to have been developed by and for "urban," the history of the steppe has always been considered as the point of view of the city: the man of the steppe is the wild one that is mobile with respect to civilized man, fixed on earth. This is the nomad, opposed to sedentary (Briant, 1982: 9-15). Like the territory it occupies, it inspires fear, a fear that is largely a fear of the unknown. (Nomad Magnified, the Nomadic Mystified: Views on the History of the Steppe, Aurenche, 1993, at para.3)

Introduction

This survey of the literature about the Bedoun of Kuwait briefly explores some different definitional terms used to describe the group, and the context of the Bedoun’s position in society as an expression of the Bedouin-Hadar social cleavage. Therefore, I also review literature about the alienation of the Bedouin (including both the Kuwaiti Bedoun and Kuwaiti citizens) in Kuwaiti society, and how the decision was made to ensure the Bedoun would be deprived of citizenship. In the absence of extended fieldwork with the group, the Bedoun have been represented by scholars in a variety of ways, most of them reflecting government policy, criminalizing and/or diminishing the authenticity of the groups’ identity (Kennedy, 2015a). The same themes used to disparage the Bedoun in scholarly definitions, have also been directed toward citizen Bedouin. Additionally, literature about the Bedouin in all fields has consistently (to my knowledge, uniformly) omitted knowledge of the regional strategies employed to settle all Bedouin of the Middle East during the 1950s and 1960s, and the recognition of their indigenous status since 1957 (International Convention on Indigenous Tribal Populations (1957) (ILO), in Bocco, 2006, p.306) which led to virtually all other Bedouin in the region receiving citizenship on permanent settlement.

Some social scientists have studied the development of thinking about the Bedouin who settled in other states in the light of this recognition, and found a great deal of resistance among metropolitan, Hadar scholars (Bocco, 2006; Fabietti, 2006). Additionally, most scholars who have specialised in studies of the Bedouin have often merely observed their societies at a distance, without considering the Bedouin’s values or opinions, or the complexity and subtlety of their cultural system (Lancaster and Lancaster, 1998; Alshawi and Gardner, 2014). In turn, this has negatively influenced representations of the Bedouin penned by academics (Lancaster and Lancaster, 1988). In this study, I discuss this problem in terms of regional (Middle Eastern) development models applied to the Bedouin, which contributed to the rise of anti-Bedouin ideologies related to settlement programs in Kuwait. By examining this regional phenomenon at the local level, I reveal how discursive strategies shifted the collective identity of the Bedoun to a completely different population segment.
I also briefly describe key segregation policies focused on the deprivation of education and citizenship, and three of the major programs that were aimed toward physical and cultural destruction of the Bedoun population. The programs include the administrative expulsion of the Bedoun (1986) (‘The Study,’ 2003) and violent ethnic cleansing (1990-1995) (Fineman, November 2, 1992), which have reduced the size of the group by up to two thirds, over the last 25 years (Human Rights Watch, 1995; ‘Over 111,000,’ 2013). I also refer to the ‘status adjustment’ program (1983-) (the term used by the government of Kuwait, see ‘7,828 Illegal,’ 2016), which I previously discussed in a summary of my research findings in 2015 (Kennedy, 2015a). ‘Status adjustment’ erases the national and ethnic identity of the Bedoun via administrative procedures. It has accompanied 'adjustments' to the national census (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994) and has involved government pressuring the Bedoun to accept the attribution of false identities and false identity documentation (WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, November 26, 2006), making the Bedoun appear to be citizens of other states. The programs was actually commenced prior to the administrative expulsion, and has continued to be implemented as an incremental method of erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing: Weissbrodt, 2008).

2.1 Definitions of the Bedoun of Kuwait

Some degree of confusion has arisen over the similar spelling of 'Bedouin' with 'Bedoun,' and the use of multiple spellings in English, of 'Bedoun.' Human Rights Watch (1995) defined the group as:

The word ‘Bedoon’ is from the Arabic phrase ‘bedoon jinsiyya,’ literally meaning either ‘without nationality’ or ‘without citizenship.’ The term should not be confused with the English word Bedouin, from the Arabic word ‘badawi,’ meaning nomad (the plural is ‘badu,’ or the more colloquial ‘bidwan’). Although many of the Bedoons are of Bedouin origin, most of them have long settled in the urban centers of Kuwait, and many have never lived a nomadic life. (Human Rights Watch, 1995)

As I mentioned in the introduction of this research, the term 'jinsiya' is not usually attached to 'Bedoun' in common usage in Kuwait, based on my experience. Furthermore, despite the cautionary tone of the Human Rights Watch (1995) definition with reference to language terms, it is important to remember that the Bedoun are Bedouin. Longva’s (1997, p.72, n6) point that the term 'Bedoun' should not be confused with 'Bedouin' was provided out of the context of the passage above, from which it was derived. Her depiction of the group as imposters (Longva, 1997, p.51) was enhanced by this statement, rendering it somewhat confusing and perhaps even misleading to readers. The Bedoun are Bedouin (I have never found an exception during my interactions with the Bedoun community), and therefore the terms have as much similarity as difference between each other, although it is merely a coincidence that the two terms have similar spelling.
In the first extended discussion of the Bedoun by an international humanitarian agency, Human Rights Watch (1991a, p.51) did not use the term 'jinsiya.' It appears that Crystal (1992, p.75, 1995, p.182) first used the term, followed by Human Rights Watch (1995) and later, Beaugrand (2010, p.18). The joining of the words appears to have been a Western scholarly construction rather than a term used in Kuwait; early Kuwaiti authors writing about the group such as al Moosa (1976) and al Anezi (1989), did not use the term **Bedoun Jinsiya**, although they used the term 'stateless' (al Anezi, 1989, p.255; al Moosa, 1976, p.158). The Bedoun refer to themselves simply as ‘Bedoun,’ ‘Kuwaiti desert-dweller,’ ‘sons of the desert,’ or other terms reflecting different phases of nomadism and settlement (Dickson, 1949, p.109; al Fayez, 1984, p.257-8; al Anezi, 1989, p.174-175; Al Waqayan, 2009). The status of the current generations having acquired no grant of nationality has been passed on from their descendants.

Aside from the similarity between 'Bedouin' and 'Bedoun,' and the use of the term 'Bedoun Jinsiya' there are also many spellings of the term ‘Bedoun.’ As I discussed at the outset of this thesis (in Chapter 1), in this research I have adopted the spelling first used by Westerns in Kuwait translating the term into English, used by foreign correspondents, the *Arab Times*, and the United Nations Security Council (July 2, 2004 and June 30, 2005), which is still used by the *Arab Times* in Kuwait. The spelling 'Bedoon' is used by the official government news agency, KUNA, and *The Kuwait Times* (also Gasperini, August 20, 1991 and Human Rights Watch, 1991, 1995). Other spellings are also used, such as Bidoun (Wilkinson, May 20, 1992) and Bidoon (Kohn, March 24, 2011; U.K. Home Office, 2016) and these spellings appear in quotes by different authors, throughout this thesis.

The term 'Bidun' with and without capitalisation (Amnesty International, 1992; Beaugrand, 2014a, 2014b, 2015; Crystal, 1992, p.75, 1995, p.182; 2005, p.174) is also used, but it has a very different and distinct meaning. Human Rights Watch (2000, 2011, 2016) adopted the spelling after having used the term 'Bedoon' since 1991 (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1995). The term 'Bidun' does not refer to the term 'Bedoun' ('Bidoon' or 'Bedoon') meaning 'without,' but to bidunville or bidonville, a French term used to describe African 'slum-dwellers' of French Morocco and Algeria who lived in homes constructed from oil drums (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2009, meaning: 'tin can city'). The term has quite insulting connotations in Arab culture, because it implies the Bedoun should be known as 'slum-dwellers;' al Naqeeb, 1990, p.134, para 3, made an obtuse but especially derogatory reference). Most of the Bedoun are poor, but they do not live in 'slums.' 'Slums' is a word usually associated with lack of cleanliness and order, as well as impoverishment. This certainly does not apply to Bedoun settlements, regardless of how impoverished the group may be. Additionally, the term 'bidun' has been applied to people of other cultures, but it does not seem to have ever been used to describe ethnic Bedouin in other settings. The persistence of the use of the French term in English academic literature appears to have similarities with the approach of some authors in the urban development paradigm, that is,
scholars who argued for the eradication of Bedouin desert settlements by claiming the
Bedouin lived in uncivilized, unhygienic, disorderly, slum conditions (see below, section
2.6.1 and 2.6.2).

In relation to the reference to nomadism by Human Rights Watch (1995), it is worth
noting that Bedouin identity has never ceased due to permanent, urban settlement. Nor
should settlement be conflated with nomadism per se (Alshawi and Gardner, 2014; al Rasheed, 2015). It is well established that Bedouins have retained their identity, including
an interest in preserving their tribal heritage, in contemporary times (Cole, 2003; al Fahad,
2004, Marx, 2012, Alshawi and Gardner, 2014). This includes the stateless and citizen
the Kuwaiti literature back to the time prior to the Bedouin being separated from the citizen
Bedouin by virtue of their statelessness, it is quite clear that Bedouin were a sub-group solely
derived from the Bedouin ethnic group, separated by carefully rationalised and planned
segregation policies (see al Moosa, 1976). I test this idea via application of the ethnic theory

The Bedouin were also described as divided into sub-groups (Human Rights Watch,
1995), as follows:
1. Those who were unable to prove continuous settlement in Kuwait from 1920, as the
   law required
2. Those who could have registered but neglected to do so
3. Those who applied for nationality and were accepted for consideration but the case
   has never been acted on by authorities
4. Children of stateless parents including those with Kuwaiti citizen mothers
5. Those who migrated from neighbouring countries to work and lost links to their
country of origin

This definition (Human Rights Watch, 1995) was never intended to be a sociological
description of the group, but for the purpose of attracting attention to the deprivation of the
Bedouin's human rights. Nevertheless, it was an in-depth and authoritative definition
accepted by scholars. The key points were to a great extent, based upon arguments and
materials in al Anezi’s (1989) work (though they were not referenced). However it is notable
that regarding the last point – ‘those who migrated,’ the Bedouin were always stateless, and
had not been granted nationality by other states prior to their being recruited to live near to

The description above from Human Rights Watch (1995) was subsequently used as
an authoritative definition of the social group by Alnajjar (2001, p.190, n3); Alhajeri (2004,
p.87, n51); and al Nakib, F., (2014, p.12, n34). Longva (1997, p.72, n6) adopted sections of
the text (‘not to be confused with Bedouins’); Shultziner and Tétreault (2012, p.284)
elaborated on it (‘those who had refused to register or came to Kuwait later remained
bidun’). The Bedouin have become known by so many different terms, that scholars may
have found their identity difficult to establish. What is undeniable however, is that the nature of the different terms used has tended toward making the group appear to be both unknown, and to no longer exist (see Appendix B, ii, Table B2 and Appendix C, i, Table C1 for lists of traditional referents and government-imposed labels that have been used by scholars).

The Kuwaiti Bedoun are the descendants of Bedouin tribes-people who settled permanently in Kuwait. They are native to the region (Weissbrodt, 2008). They include members of the main tribes of Kuwait whose traditional lands (dirah) stretch across vast regions of the Middle East (Raswan, 1930; see Appendix B, i). The Bedoun were never granted nationality after their permanent settlement in Kuwait. Therefore, some authors call them bidoun jinsiya, which means ‘without nationality’ or ‘without citizenship’ in Arabic (Human Rights Watch, 1995).

The Bedoun’s statelessness is the key factor that distinguishes the group from their ethnic majority, the Bedouin of Kuwait. Many of the Bedoun are family members of Kuwaiti citizen Bedouin and/or share the same tribal membership (Human Rights Watch, 1995). They were regarded as ‘Kuwaitis’ by the government of Kuwait, reflecting the policy to provide them citizenship, which spanned from 1965 until approximately 1985 (marking the introduction of ‘Kuwaitization policy’). Previous commitments the government had made to the Bedoun promising citizenship would be granted to them were numerous. I found reference to these commitments spread across many sources; they are listed Appendix B, iii. They were assumed to be members of the Bedouin tribes of Kuwait until 1983 (al Anezi, 1989, p.263) when measures to change their identity were first introduced. However, the policy was not officially ended until 1992 (Stanton-Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994), even though the government of Kuwait began to impose ‘status adjustment’ via national identity re-labelling from 1983 (Al Anezi, 1989, p.263, n132), and administratively expelled the group in 1986 (‘The Study,’ 2003).

The Bedoun are characterised by their tribal heterogeneity, although this has been used to imply that the group was diluted with a range of different kinds of people (Longva, 1997). Rather, the Bedoun comprise members of a range of many different tribes and tribal confederations, including those known locally as the ‘Kuwaiti tribes’ (al Shayeji, 1988; Alhajeri, 2004). All of the tribes are transnational and there is no tribe that ever held land under customary law, exclusively in Kuwait. This can be seen in the tribal maps by Raswan (1930), who drew explored the area and detailed maps of the Arabian tribal lands for National Geographic. There are some tribes that have no stateless members at all, because all members received citizenship in Kuwait (Beaugrand, 2010). But most are mixed, comprising some citizens, and some stateless members, of varying proportions.

Citizen women who marry Kuwaiti Bedoun men have stateless children (Human Rights Watch, 2014). The children initially receive benefits equivalent to citizens, until they reach the age of twenty-one. The number of these pairings is not insubstantial. Al Mughni (1996) cited the number of citizen women married to foreign husbands at 7,000 in 1993;
Human Rights Watch (1995, ‘Summary of findings, para. 5) cited around 30,000 Bedoun were spouses of Kuwaiti citizen women or children of Kuwaiti citizen women.

2.2 The Origins of the Bedouin-Hadar Social Cleavage

Only al Anezi (1989), and Alhajeri (2004) appear to have seriously questioned the role of Hadar nationalist narratives in the marginalisation of the Bedouin population, and for this reason, their contributions are crucial for gaining a balanced perspective of Kuwaiti society. Al Anezi (1989) described the Bedouins of the desert in Kuwait’s territory as one of the two groups of people ‘indigenous’ to Kuwait:

The indigenous Kuwaitis divided themselves into two groups, the merchants who had lived with in the enclosure of the old city of Kuwait (or within the ‘walls of the City of Kuwait’) and others, including Bedouins of the desert. (al Anezi, 1989, p.174)

Al Anezi (1989) described a deep cultural divide between the Bedouin and the Hadar (city-dwelling) groups. He pointed out that ‘those from within ‘the wall’ or ‘the fortress,’” (al Sour, which is Kuwait City) who called themselves ‘the elite’ (Al Anezi, 1989, p. 175, 248) were the Hadar, city-dwelling people who became the politically and economically dominant class in Kuwaiti society. The population of Hadar town dwellers within the wall were of mixed Arab-Asian-African-Persian heritage (Longva, 1997), immigrants who arrived after the Bani Khalid and the Bani Utub tribes, prior to Kuwait gaining British Protectorate status. According to al Anezi (1989), the Hadar elite used their power to influence the structure, purpose and implementation of the Nationality Law in 1959. The Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) was drawn up prior to the British conferring independence on the Protectorate in 1961. By the time it was produced, the British were losing their grip on the Arab world due to the regional assertion of Arab nationalism, which flourished in Egypt (Houraini, 1991), from where the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) was imported (al Anezi, 1989).

Consequently, the rise of Arab nationalism had a substantial impact on the Bedoun, by way political pressure and the development of an intellectual milieu in Kuwait that was generally speaking, positioned toward rationalising the elitism and exclusive cultural membership of the Kuwaiti and other Arab national Hadar, and justifying the ethnic targeting and exclusion of the Bedouin, including the Bedoun. Unfortunately, the Hadar term (al hadharah) has sometimes been used to conflate ‘sedentary’ economic production with the terms ‘urban’ and ‘civilization’ and ‘civilized,’ which has fed the Hadar misconception that the group is more ‘civilised’ than others, by virtue of their self-identification as Hadar, but particularly in opposition to the Bedouin regardless of their location in urban, semi-urban or non-urban environments (Bocco, 2006; Fabietti, 2006).

2.3 The Alienation of the Bedouin in Kuwaiti Society
Alhajeri (2004, p.14, 34, n2) described the exclusion of the Bedouin from Kuwait City by the Hadar as represented by the symbol of the city wall, which had always been the basis of Bedouin-Hadar antagonism, citing, ‘The reluctance of the Kuwait hadhar [Hadar] to accept that application of Kuwaiti identity and nationality [could apply to] for the badu [Bedouin]’ (p.15) was responsible for the ethnic cleavage. He explained,

Those outside the wall were primarily the badu of the area, who have been seen by those who lived within the boundary of the wall that they are outsiders not and entitled to gaining a Kuwaiti nationality. Adding to this problem is the attribution of the name of the original town of Kuwait to the state of Kuwait. This increased the feeling of alienation of the bedu from their being unable to identify with the name [i.e. the fortress they were not allowed to enter]; while aggravating the possessiveness of urban Kuwaitis toward what they considered their own city with their active exclusion of the badu. (Alhajeri, 2004, p.33-34; parentheses added)

It is salient that both al Anezi (1989) and Alhajeri (2004) pointed out the rejection by the Hadar community of any Bedouin from outside the city wall. On the one hand, the actual identity of all Bedouin in the territory of Kuwait was never established for the purpose of including them in a national census, or providing them citizenship. The Hadar rejected the actual territory of Kuwait and its occupants (the Bedouin) as part of the nation-state or city-state to which they (the Hadar) controlled the distribution of citizenship. Additionally, it is also claimed that the Bedouin who arrived ‘later’ in Kuwait were given citizenship over and above the Bedouin who were already there (al Nakib, 2014), and it is well known that some of the tribal people who were given citizenship after Kuwait’s independence were already citizens of Saudi Arabia (al Haddad, 1981; Crystal, 1995). Some of the oldest Bedouin families in Kuwait not granted citizenship (al Nakib, 2014), remain stateless, part of the Bedoun sub-group of the Kuwaiti Bedouin tribes.

The Bedouin have been implicitly rejected in the Hadar nationalist narrative of the al Sour, although this has not been openly acknowledged by previous authors. Examples of this approach include the recount of the al Sour narrative as part of the social context in which the Bedouin have become stateless while still referring to the Bedouin as illegal residents in a positivist fashion (al Anezi, 1989). It appears that al Anezi (1989) was trying to point out that the Bedouin who did not receive Kuwaiti citizenship (the Kuwaiti Bedouin) were overlooked because they lived in the desert territory of Kuwait, and not within the city wall. A legal scholar, he pointed out that cultural exclusion was the pre-requisite for the Bedouin’s exclusion in law. The Hadar were the principal architects delimiting the Bedouin desert camps on the perimeter and even within Kuwait City, and imposing the conditions of settlement on them (al Moosa, 1976; al Zaher, 1990). The expanse of the Kuwait desert and steppe was culturally disowned by the Hadar who feared the Bedouin (al Anezi, 1989) and thus, people from desert areas were excluded for the purpose of distributing citizenship, even
notification about the opportunity. This knowledge helps to explain why the Hadar were first and most rapidly granted citizenship prior to the Bedouin, and why many Bedouin did not register (Human Rights Watch, 1995).

This state of cultural rejection of the territory of Kuwait and its people was expressed in ‘desertization’ (al Ansari, 1994, in Ghabra, 1997a, 1997b; also Tétreault, 2001, 2003; Shultziner and Tétreault, 2012, p.285). This may leave the Bedouin with a historical entitlement to claim belonging to their territory of the state and the benefit of its resources. The Bedouin were recognised as indigenous to the Middle East by the International Convention on Indigenous Tribal Populations (1957) (ILO) (Bocco, 2006, p.306). Their customary right is reflected in the names historically assigned to the Kuwaiti Bedouin (Badiat al Kuwayt) and ‘Sons of the desert’ (Abna al badiyya). A list of the collective names that the Bedouin have been referred to historically, can be found in Appendix B, ii.

2.4 Representations of the Bedouin

2.4.1 The ‘expatriate’ Bedouin.

Crystal (1992, 1995) presented one of the first, very brief accounts of the Bedouin after Human Rights Watch (1991a) and Lesch (1991) had located the group in Kuwait at the end of the Iraq war. At the time, the group had already been identified as victims of ethnic cleansing (Fineman, November 2, 1992) and ethnic purification (Evans, February 28, 1991), and were suffering from human rights deprivations of an extraordinary magnitude (see Human Rights Watch 1991a, 1992). Crystal (1992) was one of many international scholars who have argued carefully and circuitously to define the Bedouin as citizens of other states. The researcher explained that the Kuwaiti Bedouin lived ‘on the edge of illegality’ and, ‘fell through the cracks, becoming stateless bidun jinsiyyah (without nationality)’ (Crystal, 1992, p.75). The author explained that the Bedouin:

Includes at one end, people who would legally have received Kuwaiti citizenship but whose fathers or grandfathers never registered them with government and, at the other, expatriate workers who opportunely lost their passports and hoped to better their economic lot by blending into and hoping for eventual mass naturalisation of the bidun. (Crystal, 1992, p.75-76)

Crystal (1992) did not substantiate her claims about the Bedouin being expatriates from other countries hiding their identity, acting as imposters and pretending to be Bedouin. Her narrative about the Bedouin was unreferenced. Only one reference presented in her passage on the Bedouin (al Haddad (1981), actually referred to citizen Bedouin of the Ajman tribe, who were apparently granted dual citizenship by both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (no documentary evidence was shown by al Haddad (1981) either, but the thesis has been often-quoted as an authoritative work and the ethnographic narrative is convincing). Crystal’s (1992) Bedouin narrative reflected the government policy toward the Bedouin at the time. On the one hand, it elaborated one point of the multi-point definition that later appeared in
Human Rights Watch (1995) about the Bedoun failing to register with government. On the other, the definition criminalized the group and questioned their collective identity. In the post-Iraq war years, Crystal (1995) tightened her definition to criminalize the group further:

The catchall of the group also included the more opportunistic, who had discarded valid passports in the hope of becoming Kuwaiti in order to benefit from the state’s wealth, as well as others with no other home who considered themselves Kuwaiti. Those whose papers were not in order could not slip through the bureaucratic cracks created by the invasion. (Crystal 1995, p.167)

Rather than benefiting from the state’s wealth, the group had at that time been subject to violent ethnic cleansing and killing, as I have mentioned above. Crystal (1995) instead seems to have inferred the Bedoun would be busy using the war to dishonestly acquire citizenship. Once again, the claim about the Bedoun was purely speculative. Crystal’s (1995, p.167) portrayal of the Bedoun as ‘opportunistic’ was not unique – she also portrayed all Kuwaiti citizens as opportunists suffering from entitlement, specifically ‘Arab entitlement’ (Crystal, 1992, p.83, 85, 86, 134).

2.4.2 The ‘human pool’ and ‘Iraqi’ Bedoun.

Despite the lack of evidence for claims the Bedoun population being made up of expatriates and opportunists posing as stateless Kuwaitis (Crystal, 1992, p.75-6), Longva (1997) appeared to take Crystal’s description as a reference point. In her anthropology, she proposed that the Kuwait Bedoun consisted of,

… A human pool into which Iraqi refugees, draft dodgers and infiltrators as well as absconding workers and illegal aliens could easily blend after getting rid of their identity papers. (Longva, 1997, p.51)

Crystal’s (1992, p.75-76) statement ‘expatriate workers who opportunely lost their passports... by blending in’ was almost identical in Longva’s (1997, p.51) ‘absconding workers and illegal aliens could easily blend after getting rid of their identity papers.’ Note also, that Longva (1997) finely tuned Crystal’s (1992) claim about expatriates, into claims of Iraqi infiltration (draft dodgers also being reference to ‘Iraqis,’ as well as refugees). The criminalisation of the Bedoun identity has had a lasting impact on Kuwait studies. Longva’s (1997) brief passage contained a number of crucial ideological themes about the Bedoun's identity status that had been propagated to incite ethnic cleansing from 1990 to 1995 (see Appendix E).

2.4.3 ‘The nomad’ and mercenaries’ Bedoun.

Longva’s (1997, 2000, 2006, 2005) approach to the Bedouin in Kuwait has had broader implications for studies of the Bedouin, as well as for study of the Bedoun. There were some very basic flaws in the analysis of the origin of Kuwait’s Bedouin community. Longva (1997) began by stating there were two separate groups of Kuwaiti Bedoun: one
group present in the territory of Kuwait prior to 1920 and one group arrived in Kuwait later. The first group were ‘nomads’ and the second group were ‘mercenaries’ (Longva, 1997, p. 50). The Bedoun, she informed readers, ‘consisted of two main types of people: the nomads and the mercenaries’ (Longva, 1997, p.50). However, she also characterised the stateless ‘nomads’ who arrived prior to 1920 as mercenaries: ‘with their backgrounds as fighters and marauders from the desert…. willingly entered the armed forces’ (Longva, 1997, p.50). On the other hand, she differentiated the first group of Bedoun from the second group, ‘the mercenaries’ who arrived later as a separate group, on the basis that they were already ‘citizens’ of other countries, recruited to join the states’ security forces (Longva, 1997, p.51). That is, Longva (1997) employed virtually equivalent terms to differentiate her two categories of the Bedoun, such that the categories appeared to be same, and not different at all. The only other difference between the two groups was that Longva (1997) stated ‘the nomads’ ‘never had any formal citizenship previously’ but ‘the mercenaries were citizens from the surrounding Arab states’ (p.51).

It is difficult to see much categorical difference between ‘fighters and marauders’ from the desert, and ‘mercenaries,’ if all Bedouin were nomads and mercenaries (anthropologists and historians will be aware they come from the same tribes and are overlapping categories; Houraini, 1991 provides a condensed, historical account). But Longva (1997, p.50-51) assured her readers they were ‘two different groups’ ‘lumping together’ into one stateless group. The inclusion of the second, different group was required to justify Longva’s (1997) criminalisation of the Bedoun as citizens of other states, as seen in her ‘human pool’ definition (above), which held the argument about Bedoun identity together. The Bedoun’s participation in the state’s police forces and defence forces, she quipped, was the ‘embarrassment’ of the Ministry of Defence, since they were really foreign-citizen ‘mercenaries’ (Longva, 1997, p.51).

Hiring Bedouin into the military forces was the normative process in the Middle East, reflecting the heritage of the Bedouin within the larger, tribal confederations (Marx, 1967, 1977). Justifying the Bedoun’s statelessness due to the ‘embarrassment’ of government employees, Longva (1997, p.51) did not acknowledge the similar pattern of Bedouin settlement (and citizenship and land grants) given to the Bedouin throughout the Middle East (Bocco, 2006). Strangely, Longva (1997) then conceded that government was unable to show that the ‘mercenary’ Bedoun were actually citizens from other states on the following page of her text (Longva, 1997, p.52), undermining her own claims and categorisation of the Bedouin.

It is difficult to know why Longva (1997) asserted the claim the Bedoun were nationals of other countries following Crystal (1995), because by the time she published her research, additional evidence was available to her, such as reports by Human Rights Watch (1991a, 1992, 1995) and Amnesty International (1992, 1994, 1996), showing that that the claim the Bedoun had citizenship in other states was associated with incitements to
ethnically cleanse the Bedoun and other nationals, to kill them and drive them out of Kuwait (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1992, 1995; Amnesty International 1992, 1994). Additionally, a former Kuwait’s Minister of Defence and the Interior, Sheikh Salem, admitted that government was always quite aware that the Bedoun were stateless prior to their permanent settlement in Kuwait. They had never been Iraqi ‘nationals’ (al Fayez, 1984 in interview Sheikh Salem, January 6, 1982 (Al Fayez, 1984, p. 248, n13, 257, 258; see also Group 29, 2012, p.6).

2.4.4 The ‘invisible’ Bedoun.

In the light of the definitions above, I believe that the Human Rights Watch (1995) definition was the most suitable entry point for study of the Bedoun. The more recent work by Beaugrand (2010, 2014a) who appears to be the only scholar who has completed a doctoral thesis about the Bedoun as a stand-alone subject, positioned the Bedoun as one of many groups of migrants in Kuwait, without ethnic ‘issues.’ There are three problematic themes in Beaugrand’s work. First, a preoccupation with the notion that the Bedoun population is ‘invisible’ (Beaugrand, 2010, p.16, 17, 20, 140, 161; 2011, p.228, 237). Second, persistent claims claim that government policy is ‘incoherent’ or has ‘zero coherence’ in place of interrogation of that policy (Beaugrand, 2011, p.236, 2014b, p.737; a similar approach has been taken by al Nakib, F., 2014, 2016). Third, an impression the Bedoun are not part of Kuwait’s Bedouin community but a distinct group, citing that there is little overlap between them (Beaugrand, 2010, p.17-18) which seems to be the basis for her claiming that ethnicity has no bearing on the Bedoun (Beaugrand, 2014a).

The inscription in Beaugrand’s (2010, p.14) introduction to her doctoral thesis was: ‘Open Secrets: Discernable but not Publishable (Khuri, 2007:120).’ This strange comment seems to explain the author’s reliance on invisibility and incoherence of government policy as explanations for the Bedoun’s situation. Beaugrand concluded in her advice to the Home Office, ‘as for the role of the nationality committees, [it was a] rather untidy process that led to nationality granting’ (Beaugrand, 2014a p.3; italics added). In this thesis, I explain the ‘rather untidy process’ that led to Hadar nationality grants and the Bedoun’s statelessness, via the nationality committees (Chapter 7, sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2). It was this very process that helps us to gain better understanding of the serious impact that ethnic differences have had on the deprivation of citizenship of the Bedoun.

2.5 Recognition of the Bedoun in International Law – Historical and Current Approaches

2.5.1 Regional recognition of the Bedouin of the Middle East.

The Arab League and the United Nations organized a seminar series called ‘Social Welfare in the Arab States of the Middle East (United Nations, 1956), run alongside a large research program for the ‘Arid Zones’ (Bocco, 2006). The seminar series brought together UNESCO, the World Health Organisation, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation and the International Labour Organisation (ILO), along with the governments
of the sovereign states of the region. The states were facilitated in order to conduct formal Bedouin settlement and research programs across the Middle East (Bocco, 2006, p.303-304; Massad, 2001, p.63; Cole and Altorki, 1998, p.97). Bocco (2006, p.306) explained the contribution of the International Convention on Indigenous Tribal Populations (1957) (ILO) under which most of the academic research on the Bedouin involved in the settlement programs for national development purposes, took place:

In 1957 the fortyeth session of the ILO (attended also by FAO, WHO and UNESCO) adopted a ‘Convention for the protection and integration of aboriginal and other tribal and semi-tribal populations in independent countries’ (Convention no.107). This convention states that ‘governments will be principally responsible for undertaking a co-ordinated and systematic program to protect the concerned populations and to integrate them progressively in the life of their respective populations.’ (Bocco, 2006, p.306)

Bocco (2006) refers to of the Convention on Indigenous Tribal Populations (1957) (ILO), (Bocco, 2006, p.306). The Convention has since been replaced by the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (1989) (ILO). Although Kuwait was not an independent country at the time the first Convention was adopted, this does not diminish legitimacy of the Convention’s principles and aims.

Arab scholars from metropolitan backgrounds (the Hadar) received enormous power to influence Bedouin settlement through the research program coordinated by the ILO, and which extended to the development and monitoring of settlement programs in each sovereign state (Bocco, 2006). Kuwait was a member of these international organisations as a protectorate of the United Kingdom prior to independence (1961), while the United Kingdom had a major role in the development of these organisations, including the Arab League, in the first instance. Kuwait was never isolated from these activities. Issues pertaining to Kuwait were discussed in the fourth conference of the ‘United Nations Social Welfare Seminar for Arab States’ (United Nations, 1956), and it was included as an ‘arid zone’ in the UNESCO program. The designation of arid zones in the Middle East usually pertained to the occupation of land by the Bedouin as well as to other environmental issues (UNESCO, 1979). The state joined the ILO in 1961 and the United Nations in 1963 (United Nations Member States, 2006) after becoming an independent state. The state was also funded and assisted with its development programs for Arab Countries from 1959, including education from 1959 (UNESCO, 1959), linked to the regional policy of settling the Bedouin.

The Bedouin settlement processes included coerced and forced settlement (Bocco, 2006) which have been retrospectively analysed by some scholars as constituting a ethnocidal approach and itself (referring to ‘cultural genocide’), even when referring to indigenous tribal people who received citizenship (referring to ‘cultural genocide,’ see Anaya, 2004; Lenzerini, 2008, p.74). In this thesis, I adopt a somewhat more cautious approach. Evaluations of the concept of ‘indigenous' and the utility of indigenous people's
The rights in international law have been contested since its inception (Barsh, 1986; Kingsbury 2001). Nevertheless, these instruments were first applied to the Bedouin of the Middle East from the outset of the development of this area of law (Anaya, 2004; Barsh, 1986). The mere existence of the Convention on Indigenous Tribal Populations (1957) (ILO), (Bocco, 2006, p.306), updated by the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (1989), challenges the notion still promoted by some scholars that the Bedouin are not an indigenous people, or a national or cultural collective (an ethnic group), but merely a 'social group' with ahistorical 'lifestyle' (Fabietti, 1990, p.249 critiques this view).

Many scholars (such as al Nakib, F., 2014, p.6; Castellino and Cavanaugh, 2013, p.165-166; Cole, 2006, p.245) seem to remain entirely unaware of this regional history while promoting the ‘social group’ concept of the Bedouin, or have found it entirely irrelevant to their studies. Bocco (2006), Fabietti (2006) and Lenzerini (2008) have provided a thorough account of the connection between the Bedouin and the development of international law instruments that were designed to protect them based on their status as indigenous people. Lenzerini (2008) also comprehensively addressed the right to compensation for indigenous people who suffered due to the processes of colonisation, including reparations for cultural loss (Vrdoljak, 2008, p.197-228). Novic (2016) addresses state responsibility for cultural crimes and reparations for intended cultural harm in the context of human rights violations and international criminal law (for jus cogens crimes against humanity).

In the light of the applicability of this part of international law to the Bedouin, the regional approach to statelessness in the MENA region and Kuwait in particular, represented by Mark Manly at the UNHCR, head of the UNHCR Statelessness Unit, is most concerning. He has set himself apart from international humanitarian agencies by endorsing the administrative erasure of the Bedouin's identity integral to the Kuwait government’s plan for mass identity transfer of the Bedouin to the Comoros Islands. In response to questioning about the legitimacy of the Comoros Plan, he said,

> Granting nationality to an individual of a state with which they don't have any ties is not common. But the question is, is it permissible? Provided that it is voluntary, there is not in principle any obstacle to it. (Mark Manly, UNHCR Statelessness Unit, in ‘Kuwait: Commodifying,’ December 16, 2014)

Through this statement, Mark Manly of the UNHCR, ‘in principle,’ has given a green light to Kuwaiti authorities to implement the erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing: Weissbrodt, 2008) of the Bedouin. The Comoros Plan is discussed further in Chapter 8 and the Appendices C iii, iv, D iv, E vi, F i, iii, G iii of this thesis.

2.5.2 The indigenous Bedouin.

As I have mentioned, the notion that the Bedouin are indigenous to the Middle East, the Arabian Gulf and Kuwait, was a feature of unpublished scholarly work by Kuwaiti authors. Despite this, the concept does not appear to have ever been accepted discussion about the Bedouin at the international level. A crucial point that continues to be omitted from
anthropological or sociological study of the Kuwaiti Bedouin (Longva, 1997, 2006) and findings about Bedouin settlement in Kuwait (such as Alissa, 2013, al Nakib, F., 2014, 2016, and Beaugrand, 2014b) is the fact that mass settlement of the Bedouin in Kuwait from the 1950s and 1960s, when they were first recruited for selection by the state (Alhajeri, 2004, p. 93) was not unique or untimely, but conducted in the context of the settlement of indigenous Bedouin across the Middle East. It is likely that one of the reasons for the omission of scholarly discussion about the Bedouin as indigenous tribal people from the 1990s onwards (it is a feature of earlier Kuwaiti research), is that such dialogue actually points to the authenticity of the Bedouin’s human rights claims as a Bedouin cultural collective.

Significantly, it might also point to the conceptual elements that lie beneath the ‘other national’ ideology that was disseminated into the literature, while the Bedouin absorbed the Kuwaiti national identity. That is, exploration of the concept of the Bedouin as indigenous tribal people, despite inherent difficulties (Barsh, 1986) helps to reveal, if not to deconstruct, political ideologies which have denied the Bedouin rights as an ethnic minority and as an indigenous group and as a stateless group since the 1960s.

Some examples of approaches to Bedouin statelessness in international law, bear this out. While a law student, Castellano (2008) produced an article summarising an extensive range of approaches that could be taken in international law to help the Bedouin, including addressing the illegality of their expulsion by the state, as well as cultural, land and resource rights connected to their indigenous status and right to self-determination. Alternatively, a number of scholars of international law have approached the Bedouin's situation from the point of view that the group are indigenous, and have then gone on to analyse the ramifications of the physical expulsion of the Bedouin (Doebbler, 2002; Weissbrodt, 2008). While their findings have been quite limited because there appears to have been little historical research undertaken by these scholars, and they have not explored the ramifications of their findings in the local community, they have quite clearly evaluated that the Bedouin are victims of physical and cultural destruction. I discuss these contributions further in section 2.7, below.

In another approach, Castellino and Cavanaugh (2013) have written one of the most comprehensive accounts on minority rights in the Middle East to date, but authors did not perceive commonality between the Bedouin in general (any Bedouin aside from the Negev - Palestine region) and/or stateless groups and indigenous groups. They authors were most perturbed by the potential for indigenous people in the Middle East to claim self-determination (p.53, para. 2), while they utilized particularly evasive language to describe stateless people, actually evading use of the term 'stateless' (p.52, para. 3). Ultimately, the work was highly conscious of the national security of Middle East states, emphasising territoriality over cultural collectivism. The work demonstrated the same conservative bias toward Bedouin tribal people reflected in the colonialist approach of days gone by (see Aurenche, 1993 and Lancaster and Lancaster, 1998, for critique of this approach). The
Bedoun potentially fitted into a number of categories outlined by the authors: trapped minorities, ethnic and national minorities, and for the Kuwaiti Bedouin population as a whole, the problem of the majoritarian minority.

Castellino and Cavanaugh (2013, p.166, n128) cited the van Waas (2010) research paper, *The Situation of Stateless Persons in the Middle East and North Africa* commissioned for the UNHCR, which blamed the indigenous Bedouin's statelessness on their 'way of life' that had the effect of 'leaving some stateless' as 'migrants' (p.3) – in their own lands. Fabietti (1990, p.249) has criticized such ahistorical, ‘lifestyle’ characterisations of Bedouin dispossession in the Middle East. Additionally, van Waas (2010) blamed 'a large, but unknown number of stateless children in the MENA region who failed to acquire a nationality' (p.5) amidst laws delimiting citizenship, rather than attributing responsibility to sovereign states who denied children citizenship by virtue of their enactment of laws discriminatory laws and failure to reform such law.

Thus, the UNHCR (van Waas, 2010) response has been disappointing, due to a preoccupation with attributing the cause of statelessness onto the Bedouin, while simply ignoring the evidence. A report commissioned for the UNCHR by Van Waas (2010) ignored historical data about the roles of the international organisations including the United Nations own agencies including UNESCO, the ILO, the Arab League, the World Bank (among others) who were involved in the early Bedouin settlement and citizenship programs established throughout the Middle East (Bocco, 2006; Fabietti, 2006; Gilbert, 2011). The development of international laws protecting the Bedouin's rights as indigenous, tribal and semi-tribal groups (Bocco, 2006), principally the *International Convention on Indigenous Tribal Populations* (1957) (ILO) and the *Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention* (1989) (ILO) was also ignored. Van Waas (2010) also ignored the work of other scholars of international law who had previously analysed the Bedouns’ situation and contextualised the deprivation of their human rights in terms of the targeting of their indigenous identity, heritage and restrictive controls diminishing their capacity to found families and sustain their populations, indicative of organised, sytematic repression and cultural destruction (such as Doebbler, 2002; Weissbrodt, 2008). Van Waas (2010) lacked reference to academic research and did not conduct fieldwork with stateless people in their home countries (p.47-56).

The UNHCR Statelessness Unit has been unable to meaningfully incorporate of the sub-disciplines of indigenous rights, minority rights and statelessness protections to analyse the situation of statelessness in the MENA region. Other scholars who support the rights of indigenous people, do not seem to have experienced the same conceptual limitations. Thus, far more information about the Bedouin’s right to protection as a stateless, group can be found in the literature of international law concerning indigenous people and other ethnic minorities, including former United Nations staff, compared to efforts made to ‘solve the problem’ of statelessness in the MENA region that have addressed the Bedouin.
Former UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous People, S. James Anaya (2004, 2009) produced seminal texts on indigenous rights in international law, involving an integrated approach to the protection of indigenous people and minorities inherently connected to the right to self-determination, with a focus on case studies. Texts by Anaya (2004, 2009) provide special insight into the interpretive models used by authorities and the situation of indigenous people that are sometimes not well understood by non-indigenous groups, such as limits to their ability to assert their claims imposed by outsiders due to long-term social and cultural criminalisation and oppression. Based on my limited reading, Lenzerini (2008) offers one of the most comprehensive and sophisticated accounts of the development of indigenous law including coverage of tribal and semi-tribal people (p.80) that was historically applied to the Bedouin of the Middle East (Bocco, 2006) in the context of their ‘development’ in the modern world (Fabietti, 2006). Such an approach might be a good fit for potential Bedoun claims in Kuwait, one which could help to educate the government and citizens of Kuwait, of the historical right of the Bedoun’s belonging to the nation.

To date, the international law protecting minorities from discrimination has been the main approach adopted by international humanitarian agencies in reports about the Bedouin to the United Nations Committee on Human Rights. The outcome of this approach has been disappointing as clearly, it has not produced any consistent, widespread improvement conditions for the Bedouin. I suggest that one of the major reasons for this is the weakness in conceptualisation of the Bedouin as a discriminated ‘social group’ or group of ‘stateless people,’ who have been subject to ‘racial’ discrimination from another group (of Kuwaitis) that is assumed to be of the same or similar ‘race.’ This conceptual approach is confusing; it has ignored analysis of the cultural differences between the Bedouin and Hadar and the influence of the ethnic conflict therein, on the Bedoun’s situation. Alnajjar (1984, p.66, 79) theorised the Kuwaiti Bedouin as an ethnic group which contained tribal, ethnic minorities who were cultural groups of political significance. Arguably, this was framework could have served the Bedoun much better in the human rights context, as it would have minimised the ensuing vagueness about the Bedoun’s identity (Alhajeri, 2015; Kennedy, 2014, 2015a, 2015b).

Similarly, the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954) and the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961) have also had little impact on the Bedoun’s situation. Additionally, Manly's promotion of the UNHCR's role in 'awareness raising' (Edwards and van Waas, 2014) belies the fact that the organisation has no relationship whatsoever with the Bedouin in Kuwait (H. al Fadhli, Ahmadi, personal communications, 17 November, 2014; M. al Anezi, London, personal communications, 26 December 2014; community representatives P09 and P12; this was confirmed at the UNHCR First Global Forum on Statelessness at The Hague, 14-17 October, 2014). The current position can be contrasted with the UNHCR’s practical assistance to Bedoun refugees in the
1980s after they were first expelled by the state (see section 2.5, below). For this reason, the approach to Bedouin people and the Bedoun in particular demonstrated by the UNHCR (van Waas, 2010) and the UNHCR statelessness unit (Manly in Edwards and van Waas, 2014) since the Arab Spring (above) is especially instructive. It points to reasons the state Kuwait has never felt sufficiently pressured by the United Nations Human Rights Committee’s recommendations on the Bedoun over the past twenty-five years to move beyond it's stance of rejecting the international law concept of statelessness as \textit{a priori} to rejecting the Bedoun's claims (Appendices E, iii, iv), even though the Bedoun community has increased it's effectiveness in communicating the state's breaches in international law, to the international community.

Kuwait is a signatory but has not ratified, the \textit{Rome Statute the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010)} (17 July, 1998). As I have mentioned, current frameworks used by international humanitarian organisations have resisted extended discussion of the Bedoun's indigenous status, likely due to the possibility that the Bedoun's claims may turn out to be sufficiently substantive enough, to be heard as an Advisory Opinion in the International Criminal Court (see Novic, 2016). Short (2010) has pointed out: 'There is insufficient serious discussion of culturally destructive processes, which do not involve direct physical killing or violence, through the lens of genocide' (p.831). The fact that the Bedoun have endured systematic killing and violence and the radical diminishment of their population, as well as the recasting of their identity via administrative ethnic cleansing, suggests that consideration of the Bedoun as at threat of genocide, is long overdue. Historical data collated in the Appendix as well as the qualitative interview analysis in this research should provide new opportunities to scholars to consider this possibility, and to challenge the complacency of the United Nations to the Bedoun's suffering (Doebbler, 2002) in light of this new information.

\textbf{2.6 Segregation Policies}

From the outset of the Bedouin desert settlement camps, segregation was viewed as required to prevent the Bedouin infiltrating the Hadar urban space with their social practices (al Moosa,1976), which might disrupt already-established Hadar culture and power structures in Kuwait. The state of Kuwait departed from the approaches of all other states in the region, under the pressure of Hadar and other Arab nationalists from 1965 (al Mdaires, 2010). Segregation would separate the northern tribes’ desert dweller from the urbanite permanently, symbolized by the city wall or fortress (al sour) dividing the desert dweller from the Hadar, who claim a distinctive cultural identity as ‘elite’ (al Anezi, 1989; Ghabra, 2014) liberal, ‘urbanite’ progressives (al Nakib, F., 2014; Ghabra, 2014). Segregation would ensure that the Bedouin would never be able to overcome their isolation. Physical segregation was established through the Bedouin settlement program and committees formed to manage the population (Appendix D, ii), while the ideology of the Bedoun ‘foreigner’ and ‘other national’ became embedded in society (al Anezi, 1989).
The Bedoun and some citizens of the northern tribes were then physically separated from other Bedouin via the state housing program (al Moosa, 1976; al Zaher, 1990). Physical segregation was just the first step in Bedoun containment. Hill (1969, 1973) was the first scholar who observed that Kuwaiti society had been subjected to physical segregation, through the alteration of commissioned city plans. The segregation policy was not a sign of mere bureaucratic ‘chaos’ (Alissa, 2013; al Nakib, 2016), but a carefully planned and organised interference strategy. Thus, the formation of the committees should be seen in the context of their long-running existence, rather as separate units. I have collated the series of committees beginning from 1962, in Appendix D, ii. The Municipality of Kuwait was one of the groups responsible for the surveillance of all Bedouin from 1962. The institution continued to be instrumental in the Bedouin’s surveillance and management after re-labelling of the Committee to ‘Shanty Clearance’ and ‘Illegal Dwellings,’ from 1974. Ultimately the Municipality of Kuwait gained sufficient power to operate independently from government, along Arab nationalist political lines (al Mdaires, 2010).

Where and when did the ideology of Bedouin segregation arise? The Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) gave the Hadar pre-eminence by limiting the right to vote to themselves, while limiting the admission of new citizens to the state. Naturally, this satisfied conservative, Kuwaiti Hadar nationalists. Vigorous dissemination and cross-fertilisation of political ideas and allegiances ideas took place among the more conservative Kuwaiti Hadar and those with Arab nationalist leanings, at this time (al Mdaires, 2010). Arab nationalists began to openly lobby for the exclusion of the Bedouin from Kuwaiti citizenship from as early as 1965 (al Mdaires, 2010), prior to the closure of the first round of citizenship grants being distributed from 1961 to 1966 (al Anezi, 1989). This political position involved arguments urging resistance to assimilation of the Bedouin into Kuwaiti society at the policy level, promoted by Arab nationalists in 1965 and 1971 (al Khatib, 1978 and al Nafisi, 1978, in al Mdaires, 2010 and al Qatami in al Tuwaijri, 1996) in particular.

The government program to distribute citizenship to the Bedouin in settlement programs also commenced in 1965, according to Zahir, 1985, p.53 (in Stanton Russell, 1989, p.34), reflecting the practice of the other Middle Eastern states to ensure the formerly nomadic, tribal Bedouin became permanently settled citizens and were not marginalised in the process. This was the UNESCO mandate, although it did not always manifest according to plan (Bocco, 2006). But regardless of governments’ attempt to settle the Bedouin in line with regional protocols organized by the Arab League, the Bedouin community were maligned by external, political influences from the Hadar (from the Kuwaiti and other Arab national populations). These influences were brought to bear on the ruling family and the parliament, from the very beginning of the birth of the modern state. Finally, the Bedoun’s fate was sealed with al Gonaim et al., (1991) and a group of Hadar intellectuals, who introduced law to restrict the Bedouin ethnic group from receiving citizenship in Kuwait on the basis of their ethnicity (which I discuss further below). The Bedouin segregation policy
was representative of extreme nationalist ideologies characteristic of 'the destructive legacy of Arab liberals' promoted under the guise of the called the ‘pro-democracy’ movement (Massad, March 30, 2015).

2.6.1 The Bedoun ‘illegal residents.’

Beaugrand (2010) has taken the starting point for the ‘illegal residents’ term to mean they are migrants from other countries, with Bedoun ‘illegality’ derived from the expulsion policy document that appeared in ‘The Study,’ (2003). Other researchers describe the government’s approach as a sudden and unexpected policy change (Longva, 1997, Alnajjar, 2001, Alhajeri, 2004). But the term ‘illegal residents’ was used describe the settlement of all Bedouin in Kuwait who relinquished their nomadic pattern from 1965 (Zhou, 1976, p.60). Zhou’s (1976) reference to the Bedouin population being ‘illegal residents’ dated back to 1965, the same year that Sharon Stanton Russell (1989) referred to as the beginning of the formal government settlement programs for the Bedouin, which included the mass naturalisation program (Zahir, 1985: 53 in Stanton Russell, 1989, p.34). This indicated that the Bedouin were subject to attempts to push them out of Kuwait, from the beginning of their participation in the government settlement program from 1965, when they were in the process of being naturalized en masse under government policy. Although this framing by Zhou (1976) may have been merely a perception of history, it was certainly aligned with the development of Nationalist bloc policies from 1965 until 1992, described above.

2.6.2 The Bedoun ‘squatter’ and ‘slum dweller.’

A major difference between settlement programs in the Middle East region generally, and those in Kuwait, appears to be that the Bedouin, and the Bedoun in particular, were relocated to housing projects that were unfit for human habitation (al Moosa, 1976; al Zaher, 1990). The conditions were described as so detrimental to human life, and the issue was debated by academics, planners and housing authorities from the 1960s (Hill, 1969, 1973; Shiber, 1964; Sholz, 1975) and in the Kuwaiti newspapers during the 1970s. The homes were equivalent to ‘graves’ that would kill their Bedouin occupants (quoted from al Talea, 1974 in al Zaher, 1990, p.201). They appeared to be intentionally planned leave their occupants with no choice but to vacate (Shiber, 1964, p.227) and return to their desert environs, which al Moosa (1976) later demonstrated was actually occurring. In contrast to the conditions for protecting the Bedouin agreed to by regional organisations and sovereign states (Bocco, 2006, p.306; Gilbert, 2011), influential Hadar bureaucrats and academics were openly hostile to Bedouin development and social inclusion, even though their merchant families had historically profited from the Bedouin workforce and had been involved in their organised settlement in Kuwait (Alhajeri, 2004, p.38). They described government’s attempt to provide a legitimate development program for the indigenous Bedouin, impoverished and under-developed but more crucially, as pointless and a waste of Kuwait’s resources (Alawadi, 1980, p.339; Alessa, 1981, p.83). While this may have been true to some extent,
the authors clearly blamed the Bedouin for the problem, on the basis of their cultural attributes.

Photographs taken at the time tend certainly never indicated the areas were ‘slums’ in the widely known sense of general impoverishment or disorganisation (see photographs taken by al Moosa, 1976, al Zaher, 1990, and as part of the fieldwork in this study, in Appendix H). But crucially, this portrayal was not a call for improved conditions for the Bedouin, but a positivist description of an entirely different population segment as illegal migrants (Zhou, 1976, p.57). It is arguable the approach formed a discursive strategy to justify removing the Bedouin from the state, using false labelling to change their identity from indigenous Bedouin to ‘illegal residents’ and ‘migrants.’ This form of labelling would ultimately lead to the shift of identity of the Bedouin to ‘non-Kuwaiti,’ other Arabs in the National Census (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994 in Appendix D, iii; see also Maktabi, 1992). This trajectory is illustrated in Appendices B, ii and C, i.

The term ‘illegal residents’ was applied to the Bedouin ‘who were ‘squatting’ in the country’s territory from 1965 (Zhou, 1976, p.60). In response, the Higher Committee of Shanty Clearance was established in 1970 to deal with the ‘illegal settlements’ (in al Zaher, 1990, p.203). It appeared to be the first government body established to manage the Bedouin as a separate group of the northern tribes (who would become Bedouin), in contrast to, or as a second-generation tier of, the 1965 Bedouin settlement program. A continuous chain of committees was formed thereafter, to control the population (see Appendix D, ii). Al Khatib (1978) had called for the ‘evacuation’ of desert settlements, their ‘eradication’ forever, complaining that the Bedouin shanty housing was disturbing the aesthetic ‘appearance’ of the nation (in al Zaher, 1990, p.192). The Bedouin ‘squatters’ became labelled as migrant ‘slum dwellers’ who lived in ‘slums’ (in Alawadi 1980, p.339). Note the conceptual shift in the portrayal of the Bedouin by these authors, from rejection of the Bedouin occupation of desert territory where the tribes were socially organised according to their own customary law, to rejection of temporary labour migrants who lived in a state of poverty and social disorganisation. In fact the tribal customary law had regulated their occupation of such lands for hundreds of years to the end of the Ottoman period (Abu Hakima, 1983). Kuwaiti law also respected this custom until 1987 (on the assumption that any Bedouin held has retained privileged access to their collective tribal lands), when the Bedouin were first prohibited from transiting freely between Kuwait and other states (al Anezi, 1989).

The Bedoun ‘problem’ of ‘illegal’ residents was constructed through developmental ‘urban planning’ discourse. The new language was changed to match developmental discourses about city slums, redirecting attention away from the indigenous Bedouin (and their rights to citizenship, land and access to public resources set out in regional agreements) and toward illegal migrant workers. The transition was described thus: ‘a particular class of migrant, the Bedouins, whom it [government] wants to settle’ (Zhou, 1976, p.59). This pushed the social problem into an entirely new area of scholarly study and policy discourse.
The promotion of the Bedouin as a migrant ‘social problem’ obscured the Bedouin identity of the Bedouin, who were selected out of the desert settlements and subjected to physical segregation and hardship through this process. Hence, the Bedouin ‘problem’ seems to have been physically and conceptually constructed at around the same time, through political and ‘urban planning’ policy and practice initiated by intellectuals.

Recent academic work on the Bedouin in Kuwait has taken a similar approach (see also my discussion regarding the use of term 'bidun' in this chapter, in section 2.1, above). Beaugrand (2011) stated the areas where the Bedouin life are ‘typical of Third World slums’ featuring piles of refuse (p.239). Beaugrand (2010, p.163) showed two close-up photos of segregated Bedouin settlements in Kuwait, with no rubbish to be seen. Although there are areas of uncollected rubbish in these areas, this is due to lack of municipal rubbish collection, and it is certainly not spread throughout the streets. Alissa (2013, p.56) referred to the Bedouin as ‘squatters’ today, where some Bedouin have rented homes in Ahmadi since they were expelled from their homes (which they owned) (al Zaher, 1990) after the war. Alissa (2013) presented a view that no Bedouin – citizen or stateless – had a ‘right’ to live in Ahmadi, due to ‘cultural conservatism’ (p.57). She showed photographs of a present-day Bedouin home, comparing it with an expatriate home, to illustrate the Bedouin ‘problem’ (Alissa, 2013, p.56; Figure 10, right). The photograph by the author was taken from the back lanes, and simply showed trees that had not been pruned behind a fence. Furthermore, it was not indicative of typical homes which still have open yards and gardens, like the KOC Archive photograph on the left. I travelled around the suburb on a number of occasions during my fieldwork in 2014.

2.6.3 The strategy to deprive the Bedouin of education.

The work of Raphael Patai (1976) *The Arab Mind*, particularly the author’s negative regard for the ‘uncivilized’ Bedouin, seems to have made quite an impression on Kuwaiti scholars. Picking up on al Moosa’s (1976) concept of ‘the Bedouin personality,’ Alessa (1981, p.183) extended it to the ‘Bedouin attitude,’ the antithesis to education and learning. An adult literacy program was established in Kuwait in the 1960s (al Zaher, 1990) to teach the Bedouin, because generally speaking, they had never gone to school. They did not have the same access to education as the Hadar city-dwellers, who could attend overseas universities as fee-payers courtesy of government.

Al Moosa’s (1976) study was ambivalent, however, for he provided material in his discussion that was contrary to his conclusions, showing the Bedouin had displayed a capacity for training, acquiring skills, self-education, and were capable of advancement in the workforce (p.43, 67, 149, 158, 170, 214-215, 254, 317). Some had successfully taught themselves to read and write in preparation for the police force entrance test, while others rose to supervisory level at Kuwait Oil Company. Alessa (1981, p.83) announced the program of adult literacy training a ‘failure,’ laying total blame on the Bedouin students. He
announced, ‘One cannot change people’s behaviour and attitudes through building more schools and vocational centres – one must start with changing people’s attitudes’ (Alessa, 1981, p.83). The Bedouin children had never had access to primary schools from the desert settlements, due to lack of provision of public resources that would have enabled them to go to school nearby, or to travel to schools closer to Kuwait City (al Moosa, 1976; al Zaher, 1990).

Some aspects of Alessa’s (1981) argument were reasonable: literacy training for children is more sensible for all parties, compared to literacy training for adults which is harder to achieve. But because Bedouin adults found it difficult to acquire literacy skills, Alessa (1981) argued that the Bedouin should receive no education at all, and that no further public spending should be wasted on educating their expanding population. Alessa (1981) was quite aware of the suffering that his suggestion would impose, because his work shows that he regarded himself highly as an effective education planner. He used the platform of Bedouin education ‘failure’ to promote his unique, monolithic bureaucracy (Alessa, 1981, p. 83). The plan removed the prospect of citizenship – and public education – from the Bedouin. The plan proposed instead, to invest Kuwait’s resources in an extensive and fully funded primary school system for other Arab national children (Alessa, 1981, p.109 -111). Alessa (1981) attempted to set out his segregation plan logically and convincingly, but it was full of essential gaps that would ensure the Bedouin were not protected from his policy reforms, but targeted for exclusion. Furthermore, the approach was not aimed at the long-term development of everyone in Kuwaiti society, but for rushed segregation of the Bedouin of the 1980s. Alessa (1981) was unwilling to wait just one generation for every Bedouin child to receive primary school education, which would have largely overcome the community’s illiteracy thereafter.

Alessa's (1981) policy was later crystallised into a racist, anti-Bedouin dogma, posing as a local, economic rationalist doctrine, on the eve of the Iraqi invasion. Arab nationalist al Naqeeb (1990, p.129) urged the international community to understand the 'pathology' of Gulf society as the Bedouin were about to be killed, tortured and driven out of Kuwait (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1992). Al Naqeeb (1990) explained why no Bedouin child should be allowed to be educated:

> Whoever believes that the spread of education and mass media in the long run weakens tribal, sectarian or local geographical allegiances is mistaken, since the opposite is true. The spread of education in the Gulf and Arab countries leads to their becoming more firmly and deeply rooted in what we may call the tribal consciousness… All of this pours into the general channel of the structural crisis which reveals a number of pathological symptoms… undoubtedly the result of the decline of the socialist and Arab nationalist current… when society lost its spirit. (al Naqeeb, 1990, p.127-128)
The basic tenets of this political philosophy have continued to be repeated and recycled by authors such as al Ansari (in al Qatari, February 22, 2010), al Khandari and al Hadben (2010) in connection with the provision of education to the Bedouin (including the Bedoun) in Kuwait.

2.6.4 The strategy of depriving the Bedoun of citizenship.

Alessa (1981, p.106) warned that the Bedouin who had not yet received citizenship (the Kuwaiti Bedoun) would not be so ‘easily satisfied’ with their modest lifestyle after both parents and children were urbanised and educated (p.109). The Bedouin posed the danger of expanding the citizen base, while the government policy to grant citizenship to them was in place. Alessa’s (1981) approach was well aligned with Kuwaiti Hadar values, which sought to limit the citizen base at all costs (Alnajjar in Manea, 2011, p.149, interview with the author). In this equation, the Hadar elite perceived that the maintenance of their special status over the Bedouin in Kuwaiti society is worth oppression, loss freedom and lack of social equity for the whole of society (Alnajjar and Selvik, 2016), because the ‘elite’ suffer little from the oppression of the authoritarian regime, and nor do they consider themselves as gaining anything from equity with their fellow men and women under democracy.


After Al Moosa (1976, p.319) concluded that the Bedouin should be fully integrated into Kuwaiti society but that the policy to give citizenship should be reconsidered (p.321) (once again, put on hold at the political level). Alessa (1981, p.106) then refined the ideas: the Bedouin could not adapt to settled life (p.2) and citizenship should be withheld from them permanently (p.108, 109). Alessa’s (1981) suggestions for reform of the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) was based on his overall assessment that the Bedouin were unfit for integration into Kuwaiti society, while other Arab nationals could take their place without the state having to educate them. Essentially, Alessa (1981) portrayed the ‘Manpower Problem
in Kuwait’ as a Bedouin problem that would be ‘solved’ by making those remaining Bedouin who had not yet received citizenship perpetually stateless, simply ignoring the consequences.

Al Moosa (1976) and Alessa (1981) showed exactly how and where the line could be drawn, through the Bedouin population. Along with the carefully planned intervention of nationalist, intellectual-politicians to cease further mass grants of citizenship to the Bedouin (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994), the ‘Manpower’ policy, would ensure the Bedouin would never receive citizenship as a large group due to ethnic targeting. But the ethnic targeting policy was not the end of mass grants of citizenship in Kuwait. Citizenship would continue to be granted to en masse to thousands of others who were already citizens of other states, instead (Alessa, 1981, p.109-111). According to al Naqeeb’s (1990) nostalgic, socialist sentiments, such a strategy might restore the ‘spirit of society’ (al Naqeeb sought the Bedouin’s exclusion from his vision of the pan-Arab nation). Hence, in the academic arena, promotion of dual citizenship of Kuwaiti citizens was historically not a Bedouin concept (the ‘lost their passports’ stereotype of Crystal, 1992, p.75), but a Hadar concept envisioned for the benefit of the Hadar.

Through the administrative expulsion document (‘The Study,’ 2003), the policy to eradicate the Bedouin was shifted to immigration and population control, re-inventing the Bedouin’s identity as ‘illegal migrants,’ subject to heavier surveillance than ever before (Human Rights Watch, 1995). Al Moosa (1976, p.100) had suggested the possibility that government could shift the identity of the Bedouin from the ‘non-Kuwaiti’ and ‘other Arab national’ category in the national census, while aware that the Bedouin had no nationality at all. The expulsion from the census gave a sense of finality and closure, sealing the 1986 administrative expulsion with formal recognition that the Bedouin were no longer officially regards as Kuwaitis, nor Bedouin.

The twin strategies were implemented as a national policy in 1992. The Academic Team for Population Policy (al Gonaim et al., 1991), a group of elite intellectuals that included Alessa (1981), introduced the ‘Supreme Planning Council Resolution No.11, 1992.’ It removed the ability of the Bedouin ethnic group to receive citizenship en masse from 1992 (see Appendix D, i). The national census was amended to list the Bedouin as ‘other Arabs nationals,’ but the shift was backdated to 1985, to prior to the administrative expulsion, coinciding with introduction of the nationalist economic policy, called Kuwaitization (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, see Appendix D, iii). The so-called ‘academic team’ accessed the Supreme Planning Council and the Prime Minister directly; the function of the team (to bypass parliament) was set out in the ‘Manpower’ policy (Alessa, p.111-116, including figure 5.1).

2.7 Physical and Cultural Destruction

2.7.1 The administrative expulsion of the Bedouin (1986).

Two factors combined to allocate the Bedouin to a deportable status. The policy paper in 1986 (‘The Study,’ 2003) shifted the Bedouin who had not yet received citizenship
(the Bedoun) to the status of ‘illegal residents,’ implemented during a period of extra-
constitutional rule. Combined with the program to change their nationality (‘status
adjustment’) from 1983, the Bedoun could be exited from the country as migrants of other
nations, recorded as ‘other nationals.’ The exit flow would be difficult, if not impossible, to
trace on national statistics. The 1986 plan set out the process for government to withdraw
public service employment, so that the Bedoun would then have no protection from
deporation, rendering them ‘illegal’ in the absence of a work permit from a private sector
employer (‘The Study,’ 2003). But the Bedoun were not expatriate nationals. Those who did
not already work in the private sector for oil companies (prior to nationalisation of Kuwait
Oil Company) were in virtually no position at all to acquire expatriate jobs, because they
lacked formal education and had no access to other Arab expatriate job networks. But
additionally, unionised Arab nationals for whom Arab nationalists lobbied for citizenship at
the expense of the Bedoun (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1989), dominated such
networks (al Najjar, 1983). Therefore, it was unlikely such networks would have any
interest in supplying the Bedoun with jobs. Therefore, the Bedoun would not be inclined to
receive private sector employment or work permits, enabling them to be removed from the
country en masse along with their dependents.

A range of other expulsion measures linked to the 1986 policy document were
introduced between 1983 to 1993, depriving the Bedoun of their human rights on multiple
levels (Human rights Watch, 1991a, 1995; see also Appendix E, i). The strategy attempted to
force the Bedoun to leave the country, by forcing upon them conditions that would make
them unable make a living or to sustain family life. The problem with this aspect of the 1986
plan was that the Bedoun were stateless - there was nowhere for them to go after state
borders were closed to nomadic tribes people across the Middle East in 1987 (Group 29,
2012) and this was one of the reasons why regional settlement of the Bedouin had involved
grants of citizenship (Fabietti, 2006; Kark and Frantzman, 2012). The concept of the
‘Bedouin expatriate’ (discussed above) was projected onto the Bedoun through the 1986
plan. They were to be regarded not only as ‘illegal residents’ but specifically within the
context of the illegal, temporary, foreign national worker, whether there was anywhere ‘else’
for them to be deported to as ‘illegal residents,’ or not.

The expulsion process placed the permanently settled Bedoun into a process of
migration population planning that ostensibly sought to control expatriate foreign-national
populations entering the country on temporary work permits. The administrative expulsion
of the Bedoun was connected to a variety of ministries who coordinated their efforts - chiefly
the housing planning bureaucracy, department of statistics, migration and labour affairs
planning (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994). The so-called policy change of 1986
was not a ‘secret decree’ (Beaugrand, 2010, p.150) or sudden, inexplicable policy change
(Longva, 1997, p.51). It was a long-term project coveted by academics and ministry
bureaucrats, headed by the Supreme Planning Council, which had begun at least as far back

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as 1974, when Kuwait’s Municipal Council set its sights on the eradication of Bedouin desert settlements (al Moosa, 1976; al Zaher, 1990). Beaugrand’s (2010, p.150) statement the Bedoun had to produce a ‘valid passport’ at this time was misleading; the type of passport that had to be produced, was any passport belonging to a foreign country (al Anezi, 1989) which, the author was aware, was likely to be fraudulent and obtained under duress and blatant government instruction (Beaugrand, 2010, p.154-156; WikiLeaks US Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, November 26, 2006). Clearly, the difference was absolutely crucial, because the Bedoun were stateless, which government knew (al Haroon, 1976; al Haddad, 1981; Alshayeji 1988; Alhajeri, 2004). I believe that it is more likely that the policy document published in al Talea (‘The Study,’ 2003) was part of, or an annexe to, a national migration policy developed in a Cabinet report entitled, Government Agenda, Development Plan 1985/1986 – 1989/1990, Vol 1: General Framework (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, n11) than any kind of ‘secret decree’ (Beaugrand, 2010, p.150).

2.7.2 The ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun (1990-1995).

Some authors in the social sciences have argued that the Bedoun’s population reduction by some 150,000 from 1990 to 1995, was attributable to the population voluntarily ‘leaving’ Kuwait (Ghabra, 1997a; Tétreault and al Mughni, 1995, p.69). These authors presented the government view of the Bedoun, and were not concerned with providing any counter argument to discount the known ethnic cleansing (Fineman, November 2, 1992) and population purification including 'loyalty tests' (Evans, February 28, 1991). Some foreign journalists resisted walking the government line and seem to have reported what they saw (Cushman, June 30, 1991, July 16, 1991; Evans, February 28, 1991; Fineman, November 2, 1992; Gasperini, August 20, 1991; Lorch, May 12, 1991; Wilkinson, May 20, 1991) preceding the coverage of the Bedoun issue by international human rights organisations (Amnesty International 1992, 1994, 1996; Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1992, 1993, 1994). Furthermore, Mason (2010) pointed out that any notions of non-Kuwaiti citizens from the targeted ethnic groups ‘leaving’ Kuwait at this time (1990-1995) should be contextualised against the state’s ‘systematic campaign of terror’ (p.124) which was implemented in order to force those who were not killed, to exit the country (see also Gasperini, August 20, 1991; and Wilkinson, May 20, 1991). Lorch (May 12, 1991) appears to be the first Western source who discovered the Bedoun and observed that the Kuwaiti government had begun administratively expelling them prior to the invasion.

Henckaerts (1995) observed that the physical expulsion of the Kuwaiti Bedoun, Palestinians, Jordanians, and Iraqis was instigated by the state of Kuwait at the highest level of government. Weissbrodt (2008) acknowledged the indigenous status of the Kuwaiti Bedoun was responsible for their transformation into a contemporaneous stateless population due to the historical domination of non-indigenous arrivals (the Hadar), equating the expulsions with the ideological roots of ethnic cleansing (Schechler, 1993, p.239). Weissbrodt’s (2008) interpretation was comparable to the entrapment of Palestinians under
Israeli rule. Conklin (2014) focused on the exclusion of the group as Bedouins. He focused on the strategy of denying birth registration as a form of administrative violence (Conklin, 2014, p.101) that was used to perpetuate statelessness and misery.

El Najjar (2001) discussed the expulsion of the Palestinian and Kuwaiti Bedoun population by Kuwaiti authorities, but his perspective was fairly limited to the Palestinian population. Alnajjar (2001) discussed the general decline in human rights standards following the war, citing the expulsions as one of three areas in need of attention, along with freedom of the press and the need to recover prisoners of war from Iraq. In their study on lost opportunities from the post-war reconstruction phase, Barakat and Skelton (2014) frequently referred to the Kuwaiti Bedoun. The authors (Barakat and Skelton, 2014) were critical of government and the political ‘elite’ who had undermined post-war reconciliation, but they did not address population ‘purification’ aspect of the national immigration policy or the ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun, at all.

Doebbler’s (2002) study was insightful, comparing the problem of the Kuwaiti Bedoun to the Kurds of Syria and Palestinians (p.540), emphasising the failure of regional attempts to resolve the issue (p.541), the failure of the government’s attempts to resolve the issue (p.543), and the inability of the UNHCR to help the collective via referral to other agencies within the United Nations, or to assist individuals when they attempted to flee Kuwait. The UNHCR assisted 1,300 individual cases of Kuwaiti Bedoun refugees up to 1981, but the organisation has not acted to help the population as a endangered social group as a whole (Doebbler, 2002, p.544, n.128) likely because they are not displaced but in fact, resisting displacement. Crucially, Doebbler (2002) observed that while the Kurds and Palestinians had re-invigorated their populations in the wake of expulsion by having families, the Bedoun were demographically diminished by expulsion from which they had never recovered their population numbers (Doebbler, 2002, p.547). This issue is still one of the most serious problems still faced by the Kuwaiti Bedoun: the destruction of the population to the extent that it cannot replace itself. This problem warrants urgent consideration, including analysis within frameworks of ethnic cleansing and genocide (refer also to my comments about the UNHCR in section 2.5 above).

The Bedoun are marked out by the sheer scope of their oppression and suffering compared to all other stateless groups. Weissbrodt and Collins (2006, p.264) examined the obstacles and hardships faced by stateless groups. The Bedoun were unique compared to all other groups they compared, because they featured in examples in almost every type of obstacle and hardship experienced by such groups. Sokoloff and Lewis (2005, p.5, 6) explained that the persecution of the Bedoun after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq was organised as an act of retaliation against the ethnic group. Various opinions about the numbers that need to be involved for an event or events to be called an ‘ethnic cleansing’ or ‘genocide,’ and the nature of subtypes of ethnic cleansing and genocides (such as ethnocide) are worth considering as far as they may apply to the Bedoun’s experience.
Such arguments are characteristic of theoretical diversity among scholars (Campbell, 2009; Chalk and Jonassohn, 1990; Fein, 2007), but the proportion of the population eradicated rather than the total number of deaths/transfers seems to be the more significant factor, with around fifty percent of the Bedoun population eradicated from the state between 1990 to 1995 (Human Rights Watch, 1995; Ghabra, 1997b) due to a single but protracted ethnic cleansing event (based on figures reported in Human Rights Watch, 1995; Ghabra, 1997a).

Today, the Bedouin citizens of Kuwait comprise some fifty-five percent of the citizen population in Kuwait (‘Insulted Kuwaiti,’ 2012). The Bedoun, who formerly around the same size as the Bedouin citizen population (Human Rights Watch 1995), now comprise only roughly ten percent of the Kuwaiti population overall. The current size of the population is estimated at around 111,000 (‘Over 111,000,’ 2013) or perhaps more (Human Rights watch, 2014; Maktabi, 2015), but any certainty about the population size is impossible to obtain because formal, national statistics on the Bedoun population are not reported nationally or internationally (Car-Hill, 2013). Overall, it appears the population currently comprises around just one third of its previous numbers prior to 1990, although it is difficult to tell if the ‘official’ population numbers released by government include the administratively erased Bedoun, or not. This survey brings us up to the present-day situation of the Bedoun, in which some of the group still wait for citizenship to be granted to them, while others prepare for an uncertain future as the government of Kuwait continues with ‘status adjustment’ (Toumi, September 10, 2015), negotiates the sale of the Bedoun identity to up to three countries in the so-called Comoros Plan (‘80,000 Bedoons,’ 2016) and threatens to deport most (Comoros, Kuwait,’ 2014), or all, of the whole population (‘No Plans,’ 2014).

Scholars of international law have attempted to address the Bedouns experience of 1990-1995, but they have not used a framework that might theorize ethnic cleansing (Schechler, 1993, p.1) to date. Ethnic cleansing and genocide is very commonly found among indigenous populations (Anaya, 2004, 2009; Lenzerini, 2008; see also discussion of this issue as a form of cultural destruction by Davidson, 2012 and Short, 2010) which is one reason why indigenous law approaches may prove to be a highly useful framework for approaching the human rights deprivations and state-sanctioned violence experienced by the Bedoun. The reason may be that mass population transfer and deaths were not as well described by human rights observers compared to the acts of punitive violence. The information on deaths was also somewhat sketchy, due to incomplete death counts and also due to the merging together of attempts to enact violence, torture and killing, while deportations and mass encampments of the Bedoun also occurred, but the sites where this occurred were difficult to access (Gasperini, August 20, 1991).

For this reason, I analysed multiple sources about the events and attempted to delineate method of violence and killing (Appendix F, i, ii and iii) from expulsion and other
forms of population eradication at the ‘policy’ and/or physical level (Appendix C, i, ii, iii, iv, v, Appendix D i, ii, iii, iv, Appendix E, i, ii, iii, iv, v, vi, Appendix G, i, ii, iii, iv) to establish that there were plausible grounds for claiming that ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun occurred between 1990 and 1995. Scherrer (2008) argued against the overuse of the term ‘ethnic’ to explain mass violence but Mann (2005) and Bell-Fialkoff (1999) also show that there is still much to learn from ethnic frameworks and this seems to be especially relevant to the Bedoun, considering the delay or reluctance of scholars to analyse the Kuwaiti Bedouin in particular, as an ethnic group.

2.7.3 Erasure of the Bedoun’s history and culture.

The Chairman of the Islamic Human Right Commission, Massoud Shadjareh, has stressed that the Comoros Plan points to the destruction of the Bedoun’s history and present-day culture (Hayden, November 11, 2014), which is tantamount to genocide according to definitions commonly utilized in the social sciences (Davidson, 2012; Fein, 2007; Lemkin, 1944; Powell, 2007; Short, 2010). The Commission never followed up on these concerns.

Studies of Arab states of the Persian Gulf are characterised by the self-styled academic school of Middle East ‘exceptionalism’ (Cole, 2006), but arguably, Kuwait studies suffers academic isolation more than other area studies. Highly regarded authors have created a very small, closed circle of thought in this corner of Middle East studies, one that exalts the exceptionalist paradigm exalting metropolitan elite (Gross, 1978) and repeats the ideas of a very few authors, narrowing interpretive possibilities and debate. Herb (2016) for example, selected just three authors worthy of analysis in his criticism of Kuwait’s political system that ultimately, he recommended for adoption by all other Gulf monarchies. Scholars who are not perceived to be part of this school of thought do not rate a mention. I believe interpretation, while it may be unpopular, explains why identity claims about the Bedoun by Crystal (1995) and Longva (1997) were accepted at face value by subsequent authors. The voices of those academics who have provided far more rigorous, systematic scholarly efforts such as Sharon Stanton-Russell (1989) have been virtually ignored. Efforts among conservative thinkers to reduce healthy, intellectual counter-narrative in studies of societies local to the Persian Gulf are not unknown (al Rasheed and Vitalis, 2004). This approach has had great influence on the production of knowledge about Kuwait’s history and society to date, and this becomes patently obvious in comparison between the interpretations of Kuwaiti society offered by social scientists. They have offered a consistent Hadar nationality identity narrative that justifies omissions or rejection of Bedoun identity claims. Alternatively, scholars of international humanitarian law have observed the Bedoun are indigenous people, subject to attempts by Hadar settlers and government, to wipe them out.

Kuwaiti author Al Waqayan (2009, p.38) expressed concern about the lack of knowledge about the history of the Bedoun, their ethnic origins and their contemporary culture. He explained that this had resulted in the Bedoun not only being accused of being 'illegal residents' according to the policy of the Ministry of the Interior, but also to being
described as 'outside the category of Arab peoples' in blatant ignorance, and denial of their heritage (p.38). He explained that evidence of the erasure of the Bedoun's history and culture could be observed in government communications, such as a letter to the Arab Teachers Association, which claimed the Bedoun were not Arabs. He observed,

The majority of stateless persons belonging to the Arab tribes, known in the region and from the same fabric of ethnic and historical heritage of the tribes of Kuwait citizens… [the government of Kuwait] sets out in the letter that they are outside the category of the Arab peoples. (al Waqayan, 2009, p.38; translation by Mohammed al Anezi)

Those tribes were the Bedouin tribes of Kuwait, described by Kuwaiti scholars al Anezi (1989), Alshayeji (1988) and Alhajeri (2004) (listed in Appendix B, i). Al Waqayan (2009, p.37-39) emphasised the danger that the historical origins of the group and their culture was in the process of being erased through the production of 'official' versions of knowledge, in intentional misrepresentations and also due to the ignorance, who made authoritative claims to 'know' about the group's history, identity and culture.

Conclusion

In this review of literature, I discussed some of the better-known definitions of the Bedoun of Kuwait. While the dominant view among social scientists has criminalized the Bedoun and omitted them from discussion or questioned their identity, scholars of international law have approached the group quite differently, regarding the group as indigenous people who have made valid claims about their identity and experiences of persecution (Kennedy, 2015a). I deconstructed some of the most widely regarded definitions of the Bedouin in studies of Kuwait to illustrate common ideological themes, beginning a ‘counter-narrative’ that challenges the ‘recycling of myths’ (al Rasheed and Vitalis, 2004, p. 1) of Bedoun history. The existing social cleavage between the Bedouin and Hadar (al Anezi, 1989; Alhajeri, 2004), and the commonality of themes targeting the ethnic identity of both Bedouin citizens and the Bedoun, reveals the significance of these portrayals of Bedoun, as reflections of government policy and the values of the opposing group, the Hadar. I pointed out that these themes have historical antecedents to regional research approaches to the Bedouin, particularly among metropolitan, Hadar scholars (Bocco, 2006). Therefore, I argued that the domination of the Hadar over the production of scholarly knowledge in Kuwait, must be taken into account when analysing previous sources, and the omission of recognition of the Bedouin as an indigenous people (the International Convention on Indigenous Tribal Populations (1957) (ILO), in Bocco, 2006, p.306) in social science texts referring to the Bedoun.

The policies of segregation (separation of the Bedoun from the Bedouin citizen population) were discussed in the context of developmental models used to frame Bedouin society, which incorporated anti-Bedouin ideologies influencing settlement programs in Kuwait, the deprivation of education and citizenship. Strategic deployment of language was
used to shift the identity of the group in scholarly work, simultaneously to changes made at the policy level. Finally, I described programs aimed at the destruction of the population. These included administrative expulsion (1986) (’The Study,’ 2003), the ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun (1990-1996) (Fineman, November 2, 1992) and the emergence of a third program of ‘status adjustment’ (1983), which is elaborated further in this study. This discussion illustrated that the statelessness of the Bedoun via the deprivation of citizenship, while a significant problem, was just one key element in a range of approaches used to eradicate the group to date. Overall this review underscored the need to consider historical and ideological factors in the production of knowledge about marginalized groups, and the value of exploring research conducted by Kuwaiti scholars and sources beyond the social sciences, in order to expand on existing knowledge about the identity and culture of the Bedoun in Kuwaiti society.
Chapter 3

Theoretical concepts

Sociology owns a proper place not only among the sciences but also among the arts that liberate the human mind. (Bierstedt, 1960, p.3 Sociology and Human Learning)

Introduction

In this chapter on theoretical approaches, I explain my choice of sociological theory, principally the humanistic sociology of Florian Znaniecki (1952a, 1952b) and Felix Gross (1978, 1998). I discuss this theory in the context of my reasons for my adopting a sociological approach to studying the Bedouin, who are Bedouin. The strengths of multiple identity theory in the context of ethnic theory (Horowitz, 1975; Gross, 1978) and humanistic sociology (Gross, 1978) are outlined. Themes of nationalist ideology and their underlying basis in social values (Znaniecki; 1952a, 1952b; Smith, 1996, 1991), including justifications of the cultural destruction of vulnerable groups (Davidson, 2012; Znaniecki, 1952b) are also discussed. The exceptionalist framework of ‘tribalism’ theory often applied to the Bedouin of the Middle East (Alshawi and Gardner, 2014; Cole, 2006; Tibi, 1990) is discussed in the context of anti-Bedouin ideologies that have promoted the social exclusion of the Bedouin in urban society.

These ideas help to frame the influence of nationalism, elitism and the metropolitan view (Gross, 1978) on the production of knowledge, with particular relevance to studies of Middle East society. Different conceptual approaches to marginalisation, stigmatisation (Goffman, 1968; Sigona, 2009), labelling and criminalisation (Sigona and Trehan, 2009; Znaniecki, 1952a), nationalism and cultural systems of exclusion (Gross, 1998; Znaniecki, 1952a, 1952b) and cultural destruction (Davidson, 2012; Halas; Mann, 2005; Znaniecki, 1952a) are also explored. I reflect on the observation by Guiberneau (2004) that not all social theories include stateless groups, while some resist their representation as a matter of theoretical positioning, as ephemeral ‘outsiders’ of the state. Stateless groups were accounted for in humanistic sociology, which promotes an inclusive, cultural approach to the study of nations (Gross, 1978, 1998, p.126-132; Znaniecki, 1952b, p.xvi, 21).

3.1 Ethnic Groups and Tribes

3.1.1 Ethnic groups.

Ethnicity is a major sociological category and a basic component of human identity (Smith, 1986, p.32, 1999). Gross (1998, p.88) used the term *ethnicity* to describe cultural collectives that had no central authority (government). Such groups had a sociological nature similar or identical to nationalities, but a social-political status of a minority group (Gross, 1978, p.6). According to Smith (1999, p.13) *ethnic communities* comprise populations distinguished by shared ancestry, myths of common origin, histories and cultures. Ethnic groups may or may not have an association with a specific territory but a
shared sense of social solidarity is present, at least among the group’s elites (Gross, 1998, p. 6; Smith, 1999, p.13). Gross (1978) studied tribal communities in Africa and Europe. He believed that ethnic groups were characterised by sociological bonds and integration within other groups, including tribes, kinship groups and non-tribal groups (Gross, p.88). I was unable to find a precise definition of ‘ethnic groups’ in Znaniecki’s work (he tended to refer to social groups and social collectivities) and therefore, I have relied on the definitions given by Smith (1986) and Gross (1998), above. In this study, I frame the Bedouin as an ethnic group, and tribal groups as individual sub-ethnic groups, according to Gross’s (1978) theoretical models.

3.1.2 The tribal social bond.

The unique nature of social solidarity particular to tribes in the Middle East, and in the Gulf in particular, has been promoted by many scholars as the primary and distinguishing feature of the groups’ social organisation, and their collective identity (Alshawi and Gardner, 2014; Cole, 2003; Tibi, 1990). This concept is traditionally referred to as *asabiya*, which means unity among tribal people at the family and social level (Houraini, 1991, p.460). Tribal relations are no longer strictly endogamous, which has led some scholars to speculate about the weakening of *asabiya*; this seems to indicate that family inter-marriage was the basis for classifying *asabiya* as an exclusively tribal concept. However, Cole (2003, p. 118-119) pointed out that Bedouin identity is now based less on allegiance to single tribes than to a general emphasis on tribal heritage and shared social bonds across different tribes. Other scholars believe the *asabiya* concept was always over-emphasised, due treatment of patrilineal cousin marriage as exotic (Khuri, 1990), but this anti-colonialist view tends to be less favoured in Middle East studies.

Gross (1998, p.91) described tribal societies as distinguished by common patterns of social solidarity, cooperation and common actions in society, but he believed that individuals tribes still exhibited unique patterns of social solidarity based on social dynamics exclusive to each group. Gross (1998) emphasised the practical function of the tribe in local conditions that challenged their survival. In historical times, it was the desert environment; in contemporary times, it comprises the unstable or undemocratic, authoritarian state structure. The family, clan and tribe protect and form a ‘protective, natural social shelter’ with mutual aid, solidarity and support (Gross, 1998, p.111). This function of the tribes arises especially in times of crisis and danger or chronic deprivation of resources due to lack of support from the state, and even due to the threat to the security of tribal people from the state itself (Gross, 1998, p.89, 111). This point explains the persistence of *asabiya* locally. It may also account for the persistence of transnational, tribal social networks that maintain solidarity across nations, resisting the marginalisation of their stateless members excluded by modern nation-states. In this study, I attempt to follow Gross’s (1978, 1998) approach, which demystified *asabiya* as an exceptionalist explanation of Bedouin social solidarity, shared exclusively among members of the tribes, and positions tribes as small social groups,
of which some (but not all) form a larger social collective called the tribal confederation, while all tribes are members of the broader Bedouin ethnic group.

3.1.3 Tribalism theory.

Historically, scholars studied the Bedouin as one tribal nation, as a group of nations, and as a social collective resembling a state (Frantz, 2011, p.15-17). The dominant anthropological approach to the Bedouin of the Middle East, taken by anthropologists, has been to regard the Bedouin as a unique, stand-alone tribal entity (Cole, 2006) and not as an ethnic group comprising of tribes. This is called the ‘essentialist approach’ (Cole, 2006). Tribalism theory adopts a primordial approach, similar to those that ascribe race as a biological determined, rather than as ascribed through processes of cultural meaning (Clarke, 2008). Thus, the cultural identity of the Bedouin has tended to be interpreted by anthropologists as determined by their ‘race,’ and their capacity to adapt to urban life has been seen as maligned by adherence to inward-looking cultural traditions.

For example, the highly regarded anthropologist Donald Cole (2003) claimed that the Bedouin were experiencing an emergent ethnic identity after their permanent settlement across the Arab world, but under his essentialist framework, he claimed that there were no separate Bedouin or tribal societies within the Arab states, because ‘the existing societies are state systems,’ (Cole, 2006, p.253). This tricky dialogue posits that tribes are cultural systems of themselves (ethnic groups), accepting the fact that their citizenship is divided across different countries within tribal ‘nations.’ But it ignores or minimizes attention to the fact that some Bedouin have never received citizenship from modern states. This conception of tribes avoids discussion of statelessness of the tribes based on underlying values that have position the Bedouin as challengers of nation states, even enemies of modern states (Bocco, 2006). Therefore, some scholars have simply omitted all those have been marginalized by the state, implying the tribal individual cannot be a ‘good citizen’ unless he/she has received citizenship from a state – the statist view (Gross, 1978; Guiberneau, 2004; Znaniecki, 1952a).

This approach leaves out whole population chunks – the ‘missing millions’ (Carr-Hill, 2013) who remain stateless, often by virtue of their ethnic identity, who have attempted over multiple generations, to actually participate positively in those states. Their identity as a ‘non-state actor’ is conflated as a threat. Their ordinariness and/or positive contributions to the nation-state societies in which they live, tends to be omitted by researchers. Tribalism theory has enabled the functional, social cohesion of the Bedouin (Alshawi and Gardner, 2014) based on traditional values and social practices, to be interpreted as dysfunctional and divisive, a threat to all states in the region, and increasingly, the world (see for example, Salzman, 2007). The theory remains as popular in Middle East Studies as when Patai (1976) attributed all the deficiencies and dysfunction of the collective ‘Arab Mind’ to the Bedouin. The Bedouin remain interpreted as passive, illiterate and unproductive on the home front (Alnajjar and Selvik, 2016), but an active threat to all states (Salzman, 2008; Salzman, 2007).
Certainly, it is a dominating view in studies of the Arab Gulf societies, due to a lack of published counter-narratives (al Rasheed and Vitalis, 2004; Little, 2008). In this sense, tribalism theory is anti-humanist, because it is deployed with a conscious purpose, to destroy the values of other cultures (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.214 in Halas, 2010, p.228).

3.1.4 A sociological approach to the Bedouin.

Gross (1978, 1998) offered an alternative sociological approach (1978, 1998). Sociologists regard tribal society exemplified by the tribal social bond called asabiya (social solidarity). Individual tribes are still regarded as sub-groups of larger tribal confederations (larger groups of multiple, tribes), which altogether, comprise the whole ethnic group. Each tribal group is distinguished by unique social patterns related to their lineage and other culturally patterned social characteristics, within the ethnic group (Gross, 1978, 1998). Sociologists attempt to find common patterns between social groups. Therefore, social solidarity among tribal people of a particular area is not regarded as exceptional but as normative, and comparable to other forms of solidarity shared among tribes from other regions and other kinds of social groups. Additionally, humanistic sociology (Gross, 1978, 1998; Znaniecki (1952a, 1952b) recognizes that different cultural groups have their own boundaries, and may exist beyond a state or across multiple states.

Gross (1998) had studied tribal, stateless groups that were not protected but targeted by the state powers under which they lived. Other scholars take a culturalist approach to excluded communities they describe as ‘stateless nations.’ Guibermau (1999, p.84) argued that indigenous groups are stateless nations. However the ‘stateless nation’ model is predicated on values of self-determination based on separatism (such as the Kurdish cause), which does not necessarily apply to all stateless groups. In contrast, humanistic sociologists accepted that the validity of the claim that such groups were already part of the nation, by virtue of their territorial presence, shared histories, social and cultural integration. Many theorists, including Smith (1983, 1991, 2002) assumed the communities of citizens were the only members of states or the only influences on national identity (Guibernau, 2004 p.133). Znaniecki’s (1952b, p.xvi) theoretical approach was a forerunner to the ethno-symbolist nationalism of Smith (1991), but also emphasised the study of stateless cultural collectives that co-existed within states, which may ultimately emerge as ‘stateless nations’ (Guibernau, 2004) due to their exclusion. One reason (among many) this may occur, is due to practices of exclusion exercised by dominant ethnic and/or nationalistic groups (Znaniecki, 1952b; Gross, 1988). That is, nationalism practiced by sovereign states tends to endanger minority cultures, rather than the other way around (Gross, 1988). Edayat (2014) has argued that this is a major though not exclusive characteristic, of the modern, Middle East states, particularly owing to the rise of extreme forms of nationalism among the dominant social group, which is often an elite minority which enjoys disproportionate power over other groups (Kedourie, 1988; Massad, March 30, 2015).

3.2 Multiple Identification in Ethnic Theory
3.2.1 Self-identification and multiple identification.

Multiple identities (Gross, 1978, p.41) arise as a natural response to changing social contexts. The notion of identity is fluid and changes in response to different situations (Clarke, 2008, p.526; Gross, 1978, p.xv, 58; Znaniecki, 1952a, p.243-246). It is also influenced by a sense of belonging, identities acquired at birth or later in life, both imagined and performed through social roles (Horowitz, 1975). Gross’s (1978, 1998) theory of ethnic identity focused primarily on ethnic identity but also included other types of identities reflecting social, political and cultural structures. While different classifications of identity used by the theorists appear to be quite different, Gross’ (1978) discussion of his theory contained basic elements that were quite compatible with Goffman’s (1968, p.130) theory of stigma. For example, in Gross’ (1978) theory, the multiple identities were linked to psychological process (‘ego-identity’), the performance of social roles (‘personal identity’) and acceptance and rejection by other social groups (‘social identity’). They were also ‘managed’ by the individuals according to different social contexts, particularly related to the monitoring of others’ reactions to them, and foregrounded or backgrounded as desired, or required to avoid conflict (Gross, 1978, p.55-60).

Gross (1978) noted that identity crisis was less common than the uninhibited expression of multiple identities. As a ‘natural’ aspect of the human personality (p.55), identities were inclined to fuse or develop into higher-order, supra-ethnic collectivities, through which they are reconciled (p.59), similar to the concept of super-diversity (Vertovec, 2007). He emphasised that multiple identities are a normative feature of plural and multi-ethnic societies (Gross, 1978 p.64-66; 1998, p.122), representing the complexity of human personalities, and social situations in which we are called upon to play different roles. Znaniecki (1965) also believed that identity should be regarded as taking on multiple, somewhat overlapping forms (1952b, p.16-17; 1965, p.206).

Thomas and Znaniecki (1918) accounted for the rejection of individuals and groups as symptoms of social disorganisation (Cargan, 2007), but in this study I also draw on the ideas of Goffman (1963) and Ginsberg (1996) about stigma and the spoiling of identity, to explain some of the more subjective aspects of social ‘passing’ and labelling of groups as ‘foreign,’ leading to alienation. Classifications of stigma included those based on physical characteristics (abominations of the body, referring to disability and disfigurement), those based on personal characters (perceived ‘moral’ failings), and those based on basic social or cultural characteristics such as race, ethnicity and religion, called ‘tribal stigma’ (Goffman, 1963, p.4). This corresponds well with the problem of ‘exceptionalist’ bias in tribalism theory, which has attempted to ascribe pre-determined qualities to the Bedouin based on racial characteristics, which I described above.

Applying his theory to Western society, it is likely Goffman (1963) did not envisage his theory to literally represent the stigma of tribal belonging as a Bedouin might experience it, but the theory did not preclude it. The theory has been particularly useful for exploring
the identity of the Rohingya and Roma, also stateless populations whose identities as whole population groups, are rejected (Redclift, 2013; Sigona, 2011). The theory captured the impact of alienation on identity, experienced by large groups as a form of dehumanisation, typically suffered by targeted groups of migrants (Goffman, 1963, p.6). Both labelling theory and theories of marginalisation have been criticized for limited account of the power relations that lie behind the process of stigmatizing target groups (Bayat, 2012, Clarke, 2008). However, this is a strength of Znaniecki’s’ (1952a) theory of social disorganisation (Cargan, 2007).

3.2.2 External factors influencing multiple identifications.

Some groups have been impacted by the formation and dissolution of the modern nation states that intersected pre-existing social and cultural groups collectives, which led them to be defined as ‘transnational’ groups (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.17) whose group membership is perceived as split across different nations. Gross (1978) addressed this problem in his multiple identity models. The approach is highly relevant to the Bedoun, because of the importance placed on transnational, tribal origins among the Bedouin in the Arab-ruled Middle East states, which gives rise to public debate about tribal and national allegiances. In democratic societies, the state respects the equal rights of all members while promoting an overarching national identity symbolised in citizenship. A diversity of ethnic and religious identities are tolerated. The individual’s need to retain their former national or cultural ties while absorbing a new national identity after migration may also be tolerated, even celebrated as culturally enriching the host society (Gross, 1998). However, cultural assimilation into the new national identity is still assumed.

Liberal ideologists may purport to tolerate cultural diversity, but nationalists usually demand visible assimilation of newcomers via their gradual relinquishment of national loyalty to their previous nation of residence, and development of personal identification with the new nation (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.127). Social identities that are perceived to be linked to other ethnic groups or states, may give rise to social tension and conflict, such as inter-ethnic conflict or conflicted ideas over who belongs. Such factors can be provoked or exploited by nationalist ideologists to create social disharmony, to exclude or harm other groups. Yet individuals may have many different kinds of identity, including ideological and non-ideological, interest-based identities that represent the expression of a range of cultural values and interests (Gross, 1998, p.123).

A population that expresses dual or multiple identifications may be perceived as ‘threats’ to the state because ethnic identifications are often associated with the subjective measure of ‘loyalty’ to the state (Gross, p.1978, p.75). In conflict scenarios focused on nationalistic ideology, nationalist adherents project claims that ‘others’ do not belong, accusations of inherent ‘disloyalty’ attributable to identity, and worse, assumptions that others are ‘traitors’ (Gross, 1978, p.xv, 41, 55; 1998, p.122-125). This opposition to the ‘other’ social group may arise in response to any identity not perceived to conform with the
Stigmatisation may occur in such toxic social environments, provoking an inner identity crises (at the level of the ego-identity), that requires targets to carefully manage their identity in order to avoid persecution for who they are (Goffman, 1963).

3.2.3. Social identities and the role of education and the intellectual ideal.
Gross (1978, p.6-7, 60-63) referred to the growth of ideological, non-ethnic identities among individuals as they engaged in modern or urban life. He believed that ethnic bonds were naturally loosened by engagement with other groups in society and exposure to new ideas, if individuals were attracted to and identified with those new influences. Znaniecki (1952b, p.100) took this idea further, explaining that the development of the intellectual ideal, and the growth of intellectual leaders in society, was essential to the national identity of social collectives. Mass literacy, achieved through general education in schools, is required for populations to become fully aware of national, political ideals, to participate fully in society, and to fulfil the role of active citizens in the nation. This is part of the ‘civilizing’ function of education (Znaniecki, 1952b).

Bayat (2007, 2009, 2013) developed the term ‘active citizenry’ and ‘active citizenship’ in social movement theory pertaining to the Middle East, linked to theory of marginalisation and classical sociology of the Chicago School. The idea has since been expanded upon by social movement theorists seeking political explanations, but in concordance with the Chicago School, Bayat (2012, 2013) applied the concept as a normalizing function, to describe how ordinary people conceptualize social movement in order to change their lives in concrete ways. Other concepts also relevant to this study include sumud, a Palestinian concept (Shehadeh, in Said, 1986). Sumud (also spelled 'Samed' was a pen name taken by Shehadeh (p.146, in Moore, 2013). The verb means ‘to defy, brave, withstand, resist, oppose or hold out; to repair; and to apply oneself’ (Moore, 2013, p.44, n72).

Others have interpreted Sumud purely politically, as a type of social and political resistance that has been described in contexts of Bedouin ethnic cleansing and land confiscation in the Palestinian Occupied Territories, and more generally as a psychological and spiritual orientation (van Teeffelen, August 9, 2014). Sumud is translated from the Arabic as ‘steadfastness’ or ‘steadfast perseverance.’ Another concept is ‘true generosity’ from Freire (1970, p.91, 120, 121), which refers to the pedagogy of the oppressed, wherein the oppressed share positive sentiment with their oppressors, re-educating them, so that both parties may re-claim their humanity. These concepts are based on cooperative ideals of resistance, in which social identity embodies the intellectual ideal, collective consciousness, communalism, and liberation.

Social leadership can only be developed through education, and the nurturing of the individual mind through expression of the intellectual ideal (Halas, 2010, p.201). Occupied states or societies oppressed by authoritarian rule, nationalities or ethnic groups singled out
for punitive repression, were often deprived of education, or only allowed education reflecting the cultural values the opposing nation (indoctrination). Such education was only provided in order to weaken the political resistance of those groups and to counter the spread of democracy (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.103). On the other hand, Znaniecki (1952b) also explained the rich history of self-education and community education conducted by those who sustained the intellectual ideal as a form of resistance and cultural defence in modern Europe. This included the Polish resistance movement in which he participated in a community education resistance movement during occupation (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.105, n16).

3.3 Nationalist Ideologies

3.3.1 Destructive nationalist ideologies.

Cultural organisation at the national level necessarily engages nationalist ideology. Znaniecki (1952b) emphasised that national ideologies are consciously designed and disseminated by intellectuals, who seek leadership roles in society to promote their values. Davidson’s (2012) view is similar. Cultural prejudices can be greatly magnified if they correspond with intentionally implanted, nationalist ideologies that target others for exclusion and/or eradication (Davidson, 2012, p.10). These ‘thought collectives’ are,

Artificially created, community-wide points of view,’ of which is the nation-state is an example, invoking ‘striking imaginings of fraternity. (Anderson, 1991, p.203 in Davidson, 2012, p.9)

Znaniecki (1952a, 1952b) illustrated historical examples of programmed, collective targeting ethnic groups by states, and their methods of oppression. Cultural destruction is an essential component of, if not the underlying aim, of genocide (Davidson, 2012; Lemkin, 1944; Powell, 2007; Samson and Short, 2006; Short, 2010, 2012; Znaniecki, 1952a). Destructive acts, including the eradication of whole communities, are developed from a purpose to remove the ‘source’ of a perceived problem (Halas, 2007, p.151; Znaniecki, 1952b, p.214, 346). Despite this, positive or more constructive national ideologies are also created by intellectual leaders, which contribute to the expansion of national culture and cross-fertilisation of cultures (Znaniecki, 1952b).

Short (2010) urged that attempts to determine if mass violence and genocide has been inflicted upon one social group by another, should involve inquiry into the perspective of the research group: the definition of their situation (W. I. Thomas in Short, 2010 p.833, n19). Victims of cultural destruction are often social groups who shared a unified, collective consciousness; their group identity may itself become the target of annihilation (Fein, 1993, p.23-24, in Short, 2010, p.833, n20). Short (2010) also pointed out the usefulness of labelling theory (Becker, 1963 in Short, 2010, p.832, n17) in explaining the conceptual approach of perpetrator groups toward targeted groups.

3.3.2 Ideological narratives.
Some common, nationalist ideological narratives which project outsider status onto others include themes of defence against perceived aggressors, such as the myths of sins of the fathers; and defence against a common enemy, and myths of perfection, including the quest for purity and the myth of original perfection (Znaniecki, 1952b).

**Sins of the fathers.**

In this ideology, sins of omission are projected onto subsequent generations. In many societies, when an individual member of a social group is found to have committed a prohibited act, all members of the group are considered participants in the action. The ideology is transferred from the one to the many and to future generations (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.334). The transmission of the ideology to different ‘guilty’ parties spreads blame rapidly by generalizing it throughout the target population. The intergenerational ‘sin’ becomes impossible to escape.

**Defence against a common enemy.**

National solidarity is evokes by appeals to national independence against common enemies, real or imagined. The belief that one’s culture is superior to others may also be inflated, in order to justify the dominant group’s mass exclusion and eradication of weaker groups (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.99, 113). In the absence of real conflict, one may be created to pursue nationalistic missions of aggression to discover those of ‘true’ faith or the ‘right’ kind of social order (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.97). Leaders make rhetorical appeals to the masses, labelling targeted groups and individuals as ‘evil’ and ‘enemies,’ and disturbing the ‘purity’ of the dominant group (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.98). Oppressors may claim they have been victimised, enabling them to establish programs of mass eradication of non-nationals or ethnic minorities (Mann, 2005, p.27). ‘Foreign elements’ are identified within the local, heterogeneous group.

The process is similar to stigmatisation (Goffman, 1963), as individuals are labelled for their specific characteristics as enemies of the state and prepared for elimination (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.347). This theme is manifested in a variety of self-righteous responses, including racial prejudice, economic exploitation of others, the use of violent methods of coercion, the limitation of the human rights, and the tightening of political controls (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.355 1952b, p.99). Self-defence against these ideologies is dangerous for minorities (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.99). Members of the dominant group may become labelled as transgressors due to a narrowing of norms and standards of belonging and become targeted as a defensive action (Znaniecki, 1952a).

Transgressors are rejected by the group and punished for the perceived effects (and not objective causes or causal relationships) of the transgression (Znaniecki, 1952a). Apart from settings of direct, intergroup conflict, the gradual penetration of a number of persons identified as ‘outsiders,’ ‘foreigners’ whose cultural patterns differ from those of ‘native’ participants can be perceived as ‘dangerous’ (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.356). The identification of
difference comes through recognition of the different cultural patterns inherent in the social actions.

*The quest for purity.*

The idea of the biological ‘purity’ of a whole society is expressed in the myth of perfection. This is a strongly held and effective myth that persists in culturally diverse societies, even when historical evidence challenges the myth. There is a general tendency to strive for conformity in the conservative re-organisation of the cultural system, in which members strive to restore it to mythical state of ‘original’ perfection which ties all members to a single point of origin, based on an ideologically constructed national memory (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.356).

A dominant nationality may not wish to admit ‘foreigners’ as full members of the nation, but may admit some of the ‘natives’ they have conquered to facilitate rule and control, while still regarding the whole group as hereditarily unfit for full membership. In this instance, racial prejudice interferes with assimilative expansion. Separatism is then maintained to prevent full membership and to protect the ‘pure’ national society against dilution (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.131-132). Examples include mass expulsion (as official deportations and unofficial ‘migration,’ where the group is driven out and/or flees voluntarily), genocide, or national assimilation that regards ‘unfit’ members as a lower hereditary class or caste (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.132).

*The myth of ‘original’ perfection.*

According to the myth of original perfection, a dominating group believes it is divinely or biologically superior to others (the ‘chosen ones’) and they seek return to their idealised, original status (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.87). When a national group dominates another nationality, any sign of active resistance or rebellion is interpreted as a challenge to its superiority, for which retaliatory measures are issued (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.355-6, 1952b p.86-91). Znaniecki (1952a, p.355) emphasised that the superiority of the dominant group had to be confirmed by winning results of some kind, as victory maintains social solidarity, validating the groups’ superiority and chosen path. This might constitute a gradual accumulation of small-scale-conquests and repression of minorities, or a large-scale victory over a well-defined aggressor. Smith referred to the cultural pattern of the ‘chosen’ ones (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.87) as ‘election myths’ (Smith, 1999, p.131).

**3.3.3 Ethnic nationalism, expulsion, ethnic cleansing.**

The process of ‘othering’ is developed along the lines of self-fulfilling cultural motifs, which are promoted as the perfect solution for all problems or the ‘right’ and only path. Ideologists create the arguments that justify violent acts in the name of righteous devotion to the cause (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.97; 1952b, p287). Ethnic nationalism features a dominant social group making a righteous claim to cultural superiority, racial purity and ‘belonging’ on the basis of myths of common racial descent. These myths provide the rationale for a group to justify their entitlement to eradicate others (Gross, 1998, p.75; Smith,
Tribal nationalists seek a mono-ethnic state with a single, ruling nationality group to satisfy the myth of common descent (Gross, 1998, p.75). Less powerful groups of indigenous people and/or minorities may be expelled in a broader program in which expulsion is viewed as just one of many parts of the larger ideological system (Gross, 1978, p.7, Wimmer, 2002, p.222; Znaniecki, 1952a, p.355).

3.3.4 Nationalism, the intellectual elite and the ‘metropolitan’ view.

Znaniecki (1952b) and Gross (1978) emphasised the role of the intellectual in the production of knowledge about nations. Urban elitism has been a persistent theme in the studies of Middle East society since Ibn Khaldun (2004) put forward the first Arab social study, the *Muqaddimah* (Bocco, 2006; Houraini, 1991). Aurenche (1993) discussed the impact of this approach in Middle East studies: the dominance or the ‘urban’ viewpoint had created a distortion of the history of the Bedouin which was inspired by fear of the unknown, because historians simply did not know their subject. Lancaster and Lancaster (1998) offered a similar perspective, noting ignorance and cynicism was rife among academics who wrote about the Bedouin, but rarely interacted with them. Bocco (2006) noted the same attitudes had been expressed by Hadar researchers since the 1950s, impacting including the implementation of international law protections related to Bedouin settlement programs. Gross (1978, p.xxi) discovered that native and metropolitan constructions of reality were characterized by different perceptions of reality, based on different forms of ethnic identification and relationships to the political power structure. The metropolitan class included intellectuals and ideologists who represented their interests, ‘view nationality from the vantage point and from a personal [and] collective experience of a city or an urban community’ (Gross, 1978, p.xiv). He observed that academic notions of nations and national identity could be characterised by subjectivity, inconsistency and a desire to exclude:

Political theorists, philosophers, and social scientists told the people ex cathedra what a nation is. All those groups that did not fit into their categories were disqualified in their national existence. The definitions changed: once, it was race; other times it became territory or language that distinguished nationality from other groups. Still the visible ‘objective’ difference between nationalities was not solely, and was not always, language, but a distinct culture. This is the ‘objective’ perception of nation-cultures or nationalities. (Gross, 1978, p.xiv)

3.4 Znaniecki’s Theory of Cultural Systems

3.4.1 The ideology of the outsider or ‘other’ and a humanistic response

The notion of the ‘other’ was linked to studies of migration, race relations, criminalisation and impoverishment, established by the Chicago School sociologists such as Park, Thomas and Znaniecki (Calhoun, 2007), Du Bois and others (Morris, 2015). Social theorisation of the ‘other’ began with the studies of the immigrant, perceived as a ‘stranger’ (Simmel in Wolff, 1964, p.402-408; Thomas and Znaniecki, 1919). Park (1928, p.
892 in Goldberg, 2012) introduced the concept of the ‘marginal man.’ The term ‘marginalisation’ was regarded as roughly equivalent to ‘exclusion,’ but expanded into a more complex network of ideas (Bayat, 2012, p.4). Theory of cultural disorganisation refers to the ‘outsider,’ ‘foreigner’ and ‘stranger’ to describe marginalized individuals and groups (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.356). The ‘other’ ‘is a crucial symbol that we juxtapose against the definition of who ‘we’ are, to clarify our own identity’ (Clarke, 2008, p.519).

Even in peacetime, members of the community seek out ‘others’ as culturally different from within their own groups in order to validate their own belonging Znaniecki (1952b, p.97-100). The dominant social group makes a righteous claim to superiority, purity and ‘belonging’ through the objectification of the ‘other.’ ‘Othering’ makes the assertion of smaller, less powerful groups as the ‘natives’ fraught with difficulty, because their expulsion or eradication may be viewed as one part of a larger ideological system belonging to the dominant group (Znaniecki, 1952a). Such systems of ideas emphasise racial and cultural difference to create social order, and are inherent in structural forms of discrimination (Douglas, 1966, in Clarke, 2008, p.519). Through ‘othering,’ the process of identifying, punishing and expelling ‘outsiders’ performs an important function, enhancing conservative social organisation within the dominant group (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.99).

Znaniecki’s (1934) ‘humanistic coefficient’ was an approach that addressed the problem of ‘othering,’ insofar as it regarded the data of research participants from their own point of view, as social facts (Smolicz and Secombe, 1981). The humanistic coefficient means ‘together’ and ‘do,’ in Polish (Znaniecki’s native language) and in Latin, means creating, building and achieving together (Halas, 2010, p.55). Halas (2010) pointed out that the term highlighted Znaniecki’s (1934) holistic vision of the human collective’s co-creation of cultural reality (p.55). Rather than observe research populations at a distance, subjectivity is embraced. The research participant’s ideas, values and attitudes are the focus of cultural inquiry: ‘The data belong to the experiences of people and are such as the experiences make them’ (Znaniecki, 1934, p.56 in Halas, 2010, p.56).

The humanistic coefficient was introduced by Znaniecki (1934) at a time when social scientists debated the value of subjective data, and the extent to which such data could be regarded as ‘scientific.’ The principles upon which the concept was based was essentially, Znaniecki’s (1934) response to the positivist paradigm (Halas, 2010, p.100; Szacki, 1986 in Halas, 2010; Szacki, 2010). These principles have since become mainstream among qualitative researchers, linked to classical sociology (Bierstedt, 1980; Cargan, 2007; Gross, 1978, p.xxii; Halas, 2006). The concept of the humanistic coefficient is compatible with, and should perhaps be considered as part of, social justice and participatory/collaborative research frameworks that have sought to address the marginalisation of minority groups through the production of knowledge. It is a means by which researchers may engage across multiple paradigms in sociology, but has special value as a participatory research approach (Costley, Elliott and Gibbs, 2010, p.86), orienting the researcher with the research group
from an ‘insider’s’ perspective. Similar approaches are now taken in anthropology (Lancaster and Lancaster, 2008; Lee, 1999), sociology (Denzin and Giardina, 2016) and education. In the sociology of educational research, the approach has been further developed in studies of ethnic identity, language preservation, social equity and globalisation (Maniam, 2014; Secombe and Zadja, 1999; Smolicz and Secombe, 2003; Zadja, 2005).

### 3.4.2 Social actions and ideology in the conservative cultural system.

The origins of social actions are dynamic systems of values that contain characteristics of cultural patterning (Smolicz, 1999, p.286; Znaniecki, 1952a, p.311). The precursors of actions exist the ideational level. Complex models and systems of ideas belong to the general category of cultural data (p.290) but their purpose differs from other cultural products (p.282). They are simultaneously products past ideas and future actions. Ideological systems contain standards and norms intended to guide the future actions (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.290). They are initiated and developed by thinkers who wish to resolve social conflict (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.283).

Through the design and implementation of ideological systems, social actions isolating weaker groups may be engineered to increase conformity to the dominant regime. Similarly, ideological conflict between expansionist groups could stimulate social conflict (Znaniecki, 1952a p.295). National leaders may attempt to impose their ideals of social order and cultural progress. These ideals are embedded in a variety of motifs of nationalist themes linked to ideological models (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.132). Extreme forms of nationalist ideology that seek to isolate and to harm whole social groups are typically found under authoritarian and fascist nationalist movements (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.139). These ideologies are characteristic of conservative cultural systems, which extend beyond conservatism, to imposed, restrictive systems of oppression, harm and eradication. Znaniecki (1952b) believed that active intergroup conflict could only be reduced by active, intergroup cooperation, asserting that ‘Mutual isolation has no lasting effect and it impossible in the modern world’ (p.141).

According to Znaniecki’s (1952a) theory of cultural systems, the process of defining ‘others’ as non-members of a social collective, in order to repress, exclude and eradicate another group, is an expression of the ideological foundation and values held by the opposing group (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.353). Their effectiveness is not measured by their destructive effects on others, but according to the social control (conformity) they achieved (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.353). Weaker groups are targeted with very specific and destructive actions by stronger groups, until they no longer exist. They are cast out of the tribe or state, killed, and/or their cultural products destroyed (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.346). Such processes are consciously undertaken (Halas, 2010, p.228; Znaniecki, 1952b, p.214), involving the targeting and criminalisation of identity or the social actions of particular groups, eradication by removal (mass population transfer), killing and cultural destruction in ethnic conflict.
cleansing and other forms of violence, including genocide (Gross, 1978, p. xi; 1998, p.vii; Mann, 2005; Short and Rashed, 2012).

During the process of social evaluation, the ideology has a reinforcing effect on the social system, through affirmation of members of the group as insiders, or rejection of members of the group as outsiders. It emphasises that those who are judged ‘non-conformist,’ initially endure outsider status, but tend to gravitate to new systems of values. Once an alternative ideology that aligns with the individual’s values is recognized, individuals usually seek membership within the social or cultural system in which the ideology is found. Acquiring membership in the new group is usually not difficult, as the individual’s existing values are likely compatible with the new system, but clearly, the evaluations of those in the receiving social group also have a major role in determining acceptance.

In the case of ethnic groups, membership is often but not always, based on birth; in these cases, entry of newcomers is limited to certain methods, such as marriage (Horowitz, 1975). If the system is dominated by conservative re-organisation, newcomers will not be accepted; the individual remains an outsider (Znaniecki, 1952a). In the case of non-ethnic ideologically-based identities (Gross, 1978) such as religious groups, political groups, or sub-cultures within the existing culture, acquiring membership is easier to obtain (Gross, 1978, Horowitz, 1975). Existing members of the new group usually recognize the alignment of the newcomer’s values, leading to their positive evaluation, which enables the newcomer to integrate and belong in the new social circle (Znaniecki, 1952a).

3.4.3 Criminalisation of identity.

The ideology of ‘othering’ explains how governments can control others via prohibitive rules (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.335). Categories of ‘other’ are invented by bureaucrats and legislators to distance or cast out certain groups in society by labelling them as deviant (Becker, 1963; Goffman, 1963; Short, 2010; Sigona and Trehan, 2009). These rules may reinforce existing boundaries of norms and standards that determine membership to the dominant social group, or introduce new boundaries to enforce exclusion. The boundaries of belonging are often characterised by their inconsistency and therefore, standards of criteria for membership are often changed arbitrarily (Znaniecki, 1952a). The special group of ‘insiders’ determining the rules (Becker, 1963) may elect a conspicuous identity-based attribute for which ‘outsiders’ can be recognised as deviating from their own norms, and judged as transgression that must be punished (Znaniecki, 1952a). The selection of these attributes facilitates targeting of specific groups (Stanton, 2004). Indigenous people and migrants are historically associated with high levels of stigmatisation and criminalisation by more powerful groups, which prevents their social adjustment and integration (Thomas and Znaniecki, 1919; Sigona and Trehan, 2009).

When stigma is reinforced over a period of time, labels become a powerful determinant of identity enforced by those outside the group. Such labels may significantly
depart from a groups’ self-ascribed identity (Sigona, 2005, 2011). Those who fail to meet criteria for belonging are faced with punitive retaliation (Znaniecki, 1952a, 1952b). Their group’s identity may become ‘spoiled’ (Goffman, 1963) leading individuals to become automatically associated with the label, and evaluated negatively (Sigona, 2005, 2009, 2011). They may be faced with punitive responses or omitted entirely in social interactions with others, and forced to ‘pass’ as members of the dominant group to survive (Redclift, 2016). At the official level, exclusion may entail using administrative laws to change the status of residency of the group to create an ‘illegal’ status (Znaniecki, 1952a). This criminalizes the identity of the whole group, reinforcing the group’s image as ‘deviant’ law-breakers. It may also condemn the group according to the new regulations, to sanctions such as expulsion, deportation and killing (Znaniecki, 1952a).

3.4.4 Increased conservatism among citizens.

Cultural reorganisation at the national level influences the general population by stabilising and increasing their conservatism and conformity, which reinforces collective solidarity (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.356-7). Citizens must cooperate with these authorities, either actually or vicariously (Znaniecki, 1952a). They demonstrate their cooperation by displaying interest and support for the regime on the one hand, and by condemning the perceived transgressors on the other. At this level, ordinary citizens may take on the symbolic role of ‘guardians of order’ and dissociate themselves from criminals as inferior beings (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.357). They adopt a quasi-authoritarian role in maintaining cultural superiority and national order (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.358).

Additionally, some members of the group identified as outsiders, may adopt conservative values mirroring the dominant group in order to appeal to them for inclusion (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.357). Members of the targeted group may assist the dominating regime identify ‘the other’ in their society, and even contribute in some way to their punishment or eradication. This process is also known as ‘in-group policing’ (Mann, 2005, p.21), in which members of the targeted group facilitate the surveillance and reporting of their own group for the dominant, oppressor group, genuinely believing they are contributing to the good of the greater society (Mann, 2005, p.21). This pattern is illustrated in the system of cultural disorganisation and conservative re-organisation (Znaniecki, 1952a). A dynamic but conservative response to cultural difference, may lead to punishment via social controls (repression, exclusion), ‘foreign’ identification (leading to membership restrictions, revocation of citizenship) and expulsion (coerced, forced migration, deportation, killing and cultural destruction). The more positive aspects featured in the figure are discussed in the next section of this chapter.

As I have mentioned, the identification and exclusion of non-members has a reinforcing effect on the solidarity of the in-group. Active, collective repression makes the repressors more ethnocentric and sure of the validity of the cultural order they seek to restore (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.356). Nationalist ideology is stabilised because members respond by
increasing their own conformity in relation to accepted standards and norms. This process helps to explain why populations who were previously integrated members of society, may become stigmatised by members of their own in-group, without them having performed any social action that would warrant exclusion (Sigona, 2005, 2009, 2011).

3.4.5 Creative re-organisation and the expansion of culture.

Florian Znaniecki (1930, 1936, 1939, 1955, 2007) regarded human beings as ‘conscious, active beings,’ who develop active experience in the world as individuals and as collectives of consciousness (see also Halas, 1989, 2010; Hinkle, 1994, p.292). Creative reorganisation could be contrasted with conservative reorganisation (Znaniecki, 1952a, p. 359). Creativity, innovation and leadership promote the perception that contributions to society are essentially, positive. According to Znaniecki (1952a, p.359-360), creative reorganisation involves expanding the positive functions of the nation, culture and society, to amplify its value to its members. Thus, creative cultural re-organisation introduces positive social bonds between members to increase cooperation and reduce conflict. Creative reorganisation is distinguished by the input of positive, conscious social actions into the cultural system, whereas conservative cultural re-organisation contracts culture through conformity, and is therefore more inclined toward ideological conversion and dogmatic adherence than innovation. In creative re-organisation, new common values, new relationships of functional interdependence and cultural patterns of action are introduced into society (Halas, 2010; Znaniecki, 1952a, p.359).

Thus, the collective consciousness is oriented toward inclusion and diversity. Standards, norms and values held by members of the society tend to be more flexible as cultural expansion takes place. Creative and innovative social action challenges conformity to existing standards and norms; transgressions of normative standards are a function of creativity and freedom (Halas, 2010, p.164). Such social actions which display minor variations to existing standards and norms are tolerated without conflict, allowing their incorporation into the cultural system (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.360). More radical change may require negotiation between social actors before being incorporated into the cultural system. In this context, cultural differences may be celebrated and exploited for their positive influence on culture.

Cross-cultural fertilisation of ideas leads to further differentiation, innovation and creativity between different cultural groups. Ideas and intellectual capital are fed back into the ideological system, invigorating culture and society. Those who find change and innovation undesirable or threatening, often attempt to obstruct manifestations of creative re-organisation with organised, cooperative repression (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.358). Znaniecki (1952a, p.359) believed that creative re-organisation was more difficult to achieve in society because it required the realisation of new ideals over time, contingent upon the cooperation of active leaders and growing circles of followers. Creative actions are transgressions of existing standards and norms; for this reason, they are more often prevented or repressed.
than stimulated, even in contemporary societies where creativity is more accepted more than ever before (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.208).

Much of Znaniecki’s (1952a) description of the creative processes was contained not only in his chapter on re-organisation (p.359), but also in his discussion of the formation of the ideal and the dynamic processes of ideological systems (p.270-275). This aspect of the cultural system was also discussed in his work on nationalism in relation to intellectual leadership, inter-group cooperation and education (Znaniecki, 1952b). Cultural difference is a dynamic factor in constant tension through both conservative and creative systems (Znaniecki, 1952a).

3.5 National Culture and Statelessness

In this study I adopted Znaniecki’s (1952b) cultural view of nationalism (Gross, 1998, p.81-82). Znaniecki (1952a, 1952b) addressed the ideological dimensions of nationals and nationalism, shown in the communications approach of Anderson (1983), Gellner (1983) and Smith (1991, p.11 in Guibernau, 2004, p.133). He regarded nations as socially organised collectives ‘with certain common and distinctive cultural characteristics (language, customs, historical traditions, etc.), sometimes also ‘racial’ traits and a definite geographical location’ (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.xiv). According to this view, people are organised according to their common cultures and solidarities with or without a common political government called the ‘state’ (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.xvi).

Some ethnic, cultural collectives have always been excluded from nationalist movements and state formation (Smith, 1998, p.125; 1999, p.101). Znaniecki (1952b) and Mann (2005, p.20) also observed that politicized narratives tend to promote the state as the only effective social unit. The perspective has often led to those people who lived outside the formal structures of the state being omitted from or misrepresented in research discussions, as if they did not exist at all (Znaniecki, 1952b p.ix; Gross, 1978, p.3). The perspective was applied to the Bedouin of the Middle East in Arab development theory such as Learner’s (1958) *The Passing of Traditional Society* and colonialist theory such as Coon's (1961, p.8), which declared, ‘A culture in transition is hard to explain’ (in Bocco, 2006, p.322-323).

The nationalist approach implicitly marginalizes non-national social collectives from the production of knowledge concerning nationalist ideas and phenomena at the national level. Guiberneau (2004, p.131) pointed out that some theories (such as Smith, 1991, 2002) do not account for the emergence of social bonds and cohesion among cultural communities without states. She explained that in cultural collectives without states, cultural identity is amplified, emphasising ethnic roots - shared history that extends prior to state formation - attachment to the territory and explicit desire for self-determination (but not necessarily independence). Group identity is also defined by a lack of statehood (or it could be assumed, lack of membership in the state), ‘by an impossibility to act’ in political life (Guiberneau,
2004, p.132) and therefore, ‘It is based on the existence of a community with a stable but
dynamic core’ (p.132), which strengthens the social bonds of its members.

Therefore, one of my primary considerations approaching the study of a stateless
collective was choosing an appropriate theoretical orientation that would not merely
replicate challenges to the identity and culture of the group that was already found at the
political level, but account for dynamic social change and the cultural life of the Bedoun.
Znaniecki (1952b) recognised this problem related to the preoccupation with nation-state
building:

…students of nationalities have usually followed the example of political
scientists... They have consequently ignored the social influences of numerous
and diverse nationalistic groups which are not included in the formal political
structure of the state. (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.xvi)

Znaniecki (1952b, xi) found that among numerous nationality groups with distinctive
cultures, but not necessarily their own states, all could be characterised by some degree of
active solidarity and a specific social organisation irreducible to political structures.
Znaniecki (1952b, xvi) devoted his studies in *Modern Nationalities* to these groups. He
understood that stateless populations were not only excluded from the state, but that such
populations could also have rich a cultural heritage and social life.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I reviewed the theoretical framing utilised in this study, including the
humanistic sociology approach of Florian Znaniecki (1952a, 1952b) and Felix Gross (1978,
1998), as well as ethnic, identity and labelling theories (Gross, 1978, 1998; Goffman, 1968;
Horowitz, 1975). I argued that while tribalism theory used in Middle East studies has
emphasised the Bedouin tribal social bond, it has also been associated with anti-Bedouin
ideologies that have marginalised the Bedouin in the production of knowledge, particularly
in colonialist and developmental models (Bocco, 2006; Fabietti, 2006). Ethnic theory in
sociology, on the other hand, has accounted for social solidarities and social change, as well
as multiple identities that have cultural and ideological bases (Horowitz, 1975; Gross, 1978).

Nationalist ideologies were briefly surveyed, illustrating how powerful myths can
nurture group solidarities but can also justify the physical and cultural destruction of weaker
groups (Znaniecki, 1952a, 1952b; Davidson, 2012; Smith, 1996, 1991). Different conceptual
approaches to ‘othering’ and outsider status were also discussed, such as marginalisation
(Bayat, 2012, 2013), stigmatisation, labelling (Goffman, 1968; Sigona, 2005),
'passing' (Goffman, 1968; Ginsberg, 1996), deviance and transgression (Becker, 1963,
Znaniecki, 1952a) and the criminalisation of identity (Znaniecki, 1952a; Sigona, 2011), and
political forms of nationalist and ethnic exclusion (Gross, 1998; Smith, 1998, 1999;
Znaniecki, 1952a, 1952b). I attempted to link these ideas theories that address more extreme
forms of ‘othering’ and ethnic tension, such as ethnic cleansing, cultural destruction and
genocide (Davidson, 2012; Halas, 2007; Mann, 2005; Znaniecki, 1952a) in the context of Znaniecki’s (1952a) theory of conservative, cultural re-organisation.

I also briefly surveyed the theory of creative re-organisation of cultural systems by Znaniecki’s (1952a, extensively reviewed by Halas, 2010), which explained the expansion of culture through positive forms of ideology that seek to solve social problems, such as 'active citizenship' (Bayat, 2013), 'sumud' (Moore, 2013; van Teeffelen, August 9, 2014) and educational theory in which the oppressed educate their oppressors in a pedagogy of liberation (Freire, 1970). Creativity, innovation, leadership and self-education aided the realisation of ideals and absorption of new ideologies. However, because these attributes tend to challenge existing norms and standards, they may be more difficult for others to accept (Znaniecki, 1952a). Guiberneau (2004) emphasised that cultural collectives without states experienced an increased importance of cultural identity and shared ethnic and social bonds among the collectives’ members. I emphasised that humanistic sociology adopts a culturally inclusive approach to the study of nations, which promotes the research of stateless groups from a sociological perspective (Gross, 1978, 1998, p.126-132; Znaniecki, 1952b, p.xvi, 21).
Chapter 4
The Methodological Approach

These people [academic researchers] who are supposed to be putting the structure, or the profile, the knowing [accumulation of knowledge], or… the demographic system of Kuwait… they are talking… and reading a lot … But they don’t know the people, they don’t move through the people, know the Bedoun. They did not go to al Jahra, they don’t sit with the Kuwaiti Bedouins, the Bedouin people… First, if you want to know, you must meet with the people and talk with them. (Hakeem al Fadhli, interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 5 August, 2015)

Introduction
This chapter considers the aspects of methodology for a research thesis in the qualitative paradigm (Creswell, 2003; Denzin and Lincoln, 2011), such as the aim of the research, the research questions and design within the qualitative paradigm, the exploratory and mainly inductive nature of the research, the use of empirical materials, each research method utilized, validity and reliability, ethical considerations, sample selection, fieldwork and data analysis. I explain how multiple methods of data collection were chosen in consideration of the population under study and the fieldwork component, characterised by relative social conflict and instability (Cohen and Arieli, 2011). The fieldwork focused on interviews with a marginalised and hard-to-reach population, in a politically sensitive environment (Atkinson and Flint, 2001; Clarke, 2006; Sulieman and Anderson, 2008); documentary analysis was also a major part of the study, which enhanced the reliability and generalizability of the interview findings to some extent (Atkinson and Coffey, 1997; Bulmer, 1984). I attempted to adapt the methods to reach a little known population and to adjust the study as the data emerged (Stebbins, 2001), including conducting documentary analysis to improve the reliability and generalizability of the interview data. I discuss generalisation in the context of attempting to apply the interview data to discussion about the Bedouin's culture, without obscuring the diversity of the data (Znaniecki, 1954; Guest et al., 2012; Mayring, 2007). I discuss the effort to balance the need for a transparent approach against the requirements for confidentiality and the sensitive nature of the data (Guest et al., 2012), through member checks with the research participation and in consultation with community leaders (Lassiter, 2005a, 2005b).

4.1 The Research Design
The research design was positioned in the qualitative paradigm, as an exploratory, mainly inductive study (Creswell, 2003, Denzin and Lincoln, 2011), drawing on sociological theory, and employing multiple qualitative, research methods (Znaniecki 1927, in Cargan, 2007) (see Table 1, on the following page). Initially the study was designed to focus on the Bedoun identity, culture and experiences of Bedoun students involved in higher education in Kuwait, after education reforms had been introduced during the Arab Spring (Decree
409/2011, see Appendix G, i), with the potential for political instability affecting the study kept in mind. Snowball sampling, a non-representative sampling method, was chosen due to the difficulties expected in reaching the marginalised population. Modifications were required to keep up with rapid changes in the field that took place during the study, such as access expanding the scope of the data collection techniques and the target population, in the case that interviews might not yield sufficient data.

A new dimension of the methodology emerged from my fieldwork, which was the need to collect and analyse historical information spread across a variety of fields. This information did not appear to have been consolidated before. This might appear to be a normal part of the literature review, but the process evolved into a more substantive research method. No book about the group has ever been published in English, and there has been no access to thick description (Geertz, 1973) or in-depth data to study the Bedoun beyond human rights reports, and a study by Beaugrand (2010). Beaugrand (2010) had access to two books in Arabic about the Bedoun by al Anezi (1989); one was his thesis, translated from English.

Therefore, I consolidated basic information spread across different sources and academic disciplines, to elucidate thematic patterns in the historical data. The process gave me a much broader set of historical and social facts which could guide my interpretation of the interview data, and on which I could base serious claims such as ethnic cleansing, or demonstrating the workings of the ‘status adjustment’ program. However, the information deviated from the research questions somewhat. Therefore, this analysis became an important part of the research design, but it was added as an appendage to the study, in Appendices B-G. I refer to these sections in Chapters 2 (the literature review), 6, 7 and 8 (the discussion). Thematic analysis of the interview data was provided in Appendix A. Visual data collected during fieldwork and photographs taken by other authors can be found in Appendix H. I set out all of the additional documents related to the methodology in Appendix I.
Table 1

*The Research Design*

**Research Topic**
The stateless Bedoun in Kuwaiti society
A study of the identity and culture of the Bedoun with a focus on education

**Research Questions**
Identity, culture and participation in society of the Bedoun in Kuwait, experiences in education and

**The Research Population**
The Bedoun, particularly those enrolled in post-secondary education courses
Those unable to access post-secondary education

**Literature Review**
The Bedoun
Kuwait area studies in the social sciences
Marginalisation in the Middle East, nationalism and statelessness

**Theory**
Humanistic sociology
Ethnic identity theory, marginalisation, nationalism, statelessness and cultural systems

**Methods**
Qualitative, explorative, inductive
Multiple, qualitative methods: Documentary research, fieldwork in Kuwait, loosely structured, in-depth interviews, participant observation, photography

**Fieldwork**
Hidden, hard-to-reach, marginalised and vulnerable population
Snowball referral (link-tracing) sampling, a collaborative approach

**Analysis of results**
Inductive, thematic analysis of interview data, photographs and documentary data
Codebook development, a typology, negative case comparisons
Themes evidenced by quotations, observation notes and photographs

**Discussion**
Ethnic identity, marginalisation and cultural change
Ethnic targeting, marginalisation and stigma
Intellectual identity, Education and Cultural Re-organisation

**Recommendations**
Research on the Bedoun
The United Nations Human Rights Committee, UNESCO and the UNDP
United Nations Special Rapporteurs on Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect
4.1.1 Aim of the research.

The aim of the study was to explore the personal and cultural identity of the Bedoun, the experiences that have helped them to form their identity and their participation in society in Kuwait. In particular, the study sought to discover the Bedoun’s experiences in education and ways in which they express their intellectual identity and capacity to contribute to society.

4.1.2 Research questions.

The key Research Questions were:

1. What are key aspects of the personal and cultural identity of the Bedoun?
2. What are some of the key experiences that have helped to form the identity of the Bedoun?
3. What are the personal benefits and challenges that arise from participation of the Bedoun in Kuwaiti society? What are the challenges for those who are excluded?
4. What are the personal benefits and challenges that arise from participation of the stateless in post-secondary education? What are the challenges for those who are excluded?
5. What are the thoughts and feelings of the Bedoun in relation to their achievements, difficulties, their rights, obligations and duties as members of their families, the stateless community and as members of the student community alongside Kuwaiti citizens and other non-nationals?

A flexible approach was taken to the development of the research questions for this study. In consideration of the social context of the interviewees, the focus of the research questions shifted away from concentrating mainly on experiences in post-secondary education, and toward the interviewees’ experiences of their identity and culture. Although data was collected on participation in education, over the course of the study I realised that the ethnic identity of the Bedoun, and also of the Bedouin, had not been well established in the literature. Therefore, there was a more pressing need to focus on this gap in knowledge. Furthermore, as education reforms introduced in 2011 had begun to be reported as having failed only some months prior to the fieldwork, it was only during the fieldwork that I realised that the Bedoun’s identity and culture was ethnically targeted in a manner that actually prevented their participation in education, which increased the salience of research investigating identity and culture. This problem warranted education issues to be understood in the context of the Bedoun’s historical, cultural development. These changes were illustrated in the ‘Development of the research questions,’ shown in Appendix I i).
4.1.3 The qualitative paradigm.

Qualitative research in the social sciences investigates ‘the world of lived experience… where individual belief and action intersect with culture’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011, p.2). It is a naturalistic form of inquiry, a process used to understand social or human problems, often carried out as field studies (Burgess, 1986, Creswell, 2003; Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). Such studies are characterised by interaction between the researcher and research participants, and therefore sample sizes tend to be smaller than those found in quantitative research studies. Qualitative research is often distinguished from the quantitative paradigm, which is based on the positivistic scientific framework (Znaniecki, 1952a). While quantitative researchers tend to makes claims to scientific objectivity and authority over knowledge (Denzin and Giardina, 2010), qualitative researchers have alternatively, articulated a different kind of worldview based on humanism, social justice and resistance to oppression (Abu-Lughod, 2008; Denzin and Giardina, 2016).

4.1.4 The inductive research process.

The inductive method generates new theory derived from empirical data (Burgess, 1986, Denzin, 1970). In exploratory, inductive research, social phenomena are studied without the a priori expectations that are typical of deductive studies (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). This overall approach determined my selection of strategies of the research design: a multiple methods approach to provide more than one means of collecting data, fieldwork involved recording participant observations in a notebook or directly onto my computer, taking photographs during my excursions with fieldwork guides, and starting my code-book during the interview phase to help track emerging categories of data, which in turn guided the loosely structured interviews. The outcome of each new interview indicated the development of the categories of data (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), although I did not formally analyse each interview in succession at that time. I retained negative cases during the thematic analysis. I explain the value of this strategy, below. Exploration was maintained from the conception of a project all the way through the writing up stages (Stebbins, 2001). I continued to refine the themes derived from the data as I theorised.

4.1.5 Empirical methods.

This research was grounded in the empirical approach since first, it comprised fieldwork study and second, it drew on the empirical materials collected from the field and documentary texts (Bruyn, 1966; Strubing, 2007; Thomas and Znaniecki, 1919/1927). Empirical investigation enables researchers to identify basic facts associated with the case at hand, aspects of the problem that need to be taken into account in order to reach a solution (Strubing, 2007 p.564). Empirical study may also involve the researcher interacting with participants as a means of gaining knowledge about them. According to Denzin and Lincoln (2011), without fieldwork, researchers might miss the relevant facts altogether, or overlook important ones that become obvious only by being present in the field. Fieldwork provides
the material from which researchers create their interpretive practices (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). I discuss my use of multiple, empirical methods below.

### 4.2 Data Collection Techniques.

The following categories of information and their sources were collected for use in this study:

- Documents analysed included books, academic journal articles, scholarly articles in intuitional publications, student thesis work, international humanitarian agency reports, reports of local civil society groups, newspaper articles (including online), ‘activist’ blogs, government policy documents, government migration and foreign policy documents, e.g. country advices, ethnic group ‘guidance notes,’ migration court transcripts, copies personal identity documents, WikiLeaks cables, U.S. Department of State reports, and submissions to the United Nations organisations such as the Council for Human Rights by local and international humanitarian organisations.

- Loosely structured interviews were conducted to collect data form the members of the Bedoun community in Kuwait, and two individuals who live permanently outside Kuwait but still have family residing in Kuwait.

- Participant observation notes were also gathered during fieldwork in Kuwait.

- Visual data was collected in the form of photographs taken in Kuwait, during my fieldwork from February to April 2014.

#### 4.2.1 Researching documents.

Some researchers regard documentary sources of data as social facts in themselves (Atkinson and Coffey, 1997). Documentary sources common to sociological study include historical archives, newspaper files, court records, social agency records and other organisational documents (Bulmer, 1984). Thomas and Znaniecki (1927) conducted the first sociological study that drew substantially on different document types, such as a life histories, personal letters, identity records and government records. They duly defended the use of methods that collected evidence from the participant’s subjective point of view, as unique and important data representing the cultural group (Thomas in Blumer, 1979, p. 84-86).

The range of documents I sourced for this research were listed under 4.2, above. Documentary research was undertaken throughout the study, commencing with the literature review and finishing with the final drafts of the thesis. Some of the most valuable documents featured in this study were the doctoral thesis works by Kuwaiti scholars, which I discussed in Chapter 2. Additionally, personal identity documents were provided by some of the research participants, including national census documents, identification cards, birth certificates and hospital birth record papers. Some of the documents were sourced directly from research participants, including additional documents sourced in Kuwait by Mohammed al Anezi, of London.
4.2.1.1. Transliteration.

There were a number of linguistic reasons that I chose to present a ‘plain language’ use of Arabic terms. However, the main two reasons were to enhance readability of the research by others and to enhance the searchability of Arabic author names by respecting the spelling of those names in their original published work. I followed the straightforward approach of Plotkin-Boghardt (2007) to translation of Arabic in the Kuwaiti context:

To enhance the “user-friendliness” of Arabic terms in this study for non-specialists, Arabic is transliterated according to typical press usage (e.g. Shiite rather than Shi‘i) and without diacritical marks (e.g. Shia rather than Shi‘a). In this vein, most singular Arabic words are made plural by adding “s” rather than using the transliterated Arabic plural (e.g. diwaniyyas rather than diwaniyyat). Kuwaiti proper names are transliterated as they are by the individuals themselves, Kuwaiti English language newspapers, or other local sources. (Plotkin-Boghardt, 2007, p.xiii)

4.2.2 The interview process.

Semi-structured, in-depth interviews were the primary method of data collection. Guest, Namey and Mitchell (2013, p.21) suggested that interviews with semi- or unstructured approaches using open-ended questions was the main method of data collection in qualitative research. Kvale (1996, p.5) called this type of interview ‘the Conversation,’ featuring a methodological awareness of question forms, a focus on the dynamics of interaction between interviewer and interviewee, and also a critical attention to what was said. Patton (1987) captured the complexity behind the in-depth interview, which involves:

… asking open-ended questions, listening to and recording the answers, and then following up with additional relevant questions. On the surface this appears to require no more than knowing how to talk and listen. Beneath the surface, however, interviewing becomes an art and science requiring skill, sensitivity, concentration, interpersonal understanding, insight, mental acuity and discipline. (Patton, 1987, p.108)

Kvale (1996) and Patton’s (1987) acknowledgement of the ‘art’ of the technique of interviewing and behind-the-scenes elements point to the complexity of the process that takes place in the data collection phase. Guest et al., (2013, p.21) focused on the collaborative nature of interviews, and the explication of data through quotations. I found this approach to be quite similar to Znaniecki (1952a, p.253) and Gross (1978, p.xx), who attempted to show that the research participant’s subjective viewpoint and their definition of their own situation, could be revealed through quotations derived from via conversation-style interview methods. Bhopal and Duechar (2016) called the very rich, autobiographical data arising from interviews with marginalised people, ‘dense life stories.’ The interview questions were considered prior to the fieldwork, and these are listed under ‘Main and supplementary interview questions’ in Appendix I, ii. These questions were compiled to help
structure the interviews and to prompt interviewees if required (a loosely structured approach was planned).

Interviews were initially arranged to occur on a number of different university campuses in Kuwait City or other agreed locations nominated by interviewees. The respondents tended to choose the latter option, although a number of interviews took place at the American University of Kuwait in Salmiya, where I had secured a research fellowship in the Centre for Gulf Studies. Interviews were conducted in Kuwait in Salmiya, al Rai, Central Kuwait City, Taima and a few other locations that I am unable to disclose due to privacy concerns. Skype interviews were also conducted between myself in Adelaide, and participants in Taima, Sulabiya, Ahmadi (all in Kuwait) and London later in the study. I collated the basic information about interviews on the ‘Interview data sheet,’ such as the location (Appendix viii), the number of interviews conducted with each participant, and the language and translators utilised (see Appendix I, iii). Overall, I conducted interviews between February 2014 and February 2016.

Three participants joined the study after my initial fieldwork. I discussed the issue of the need to take a slightly different approach for three participants who joined the study in late 2015 with my Principal Supervisor, who consented to the approach. Participant 19 joined the study in late 2015 and I conducted a formal interview with him, in early 2016. I recorded the interview and asked the research questions. Like the other participants, the data was rich and valuable to the study, but I did not conduct a thematic analysis on the interview data due to the time constraints. I expect to complete transcribing and analysing the data at a later date. The participant also provided additional and valuable assistance to me with clarifying language issues and updates on the local situation.

I adopted a different set of interview questions for two research participants who have lead the Bedoun’s civil rights movement in Kuwait and the diaspora, who I also discussed in the Acknowledgements section. Mohammed al Anezi, is a Bedoun who has since acquired citizenship of the United Kingdom and lives in London (Participant 20). I conducted an informal interview without a recording for Mohammed, which ran for around one and a half hours. Instead of the research questions, we discussed specific areas of knowledge, such as information about particular tribes, religious sects, the procedures of the national census and for acquiring personal documentation, and language terms.

Hakeem al Fadhli, is probably the most widely known social leader of the Bedoun in Kuwait (Participant 18). I found that he had already performed the role of a public intellectual, although he did not perceive himself in that way. He had engaged in rigorous debate about the Bedoun with Kuwaiti elites on television and in other forums during the Arab Spring, but unfortunately this work was never translated into English. His contributions to research had steadily accumulated in the meantime. I conducted two formal interviews after he had assisted me in a myriad of other ways. I did not have time to subject the data to a full thematic analysis prior to writing up the thesis, as the total interview time
was four hours. I utilised the interviews and our many personal communications as part of the collaborative approach, to clarify, contextualise and theorize the data.

4.2.2.1 The use of interpreters.

Four out of twenty-five interviews required translation (see the ‘Interview data sheet,’ Appendix I, iii). Initial arrangements for interpreters to be sourced through a local humanitarian organisation in Kuwait, did not eventuate. This left me to locate interpreters myself. The interpreters comprised two citizen advocates and two Bedoun individuals. As often arises in fieldwork, the translators also acted as gatekeepers and cultural guides. One translator provided ongoing assistance in the field and became my most important cultural guide. Further notes on translation can be found in the ‘Transcription and data management protocol’ (Appendix I, vii).

4.2.3 Participant observation.

The participant observation method is known for revealing the depth of social life to a greater degree than interviews or other methods alone. Unique information that is unlikely to be repeated is documented, based on researcher observations from a distance, and researcher-participant interactions up-close. However, like collaborative research, participant observation may lead to stress between the researcher and participants (Tischler, 2014, p.33). Participant observation can also help to position the researcher as a familiar presence in the community and to enable him or her to make contact with, and establish rapport with, potential interviewees (Hennick, Hutter and Bailey, 2011). Observation was limited in my work with the Bedoun, due to their preference for non-disclosure in public spaces and the constraints placed on their participation in civil society, which leads to security concerns. As a result, my richest experiences gathering data tended to occur when trusted gatekeepers secured my interviews, and when I was chaperoned. Therefore, I came to appreciate and value my very real dependence on gendered social values and in particular, male and female cultural guides for providing access to the community. I visited al Jahra a number of times, and travelled from the north to (Abdali) to the south (Wafra), as well the Kuwait Oil Company and al Hamadi, which are inland. When it came to selecting which data to analyse for the results, I did not regard my participant observation notes as valuable as the interview data, as I found the interview data as more representative of the Bedoun’s values. I regarded my observation notes as a closer reflection of my personal impressions, rather than theirs. Therefore, I did not conduct a thematic analysis on my observational data but used it to supplement just a few themes as required.

4.2.4 Photography.

Visual methods are not used frequently in sociology, but their use does have a long history, going back to the beginning of social inquiry (Bogdan and Biklen, 1992). Both Denzin (1970, p.215) and Becker (1981) promoted the use of photographs for inductive, qualitative research in sociology, and explained how to interpret them for qualitative,

I applied thematic analysis to my photographic images by treating the collection as a whole, and incorporating them into the existing theme of ‘marginalisation of identity’ influenced by poverty, as supplementary evidence of the theme. I did not analyse the photographs separately, which would have likely led to me exploring the concept of segregation in greater depth, as I regarded this as beyond the scope of the current topic. Instead, I presented a comparative visual record of Bedoun settlement over the last forty years in Appendix H, by combining my images with those of Professor al Moosa (1976) and al Zaher (1990).

4.2.5 Fieldwork access.

Fieldwork access issues were characterised by the population being hidden (Spreen, 1992) and hard-to-reach (Atkinson and Flint, 2001) due to their collective, contemporary history of expulsions and human rights violations (Human Rights Watch, 2011). Fieldwork arrangements involved a full ethical review of the Human Research and Ethics Committee at the University of Adelaide (Appendix I, iv). I argued that the research was grounded in principles of beneficence, based on the Australian National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007). This meant that the population’s relative level of social disadvantage, marginalisation and indigenous status warranted careful consideration, and that snowball sampling (also known as referral or link-chain methods) were the obvious choice.

Social science approaches to fieldwork in the Middle East such as Clark (2006), Suleiman and Anderson (2007) and specifically, explanations of how populations could be accessed in difficult circumstances (Cohen and Arieli, 2011) were especially helpful. I also had some degree of personally acquired cultural knowledge of the group prior to my fieldwork. Formal field access arrangements were made well in advance, but they all proved to be unreliable in Kuwait due to the stigmatisation of the Bedoun, and the nature of the surveillance culture. I obtained a research fellowship at the American University Gulf Studies Centre, under Associate Professor Farah al Nakib. My fieldwork access issues became very much entwined with my observational experiences and interviews (described above), where informal access using the snowball sampling method was highly effective (discussed in the next section).

4.2.6 Sample selection.

Snowball sampling is also known as the referral method and link-tracing method (Spreen, 1992, Brackertz, 2007). It is a form of purposive sampling (Chilisa, 2011), used in exploratory studies (Guest, et al., 2012) or where random sampling is inappropriate (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003a, p. 713). Over time, a network of trusted contacts can be built up based upon the interest of those persons who have provided referrals, in maintaining relationships (Brackertz, 2007). Atkinson and Flint (2001) define snowball sampling as,
In its simplest formulation snowball sampling consists of identifying respondents who are then used to refer researchers on to other respondents. (Atkinson and Flint, 2001, p.1)

Snowball sampling is frequently used in the Middle East as a qualitative research method in general (Atkinson and Flint, 2001; Clarke, 2006; Sulieman and Anderson, 2008). In her survey of research methods in the Middle East, Clarke (2006) found that some 89% of researchers relied on snowball sampling methods. There may be a range of reasons why populations need to be accessed through this type of sampling, and this may include simply a lack of data available on the population under study, with which to establish a random sample (Clark, 2006, Cohen and Arieli, 2011). It is considered the method of choice by many researchers for accessing marginalised and vulnerable populations (Chilisa, 2012; Cohen and Arieli, 2011; Jacobsen and Landau, 2003). The method has also been used in conflict-ridden environments including war zones (Cohen and Arieli, 2011; Romano, 2006), with victims of violence, racial minorities, refugees, the chronically ill and the poor (Freimuth and Mettger, 1990), and with populations who are criminalized and socially isolated (Faugier and Sargeant, 1997). All of these factors applied in one way or another, to the participants in this study due to their identity and legal status.

This sampling method seems to be of particular utility for studying Middle East societies, because its basic principles, which rely on trusted relationships, reflect the concept of *wasta*, which is a culturally specific form of social networking among Arab men and women (Abalkhail and Allen, 2016; Weir, 2004). Additionally, the Bedouin remain predominantly an oral-based culture, and although this is changing over time, they are known to prefer face-to-face contacts (Abu-Lughod, 2000; Ingham, 1986). I also experienced some disadvantages of snowball sampling concerning attempts to secure access through more formal or publically ‘approved’ channels. Civil society organisations with whom I had made arrangements over a year in advance pulled out of the arrangements or did not follow the agreed plans for access, recruitment and/or translation. In the field, this problem forced me to very quickly, seek other avenues for access using the snowball referral method. These avenues proved to be far more successful in any case, and provided me with a more diverse group of participants, and more durable relationships with the community. Once again, this process foregrounded the importance of shared trust, which is vital in research conducted in collaboration with marginalized groups (Bergold and Thomas, 2012; Lassiter, 2005b).

4.3 Data Analysis and Interpretation

4.3.1 Thematic analysis of interview data.

Thematic analysis was used in this study, according to the procedures described in Guest et al., (2012). Thematic analysis is inductive and exploratory in approach, which can be distinguished from classic content analysis, which is deductive and confirmatory in
approach (Guest et al., 2012; Weber, 1990). The definition of thematic analysis varies somewhat between authors, but it is one of the most frequently and widely used methods in qualitative research (Boyatzis, 1998, Braun and Clarke, 2006, Guest et al., 2012). Braun and Clarke (2006) emphasised the utility and flexibility of thematic analysis, which is adaptable to a range of theories. They describe thematic analysis as,

A method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data. It minimally organises and describes your data set in (rich) detail.  
(Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.6)

Thematic analysis was also recommended the as a key analytic tool that researchers should learn prior to taking on more complex methods, as it teaches novice researchers core skills that are transferrable across many other forms of analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.4). 

Braun and Clark (2006) also emphasised the interpretive function, discussed in Boyatzzis (1998), which might be suitable for the construction of an ethnography. However, Guest et al., (2012) suggested that the interpretive method should be balanced by a highly systemic, ‘scientific’ approach and I found this quite appealing when faced with the controversial nature of my findings. Ultimately, the degree to which the data is abstracted is dependent upon the choices of the researcher. Guest (et al., 2012) suggested that an Audit Trail could be used to trace the techniques and procedures implemented, in order to maintain rigour and enhance reliability (Appendix I, vi). After my first analysis gave rise to the problem that I had not reduced my data enough and some of my concepts seemed to be too vague for me to theorize confidently, I repeated the process, refining the thematic concepts further. This second attempt enabled me to show my links between the empirical data and the abstracted levels with more clarity, while accounting for all data collected under the selected meta-themes.

4.3.2 Codebook development.

Znaniecki (Lapota in Znaniecki, 1965, xvii) believed that ‘sociology must proceed through induction to the analysis of the various forms of social systems, with a goal of developing a taxonomy of such systems.’ Taxonomies are used to map phenomena and to build interpretive models for theorisation (Alexander, 2012). I referred to taxonomies of social systems described by previous researchers (Gittus, 1972, in Burgess, 1986; Jenkins, 2008; Zetterberg, 1965; Znaniecki, 1952a) to help me develop the codebook typology, as there was no previous sociology study on the Bedoun that could provide me with clues as to how I should categorize my data (see Appendices I, ix, x). By tracking the development of codes in the field, I was able to explore unanticipated findings in some detail, such as the open acceptance of Bedoun identity as a high cultural value among the participants, including by formerly stateless citizens. Due to the unique context of the Bedoun’s situation, which gave rise to specific and unusual concepts and the use of English as a second or third language in the transcripts, I decided to manually code and analyse the data.

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4.4 Validity and Reliability

Denzin (1970, p.234-5) believed that there is no longer a single, gold standard for qualitative work and that within qualitative research paradigm, methodological rules and interpretive guidelines are open to change and different interpretations over time. Guest et al., (2012, p.99-101) described techniques to enhance the validity and reliability of qualitative, which they also referred to as ‘credibility and dependability.’ The procedures for establishing reliability and validity in this study were discussed Appendix I, v and vi (the latter is a description of an analysis ‘audit trail’). They involved:

- The use of multiple methods and/or data sources
- Adjustment of the structure of instruments to fit the goals and structure of the study (e.g. included modifying the research questions)
- Monitoring data for theme development as they emerged, eliciting feedback from the participants after summarizing the interview
- Establishing the transcription protocol before transcribing, establishing translation expectations before commencing interviews (Appendix I, vii)
- Developing a precise codebook, creating an audit trail, (methodological) triangulation of data sources and negative case analysis supporting themes (see Appendix I, iv, ‘Techniques used to enhance validity and reliability’), and
- The use of quotations or other data points to enhance interpretation (Guest et al., 2012). This data will be placed in the Australian Data Archive, as I have mentioned. Both Shenton (2004) and Guest et al., (2012) emphasised that reliability (or repeatability) was not necessarily a major concern for all qualitative research studies. Rather, the researcher should be able to communicate clearly to other researchers, what was done to achieve the outcomes claimed. For this purpose, I followed Guest et al., (2012), and included additional documentation of my methods, such as a sample of a transcript (Appendix I, xi), a sample of a data extraction summary used in the thematic analysis (Appendix I, xii), and a sample of my participant observation notes (Appendix I, xiii).

It is worth noting my approach to generalizing, as I have tended to generalise some of the results of this study to the researched population as indicative of collectivist values, actions and cultural patterns. In humanistic sociological analysis, the identification of an individual attribute can be interpreted as a reflection of the cultural values shared by the group to which the individual belongs (Znaniecki, 1954). For example, a person’s positive attitude to members of the extended family, no matter what their classification by the government might be, can be regarded as reflective of the groups’ collectivist family values. This interpretation is greatly strengthened when many (though not necessarily all) people from the same group included in a set of respondents, express the same attitude. It is then possible to legitimately interpret this widespread attitude as a cultural value of the group as a whole. Similarly, individual social actions may take on collectivist functions in society, which leads such social action becoming institutionalised (Znaniecki, 1954, p.23). However,
there is one important exception, in the case of a Bedoun individual attempting to ‘pass’ as a
citizen Bedouin and behave in ways expected by the Hadar, their attitude would not be
regarded as reflecting the Bedoun’s values, but the values of the Hadar group with which he
or she needed to be associated in that particular context.

Multiple research methods enabled me to enhance the interview data for the purpose
of generalisation with additional data. Documentary research in particular provided an
opportunity to verify data and confirm essential findings. This process was similar to
‘theoretical sampling’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1987) that takes place during the
inductive analysis process:

It is a form of argumentative generalisation in the process of data collection.
The main idea is that from the beginning of data collection the material is
analysed by coding ... [to guide] inductive theory development. The first
results lead to considerations what further material (including new interviews,
field observations, and documents) is needed to confirm or support or critical
check the first results. This is an iterative process that comes to an end if
sufficient evidence had been found (saturation). (Mayring, 2007, ‘Procedures
of Generalisation’)

4.5 Ethical Considerations

4.5.1 The principle of beneficence.

Bhopal and Duechar (2016) described the principle of beneficence to the researched
population: any fieldwork with marginalised people should be characterised by equity,
dignity and respect, and researcher analyses should help to dispel prejudicial assumptions of
the participant population (p.268). The study was approved by the Human Research Ethics
Committee at the University of Adelaide (a full committee of review) and granted Approval
Number H2013 087 (see Appendix I, iv). As the study evolved, amendments were sent to the
committee for approval according to University procedure. These included the expansion of
the participant base prior to fieldwork to include Kuwaiti citizens and non-nationals, in the
case that an insufficient number of individuals agreed to participate and the broadening of
methods to include written documents as well as interviews, participant observation and
photography.

A second amendment was submitted to enable Skype interviews and to open up the
study to individuals not currently in enrolled in education, as by that stage, it had become
clear that participation in post-secondary education was not as common as it had appeared
prior to the fieldwork (due to failure of national policy reforms). I had envisaged that the
study was as a high-risk project for the purpose of ethical review due to the marginality of
the research participants and their lack of legal rights, and due to the nature of the
government regime in place in Kuwait. The regime in Kuwait is not a democratic system of
government and it has rejected and has criminalized en masse the population under study
since 1986 (Human Rights Watch, 2011), but the impact of government actions on the research process was difficult to know in advance.

Crucial to the ethical considerations was the ability to maintain the confidentiality of most of the research participants, while balancing the need for an appropriate level of methodological transparency. Middle East research in the social science is characterised by small-scale, qualitative studies where real challenges exist as to methodological transparency, particularly in locations or social situations vulnerable to conflict (Clarke, 2006; Cohen and Arieli, 2011; Romano, 2006; Suleiman and Anderson, 2007). These issues are integral to the challenges of research in the Middle East, but they are not unique to the region. Some researchers assert that these challenges exist across the whole paradigm of qualitative research (Jacobsen and Landau, 2003, Rogers, 2004, Brackertz, 2007), especially with marginalised populations (Faugier and Sargeant, 1997). Others have argued against complete disclosure as a political and positivistic concern and promoted the need for respectful, professional discretion, required to maintain trustworthiness with participants and to protect their confidentiality (Denzin, 2009; Kaiser, 2009; Shaffir and Stebbins, 1991; Shenton, 2004).

In order to balance these needs, I consulted with the Bedoun community. In the end, I had to make a decision about providing sufficient disclosure of participants that would encourage future researchers and the community to communicate without citizen gatekeeper intermediaries who might hinder access to the population. For this reason, I made the decision with the consent of the individuals concerned, to disclose the names of two important leaders in the community Mohammed al Anezi (in the United Kingdom; P20) Hakeem al Fadhli (in Kuwait; P18). Both individuals assisted me a great deal in the middle stages of my project, specifically with my theoretical perspective. It is beyond the scope of the thesis to explore the nature of my collaborative relationships much further, but it would be remiss of me not to emphasise the essential roles of my research collaborators and cultural guides (Lassiter, 2005), some of whom I cannot name at this time.

Conclusion

This chapter outlined the methodological approach adopted for this study, which was positioned in the qualitative paradigm (Creswell, 2003; Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). The study was designed as an exploratory, inductive inquiry (Stebbins, 2001; Znaniecki, 1952a). I discussed the adaptation of the research questions over the duration of the study, and the use of multiple empirical data collection techniques (Znaniecki, 1952a). In order to enhance the reliability and validity of the study, I incorporated additional checks and balances described by Guest et al., (2012), which are I documented in Appendix I. I discussed the validity and reliability of the data and generalisation in the context of the study (Guest et al., 2012), such as the Bedoun's local environment, the requirements for confidentiality and transparency regarding different aspects of the research. I consulted with the research participants and community leaders for member checks and to discuss my approach to the
disclosure of sensitive data, in order to balance the need for transparency with confidentiality (Lassiter, 2005a, 2005b). The snowball sampling method was selected to cater to the field environment in the Middle East, the vulnerable population researched, and the sensitive political environment.
Chapter 5
Overview of the Results

Introduction

This chapter provides a summary of the demographic data of the interviewees and the thematic analysis of interviews. The demographic data includes gender, age, legal identity status, family data, tribal membership and religious affiliation, residential, employment and educational data. The thematic analysis is presented under three meta-themes: Bedoun identity, the marginalisation of identity and culture, education and the intellectual ideal. The data was analysed to a depth of six levels, comprising meta-themes, themes, sub-themes, minor sub-themes, minor sub-sub themes and minor sub-sub-sub themes. Where relevant, some observations and explanatory notes have been provided, to explain points expanded upon in the discussion. Themes derived from the interview transcript data can be found in Appendix A. Note that a thematic analysis of the literature and other documents was also conducted to supplement the interview data. This information can be found in Appendices B-G.

5.1 Interviewee Demographic Data

A brief overview of the demographic data of individuals interviewed provided greater context for their responses. The total number of interviewees of members of the Bedoun community included in the study was twenty. The demographic data below refers to those individuals. The total number of interviewees whose data was included in the thematic analysis was seventeen. I discussed this rationale in Chapter 4 on methodological approaches.

5.1.1 Gender.

Twelve males and eight females were interviewed (see Table 2, below). Individuals were interviewed separately except for two groups of two females who were sisters, who were interviewed together for cultural reasons. Interviews took place in Salmiya and al Rai (Kuwait City centre), Ahmadi (south of Kuwait City) and Taima (in al Jahra, north of Kuwait City).

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender of Interview Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1.2 Age.
The interviewees were aged between twenty and forty-four (see Table 3, below). Six individuals were aged between twenty and twenty-nine; eleven individuals were aged between thirty and thirty-nine; four individuals were aged between forty and forty-nine.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1.3 Identity status and legal status (statelessness and nationality).

Interviewees’ legal identity status is shown below (Table 4). All respondents identified as ‘Bedoun’ people. Membership of the Bedoun community is based on ethnic and cultural identity, which is derived from one’s status at birth and ongoing cultural affiliations, rather than official legal status. The ethnic identity has endured beyond changes to legal status. I explain this point further in Chapter 6, the discussion. The legal status of Bedoun identity is observed by human rights organisations as arbitrarily assigned rather than an objective status (Human Rights Watch, 1995, 2000, 2011; Amnesty International, June 20 – July 15, 2016).

Sixteen of the Bedoun interviewees were stateless at the time of interview. One individual was a citizen mother who spoke for her stateless children, who were minors. Her husband was also stateless. Two individuals were citizens of Western countries, having been born stateless and having spent most of their lives in Kuwait without citizenship. Another individual was a citizen of Kuwait, having been granted citizenship within five years prior to interview. Three out of the fourteen stateless interviewees were ‘undocumented’ stateless people (United Kingdom: Home Office, March 5, 2009, February 3, 2014), having been subjected to erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing: Weissbrodt, 2008). The process of administrative ethnic cleansing via the re-allocation of individual’s records to ineffective nationality labels, called ‘status adjustment,’ is explored further below and in the discussion section.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.1.4 Family composition and legal status.

The family composition of Bedouin interviewees included other stateless members and citizen members. Thirteen interviewees had citizens in their immediate or close extended families, such as uncles, aunts or first cousins or siblings (see Table 5 below). Where aunts and uncles received citizenship, it was related to them receiving direct grants of citizenship over the last fifty-five years. This scenario may be regarded as quite typical of the integration of previous generations in the Kuwaiti Bedouin community in which families comprised of members with different degrees of Kuwaiti nationality status due to the inconsistent manner in which they were assessed for citizenship under the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) by the Nationality Committees who invoked Decree 5/1960 (Human Rights Watch, 1995) (see Chapter 7, section 7.3.1 and 7.3.2). Seven interviewees had siblings or cousins who intermarried with citizens, usually first cousins or relatives from the extended family. Traditional Bedouin patterns of family marriage persisted, including consanguineous and extended family marriage perpetuating Bedouin customary law practices, although new forms of partnerships were also regarded as desirable for both personal and health reasons (many participants were quite aware of the health toll of patrilineal cousin marriage upon their families, and wished to avoid it).

The composition of families in mixed stateless and citizen Bedouin family units, indicated the ongoing integration of the current generation, and the maintenance of Bedouin social solidarities and cultural practices between the Bedouin and citizens (first reported by Human Rights Watch, 1995). It also suggested a relationship between the maintenance of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Identity Status</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stateless - ‘documented’</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Stateless – ‘undocumented’  
(Unknown/unidentified/nationality label affected by ‘status adjustment’) | 3 |
| Formerly stateless  
(Citizen by Kuwaiti nationality grant) | 1 |
| Formerly stateless  
(Citizen by immigration to another country) | 2 |
| Kuwaiti citizen mother of stateless children, wife of stateless spouse | 1 |
customary social and cultural practices with the social problem of different citizenship status and statelessness shared within families. It appeared that family marriage (following the Bedouin traditional customary practice) served as a pathway for citizenship to be granted to some stateless family members, although this provided for quite different outcomes for males and females, due to the gendered provisions of the *Nationality Law 1959* (Kuwait). On the other hand, the government practices of restricting and delaying official recognition of marriage to Kuwaiti Bedouin citizens and between the Bedoun, as well as between exclusively Bedoun partners (set out in the 1986 expulsion policy, see Appendix E, i), while preventing the founding of families, also appeared to reinforce the maintenance of customary social and cultural practices related to marriage, divorce and child birth for those who could marry. The connection between these results and culturally-patterened family values is discussed in Chapter 6.

Table 5

*Family Composition of Interview Respondents*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family composition</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stateless with citizens in family</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siblings or cousins intermarried with citizens</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undisclosed</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No citizens in family</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1.5 Marital and birth data.

Table 6 and Table 7 show the marital and birth data of the interviewees. Six respondents were married; two were divorced (see Table 6). Eight of the respondents had children (six of these respondents were married, two were divorced). Twelve respondents were single, had never married and were childless (see Table 7). All but one interviewee reported that they had no plans for marriage due to lack of future prospects.
The birth rate among the Bedoun interviewees appeared to be in decline compared to previous generations. Some interviewees discussed the fact that smaller families were regarded as desirable among the current generation, but many interviewees also discussed their predicament of being unable to marry due to their social status and issues related to their statelessness, such as poverty.

It is not possible to generalize from such a small data set, a quantitative population decline in the general population. However, further information could be gained by comparing the birth data between the respondent’s and their parent's generation. I compared the size of the respondent's families in the current generation, with the size of the family units in which they had grown up. Historically, state policies have appeared to target not only the Bedoun’s population growth, but also population maintenance.
The data are worth considering, in view of the fact that no such analysis appears to have been published previously. I did not collect data on this matter for six interviewees, as the seriousness of the issue only became apparent to me after I had already begun to collect my field data. As children, the respondent's parents had known larger families, with most interviewees raised in families containing eight or more members due to high birth rates (see Table 8, above).

The data in Table 8 above, can be compared to the relatively small family size of the interviewees themselves, listed in Table 9, below. Eight out of twenty interviewees were parents, with a maximum of five children in a family. This data was only an estimate of family size, because for example, I did not consider grandparents and spouses in a household, but focused on replacement of the population via childbirth. It should also be remembered that this sample was not a representative one. Due to the dominance of Bedouin cultural values, all those who had children, were married or divorced in heterosexual couplings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of children of respondent’s parents</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-5 children</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10 children</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-15 children</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-20 children</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undisclosed</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data are worth considering, in view of the fact that no such analysis appears to have been published previously. I did not collect data on this matter for six interviewees, as the seriousness of the issue only became apparent to me after I had already begun to collect my field data. As children, the respondent's parents had known larger families, with most interviewees raised in families containing eight or more members due to high birth rates (see Table 8, above).

The data in Table 8 above, can be compared to the relatively small family size of the interviewees themselves, listed in Table 9, below. Eight out of twenty interviewees were parents, with a maximum of five children in a family. This data was only an estimate of family size, because for example, I did not consider grandparents and spouses in a household, but focused on replacement of the population via childbirth. It should also be remembered that this sample was not a representative one. Due to the dominance of Bedouin cultural values, all those who had children, were married or divorced in heterosexual couplings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of children of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No children</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.1.6 Tribal membership and religious affiliation.

The research participants came from at least four tribes (see Table 10, below). Five individuals were from the al Aneza, four from the D’afiri, two from the Shammar and two from the Bani Khalid. Tribal identity proved to be one of the strongest qualitative themes in this study. I discuss this factor in more detail below.

Table 10

*Tribal Affiliations of Interview Respondents*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribal Affiliation</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Anezi</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D’afiri</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shammar</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bani Khalid</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undisclosed</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nine interviewees were Sunni and three were Shia. Eight chose not to disclose their religious affiliation (see Table 11, below). The results were characterised by a lack of strong sectarian sentiment among the research participants. Religious issues were discussed briefly. The themes arising are displayed below, under the meta-theme of ‘Bedoun identity.’

Table 11

*Religious Affiliations of Interview Respondents*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious affiliation</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

115
5.1.7 Place of upbringing and current residence.

Overall, the data indicated that the interviewee’s families had moved closer to the city while they were growing up. Therefore, I set out the data in two tables to illustrate the demographic shift as families relocated from al Jahra in particular, closer to Kuwait City or to the south of Kuwait City. Twelve respondents grew up in al Jahra (north of Kuwait City), two in Sulabiya, one in Hawai (central Kuwait City), one in Ahmadi (south of Kuwait City). Four respondents did not disclose their place of upbringing (see Table 12, below).

Table 12

*Interviewee Respondents’ Place of Residence as Children*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place where interviewees lived as children</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Jahra</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulabiya</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawai</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmadi</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undisclosed</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In regard to the current place of residence at time of interview, five respondents still lived in al Jahra, and two in Sulabiya (see Table 13, below).

Table 13

*Interviewee’s Place of Residence (at Present)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place where interviewees live at present</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Jahra</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Two interviewees lived in Farwaniya (central Kuwait City), one in central Hawali and six in Ahmadi, south of Kuwait City. One interviewee from al Jahra and one interviewee from Hawali had managed to leave Kuwait and acquire citizenship in Western countries, through the asylum process. The place of residence of two of the interviewees was undisclosed.

5.1.8 Educational data.

The interviewees had participated in education at a variety of levels of vocational and higher education. The data in Table 14 (below), indicated the interviewees’ highest level of qualifications completed or currently studying. All three individuals at PhD level had also completed Masters programs. Seven individuals had completed a Diploma level qualification and nine had completed a Bachelor degree.

Initially, interviewees were selected according to experience in tertiary (post-secondary) education. However, the study was broadened to include other types of students, to better account for the variety of experiences acquired by the Bedoun in education, and the barriers to education faced by the population from which the participants were drawn. Nevertheless, most students recruited for this study had completed or were completing, degree studies.

Most research participants attended (or were attending) private educational institutions (see Table 15, below). The higher education sector in Kuwait is somewhat more complex than table above indicates, because vocational and technical training institutes (also known as ‘colleges’ in Kuwait) and universities offer bridging programs, diplomas or degrees. Additionally, some individuals had studied more than one qualification and were not necessarily currently studying their highest-level qualification (in accordance with employment demands and patterns of life-long learning). Some interviewees had been admitted into public education facilities in previous years, when regulations regarding the Bedoun’s access to education were different. Some had accessed public education under temporary programs offered to the Bedoun by government, in order to fulfil local, labour market demands. Two respondents had studied overseas some years ago, when access to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sulabiya</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farwaniya</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawali</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmadi</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undisclosed</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
higher education was even more restricted to the Bedoun than it is at present, and they had been forced to make illegal border crossings in order to do so.
Table 14

*Educational Experience of Interviewees – Highest Level of Qualification*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qualification type</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor degree</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two respondents had not completed a formal post-secondary education qualification. One respondent had no experience in vocational training or higher education, and one other had completed work-based training in his profession, which may be regarded as an informal vocational program or a cadetship/apprenticeship. Some had also participated in formal and non-formal, on-the-job training.

Table 15

*Educational Experience of Interviewees – Institution of Qualifications*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational institutions attended</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public college</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public university</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private college</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private university</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten participants had acquired multiple, post-secondary qualifications. Twelve out of the twenty in the research group had been affected by education bans forcing them out of public schools during their secondary education, for different lengths of time, depending upon their family’s circumstances. Thirteen interviewees had been personally affected by bans on education which had interfered with their transition from secondary school to university.

The interviewees had studied a variety of subjects (see Table 16, below).
Table 16

*Areas of University and College Specialisation*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject areas College</th>
<th>Subject areas University</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nursing</td>
<td>Arts/Humanities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office administration</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business administration</td>
<td>Business management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer science</td>
<td>Computer science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>Law</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

College subjects included computer science, office and business administration and nursing. University subjects included Arts/Humanities, education, computer science, business management, engineering and law. The Bedouin are currently prohibited from studying law in Kuwait, but one of the older participants was able to study law overseas and re-enter the country. Only one student was studying at Kuwait University; the others were studying at private universities.

### 5.1.9 Employment.

Research participants also engaged in a variety of types of employment (see Table 17, below). The numbers in parenthesis next to each job type refers to the number of respondents employed in that work type. Six interviewees were self-employed, eight held skilled and semi-professional jobs, and ten held professional positions. The interviewees’ work and study patterns were indicative of them seeking conditions in which they could be productive. The entrepreneurial nature of many of the interviewees was an unexpected and novel finding. Many worked in more than one area of employment, as well as attending college or university part-time. Only two respondents felt reasonably comfortable about the security of their employment. Generally speaking, the respondents felt that their employment was highly insecure due to their statelessness and this seemed to place pressure on them to be as productive as possible.
5.2 Findings from the thematic analysis – Bedoun identity

A Thematic Analysis Chart has been provided to illustrate the themes visually, enabling a better understanding of the scope of the analysis overall (see Appendix A, iii, Table A7). Three themes arose from the meta-theme Bedoun identity, including tribal identity, personal identity and collective identity, which are listed in Appendix A i.

5.2.1 Tribal identity.

The theme of tribal identity featured sub-themes of tribal origins, Bedouin language and names, religious values and the Bedoun and tribal politics. All of the themes related to this meta-theme are listed in Appendix A i, Table A1. The tribal identity of the Bedoun was foregrounded as a primary identity. Often, the identity was somewhat implicit, for example, one respondent asked me about my tribe (P09), assuming I came from a similar type of society. The richest sub-theme under tribal identity was tribal origins, associated with six minor sub-themes, while the sub-theme itself was supported by data from sixteen out of twenty interviewees. It is noteworthy that tribal identity *per se* was not a major focus of the research questions.

The relevance of tribal issues emerged during my fieldwork in Kuwait. The self-ascription of Bedoun identity as native Bedouin of Kuwait was one of the strongest, qualitative themes in this study – many different terms and concepts were used to describe it, indicating a functional and rich tribal heritage persisted in the community. Other sub-themes

---

**Table 17**

*Types of Employment Held by Interviewees*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self Employed</th>
<th>Skilled and semi-professional</th>
<th>Professional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Street-selling (1)</td>
<td>Security officer (1)</td>
<td>Journalist (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market stalls (1)</td>
<td>Computer programming (1)</td>
<td>Translator (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer consultancy (1)</td>
<td>Computer illustration (1)</td>
<td>Law practice (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Software engineering consultancy (1)</td>
<td>Video editing (1)</td>
<td>Line management (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community advocacy (2)</td>
<td>Writing and editing (2)</td>
<td>Teaching (schools) (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Office administration (2)</td>
<td>Lecturing (university) (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Supervising university research (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
added to the historical discussion of multiple layers of Bedoun identity, including local
corcepts used to describe oneself and one's worldview, or local identity and transnational
identity, related to the Bedouin’s traditional tribal presence across the Middle East. Other
sub-themes included tribal language and names, the northern and southern tribes, religious
values and tribal political issues concerning the Bedoun. I will now briefly discuss some of
the important findings in relation to the tribal identity of the Bedoun arising from this study,
and explain their significance.

5.2.2 Self-ascribed terms for tribal identity.

I have listed the names of the tribes to which the individual respondents belonged, in
Table 10, above. Rather than being characterised by ethnic difference from the Bedouin of
Kuwait (Beaugrand, 2010, p.18), the results of the interview data indicated that the Bedoun
may be characterised by their sameness to the Kuwaiti Bedouin, because they are members
of the same families and tribal groups. The interviewees also explained the basis for the
acute marginalisation of the Bedoun and the more general marginalisation of the Bedouin in
Kuwait, which characterises their difference from citizen Bedouin. In other words, there
appears to be different degrees of integration and marginalisation leading to complex, multi-
layered identities shared by the Bedoun and their citizen tribal members. While they remain
part of the Bedouin ethnic group in their traditional tribal collectives, their identity and
affiliations are also influenced by their status and belonging to the 'Bedoun' collective. Ten
different self-ascribed identity terms related to tribal identity discussed by the interviewees,
are shown below in Table 18. I attempt to theorise the self-ascription of Bedoun identity
terms within the Bedouin ethnic structure in Chapter 6, according to theory of multiple

The theme of ‘native people' predominated, with seven interviewees discussing this
aspect of their identity. Their expression of being native was connected to the land,
specifically the desert, and identification with traditional names for the Bedouin such as
‘Bedu,' ‘Kuwaiti desert dweller’ (P08) and ‘Sons of the desert’ (P09) from the time of the
Bani Utub. This term refers to the three tribal groups, including the ruling family, who
settled in Kuwait (P09, P14). Note that the history of the Bani Utub was known by its
members; and Lorimer (1915) had pointed out in his English text that the tribes lead by the
Utub sheikhs, included ‘contingents of numerous tribes from the Arab mainland’ (p.839)
referring to the region of the northern tribes. For others, an aspect of tribal identity such as
being from the camel-breeding Bedouin tribes (P12) was part of an implicit identification.
Interviewees also discussed the presence of their tribe in Kuwait prior to the formation of the
modern state (P08, P12, P18, P19, P20). Transnational tribal origins and tribal alliances
were discussed by some interviewees, including the relationship between these alliances and
the status of the Bedoun in Bedouin society.
Table 18

References to Tribal Identity by Bedoun Research Participants

Self-ascribed Tribal Identity

1. *Bedu* or Bedouin
2. Sons of the desert
3. Desert dwellers of Kuwait
4. Native
5. *Usil*
6. First (arrivals)
7. Bani Utub
8. Individual tribal names
9. Northern and southern tribes
   (regional, transnational)
10. Northern and southern areas of Kuwait city (local)

Interviewees pointed out that the Bedoun and citizens of Kuwait are in many respects, culturally identical (P03, P06, P09) because they are members of the same families (P16, P17, P18, P19, P120). However, there have been some points of differences between citizens and stateless Bedouin developing during the present generation (P05, P08, P12, P18). Among the Bedouin, individual identity and tribal heritage could be fairly easily established by talking together (P12). The pastoral activities of their interviewees’ grandparents or great-grandparents included nomadic and semi-nomadic practices, involving sheep, cattle and camel herding. The Kuwaiti citizen was recognised by nomadic Bedouin not as ‘settled’ as scholars refer to the concept, since the Bedouin were also settled in Kuwait to varying degrees according to their tribes’ nomadic and semi-nomadic cultural patterns. The citizen was a person who had acquired their own house, while the Bedoun were desert dwellers and/or did not own property in Kuwait City (P12). The range of self-ascribed terms for tribal identity contributed to two concepts. The first, the notion of the Bedoun as a sub-group of the Kuwaiti Bedouin, belonging to the same tribal groups, to the extent that nuclier families integrated Bedoun and Bedouin citizens both historically, and contemporaneously. Seocond, the notion of the Bedouin as an ethnic group separate from the Hadar, due to the persistence of their own, distinctive tribal cultural traditions - and the Hadar's desire for the same (al Anezi, 1989, p.175).

5.2.3 The Northern-Southern tribal groups.

The tribes of Kuwait were recognised as having northern tribes or the southern tribal *dirah* (traditional lands). On this basis, the different members of each tribe were described colloquially as the 'northern tribes' and the 'southern tribes.' This complexity of this difference was demonstrated in the literature by Kuwaiti authors and others (al Haddad, 1981; al Fayez, 1984, p.249; al Haddad, 1981; al Tuwajirir, p.198; 1996). Some authors referring to single tribes as being 'northern' or 'southern,' and other tribes having members
who were ‘northern’ or ‘southern’ relative to the location of their ancestors within the tribal
dirah. For example, the Ajman were described as both 'northern' and 'southern' by different
authors. But much tribal dirah crossed both northern and southern regions. The tribal dirah
was described by Kuwati authors Alsheyeji (1998) and Alhajeri (2004) in their descriptions
of the main tribes of Kuwait, their tribal units and territory (Appendix B, i). The literature
was consistent regarding the designation of the Bedoun as the northern tribes by Kuwaiti
authors, based on the tendency for the members of the state's security services – the military,
national guard and police – to be drawn from those tribes (al Anezi, 1989; al Fayez, 1984; al
Moosa, 1976; Alhajeri, 2004). Interviewees also referred to their tribal membership in this
way. In the early 1990s, the northern tribes were also known to be Bedoun due to their
association with 'Iraqi' identity. My research of the literature indicated that this concept was
constructed after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. I discuss the social organisation of the
tribes further in Chapter 6, section 6.1.

The northern-southern tribal dialect and accent recognised as a factor related to
regional identity, as it indicated a difference between the members of tribes who could not be
distinguished on the basis of appearance alone (P05). Two points arose in relation to the
tribal accent. The experience of the interviewees was that the Hadar they met in social
interactions were preoccupied with their accent, stigmatising it. The interviewees thought
this was part of an attempt to attribute negative characteristics to members of the northern
tribes in social interactions. The assumptions made by Hadar individuals about the origin of
an individual based on their accent was regarded by the Bedoun as inaccurate (P05, P19). I
found the perceived dialect or accent was more a vernacular with a wide range of expression.

Nevertheless, the northern-southern tribal accent was regarded as an important
cultural difference, by the Bedouin themselves (P03, P05). According to the research
participants, some members of the southern regions of the tribes, also stigmatised, the
northern accent (P03, P05, P16, P17, P19). It was explained that anyone who believes they
can hear a northern accent, then proceeds to judge the individual from whom it was heard, as
an 'Iraqi' (P05). This problem is discussed further below, regarding themes of
marginalisation. The finding about the Bedoun as members of the northern or southern
tribes, strengthens the concept of the Bedouin as a separate ethnic group from the Hadar.
Additionally, it helps to delineate the role of the Bedouin in Bedouin society in Kuwait, as
predominantly people of the northern tribes or tribal dirah, or as assumed to be so, by others.
5.2.4 Ethnic targeting of families and tribes – family and tribal names.

Interview data and documentary research indicated that ethnic targeting of families and tribes occurred across a number of areas, on the basis of individuals' Bedouin identity. One of these areas was Bedouin family and tribal names (P08, P13). One interviewee had no tribal name or surname listed on his identification card, as the Central Apparatus had removed these. Despite this the individual identified closely with his family lineage; all other interviewees had their tribal names listed on their identification cards. It is worth noting that tribal identity was described in more specific terms in relation to marginalisation and stigmatisation, which connected tribal identity and culture to ethnic tensions and violent conflict at the levels of government, other institutions and in personal, social interactions with the Hadar in particular. I have analysed this data in greater detail under the second meta-theme (‘marginalisation of identity and culture’) below. Along with the data on stateless/citizen family integration, these results also strengthen the notion of the Bedoun as a sub-group of the Kuwaiti Bedouin. This functional social integration of Bedoun-Bedouin citizen families had become targeted by government in a variety of ways, discussed further in Chapter 6.

5.2.5 Additional data from the analysis of documents.

Data from the interviews, and a variety of literary and photographic sources indicated that the Bedoun have been ethnically targeted to prevent their participation in society, as well as to limit the population growth and development as a whole. In order to support my discussion of the results of the interview data, while attempting to remain focused on answering the research questions, it was necessary to collate additional information systematically and to present it in the Appendices. Until now, important information about the Bedoun's history, and particularly government policy toward the Bedoun, has been spread in a piecemeal fashion across a variety of fields and genres, making it difficult for scholars to substantiate Bedoun claims, build strong arguments and draw specific conclusions from the available knowledge. This limitation may have influenced the tendency of new authors studying the Bedoun to build on taken-for-granted knowledge claims about the Bedoun, that were not substantiated by scholars when the first claims were originally put forward, rather than questioning claims not substantiated by fieldwork historical data, attempting to consolidate the available data, and considering that perhaps previous findings were somewhat flawed (as I discussed in Chapter 2).

Overall, the documentary analyses presented in the Appendices illustrate how and to what extent, the Bedoun had been subject to a government policy of ethnic targeting and cultural reorganisation. I have attempted to arrange the Appendices thematically, each with a number of sub-sections, to illustrate the different aspects of how this has been accomplished by ideologists and intellectuals working with the government of Kuwait.

5.2.6 Personal identity.
Within the theme of personal identity, the sub-themes arising included personal evaluations of identity, the changing social roles of Bedouin women, Bedouin children with Kuwaiti citizen mothers, and the changing social roles of Bedouin men. The minor-subthemes related to this sub-theme are listed in Appendix A, Table A1. Note that Bedouin women who were married Kuwaiti citizens are usually granted Kuwaiti citizenship as a matter of course, and they tend to live with their citizen families. Therefore, I did not meet any Bedouin women married to citizen men during my fieldwork, although some interviewees had sisters married to Kuwaiti citizen men. On the other hand, the interview data included a number of themes related to the experience of a citizen woman married to a stateless man, and experiences of a child of a citizen women married to stateless man, and the experiences of a child whose parents were both stateless but late in their lives, received Kuwaiti citizenship. The results below contributed to the understanding of the personal identity of the Bedouin, as well as the influences of statelessness and marginalisation on contemporary gender roles and relationships within the community.

5.2.7 Collective identity and government interactions.

In relation to the theme of collective identity, sub-themes included family histories and citizen registration. There has been a large focus on problems related to citizenship registration, reflected in the Human Rights Watch (1995) definition of the Bedouin (discussed in Chapter 2). There was also the consideration that many Bedouin working men were unable to travel to the registration office in Kuwait City because they were working during office hours, and could not obtain permission to take leave from their posts. A second sub-theme concerned the experiences of the current generation of Bedouin who had been ‘waiting’ their entire lives for citizenship to be granted to their families, on the basis of government legislation and commitments (see Appendix B, iii) that should have enabled them receive citizenship, according to the Constitution of Kuwait (1992/1962) (concerning military servicemen: see Appendix B, v) and the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) for others (see Appendix B, vi). This was not only an expectation transmitted across generations by families, but continued to be perpetuated by government, including by staff at the Ministry of Interior’s Central Apparatus, where ‘status adjustment’ was also conducted (verified in announcements by government authorities in the media, see Chapter 7).

Additionally, a participant who acquired citizenship grant prior to the Arab Spring, provided rich data as a case example. The data illustrated the additional forms of systematic abuse adopted by the Central Apparatus, due to the participant’s ethnic and tribal identity. A third sub-theme revealed some of the official methods used to change the Bedouin identity according to the Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program. The themes provided insight into the culture within the Ministry of Interior and the victimisation of the Bedouin. In the case of the interviewee granted citizenship, his whole family unit was subjected to exploitative treatment during the administrative processes required to change his identity from 'non-Kuwaiti' to 'Kuwaiti.' The process took many years to complete and involved the
isolation and interrogation of different sections of the family. The strategy of intimidation appeared to be deployed in an attempt to coerce the family into giving up on the process before each member had their citizenship grant finalised.

Three research participants had experienced ‘status adjustment,’ where the Central Apparatus changed their nationality on official records, along with one participant’s spouse (P10, P11, P14, P19). The process was described as presenting the following problems. First, the historical, cultural identity as Kuwaiti Bedouin was erased at the official level. The participants were aware of the historical and cultural implications of what was happening to their collective. Second, they had no power over their individual situation. They had been listed with an ineffective nationality label that did not belong to them, and which they could not use (that is, the word of a country other than Kuwait was used to state the nationality of the individual). They were still stateless, but the state had recorded them with a fraudulent identity. Third, the whole process of ‘status adjustment’ was undertaken without their knowledge, or participation. Their identity ‘status’ was ‘adjusted’ to Syrian and Saudi Arabian nationalities. The process removed official recognition of their ethnic identity as Bedouins, and national identity, as Kuwaitis. Any official documentation that they required forthwith, such as marriage certificates or birth certificates for their children, would state the new nationality label on the document. Thus, the identity of future generations of their families was also ‘adjusted.’

Other, minor-subthemes involved a general refusal by government to provide accurate identity documentation, because ‘status adjustment’ had already been or was in the process of being, enforced (the participant’s identity files held by government stated they were ‘illegal residents’ with false nationalities) and the refusal of authorities to process marriage certificates. The latter problem has been Bedouin policy since the 1986 administrative expulsion (‘The Study,’ 2003; see Appendix E, ii), which prevents many in the group from founding families. ‘Status adjustment’ was thus a problem not only for the individuals who was subjected to the process, but for all family members listed under the persons’ file, and for any new members of the family born subsequently. Thousands of men of previous generations had been coerced by government into participating in the process, and had signed documents stating a false nationality, or had purchased fake passports under instructions from Central Apparatus staff. Some of the research participants' fathers were victims of this process.

Regarding the occupations of the interviewees' fathers, sixteen out of twenty were employed prior to the Iraq war either in the Ministry of Defence (in the military forces) or the Ministry of the Interior (in the police force). The interviewee’s mothers were all homemakers and usually illiterate, except for one interviewee (P04), who stated that her citizen mother had worked in the government service prior to her having children. In the past, there were active recruitment programs that attempted to integrate Kuwaiti women in to entry-level employment roles. These nationalistic programs no longer exist in a substantive
form, due to the lucrative system of cash payments distributed regularly to citizens which is widely believed to purchase their political compliance with the authoritarian regime.

5.2.8 Other themes beyond the scope of the present study.
Other themes of Bedoun identity arising from the interview data related to a meta-theme of ‘family life’ analysed from the interviewees. This was beyond the scope of the present study, but are worth mentioning briefly. This included the childlessness of stateless women and men (all but one female respondent in this study was childless), the theme of professionalisation of Bedoun women and parents supporting stateless women’s careers and marriage choices. Another substantial portion of interviewee data was associated with the meta-theme of ‘employment,’ which also falls outside the scope of the present study.

5.3 Findings from the thematic analysis - Marginalisation of identity and culture
Three themes arose from the meta-theme of marginalisation of identity and culture, including ethnic targeting and social exclusion, stigma and stranger status and social integration. Themes related to this meta-theme are shown in Appendix A i, Table A2.

5.3.1 Ethnic targeting and social exclusion.
Sub-themes arising from the theme of ethnic targeting and social exclusion related to tribal identity and included ethnic targeting of the northern tribes. Other themes related to ethnic targeting and Bedouin identity, principally related to psychological pressures and encounters with ‘othering’ in social interactions, and the labelling of the participants by others, with other identities. In this area of the analysis, interviewees indicated that they were subject to concrete experiences of social exclusion due to being members of the northern tribes, or perceived as such, by others. They explained that the northern tribes were targeted over their perceived origins in relation to the desert and marshlands, and to their accent or dialect in particular. More specific themes of tribal marginalisation included the projection of the notion of ‘Iraqi’ and nebulous, ‘foreign’ identities onto the Bedoun, leading to stigmatisation. Other themes included religious affiliation (Sunni/Shia), and the Bedoun as a native person, a concept which was identified by the interviewees as a ‘difference’ that attracted mistreatment of the Bedoun by others.

The data also showed that most Bedoun were likely from the northern tribes, while others assumed these origins, in virtually any case. These results revealed a great deal about the nature of social interactions between the Bedoun and other members of Kuwaiti society, and illustrated how individuals managed their identity when faced with the pressure to conform to social standards determined by the dominant Hadar. The Bedoun were always vulnerable to arrest due to their statelessness, which gave others inordinate social power over them in social transactions (if their identity was known to the other party involved in the social transaction). The interviewees also described homelessness and poverty as identifying markers of Bedoun identity, because the Bedoun existed for the most part, in a comparatively different economic class to Kuwaiti citizens (although there were some exceptions to the
rule). As one of my Bedoun cultural guides explained to me, while not not all Bedoun are seriously impoverished, but most are, out all o those who are, are surely Bedoun.

### 5.3.2 Visual data of historical desert settlements, the segregated suburbs of Taima and Sulabiya.

In addition to interview data on poverty, I have included photographic evidence from Kuwait in Appendix H, showing a historical record of segregated, so-called ‘popular housing’ complexes in Taima, al Jahra and Sulabiya and photographs for comparative purposes to show city housing in impoverished areas of Salmiya in Kuwait City. These findings concern the contextual factors related to the Bedoun’s poverty and segregation in Taima and Sulabiya, and may be compared to other forms of urban poverty in Kuwait, contemporaneous and historical (al Nakib, 2016) as well as historical claims that the Bedoun were 'squatters' and 'slum-dwellers' (al Khatib, 1978; Alawadi, 1980, p.339; Alissa, 2013; Beaugrand, 2011, p.239, 2014, p.737; Zhou, 1976).

### 5.3.3 Stigma, stranger status and Bedoun identity.

Sub-themes arising from the theme of ‘stigma, stranger status and Bedoun identity’ included stigmatisation and the citizen population, the Bedoun as stranger and contradictions of the Bedouin-citizen stranger status. These themes were rich data, leading to my analysis of fifteen sub-sub-themes and five minor, sub-sub-themes. Experiences of stigmatisation were intensified by mutual fears held by citizens and the Bedoun, connected to intense social demands for conformity and fear of reprisal from authorities. These results further reinforced the argument that the Bedoun were subject to ethnic targeting by the Hadar on the basis of their Bedouin tribal identity, but also demonstrated that the whole of Bedouin society was affected by the Bedoun problem and the prospect that Bedouin citizens could become stateless. This problem impacted social relations between the Bedouin citizen and Bedouin groups in the community. The Hadar were also affected, though they tended to be the aggressors (Znaniecki, 1952b) or to perform roles as ‘in-group police’ (Mann, 2005).

### 5.3.4 Social integration.

Sub-themes arising from the theme of social integration included social integration prior to administrative expulsion (1986), social integration in the present day, ‘passing’ as a citizen, friendship and the disclosure of identity. Both the social practices of ‘passing’ and disclosing Bedouin identity were discussed, along with the adoption of different social strategies and the reasons for disclosure (Becker, 1983; Goffman, 1963). The impact of identity management in a stigmatising environment was discussed in relation to its impact on young Bedouin’s peer relationships with others. These findings tended to reveal more detailed information about interpersonal transactions than the previous themes, particularly regarding how the interviewees managed their identity faced with both subtle and overt forms of oppression and social conflict in public spaces.

The theme of social integration in the present day included some positive insights from the participants regarding their reflections on the social problems in Kuwaiti society,
and in response to their experiences, learning how to think independently (individually and as a group). They had begun to create a new society, through their conscious participation and projection of inclusive values. Some participants attempted to follow their own life purpose, whether it required them to work toward integrating more deeply in citizen society, or to carve out their own life-path, living as independently as possible from citizen society, in order to avoid projected stigmas and other negative evaluations.

5.3.5 Other data beyond scope of the present study.

Additional data was collected pertaining to siblings as the primary friendship group but an in-depth discussion of this data is beyond the scope of the present study, as it is best discussed in the context of theorisation on family life. Therefore, I have limited the discussion of results to friendships with peers outside the immediate family.

5.4 Findings From the Thematic Analysis – Bedoun Education and the Intellectual Ideal

Four themes arose from the meta-theme Bedoun education and the intellectual ideal. These included institutional issues, access to education, positive experiences in education, the social and cultural purpose of education, marginalisation in education and social segregation in education. All of the themes related to this meta-theme are listed in Appendix A, i, Table A3.

5.4.1 Institutional discrimination.

Regarding the theme of institutional discrimination, sub-themes included issues with the Central Apparatus, schools, colleges and universities, and other institutions. My documentary research of institutional factors linked to the discrimination of the Bedoun in education proved to be so varied, complex and confounded by issues of data verification, that the matter extended well beyond the scope of this study. This is because the government of Kuwait does not publish data on Bedoun participation at the national level, and the Bedoun population is omitted from international developmental indicators (Carr-Hill, 2013). I have provided an analysis of some aspects of this problem in Appendix G, ii. Other themes of institutional discrimination tended to reflect both formal, institutionalised methods of deprivation and more informal, social forms discrimination, connected to the theme of marginalisation of identity and culture (section 5.3) above, where the dynamics of social interactions were explored in greater detail.

5.4.2 Access to education.

In this section, I attempted to analyse how the Bedoun interviewees and other members of their community actually accessed education, rather than focusing on the limitations to that access (which I noted above). However, it is important to note that the Bedoun’s access to education was claimed to be provided via financial support distributed by the so-called Education Fund. Education of the Bedoun was only measured by the government of Kuwait as budget expenditure, rather than according to actual student participation, such as via enrolment numbers, or successfully completions of qualifications.
A total of 15,105 Bedoun students (just over ten percent across the entire population) were claimed to have received funding across all levels of education in 2014/2015 ('Kuwait Showcases,' 2015).

The number of Bedoun primary and secondary school students who are required to receive free education on a compulsory basis according to the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948), and the number who do actually receive that level of tuition, was not disclosed in Kuwait's report to the United Nations (United Nations General Assembly Human Rights Council, November 3, 2014, p.9). The Fund was promoted to the public as if it provided fully funded education to all Bedouin in Kuwait ('Illegal Residents,' 2015;'Kuwait Showcases,' 2015) either as a government funded or charity funded service, which was misleading. Overall, the Education Fund was characterised by a network of access restrictions, rather than provisions for access. Only two interviewees in this study accessed the Education Fund. Therefore, the Fund did not arise as a meaningful theme of qualitative data on participation in education for the Bedoun interviewees. I investigated the actual purpose of the fund, the functions it performs, and its more serious limitations along with other restrictions on education for the Bedoun, in Appendix G, ii.

Within the theme of access to education, sub-themes of informal system and the formal system of education arose, with the majority of interviewees accessing education via informal means. Only one participant had gained entry into Kuwait University through formal pathways, after he received citizenship. Some level of organised, informal access to education by the Bedoun does exist in Kuwait, arranged within the Bedouin community among well-known Bedouin social leaders and intellectuals and private citizen ‘sponsors’ in response to needs, at all levels of education (P09, P13, P15). The themes of access to education indicated intellectual idealism, altruism and communal values motivated and facilitated the participation of young Bedoun in education, where they otherwise might not attend school.

This area of the analysis also yielded valuable insights into the Bedoun’s integration in Bedouin citizen society. Research respondents tended to show patterns of education access featuring patchy and substantially interrupted participation in post-secondary education, and combined work with study. Older interviewees had accumulated multiple qualifications and a pattern of life-long learning (above) in response to the employment market in Kuwait and their marginalisation. For example, there were high employer demands due to the competitiveness of the local expatriate job market in Kuwait, while there was also pressure to achieve more to offer more to prospective employers to compensate for being a Bedoun, having low social status and virtually no negotiating power with employers due to the Bedoun’s legal status.

The Bedoun’s participation in post-secondary education had provided the basis for an expanded identity and life experience reflecting engagement with the intellectual ideal, which was highly valued by the interviewees. The growth in intellectual identity and new
perspectives about the function of education appeared to be connected to certain aspects of their ethnic identity and culture, especially social solidarity and the sharing of resources. This identification was reinforced by the cultivation of contacts with international social networks, journalists, international human rights organisations, scholars, and for a few select individuals, participation in education overseas. These results also indicated the reality of abuse of Bedoun children in the education system in Kuwait. They revealed how imposed, bureaucratic marginalisation was intertwined with ethnic targeting in social interactions. My documentary research on the portrayal of the Bedoun and Bedouin by scholars at the local and regional levels suggested that the ethnic targeting of the Bedoun in the education may be endemic, not only in Kuwaiti society, but also among Arab expatriates in the private and public education sectors (see Appendix C vi-viii).

5.4.3 Positive experiences in education.

The research questions on this topic enabled the interviewees to elaborate on positive aspects of their identity as well as life experience, especially within the theme of ‘the social and cultural purpose of education.’ This theme led to a rich set of sub-themes and a range of minor sub-themes describing the growth of the Bedouns’ identity beyond ethnic and/or nationalist concepts, due to identification with the intellectual ideal. The intellectual identity was reinforced by formal and informal processes of learning, including self-education and the cultivation of strategies of persistence required to ensure completion of qualifications as well as high achievement against multiple obstacles. Interviewees described a desire to transcend the boundaries of their present situation, to become economically independent, to cultivate their life purpose, self-worth and self-awareness. Some respondents identified education as a life-path that had enabled them to achieve a higher purpose in life, attempting to channel their own positive inputs into Kuwaiti society in order to improve it. Others believed in the power of education to enable social transformation of all social groups. In other words, they believed that when the whole population was schooled, the Bedoun collective would be able to overcome their oppression and receive the recognition they were owed by the state. They regarded the segregation and ethnic targeting of the Bedoun as a burden and a stain on the whole of Kuwaiti society, and not only a problem for the community of the Bedoun or the State.

Positive experiences in education also led to the elaboration of ideas about the participation of the Bedoun in civil society, intellectual life and visions of a new society and aspirations for the future. The theme of the social and cultural purpose of education was an especially rich theme, with four minor sub-themes, fifteen minor sub-sub-themes and six minor sub-sub-sub themes (see Appendix A, i). I elaborated on themes from this section in the discussion (Chapter 7, see Table 23 and Table 24, respectively), indicating a shift from ethnic identity to intellectual identity via the expansion of the intellectual ideal among the population, and the development of new, creative ideals about the role of education, self-education, innovation, the development of a young literary community (though a suppressed
one) and new visions of society. According to these findings, the Bedoun’s participation in post-secondary education has provided the basis of an expanded identity and life experience reflecting engagement with the intellectual ideal and the positive expansion of culture within the Bedoun community. A growth in intellectual identity and new perspectives about the function of education appeared to be connected to certain traditional aspects of their Bedouin ethnic identity and culture, operating as an adaptive response to contemporary society and their extraordinary conditions of oppression, which I argue further in Chapter 8.

5.4.4 Marginalisation in education.

The theme of marginalisation in education, featured sub-themes related to experiences of overt abuse and experiences of stigmatisation. Four minor-subthemes related to overt abuse, and seven minor sub-themes related to the stigmatisation of students (see Appendix A, i). There was some overlap in themes related to stigmatisation and institutional issues concerning abuse of Bedoun students by teachers who were citizens or other Arab nationals. Generally speaking, the Ministry of Interior’s powers of oversight over multiple other Ministries, and especially the Ministry of Education, had resulted in direct interference in the interviewees participation in education. These results indicated the reality of experiences of abuse of Bedoun children, adolescents and adults in the education system. They revealed how imposed, bureaucratic marginalisation was intertwined with ethnic targeting in social interactions. They also indicated that there may be a connection between ethnic targeting by the Kuwaiti Hadar and other Arab national expatriates. My documentary research on the portrayal of the Bedoun and Bedouin by scholars at both the local and regional levels suggested that the ethnic targeting of the Bedoun may be endemic in Kuwait, not only within Kuwaiti society but also among Arab expatriates (see Appendix G, iii). Such targeting appeared to function automatically as embedded, localised nationalist values and ideologies (as a ‘right’ or ‘need’ to exclude the Bedoun from educational settings, or to supress their impetus to learn within educational settings), as much as it was attributed to personal prejudice of individuals abusing the Bedun in face-to-face interactions in schools and university settings.

5.4.5 Social segregation in education.

Regarding the theme of social segregation in education, sub-themes included the expulsion of the Bedoun from schools 1986-1992 and the unschooled Bedoun. In this section of the analysis, themes reflected highly personal experiences of the administrative expulsion during the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the limiting of interviewees' life prospects. Nevertheless, some interviewees of this generation who received partial education have managed to compensate for their losses over time, and are arguably more highly, socially mobilized than the younger generations who have not been able to acquire a basic education. The theme of the unschooled Bedoun also featured examples from life histories of the Bedoun interviewees’ siblings, extended family members and friends.
The data indicated that there are many Bedoun who are completely cut-off from society due to government-imposed social segregation in education, which commenced during their school years. Important flow-on effects of segregation involving employment, marriage and founding families were also indicated, along with severe impacts on mental health and wellbeing. The impact of social segregation in education on the group’s long-term development and their capacity to sustain themselves economically cannot be over-emphasised. It comprised a downward pressure on the ability of the Bedoun to live meaningfully in Kuwait, to found families and sustain their existence as a population.

**Conclusion**

This chapter provided a summary of data collected from interviewees with the Bedoun research participants, including selected demographic information and a thematic analysis of interviews. Demographic data featured gender, age, legal identity status (statelessness and nationality), family data, tribal membership and religious affiliation, place of residence, employment and educational experience. The thematic analysis was discussed under three meta-themes: Bedoun identity, the marginalisation of identity and culture, and education and the intellectual ideal. The data was analysed to a depth of six levels: levels of meta-themes, themes, sub-themes, minor sub-themes, minor sub sub-themes, and minor sub-sub-themes. I also included some relevant observations and explanatory notes to help elucidate the themes analysed, and brief comments on initial findings elaborated in the discussion. Appendix A contains data from the analysis of the interview transcripts. Additional thematic analyses were conducted on relevant literature and other documents. I have included this information in Appendices B-G.
Chapter 6
Discussion of
The Ethnic Identity and Culture of the Bedoun

Yes, many people cross back and forward, back and forward… Yes, this was a normal way for desert people to live. (Participant 8, interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 8 April, 2014)

So these are the effects of the tribe, of being native people… I haven’t forgotten that I’m Bedouin, I reflect about it all the time. (Participant 3, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 7 March, 2014)

Introduction

This chapter discusses the Bedoun’s ethnic identity and responses to social change. I apply theoretical modelling adapted from Felix Gross’ (1978) theory of multiple ethnic identification, and discuss this analysis in comparison with other theories of cultural systems (Znanicki, 1952a), ethnic change (Horowitz, 1975) and Bedouin social change in the Middle East (Marx, 1967; Stewart, 2012) and the Persian Gulf in particular (al Fahad, 2004; Khuri, 1990). The interview data indicated the Bedouin retained deep cultural ties to their traditional heritage, which was manifested in a variety of traditional names. These concepts were deeply connected to the participant’s personal and collective histories, their places of settlement, and different levels of the ethnic structure. They pointed to the integration of national identity by family members in previous generations, passed down to subsequent generations. Thus, many Bedouin expressed themselves as having developed a strong sense of Kuwaiti national identity, although they had been rendered stateless.

Gross’s (1978) ethnic theory helps to explain new concepts about the level of persecution experienced by the Bedouin on the grounds of tribal and ethnic identity. The ‘status adjustment’ program imposed a further level of ethnic differentiation over the Bedouin, in the form of false nationality labelling. The ‘adjustment’ process, introduced secretly from 1983 (Al Anezi, 1989, p.263, n132), changed the ethnic and national identity of the affected individuals in official documents, as well as that of their nuclear and/or extended families (those who had not yet become citizens of Kuwait).

The targeting of Bedouin names at every level of the ethnic structure revealed that the impact of an imposed, restrictive re-organisation (M. Secombe, personal communications, January 22, 2016) of the Bedouin, indicating the approach of oppressors was comprehensive and systematic, and likely designed by intellectuals. The self-ascription of tribal identity terms by the Bedouin respondents indicated a strong sense of ethnic belonging, the operation of multiple ethnic identities, and the threat of erasure of ethnic identity via the ‘status adjustment’ program (administrative ethnic cleansing, in Weissbrodt, 2008).
6.1 Ethnic Identity and Cultural Change

6.1.1 Ethnic and tribal identity.

The prevalence of tribal identification led me to adopt Gross’s (1978) theory of ethnic identification. I analysed the various tribal identity terms used by the interviewees within the framework of the vertical ethnic structure (Gross, 1978, p.36). The framework conceptualises multiple identities expressed by members of ethnic groups at the local, regional and national level of identification. It accounts for functional relationships between different types of identities, such as those linked to ancestry and heritage, residency and sense of place, and imposed national-level political and juridical identities (Gross, 1978). Local identity includes personal identity, language, kinship relations, religion, and also native identity and micro-ethnic identity. My thematic analysis of the interview data illustrated that the Bedoun interviewee’s identity spanned local, regional and national levels. The analysis is shown in Table 19 below.

Table 19

*Tribal Identity Terms Reflecting the Ethnic Structure*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms used by research participants</th>
<th>Levels of ethnic identification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Bedouin (<em>Bedu</em>)</td>
<td>Transnational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Sons of the desert (<em>Abna al badiyya</em>)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Desert dwellers of Kuwait (<em>Badiat al Kuwayt</em>)</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Native</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. First (arrivals)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. <em>Bani Utub</em> (comprising the al Sabah, al Khalifa, and al Jalahimah)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. <em>Usul</em> (<em>Asil</em>)</td>
<td>Local and regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Individual tribal names</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Northern and southern tribes and dialects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Northern, central and southern areas of Kuwait city</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: My use of Arabic terms is taken from Appendix B, ii including Lorimer (1915, p.829), Dickson (1949) and the term *Usul/Asil* from Khuri (1990).*

Note that these terms were supported by context: they were used by the interviewees in long, complex conversations about their identity for the purpose of this research. Their
elaborations from the interview transcripts will be placed in the Australian Data Archive after the thesis examination, to preserve a record of cultural heritage for the Bedoun (courtesy of the Australian National University in Canberra). Thus, the terms used by the Bedoun should not be understood as merely labels, but as cultural signifiers deeply rooted in historical meaning.

National-level terms referred to Bedouin of Kuwait. The term ‘native’ was employed in reference to belonging to the country, as ‘first’ arrivals, either before or after the Bani Utub tribes. Hakeem al Fadhli observed that human rights discourses on statelessness had directed the world’s attention to the statelessness of the Bedoun, rather than their indigenous status:

We have our home. But no one wants to talk about it, ‘They are natives, they are genuine, they are the people of Kuwait.’ (Hakeem al Fadhli, interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 3 August, 2015)

Many of the Bedoun rejected the notion that they were stateless, as they had assimilated Kuwaiti national identity and identified with Kuwait as their ‘home’ or ‘country’ (P12). Participant 12 explained,

P12: Yes, yes, yes, they make for your friend, you are different, different… he ask me… are you from where?

My father and grandfather from one hundred years here, in Kuwait here, and no exit.’ This is my country. (Participant 12, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 1 April, 2014)

Local terms included Asil, tribal names and groupings into northern and southern tribes or northern and southern members within tribes, and recent settlement in the state in certain parts of Kuwait city, associated with particular tribes. The main tribes of Kuwait have traditional tribal lands (dirah) that cover across most of the countries of the Middle East to varying extents, which were connected to complex customary laws regarding land access. This included land and resource access rules based on the principle of equity (Wilkinson, 1983). Each individual tribal name is linked to historical, transnational social collectives, expressed as group identities (Alshawi and Gardner, 2014; Cole, 2006). A list of the tribes and their dirah (from al Shayeji, 1998; Alhajeri, 2004) can be found in Appendix B, i. A colour map of the complex dirah published by the American Geographical Society, can be found in Raswan (1930): Tribal Areas and Migration Lines of the North Arabian Bedouins. Raswan (1930) drew the map himself.

I listed the groupings of the individual tribes, and their northern and southern members, at the local and regional (within the state) levels. The tribes tended to settle together in particular parts of Kuwait City and its surrounding areas. Their settlement indicated Bedoun integration remains a feature of Bedouin society. For example, al Jahra is
known as an area with a high concentration of Bedoun (Beaugrand, 2014b), but there is also a high concentration of Bedouin citizens living there. Ahmadi is known as an area with a high concentration of Bedouin citizens (Tétreault, 2003), but there is also a high concentration of Bedoun living there. Not all Bedouin live in the segregated compounds of Taima (al Jahra), but in other parts of al Jahra, while a number of citizens have always lived in the segregated compounds of Sulabiya along with the Bedouin (for photographs of these areas taken from 1974 to 2014, see Appendix H).

I discussed basic concepts about the northern and southern tribes in Chapter 5, section 5.2.3. The division of the northern and southern tribes has not been discussed in research a great deal, beyond general assumptions that the northern tribes comprise Bedoun (Beaugrand, 2010), and the southern tribes comprise citizens (Crystal, 1995). In this research, I attempted to provide a deeper analysis. The ethnic division was revealed to be of upmost importance, because the perception of the division appears to lie at the heart of justifications by others, including the government of Kuwait, for segregating the Bedoun and targeting them with punitive actions (discussed in the following chapter). However, cultural or social differences between northern and southern tribal people should be contextualised against the existence of the whole cultural system, regulated to varying extents by tribal law covering virtually all aspects of the Bedouin’s public life, which goes back hundreds of years (Raswan, 1930; Stewart, 2006; Wilkinson, 1983).

Additionally, the northern and southern Bedouin in Kuwait retain social integration through a range of key social practices in the present day. Despite this integration, tension in society within the tribes and between the Bedouin and Hadar in particular, worked against social integration of the Bedouin. One of three meta-themes in this study concerned the ethnic targeting, social isolation, and social exclusion of the Bedouin. The northern tribal identity was one of the strongest issues correlated with the theme. The participants discussed the northern tribal identity in the context of issues of ethnic conflict pertaining to language, dialect and inter-tribal and intra-tribal relations. This meta-theme was explored further below. Overall, the research participants appeared to identify primarily as Bedouin, and secondarily as Bedouin, although the order of identification could change, depending upon contextual factors (Gross, 1978).

My interviews and participant observation experiences led me to understand that the Bedouin do not always explicitly identify as tribal people, nor as members of the northern or southern tribal groups, even though they regard themselves as having a strong tribal identity. They assume that others are aware of their identity as a self-evident feature of their makeup. Their self-identification is usually expressed implicitly, which may or may not be detectable to outsiders.

None of the Bedouin that I met in Kuwait or elsewhere, were aware of the manner in which the Bedouin’s identity has been portrayed published academic work, or of the influence of these interpretations over the thinking of scholars and international
humanitarian organisations who visit Kuwait to study the Bedoun. This point demonstrates the relative isolation of the Bedoun within Kuwaiti society, but also, the fact that while academics have cast aspersions over their identity, even Bedoun intellectuals and human rights activists have very much been preoccupied with local attacks on their personal and group identity and basic survival needs. This has prevented most, but not all, from contributing to the development of scholarship, beyond the arena of short-term human rights reporting and international media reports which are published sporadically (the development of an intellectual class in the community is discussed further in Chapter 8).

6.1.2 The model of the ethnic identity structure

At the next stage of the analysis, I applied Gross’ (1978) model of the vertical ethnic structure to the different components of the national, regional and local/native identities, shown in Figure 1, below. This process enabled the position of the Bedoun in Bedouin society to be understood from the perspective of ethnic theory (Gross, 1978), after the analysis of individual terms for self-ascribed identity (Table 19, above). These classifications helped to conceptualise the depth of the vertical ethnic structure (Gross, 1978, p.39), based on the thematic analysis of interview data. The discussion continues by examining the Kuwaiti national identity (6.1.2.1), the Bedouin identity (6.1.2.2) the differentiation of the northern and southern tribal identity (6.1.2.3), the Bedoun identity (6.1.2.4) and the emerging Bedoun Bedoun (6.1.2.5) which signifies the erased identity.

6.1.2.1 The Kuwaiti national identity.
The analysis of interview data indicated that the Bedoun interviewees had developed their own strong sense of tribal and national identity, despite their historical expulsion from the state (which had occurred in many of the respondent's lifetimes, which they remembered). These identities were differentiated, illustrated by the number of different terms used to describe the Bedouin tribal identity (shown in Table 19 below). Regarding the national identity, the interviewees used the term *Kuwaiti* in two main contexts. First, they referred to themselves as 'Kuwaitis' when expressing their belonging to the country (in common with the Bedouin and Hadar citizens), compared to expatriates with citizenship in other countries, including other Arabs. Second, the term *Kuwaiti* was used only to refer to the citizen community, in contexts where they emphasised their separateness as Bedoun. In this context, the term is used with outsiders to describe others, usually to distinguish between Kuwaiti citizens and other Arab citizens, and the ‘Kuwaitis’ was virtually identical in meaning to the ‘citizens.’

The maintenance of the term *Kuwaiti* to refer to the Bedoun (the first meaning) reflected the participant’s absorption of the national identity, transmitted across generations. The 'Kuwaiti' identity was linked to the notion that one’s ancestors occupied the territory of Kuwait prior to the formation of the modern nation state and/or that one's father or grandfather was brought to the state by tribal sheikhs (Alhajeri, 2004, described the selection...
of tribal members for the public service by government committees, who eventually became the Bedoun). Given the strong historical roots expressed the Bedoun interviewee’s identity, and the persistent integration of Bedoun families with Bedoun citizen families with whom they had permanently settled in Kuwait (al Moosa, 1976; Human Rights Watch, 1995), it appeared that assimilation of the Bedoun into the Kuwaiti national culture had been complete prior to the Bedoun’s administrative expulsion in 1986 (‘The Study,’ 2003).

The roles of the Bedoun in government service would have undoubtedly reinforced their sense of national identity, since they were members of the state security services (military, national guard and police). This was demonstrated by P15’s father, who gave service in two Arab wars for Kuwait but whose family was later administratively erased by 'status adjustment' and reallocated as of 'Saudi Arabian' nationality. The Bedoun had retained this sense of identity. It had been transmitted to them by their Bedoun and citizen parents and relatives. They had absorbed the identity personally through their life experience despite their expulsion from the state.

Another factor in the absorption of national identity is the nature by which government misled the Bedoun for decades, that citizenship would be forthcoming to them, in recognition of the state's perception of their identity as Kuwaiti nationals. As I have

<table>
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<th>Levels of ethnic identity</th>
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<tr>
<td>National level</td>
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<td>Bedouin</td>
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<td>Ethnic group</td>
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<td>Regional level</td>
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<tr>
<td>Northern and Southern tribes, tribal confederations –i.e. large tribal networks</td>
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<td>Multi-tribe groups</td>
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<td>Local Level</td>
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<td>Individual tribes, may include both Northern and Southern members</td>
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<td>Sub-ethnic group</td>
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<td>Comprise Bedouin citizens and stateless (the Bedoun)</td>
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<td>The Bedoun</td>
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<td>Micro-ethnic group</td>
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A sub-group of the micro-ethnic group
mentioned, this was shown on the National Census documents officially published by the state (see Appendix B, iv), but also indicated by the fact that the documents were identical to those received by citizens. This was likely an essential factor placating the Bedoun while they waited for their citizenship applications to be duly processed, which simply never occurred. Additionally, authorities of the state repeatedly legislated and attempted to legislate for the Bedoun to be granted citizenship, and this national policy was reinforced by repeated reassurances of the same (see Appendix B, iii).

Thus, at the national level of identification (Gross, 1978), the Bedoun interviewees had developed and/or retained their sense of being ‘Kuwaiti’ as a national identity along with their ethnic identity belonging to the Bedouin ethnic community across multiple generations. This may be interpreted as a reflection of the tribal social order (Gross, 1998). ‘Kuwaiti’ is not an ethnic identity, but a national one. The national and ethnic identification at this level did not conflict or compete with each other (Gross, 1978), but were mutually compatible forms of identity. This aspect highlighted the Bedoun’s ability to maintain their sense of identity and culture amidst the social and cultural forces of disorganisation (Znaniecki, 1952a), imposed by the government regime and experienced in social relations with others.

Reports by Human Rights Watch (1991a; 2000) indicated that the Bedoun had continued to refer to themselves as ‘Kuwaitis’ after administrative expulsion (1986) and during and after the invasion of Iraq and the subsequent period of ethnic cleansing (1991-1995). Bedoun expelled from Kuwait and not allowed to return after the war, were reported to have attempted to return to Kuwait in 2000, gathering at the border of Iraq. They still identified themselves as ‘Kuwaiti’ (Human Rights Watch, 2000). Therefore, this expression of national identity cannot be regarded as a product of the Arab Spring or a constructed identity arising from the political consciousness of just a few individuals. The community expressed an organic and natural identification arising from personal experience (Gross, 1978), enhanced via recognition of the shared ideals and value systems of that group (Znaniecki, 1952a), which spread *en masse* as a consciousness of belonging, leading to self-ascription of identity to a particular group (Gross, 1978; Horowitz, 1975).

In my personal experience, I have observed immigration court documents from the United Kingdom in which a judge deciding a case determined that a Bedoun who referred to himself as a ‘Kuwaiti’ and not a ‘Bedoun’ could not have ‘really’ been a Bedoun. This assumption was not based on research, but on the judge’s opinion, influenced by the myth of the Bedoun’s false identity, a government approach constructed in the 1980s and 1990s, promoted by Western scholars (as I discussed in Chapter 2). The idea was entirely mistaken, as the decision issued did not take into account the different functions of self-referents according to the different audiences to whom the Bedoun addresses himself or herself. On the other hand, this research shows that many Bedoun will never clearly state they are Bedoun to strangers, even if it is their primary identity, due to fear of stigmatisation and persecution. Al Moosa (1976) had discovered the Bedoun had already assimilated the
national identity in 1974, after they had been living for decades in government-monitored, desert settlements. The interviewees indicated that the absorption of the national identity was maintained over generations within their families until the present day (national identity was expressed by P01, P02, P03, P07, P08, P09, P12, P13, P16, P17, P18, P19, P20).

6.1.2.2 The Bedouin identity.
At the national level, the over-arching ethnic identity was Bedouin. This identity was characterised by a number of different terms used by the research participants to refer to their ethnic, tribal identity, and their elaborations about that identity thematically analysed (Appendix A), and shown in Table 19 above (section 6.1.1). The northern and southern tribes were a regional designation, which held associations to different parts of the Middle East, as I will explain further below.

The strongest themes arising in this study concerned tribal identity and the marginalisation of tribal identity (shown in the interview themes listed in Appendix A). All of the respondents’ heritage was derived from tribes and/or tribal confederations, which were all locally recognised as the northern and southern tribes of Arabia (see Appendix B, i). Ten different themes relating to tribal identity are shown in Table 18, Chapter 5. Themes arising from tribal identity included cultural connections with the land itself, such as *Bedu* or ‘Bedouin,’ ‘sons of the desert,’ ‘desert dwellers of Kuwait,’ also the term ‘native’ of Kuwait. *Bedu* is a general term for the Bedouin, who are indigenous to the region (Cole, 2006). ‘Sons of the desert’ has been used continuously by the Bedouin in Kuwait (al Waqayan, 2009). All but one research participant came from families who identified with their family’s tribal origins. Some used more than one term to describe their tribal identity, while others made a singular reference. The only respondent who did not identify with tribal origins rejected the term ‘tribal’ although her father was a Bedouin, while her mother was a Kuwaiti citizen of migrant heritage. Due to her father’s transition to urban life, she no longer regarded her family as having tribal origins.

Table 19 illustrated different levels of ethnic identification applied to Gross’s (1978) vertical model of the ethnic structure, which I extended to include reference to transnational communities. This was because Bedouin’s historical occupation of the Middle East prior to the formation of the modern nation-state was transnational. I classified the terms ‘desert dwellers of Kuwait’ and self-identification as ‘native’ to the local level, as the terms were used specifically to reference belonging to Kuwait. These terms have been retained from the past (when the tribes were nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoralists) until the present day, long after permanent settlement in Kuwait.

Because these terms were transmitted to the participants by their elders after many generations of permanent settlement in Kuwait, we can no longer say such terms refer only to the transnational context in the present day. Rather, these concepts have become part of the contemporary tribal identity within the Bedouin community in Kuwait.
P09: The government knows we are the sons of this land. They know everything. But they didn’t want [us]. So we think the government must [give] back that [country to the] Bedoun now, for [it is] their country, because they need it now. (Participant 09, Interview in Taima, Kuwait, 26 March 2014)

The sense of belonging to the land characteristic of indigenous people, was inherent in the terms Desert Dwellers of Kuwait, or the Sons of the Desert, as one interviewee demonstrated when he referred to his identity status.

6.1.2.3 The northern and southern tribal identity.

The interviewees also described a regional level of identification, associated with belonging to the northern and/or southern tribes. All interviewees who discussed identification at this level, identified with the northern tribes. The importance of distinction between the northern and southern tribal groups lies in the fact that generally speaking (and there are exceptions to this rule), the southern tribal people are commonly known as the Bedu of Kuwait, while the northern people are also Bedu, but have become known as the Bedoun. The Bedoun are also Bedu, but they have been separated from the citizen Bedu over time due to their statelessness leading to ethnic proliferation. Thus, the Bedu of the northern tribal dirah had become known collectively as the Bedoun, which described their contemporary identity. The term Bedoun was first introduced by government for those marked out to be left perpetually stateless (which the community did not realise at the time), and then later banned by government (see Appendix B). However, all Kuwaitis had retained usage of the term Bedoun, reflecting the ongoing function of the term in Kuwaiti society, which points to the northern tribal identity. This is notwithstanding the common use of other self-ascribed, traditional Bedouin identity terms that had also been retained by the Bedoun interviewees along with their citizen tribal counterparts.

An important factor that warrants special clarification, is that the northern and southern tribes are not necessarily separate tribal units, but in some circumstances, two parts of one tribal unit. They are grouped according to those members of the main tribes of Kuwait whose ancestors are derived from the northern (Middle East region including Jordan and Syria, for example) or southern regions (Arabian Gulf) relative to each tribes’ dirah (their traditional land boundaries). Most, but not all, of the main tribes of Kuwait feature members from both northern and southern ethnic sub-groups; others are known to be wholly northern or southern. This factor is somewhat confused by different authors referring to some tribal groups as specifically 'southern' or 'northern,' depending upon their viewpoint, while others refer to southern and northern areas within each dirah, just as the Bedoun do (I have already referred readers to the maps of Raswan, 1930, and Appendix B, i).

How has this problem arisen? I would suggest that academics have not yet become accustomed to the local vernacular of what could be called 'Kuwaiti English.' The English term 'tribe' is used interchangeably in Kuwait for the term 'tribal,' which is not used as a general descriptor as seen in the academic literature (al Naqeeb, 1990; al Khandari and al
Hadben, 2010; al Ansari in al Qatari, February 22, 2010), but as a specific word referring to particular individuals. Thus, a member of the northern or southern tribes is also ‘a tribal,’ while a conservative, usually (but not always) older tribal person is known as ‘a traditional.’ Similarly, one research participant also used more general terms, ‘the People of the north,’ and ‘the People of the south,’ while the Hadar were called ‘the People of the Sea’ (by P05).

Thus, when a Kuwaiti stated he or she was from the northern or southern tribes, they meant they are a tribal (person) of the northern or southern regions of their tribe, or they are from a northern or southern tribal unit that does not include dirah that is referred to as having northern and southern divisions. Ultimately, the importance of the distinction is maintained by each individual and their tribal collective, similar to the two different functions of the term ‘Kuwaiti’ used by the Bedoun.

6.1.2.4 The Bedoun identity.

The term Bedoun was used by the research participants to emphasise their primary identity and belonging to the cultural collective of the Bedoun, as part of the Bedouin ethnicity. One does not need to spend long among Kuwaitis including the Hadar, Bedouin citizens and Bedouin, to learn that the term refers to a fairly homogenous grouping Bedouins characterised by social and cultural solidarity, and that the term Bedoun Jinsiya is rarely, if ever, used (I discussed this aspect in Chapter 2). The term Bedoun reflected the research respondent’s situation of being targeted with deprivation of genuine, official identity documents. The term was rarely used to emphasise the legal status of statelessness, without nationality (Bedoun Jinsiya). Many Bedoun do not regard themselves as stateless at all.

The Bedoun identity taken on far more holistic connotations of inclusion rather than exclusion, according to its use by interviewees in this study. For example, research participants who are no longer stateless but who were born and raised as Bedoun, and who subsequently acquired citizenship in Kuwait or another country, still referred to themselves as Bedouins (P03, P05 and P19), and felt they belonged to the group regardless of any new legal status they had required. This factor demonstrated the use of the term Bedoun as a self-ascribed identity, transcending a strictly legal meaning of the term, and a government-imposed identity. Among the interviewees, the identity was used to signify cultural membership, not legal exclusion from the state (although these circumstances certainly applied to them). Additionally, when among Kuwaitis and other Arab nationals, the term Bedoun is used strictly with meaning attached to the local context, and not with reference to other stateless people known as ‘Bedoun’ in other parts of the Middle East. If stateless people are referred to who are not also Kuwaiti, then the speaker will clarify this. Thus, among all Arabs in Kuwait, generally speaking, the Bedoun are recognised as Kuwaiti Bedoun.

The Bedoun identity has been influenced by the events from which it has arisen: expulsion, ethnic cleansing, ongoing criminalisation and so on. Thus, the Bedoun identity has been impacted by external circumstances to the extent that although it is generally
speaking the primary identity, a Bedoun does not necessarily make this identity known to others. Thus, a Bedoun may not say he or she is Bedoun, but may simply emphasise another aspect of their identity in a social situation so as to make the Bedoun identity a secondary identity. This contextual shift is inherent to the nature of multiple identities (Gross, 1978), and although the degree to which the Bedoun manage their identity in response to social stigma (indeed, the tribal stigma) (Goffman, 1963) may be unusual, it is not unique.

Nevertheless, it would not be surprising to find that the self-managed suppression of the Bedoun identity may be more psychologically stressful for some individuals more than others, and this may be impacted by the individuals' other personal identifications and behaviours (Gross, 1978), such as seclusion (a theme which arose in the findings, especially among young males). This issue is discussed further in Chapter 7, section 7.2, including Table 21). That the Bedoun identity was a signifier of cultural belonging rather than legal status, also appeared to be a reflection of the group’s unusual historical context. The identity had been retained by the collective despite the proliferation of alternative names and legal status used to refer to the group (see Chapter 7).

Thus, in summary of the regional identifications (the northern and southern tribes) and the local Bedoun identification, when the Bedoun refer to their membership of the Bedouin tribes in Kuwait, they usually, also implicitly refer to southern and the northern groups which contain people of different tribes. The logic of this pattern is evident when one views the table of the main tribes of Kuwait and the areas of land across which their traditional tribal dirah was located. The individual tribes are sub-ethnic groups at the local, 'native' ethnic group. The Bedoun emerge at the level of a micro-ethnic group, as they comprise minority sub-groups of each, individual tribe. The importance of this distinction relates to the historical development of the Bedoun identity as members of the northern tribes and their persecution on that basis, which is discussed further in Chapter 8. It also reflects the nature of indigenous identity, which is constantly drawn to references to belonging to the land, and the marking out of locations therein.

6.1.2.5 The Bedoun Bedoun (erased) identity.

The Bedoun Bedoun identity was used by individuals who had been listed with a ‘security restriction,’ and/or their identity had been changed to another nationality label in the ‘status adjustment’ program (also discussed further in Chapter 7). Their identity had been erased (Weissbrodt, 2008), or they were undergoing the process of erasure. Such individuals were no longer issued with identity cards and they could not access public services. Usually, the erasure was also implemented across their nuclear family unit as an additional, punitive measure. Such individuals were no longer recognised as ‘Bedoun’ by the state. Locally, this is called the status of being ‘without’ among the ‘withouts’ (Bedoun means ‘without’ in Arabic) status, hence the repetition of the term. In this study, three participants had had their identity erased, while four were undergoing the process due to security restrictions, including community leader Hakeem al Fadhli.
The emergence of the Bedoun Bedoun identity at the local level is an example of the way the Bedoun attempt to retain cultural belonging for the members of their own group, while also signifying the imposed restrictions on their identity status. The creation of the group arising from government actions appeared follow a similar pattern to the creation of the Bedoun ethnic sub-group. The latter identity had developed meanings associated not only with ethnic exclusion, but also the absorption of the national identity and a sense of cultural belonging to the state. That the Bedoun were Kuwaiti, was acknowledged in the National Census until 1992. The Bedoun Bedoun group comprised individuals identified as belonging to a particular sub-group and split off from the larger group (the Bedoun collective) via criminalisation and segregation, characterised by the loss of access to recognition as a Bedoun on government records, and/or the menial level of state-provided resources that some Bedoun are allocated. This pattern reflected the previous separation of the Bedoun as a minority group from the Bedouin ethnic group, via the erasure of their ‘Bedouin’ and 'Kuwait' identity (shown in Table 20).

In the case of the Bedoun Bedoun, the group were segregated according to labelling introduced by the Central Apparatus in 2012, which coded the Bedoun population according to colour categories, loosely connected to the previous nationality re-allocation methods of the 'status adjustment' program. After the new population typing measures were introduced in 2012, the Ministry of the Interior applied additional, punitive targets and measures to the so-called 'security restriction.' Administrative erasure measures were henceforth imposed upon freedom of expression for human rights ‘activism’ and ‘protest’ that occurred during the Arab Spring. Affected individuals, and sometimes their whole families, were deemed 'not eligible' for citizenship (see Appendix D, iv, including Table D5). This created a new category of tens of thousands of Bedoun who had their new colour-labelled identity status stripped from them (Nacheva, April 6, 2014), no sooner than the system was publicised. The Bedoun Bedoun category was equivalent to the ‘red’ identity category, and marked out for mass expulsion from the state ('8,000 Bedoons' June 18, 2012 and June 19, 2012).

It is worth remembering that the Bedoun have also been known by many other names that reflect the traditional Bedouin identity (Appendix B, ii) and also by many other names signifying their progressive erasure by the state of Kuwait, particularly after the administrative expulsion of 1986 (‘The Study,’ 2003) (Appendix C, i). Essentially, the Bedoun affected by the program of erasure (‘status adjustment’) used the term Bedoun Bedoun to acknowledge that their Bedoun identity has been confiscated and erased by the state on the Ministry of Interior’s Central Apparatus database (according to the agency itself), and as Bedouins, and as Kuwaitis, as all Bedoun were once officially recorded. They were listed as a citizen of another country, and referred to the immigration department, and/or are listed as a criminal identified by the Central Apparatus, labelled with the security restriction (a state security ‘offence’) issued by the Ministry of Interior. The ‘security restriction’ and identity change that accompanies the process of become a Bedoun Bedoun.
also happened to replace the necessity of a judicial or custodial, criminal sentence for the purpose of disqualifying a Bedoun of eligibility for citizenship under the *Nationality Law, 1959* (Kuwait). The *Bedoun Bedoun*/erased identification class represented a major step in the evolution of the 'status adjustment' program of identity erasure, since the new colour-typing identity system was introduced in 2012, further streamlined the erasure, which international humanitarian agencies subsequently all but ignored.

In this discussion of the *Bedoun Bedoun* identification, I have attempted to show how the Bedoun's ethnic identity was consolidated (Horowitz, 1975) through the absorption and retention of the national identity wherein they became *Kuwait*, then proliferated (Horowitz, 1975) via the delay of citizenship then administrative expulsion from the state, and then further intentionally differentiated by government via new methods of segregation, leading to the emergence of the erased category, the *Bedoun Bedoun*. The Bedoun’s national identity had been assimilated upon settlement prior to and up to the 1960s, long before the group was made aware they would be deprived of citizenship (some twenty years later), and so the identity has been retained and transmitted down through new generations.

The decision by government authorities to leave the Bedoun without citizenship around 1985-1986, a process some authors have called ‘de-nationalisation’ (Human Rights Watch, 1995) has been presented as the major scandal in the government of Kuwait’s handling of the group. Yet, it just one of many stages of government-imposed social segregation forcing ethnic proliferation and pressuring the groups’ ability to maintain a consolidated collective identity. The program has included nationality re-labelling – erasing the Bedoun’s national and ethnic identity (‘status adjustment’ from 1983), the administrative expulsion (’The Study,’ 2003) and further restrictions prohibiting citizenship solely on the basis of their ethnicity, introduced in 1992 (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1992) after violent ethnic cleansing and killing organised by the state (see Appendix F) further mass deportations around 2000 (Human Rights Watch, 2000, 2001) followed by population typing, criminalisation and new procedures of erasure in 2012 (8,000 Bedoon,' June 18 and June 19, 2012).

Hence, in this study I refer to the broader program of erasure, or administrative ethnic cleansing (Weissbrodt, 2008) associated with ‘status adjustment’ (Kennedy, 2015a), and not merely a single-event ‘denationalisation.’ The notion of de-nationalisation by the state of Kuwait underplays the complexity of the program which has sought to annihilate the numbers and culture of the population. The ethnic identity and nationality identity of the Bedoun in the process of being replaced with an enforced, false identity, that makes individuals (an eventually the whole group) appear to hold citizenship in countries that they do not. There is a tangible link between imposed ‘status adjustment’ and the proliferation of the fraudulent identity document industry in Kuwait, ostensibly managed ‘at a distance’ by the Ministry of Interior, which affects immigration flows throughout the world (WikiLeaks U.S. Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, November 26, 2006).
The measures can also be linked to the removal of ethnic identity signified by the targeting of names across every level of the ethnic structure, based on Gross' model (1987) (in section 6.1.5, including Table 20, below). When these known historical developments are simply collated and compared, the intention of government to remove the whole ethnic group from the National Census, becomes quite clear. The historical continuum of names indicates quite transparently, that the whole sub-ethnic group of the Kuwaiti Bedoun known as the Bedoun, is being made to disappear (Appendices B, ii and C, i). I discuss the program of ‘status adjustment’ further in section 7.4.2.

Overall, the research participants displayed a multiple identity profile linked to many different layers of tribal identity, similar Bedoun citizens in Kuwait (al Rasheed, 2015) and other nations of the Gulf (Alshawi and Gardner, 2014). Similarities included carefully preserved family lineages to many different tribes, with extended family relations spread across a number of different states of the Middle East, including to the north of the region, and a cultivated national identity based on loyalty to the Emir of Kuwait, citizenship and participation in society. The research showed that such an identity could be interpreted as indicative of a complex, culturally enriched society that is normally regarded as desirable and benefiticious to the modern state (Alshawi and Gardner, 2014).

The persistence of the tribal social bond, asabiya (Gross, 1998, p.111) may help to account for the ability of the Bedoun to adapt and survive their administrative expulsion from the state and attempts to physically eradicate them, because the historical pattern shows they have ethnically differentiated or proliferated (Horowitz, 1975) from their individual tribes through the imposed force of government re-organisation, but then consolidated (Horowitz, 1975) into a sub-ethnic group, the Bedoun. The tribal social bond, featuring strong descent identity and social solidarity (Gross, 1998), remains a vital feature of tribal identity in states that were more oppressive than protective, in states characterised by corruption, and where communities cannot access their share of state resources (p.111). The social solidarity of ethnic collectives is often based on hundreds of years of shared history and culture, which strengthen cultural values and social bonds in ways that transcended the narrow definitions of culture that the modern nation state attempts to impose upon cultural collectives, for purely political purposes (Znaniecki, 1952b).

6.1.3 The Bedoun's perception of the term Bedoun Jinsiya ‘Without Nationality.’

Discovering subjective differences between individual’s perceptions of their identity and ascriptions used by outsiders has been important area of study for humanistic sociologists (Gross, 1978; Halas, 2010; Znaniecki, 1952b). The cultural data provided by the research participants points to differences in the construction of social realities between ‘natives’ and scholars. Exploration of the perspective of those studied helps to correct misconceptions in the existing corpus of knowledge created by scholar-driven descriptions of ethnicity and nationality, and to expand cultural knowledge (Gross, 1978, p.3, 7-6). It is
derived through humanistic sociology (Gross, 1978; Znaniecki, 1952a) particularly research work utilizing the humanistic coefficient (Halas, 1989, 2007, 2010; Smolicz and Secombe, 1981; Znaniecki, 1952a, p.132). In indigenous anothropology, this approach often manifests as the ‘collaborative’ methodology (Lassiter, 2005a, 2005b).

This study helped to clarify the meaning of the Bedoun identity for the interviewees, compared to the meaning advanced by outsider ‘experts.’ From the discussion so far, a much deeper understanding of the Bedoun’s ethnic identity and social integration in Kuwait has arisen from this approach, compared to past investigations. The main difference between the Bedoun respondent’s definition of their identity in this study, and the frequently referenced definition stated in Human Rights Watch (1995), was that the Bedoun were quite consciously aware they were both integrated into the citizen population through their tribal identity as Bedouins, and had also absorbed the Kuwaiti national identity. One young man in his twenties responded to my question as to how he perceived his identity and culture as a Bedoun person:

P06: I would say that since I was born here lived here as a Kuwaiti but as long as I don’t have papers for it, we can’t get called that.

Actually we don’t call ourselves Bedoun, we call ourselves Kuwaiti Bedouns. We are from the north. You know how Bedouins live, they migrate from place to place for water and grass… as Bedouins they don’t have papers. (Participant 6, Interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 15 March, 2014)

This emphasis on the meaning of the Bedoun as ‘without papers’ was repeated by other participants. Hakeem al Fadhli explained his interpretation of the general meaning of the Bedoun identity:

The Bedoun [are] the natives from Kuwait who [are] from the tribes, but they are without the documentation, the legal documentation to be recognised as citizen. So this is the difference between the Bedouin, the word itself is ‘without,’ it means you don’t have the documents.

The Bedoun, most of them belong to the tribes. And then [there] is something very important we have to remember, which is the northern tribes and the southern tribes. (Hakeem al Fadhli, interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 3 August, 2015)

The distinction between the northern and southern tribes seems to have been not only been crucial in determining whether or not the Bedoun received citizenship, but it was also a key factor in ethnic targeting and ethnic cleansing, which I discuss further in Chapter 8. For the moment, note the similarity between the young man’s explanation above (Participant 6), and the description given by Hakeem al Fadhli, which I recorded one and a half years later. The young man had no familiarity with any Bedoun individuals in the social leadership group, and his cultural identity appeared to be transmitted almost exclusively by
his parents and extended family members such as uncles and aunts. Both research participants provided a virtually identical perception of their name, ‘Bedoun.’ The meaning of the Bedoun in this study was therefore, somewhat different to how it has been portrayed in the international media, by scholars and government, but may well be quite consistent within the group itself – focusing on lack of genuine identity documents, but not lack of identity. The notion of the Bedoun as people without documents will be revisited in Chapter 7, when I analyse Decree 5/1960 (sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2).

The meaning of the term *Bedoun Jinsiya* appears to have been first reported in English, in Human Rights Watch (1991a, 51, n193). The report claimed the term ‘Bedoun’ was derived from the Arabic phrase *Bedoun Jinsiya* to refer to anyone whose qualification for citizenship ‘was in doubt’ (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, p.50-51). Later, the group was associated with ‘failure’ to register for citizenship (Human Rights Watch, 1995), then ‘refusal’ to register for citizenship (Shultziner and Tétreault (2012, p.284). As I mentioned in Chapter 2, the concept of Bedoun resistance to citizenship registration has been used as a rationale for the deprivation of citizenship, but this belief simply contradicts the use of an equation to determine the citizenship distribution in Kuwait, whereby half the Bedouin did not receive citizenship (one of the key findings of Human Rights Watch, 1995). This belief appears to have been acceptable to scholars likely because they linked it to the literature of tribalism theory, which has (and still does) characteristically associated the Bedouin people in general, with resistance to state-building and comprising ‘security’ threats to the state (discussed in Chapter 3).

I discovered that the Bedoun had been led to believe that citizenship had already been granted to them (al Moosa, 1976; al Fayez, 1984) due to their participation in the desert settlement program, which stipulated that citizenship would be granted on the basis of their tribal affiliation (Stanton Russell, 1989). It is beyond the scope of the present research to delve into the duplicity that ensued within the Municipality of Kuwait that led to the entrapment and manipulation of the Bedoun within the desert settlements, but it is worth noting that the Municipality was dominated by nationalist interests and was largely independent of government (Mdaires, 2010), and the settlements were carefully monitored and controlled, with regular home and document-checks taking place (al Moosa, 1976; al Zaher, 1990). The Bedouin were under constant surveillance from at least 1965. Thus, there was no flooding of the settlements with unwanted, unwelcome or unqualified Bedouin who were not recruited specifically to settle in the camps. Those who settled there were thoroughly vetted by tribal sheikhs and government authorities prior to entry, and they were accepted as selected citizens, on the basis that citizenship would be granted to them, prior to them being subject to constant, ongoing surveillance.

For those Bedouin in the camps who became the Bedoun, the identity meant ‘without papers,’ not ‘without nationality’ because the purpose of their submission to permanent settlement and camp life, was to receive those papers, which would confirm that
the promise of citizenship of Kuwait had been delivered. Some of the Bedoun interviewees were still waiting for their citizenship to be granted to them (P04, P07, P08, P13). A female research participant explained that most Kuwaitis are aware of the Bedoun’s heritage in Kuwait as among the first settlers (al Nakib, 2014, supported this view in one of her publications):

P08: People at here… they have family from same background. So they know the story, they know I have rights here. And they know I am Kuwaiti from where people have [come] from, where first. (Participant 8, interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 8 April, 2014)

The context in which the term ‘Bedoun’ was used substantiated the Bedoun’s claim that they government was aware that the tribal groups had no other nationality prior to their permanent settlement in Kuwait (Al Fayez, 1984, p.257-8), while many had submitted their personal identity documents demonstrating they had already qualified for the citizenship grant under the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) of Kuwait (Appendix B, vi). The respondents’ perception of their identity was aligned with previous field research conducted by Kuwaiti researchers (al Fayez, 1984, p.257-258; al Moosa, 1976) that indicated not only absorption of the nationality ideology, but also the possibility that citizenship had actually been granted to the group. This provides new insight into the contemporary history of the Bedouin in Kuwait, their social solidarity and conviction that they are living in their homeland. The notion that the Bedoun ‘failed’ to register or ‘refused’ to register for citizenship in large numbers should be disregarded due to lack of supporting of evidence beyond anecdotal comments and the presence of contradictory evidence (the use of a formula to distribute citizenship to only half the Kuwaiti Bedouin in the 1960s).

6.2 The Role of Theorisation of the Bedoun as an Ethnic Group

The discussion of the ethnic structure above, provides a stronger theoretical basis for understanding the Bedouin of Kuwait compared to the current status of knowledge, which positions the Bedouin adjacent the Hadar as two social groups within one nationality group, and not as an ethnic group (al Nakib, F., 2014; Alhajeri, 2015; Beaugrand, 2014a; Longva, 2006, p.175, 179), or as the whole nationality group of Bedouin and Hadar as one ethnic minority (Longva, 2006, p.181). The modelling of the ethnic structure (Gross, 1978) introduced a simple theoretical schema that can be used to explain the different degrees of the Bedouin’s ethnic exclusion leading to social isolation and identity crisis (al Waqayan, 2008). It focuses attention on who the Bedoun are, rather than who they are not (which was the focus of many previous definitions of the Bedoun, as I discussed in Chapter 2).

While at the academic level, the categorisation of the Bedouin and Hadar as different 'social groups' may be simply theoretical to academics, these unchallenged positions which have become regarded as authoritative knowledge, have had very real and practical consequences upon the Bedoun. On the one hand, this framing of the Bedouin in Kuwait has enabled scholars to distance the Bedouin from historical origins as Bedouin, it has also
enabled the state to continue ethnically targeting the Bedoun. This approach adopted in Western texts (see Chapter 2) has under-emphasised extent to which social conflict in Kuwaiti society, where the Hadar elite (Al Anezi, 1989, p.272) have rejected all Kuwaiti Bedouin of both northern and southern tribal origins, including Bedouin citizens as well as the Bedoun, regarding them as non-members of their own state.

6.2.1 The impact the research findings on previous understandings of the Hadar and Bedouin as merely 'social groups.'

The theorisation of the Bedouin ethnic structure I have presented above, concurred with previous findings on the main tribes of Kuwait (Al Anezi, 1989, p.263; Alhajeri, 2004; Alshayyeji, 1988; see Appendix B, i). Most, but not all of the participants consented to having their individual tribes disclosed (Chapter 5, Table 10). This information confirmed the findings of Human Rights Watch (1995) that the Bedoun are drawn from a range of different tribes of Kuwait, connected by family relations. In Chapter 2 (section 2.5), I discussed the dual approaches to establishing grounds for breaches to the right of self-determination in international human rights law, minority rights and indigenous rights, both which focus on discrimination as the limiting factors to participation in society. International law recognising indigenous tribal people attributes additional weight to historical processes of domination by colonisers (Anaya, 2004, 2009). Both approaches may be applied to the Bedoun, due to the domination of urban settlers, the Hadar, and the period of British control (under which Decree 5/1960 was adopted), while the Bedoun were coerced to settle permanently in Kuwait under the promise of citizenship. I argued that while the Bedoun could be viewed as an ethnic minority in Kuwait today, and that their discrimination as a 'social group' has been the predominant approach by international humanitarian agencies in their reports to the United Nations to date. Yet the historical development of the Bedoun's statelessness and deprivations of their human rights occurred because they were tribal people indigenous to the region, and were coerced to settle in desert camps in Kuwait with the corresponding promise of citizenship, for that reason.

Not only is this area of international law yet to be explored by the Bedoun, scholars in the social sciences have avoided discussion of attempts to annihilate the Bedoun to date, that have been have been overwhelmingly ethnic in orientation (I present additional data to support this argument in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8). For both of these reasons, I argue that the theorisation of the Bedouin as an ethnic group is not only essential for understanding of the group's perception by government (on the basis that the Bedoun are targeted as part of the Bedouin ethnic group), it forms an essential approach for the group to be recognized as a persecuted ethnic minority in international law. In order for this to happen, in turn, the Kuwaiti Bedouin have to be accepted as an ethnic group. In the social sciences concerning Kuwait, they are not yet explicitly conceived of as such due to the limited state of theoretical development. In order to establish this view, one must challenge Longva’s (1997) analysis of the Bedouin as a 'social group’, which has become the standard academic frame of
reference to the Bedouin in Kuwaiti society (see for example, Alshawi and Gardner, 2014). Therefore, in this section I will attempt to present a counter-argument to the current state of knowledge.

Longva (2006) claimed Kuwait was ‘ruled by an ethnic minority’ (p.179). Her theory that the ruling regime practiced ‘ethnocracy’ (ethnocratic rule) positioned the country ruled by a single ethnic minority group (p.181), but oddly failed to point out the name of this group (p.181, referencing p.187, n29 – Longva, 2005). Longva (2006) used clever wording to imply the Bedouin and Hadar might comprise different ethnic groups (p.175. 179), but did not commit herself to a transparent analysis by providing the name of the theorist from whose specific model she was applying and then adapting it to produce new insights.

Her own model (Longva, 2005) was an ‘ethnocracy’ that theorised the ‘Kuwaiti’ (citizens) against expatriates (the foreign workforce derived from multiple nationalities and ethnic groups) - as she had always done (Longva, 1997). The researcher seemed to believe the ‘Kuwaiti’ ethnic minority (one ethnic group) comprised the two social groups (Bedouin and Hadar). Thus, any clarification the two social groups were actually two ethnic groups (in conflict) undermined her theory of the ethnocracy as a single ruling ethnic group.

Her basic conceptual error was to claim the ‘Kuwaiti’ (national, citizen-only) model was based on an anlysis of ethnic groups (‘ethnocracy’). This enabled her to avoid leading other researchers to rather significant insights about the Bedouin identity, such as theorising the Bedoun’s role in Kuwaiti society as part of the Bedouin ethnic group, and discussing the national identity of the Bedouin (which is the Kuwaiti national identity, as this study has shown), which would have challenged her ‘ethnocracy’ model both ways (there is no single ethnic group but two groups, and the ‘Kuwaitii’ is not a citizen-only identity in Kuwait).

After all, Longva (2005, 2006) used the model to promote the concept of a unified, citizen-only, mono-ethnic Kuwaiti national identity. Indeed, she omitted the Bedoun from this extended discussion on the Bedouin (Longva, 2006), while promoting the new model.

Longva’s (2005, 2006) ‘ethnocracy’ was in fact, a nationalist model. In it, she referred only to groups defined by nationality and/or legal citizenship (bizarrely, this is very obvious from the titles of both the articles but I will try not to labour the point). She also avoided breaking down the foundation concept of the widely discussed Kuwaiti welfare state model - the historical Kuwaiti social contract comprising the dominant Hadar elites’ bargain with the Bedouin ruler, which ensured the continuation of Hadar power over the Bedouin (Crystal, 1992, 1995). The welfare state model was able to account for these local nuances (apparent contradictions) in Kuwaiti society by focusing discussion on state resources, corporate interests and materialist human motives. Longva’s (1997, 2005, 2006) theory could not, because she was invested in presenting the Hadar and Bedouin as one unit. In other words, the theory always came before the data. Therefore, she did not need to tell her audience who she thought the ruling ethnic minority really was – the Bedouin (the ruler) or
the Hadar (the ‘elite’). Instead, she repeatedly maintained they were one in the same, ‘Kuwaitis are a privileged minority’ (p.180).

Longva’s (2005, 2006) approach overlooked the gravity of ethnic conflict in Kuwait, manifesting as the ascendancy of Hadar mono-ethnic nationalism, the atrocities committed against the Bedoun due to their ethnic identity (expulsion and cleansing on ethnic grounds), and the consistency of Hadar intellectual thought that had supported Bedoun oppression due to ethnic difference and tribal characteristics. The notion of ‘ethnocracy’ was flawed to begin with as it was a nationalist model, as I have outlined. But additionally, the so-called single ruling ethnic group, ‘Kuwaitis,’ (a national grouping) and the two social groups, Bedouin and Hadar (the Bedouin an ethnic grouping, the Hadar type is perhaps more debatable) were never systematically tested against a theoretical model.

It is worth noting that many Kuwaiti authors have diverged significantly from Longva’s (1997) analysis. Kuwaiti authors consistently expressed a clear conviction the Hadar and Bedouin identity and culture were not remotely alike or compatible (for example, al Anezi, 1989; al Khatib, 1978; al Nafisi, 1978; al Najjar, 1983; al Naqeeb, 1990; Alessa, 1981; Khalaf and Hammoud, 1987; Ghabra, 1997a; al Khandari and al Hadben, 2010). The view that the Bedouin and Hadar were inherently different and unreconcilable ethnic groups was highlighted in local versions of tribalism theory, wherein Hadar scholars (of Kuwaiti and other Arab nationalities) sought to sharply differentiate their own culture from Bedouin culture. This approach was exemplified in a classic study by Khalaf and Hammoud (1987), *The Emergence of the Oil Welfare State: The Case of Kuwait*.

The notion of the Bedouin as a ‘social group’ was then adopted by al Nakib (2014, p. 5, as ‘socially distinct’ groups) and Beaugrand (2014b). In the latter case, the concepts were already in use at the U.K. Home Office for Bedoun refugee claims. It enabled Beaugrand (2014b) to attempt to alter U.K. Foreign Office policy on the Bedoun, by attempting to remove reference to the definition of the Bedouin identity as an ethnic group (of Bedouins) from the very first point of the Kuwait country advice, to ‘stateless Arabs’ (Beaugrand, 2014b; U. K. Home Office, 2014, p.36) leaving them defined as a social group in the text. This was allowed despite that U. K. immigration case law established Bedoun identity on the basis of their having fled Kuwait to escape discrimination and persecution on grounds of their ethnic and tribal identity (Kennedy, 2015b). Ethnic persecution is a stronger claim than discrimination as a member of a social group. This strategy, if successful, would have limited the Bedoun's ability to assert their claims in international law by shifting their recognition as an indigenous tribal group with a distinct ethnic identity, to a group of unknown ‘other’ people – mirroring Kuwait government policy. Beaugrand’s (2014b) refutation of the definition of the Bedouin’s identity based on their ethnicity was later rejected and withdrawn, leading to a second version of the U.K. Home Office Kuwait (2016, July) published as *Country Information and Guidance Kuwaiti Bidoon Version 2.0*. 

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The ideas should not be regarded as plausible arguments for refuting Bedouin or Bedoun identity claims. Lack of theorisation or fieldwork conducted by scholars relating to the ethnic identity and persecution of the Bedoun, should not be used to support claims of the absence of ethnic identity and persecution. This applies to the so-called ‘documented’ Bedoun in particular. This strategy has been adopted by the U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office in Kuwait, and the U.K. Home Office in London (F.C.O. Kuwait, 2007 in U.K. Home Office, 2009; U.K. Home Office, 2014), and other developed nations may have followed suit, in order to reduce the success Bedoun refugee claims. Instead, the approaches of analysing the Bedouin and Hadar as merely ‘social groups’ should be interpreted as indicative of lack of rigorous analysis of the ethnic tensions in Kuwaiti society, due to the politicisation of research efforts. Furthermore, I provide new evidence of the ethnic targeting and persecution of the Bedoun including the so-called documented Bedoun, in Appendix D, iv.

6.2.2 An example of ethnic targeting modelled with Gross’s ethnic theory.

As I have discussed in the previous section, the reluctance of scholars to theorise the ethnicity of the Bedouin as distinct from the Hadar in Kuwaiti society has meant that the extent of ethnic targeting of the Bedoun in Kuwait has remained largely unknown outside Kuwait. The following example demonstrates the value of using ethnic theory in illustrating the extraordinary extent to which the ethnic structure of the Bedoun has been systematically targeted by the state. In doing so, it also reveals the weakness of the persistent ‘social group’ model for theorising the historical and ongoing Bedouin and Hadar conflict in Kuwaiti society. The discussion so far, has revealed the system of social organisation of the Bedoun in Kuwaiti society, which reflects the structure of national and ethnic identity drawing on Feliks Gross’s (1978) ethnic theory derived from humanistic sociology. Plotting the structure of the ethnic and the national identity expressed by the Bedouin interviewees according to this theory of (Gross, 1978), illustrated the point that the Bedouin were not a disconnected, isolated group of strangers, or ‘other nationals,’ but an ethnic group that had been socially integrated in Kuwaiti society until 1986, whereupon the group began to dynamically re-organise into a new ethnic group while retaining some degree of integration with the Bedouin citizen community.

After analysing the results in Figure 1, I observed that the historical removal of traditional names of the Bedoun had obscured the identity of the multi-tribal ethnic group to outsiders, as if the rationale to remove names had been carefully designed. For this reason, I conducted further documentary research and analysis on the names used for the Bedoun in the literature, which featured the traditional names (Appendix B, ii) and contemporary, collective terms used by government to replace identity (Appendix C, i). The analysis demonstrated both a proliferation of names and a stage-oriented development of terminology, pointing to administrative erasure, also known as administrative ethnic cleansing (Dedic, 2003; Jalusic and Dedic, 2008; Weissbrodt, 2008). The structure provided
an elaboration on the historical development of the names used to describe the Bedoun as increasingly conceptually, symbolically and legally separated from the group’s traditional cultural identity. I selected just one example from that analysis concerning the removal of names, to illustrate the systematic and all-encompassing nature of the approach.

In Table 20 (below), I have outlined government measures which have attempted to erase the Bedoun’s Bedouin ethnic identity through administrative procedures. Ethnic targeting developed historically, in a certain chronological order (refer to the left-hand column, showing the years that policies were introduced). The targeting conformed to a highly structured conceptual, sequential framework (refer to the central column, which shows a broad and general whole-group approach, and the right-hand column, showing the level of the ethnic structure targeted). The data shows that targeting of the whole group spanned all levels in the ethnic structure. The program was revived after the Arab Spring in 2012, with a new strategy that focused on individuals, removing their tribal names and family names. In 2014, Farah al Nakib asked, ‘What hindered the outcome… whereby the badu [the Bedouin] would be assimilated and the term no longer used to designate a distinct social group?’ (al Nakib, F., 2014, p.6-7; italics added).

The example illustrates what this sentiment looks like when it is implemented by the state. Ethnic targeting involved every level of the theoretical ethnic structure. It is difficult to imagine that the comprehensive method of ethnic targeting revealed in Table 20, was devised by bureaucrats. A more likely explanation is that the schema was planned systematically by intellectuals trained in the social sciences. The policy seems to have been designed to exclude the Bedoun from society by removing their collective, tribal and family names. The restrictions conformed to a predictable, pre-determined structure reflecting a framework of ethnic theory. The example suggests that the imposed, restrictive cultural re-organisation (M. Secombe, personal communications, January 22, 2016) of the Bedoun from at least 1983, did not merely come about due to the expansion of a government bureaucracy. The system appears to have been programmed by intellectuals familiar with ethnic theory in the social sciences. Multiple, theoretical levels of identity were perceived, including the social and/or cultural levels and the political-juridical and national levels (Gross, 1978).
Table 20

Government Measures Removing the Bedouin Ethnic Identity from the Bedoun (1983-2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Term or type of term removed</th>
<th>Level in the ethnic structure targeted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>'Bedoun'</td>
<td>The micro-ethnic level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>'Kuwaiti Bedouin'</td>
<td>The ethic level (Bedouin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Badiat al Kuwayt/Desert dwellers of Kuwait</td>
<td>Removal of the term from official documents held by the Kuwaiti Bedouin in Emiri Decree 41/1987 (Group 29, 2012, p.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>'Kuwaiti'</td>
<td>The national level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Removal of whole Bedoun population in the National Census from the ‘Kuwaiti’ nationality group (backdated to 1985). Reallocation to ‘other Arab nationals’ of unspecified nationality (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994, n32)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Tribal names</td>
<td>The sub-ethnic level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Removal of tribal names required for citizenship and voter registration</td>
<td>‘CSRSIR to remove tribe, family names from Bedoun records,’ <em>Arab Times</em>, 7 April, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Family names</td>
<td>The individual level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Removal of family names, on basis that Bedoun attempted to obtain citizenship by changing their family names</td>
<td>‘CSRSIR to remove tribe, family names from Bedoun records,’ <em>Arab Times</em>, 7 April, 2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The example illustrated that a systematic policy and program at the official level targeted all levels of the Bedouin identity and culture from the Bedoun, via the eradication of references to the Bedoun as *Bedoun, Bedouin and Kuwaiti*. The example supports the findings of BA and Others, UKIAT [2004] 00256 CG (in U.K. Home Office, 2014, p.7-8),
which asserted that the ethnic and tribal identity of the Bedoun has been targeted and persecuted by the state of Kuwait. Moreover, the example underscored the persecution of both so-called ‘documented’ and ‘undocumented’ Bedoun (a distinction used by the U.K. Home Office, 2009, 2014, 2016 pertaining to Bedoun refugee claims). Yet this was not the only example of highly organised, systemic ethnic targeting of the Bedoun by the state. Other examples can be found in the Appendices, such as the historical development of a system of committees used to study (conduct surveillance and exert control over) the Bedouin desert community, later narrowed to focus on the Bedoun exclusively (Appendix D, ii), other aspects of the historical development of labelling the Bedoun (Appendices B, ii and C, i), and a range of methods used by government to ascribe ‘other nationality’ to further conceal their identity, which it calls ‘status adjustment’ (Appendix E, v, vi).

Conclusion
In this Chapter, I have discussed the Bedoun’s ethnic identity and the group’s responses to social change. I argued that new knowledge about the ethnic structure (Gross, 1978) of the Bedoun within Bedouin society, and the Bedoun identity in relation to the state, could improve understanding of the Bedoun in Kuwaiti society. The interview data indicated that the Bedoun retained deep cultural ties to their traditional heritage, which was manifested in a variety of self-ascribed identity terms. However, the Bedoun identity was also subject to dynamic cultural change, as in some cases, membership transcended legal identity and had expanded into the citizen population. Generally speaking, the Bedoun interviewees experienced a strong, multi-layered ethnic identity and sense of tribal belonging (asabiya, in Gross, 1998, p.111) as well as a unique form of national identity. Many interviewees were raised as Kuwaiti citizens as children, and received transmission of their national identity from immediate and extended family members.

Thus, statelessness was only one aspect of the Bedoun’s identity, and it was not usually the primary identity. Previous scholar’s lack of engagement with ethnic theory helped to explain why the Bedoun’s oppression has remained largely unknown outside Kuwait. The Ministry of Interior’s Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program imposed a further level of ethnic differentiation over the Bedoun, in the form of false nationality labelling. The ‘adjustment’ process changed the ethnic and national identity on official documents naming the concerned individuals, and their families, targeting terms of identity in particular. The state labelled the effected people with other nationalities and erased their identity as Bedouns, Bedouins and Kuwaitis, as well as tribal and family names, on official government documents. Thus, the theoretical modelling of the ethnic structure (Gross, 1978) revealed that the ethnic targeting of the Bedoun was more extensive and deliberately planned, than had been expected.

This analysis supported previous findings that the group are persecuted on grounds of their ethnic and tribal identity (BA and Others, UKIAT [2004] 00256 CG in U.K. Home Office, 2014, p.7-8), including both ‘documented’ and ‘undocumented’ Bedoun (F.C.O. 2006
Chapter 7
Discussion of
Social Exclusion and Ethnic Targeting of the Bedoun in Kuwaiti Society

And yianni, Arabic man, not stupid, no, no, not stupid, but he is light, yianni. No more think, not more idea, no, no, no for the future. My life, this is my country, this is my camel, never mind, open. I don’t want hospital, I don’t want schools… After petrol, no, no, no… and begin problems. Until this time, I am without. [Bedoun]. (Participant 12, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 1 April, 2014)

Introduction

This chapter is concerned with the some of the processes of social exclusion and ethnic targeting of the Bedoun in Kuwaiti society. I explore the cultural patterning of exclusion and persecution that arises is the Bedoun’s social interactions, and the role of ideology in the social conflict. Two major themes of analysis arising from the interview data are outlined, the targeting of the Bedouin due to their origins as desert dwellers, and the ethnic targeting of the Bedouin of the northern tribes. The focus on the Bedouin's origins as desert dwellers involves a discussion of the process by which attempts were made to exclude the Bedouin from citizenship from 1961, through the operation of Nationality Committees, which distributed citizenship. Specific procedures gave extraordinary powers to a very small number of individuals to choose or to reject citizens.

Consideration of Decree 5/1960 suggests that it is almost certain that members of the Hadar community, who received first-degree citizenship in the 1960s, did not have sufficient documents to prove their identity for the purpose of the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) while equally, Bedouin who did have appropriate documentation according to the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait), could be rejected by the same Committees on purely discriminatory grounds.

The targeting of Bedouin due to their origins in the northern tribes is also discussed. This theme was influenced by the ideological expansion of tribalism theory during the invasion of Iraq and beyond, which impacted scholarly interpretations of the Bedou during the 1990s. These themes have been absorbed by the general population and are still experienced by the Bedou today, via ethnic targeting in social interactions and through the ‘status adjustment’ program. This finding was supported by interview data as well as the analysis of scholarly and public discourse. I discuss the distinction between the northern and southern tribes, and key elements involved in the nature of ethnic targeting of the Bedouin community as a whole, which although it sets out to divide the tribes’ solidarity, ultimately defeats its own purpose and potentially, encourages greater social solidarity between both the stateless and citizen Bedouin Kuwait.

7.1 Ethnic and Non-ethnic Identities in Kuwaiti Society
My starting point was to model the ethnic and non-ethnic identities among the Bedouin and Hadar in Kuwaiti society derived from my analysis of the interview findings, on Gross’ (1978) models of ethnic identification. I devised a basic model incorporating the vertical model (political-juridical identification) (Gross, 1978, p.51, Figure 3) and the horizontal (parallel) identity model, (p.57, Figure 4). The model is shown in Figure 2, below. The Figure shows two basic types of identity derived from Gross (1978), the political-ideological and cultural-ethnic identities (p.50). It accounts for non-ethnic identities, including religious identities, as part of ideological, non-ethnic identities (Gross, 1978, p.63).

The model featured the main ethnic identities of Kuwaitis, comprising the Hadar, the Bedouin, and the Bedoun as a micro-ethnic group of the Bedouin. It included a capstone level of identity at the top of the structure, representing the collective or supra-ethnic identity. The religious identity was characterised by either Sunni or Shia muslims, who made up the vast majority of society (although there are some exceptions to this rule, such as Christians and Jews, who are permitted to practice their religion in Kuwait).

As a conceptual framework of Kuwaiti society, Figure 2 (below) also illustrated the Bedouin sub-groups of the northern and southern tribal identity (consisting of many individual tribes and larger groups of tribes, called tribal confederations), and the Bedoun, mostly comprising people of the northern Bedouin tribes. This is a simple model and it does not attempt to describe the complexity of inter-relations between the groups, which are considerable. Its purpose is to provide a basic sketch of the structure of Kuwaiti society and to illustrate the relative political, ethnic and social identities of the Bedoun in comparison with other groups, in order to enhance understanding of the following discussion.

7.2 The Cultural Patterning of Social Interactions

The process of social interactions was described in participant experiences in the interview data. The veracity of these experiences was supported with data from the analysis of both academic and public discourse in Kuwait. These cultural patterns of social interactions indicated two major themes, which form the major sections of this chapter (sections 7.3 and 7.4). These are the themes of ethnic targeting of the ‘desert dweller’ (badiat al Kuwayt) and the ethnic targeting of the ‘northern tribes’ Bedouin.

The accounts of two research participants were especially efficacious in highlighting two important cultural patterns associated with these interactional processes. Both processes were concerned with the discovery of the Bedoun’s ‘origins.’ One interviewee (P12) was a traditional man who remained strongly connected to his family’s nomadic heritage, although he lived and worked in the metropolitan area. He discussed his interaction with citizen Bedouin whose families had more recently arrived in Kuwait. The newcomers directed
uestions to him to subtly inquire as to his origins in the desert, and then as to whether he was from the northern or southern tribes, prior to asking him directly if he was ‘Iraqi.’

The second interviewee (P05) was a younger man who had comparatively more frequent interactions in Hadar society. He emphasised the detail with which the Bedoun are scrutinized as members of the northern tribes, including the influence of accent and dialect (comprising the local vernacular) as social markers. He also described the transference of notions of criminality projected onto the Bedoun from the Iraq war period (the Iraqi ‘traitor’) to the Arab Spring period (as the destabilizing, criminalised, human rights ‘activist’ or ‘protestor’). Similar accounts were provided by the other interviewees, such as P13 and P17.

The social interactions outlined by the interviewees outlined a certain order of cultural patterning (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.271), which focused on the tribal identity of the Bedoun. The descriptions also highlighted an impulse among others in Kuwaiti society to discover the tribal identity of the Bedouin. Such people were quite motivated to distinguish
the Bedoun from citizen Bedouin. According to the accounts, the basic cultural patterning of Bedoun social interactions with other groups may be characterised in four, sequential steps:

1. Identification by others as a Kuwaiti
2. Identification by others as a Bedouin
3. Identification by others as a Bedouin of the northern tribes
4. Identification by others and as a stateless Bedouin - a Bedoun

The pattern emphasised that the tribal identity of the Bedoun remained a major value influencing the attitude of the citizen population, both Bedouin and Hadar, toward the Bedoun. It pointed to the imposition of a social order upon the Bedoun, not unlike the restrictive re-organisation of the Bedoun at the bureaucratic level. Certain patterns of citizen inquiry seemed to play a significant role in determining the outcome of social interactions. That is, the procedure or order of inquiry appeared to be important in helping the other party to establish whether or not they could or would continue to interact further, or to exclude the Bedoun, and to what extent.

The term ‘desert dweller’ (badiat al Kuwayt) was derived from the traditional name for the Bedouin of Kuwait (Group 29, 2012, p.6). The ‘northern tribes’ was subject to the ideology of the foreign ‘other,’ a theme symbolising transgression of the Hadar in-group boundaries, whereupon the question of ‘origins’ comes into play in a more specific way. Thus, ethnic targeting tended to result in discrimination or more serious forms of persecution such as direct confrontation (noting here that I have limited the discussion to interpersonal social interactions, and not institutionalised levels of discrimination, although these may be inferred from the findings: Znaniecki, 1954). These themes and key concepts that were related to the themes analysed in the interview data, are shown below, in Table 21.

The themes listed showed that the Bedouin and Bedoun were subject to ethnic targeting or discrimination, on at least two bases. First, targeting was motivated by ideas related to the Bedoun being indigenous Bedouin, whose ancestors lived in the desert of Kuwait’s territory and traversed tribal dirah to the north and south of Kuwait. Second, ethnic targeting was motivated to isolate members of the northern tribes specifically, as so-called ‘nationals’ of a range of other nations, as inferior, uncivilised, undeserving of citizenship due to perceptions about their tribal culture, and so on. But this was not merely a perception held by interviewees. There were strong links in the literature and public discourse confirming the targeting of both the desert dweller, and the northern tribes (see my thematic analysis in Appendix C, vi-viii). The concept of ethnic targeting or discrimination Table 21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The ‘desert dweller’</th>
<th>The foreign ‘other’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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Themes Related to Tribal Stigma Associated with Social interactions with Other Ethnic Groups
of the ‘desert dweller’ may tend more toward the southern tribes, due to the location of the southern tribal dirah over the desert of the Najd (Saudi Arabian), but this may be more of a conceptual distinction than a practical reality. Explicit reference to the northern tribes per se, is uncommon in the literature (in English) about Kuwaiti society, but reference to the Iraqi origins of the Bedoun, or to states from which the tribal dirah of the northern tribes are associated with (such as Jordan and Syria), is quite common, pointing to the contemporary construction of this aspect of identity related to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq.

### 7.3 Ethnic Targeting of the Bedouin and the Origins of the Desert Dweller

The origin of the Bedouin as a desert dweller related to long-term historical presence of the Bedouin in Kuwait. The traditional name for the Bedouin (Bedu) was associated with negative, Orientalist motifs in the academic literature. The Bedouin were described by scholars as an inferior, dangerous and menacing tribal society (Bocco, 2006) (see Table 21, above). The concepts appeared to have been differentiated in contemporary academic writing, whereby the southern tribes were associated more positively and related to Hadar culture (in relation to the Ajman tribe being granted first-degree citizenship), while the northern tribes were demonised due to their proximity to Iraq. As I have mentioned, all of the Bedouin tribes of Kuwait had traditional dirah extending across multiple nations. The theme of targeting the Bedouin on the basis of their inhabiting the desert territory of Kuwait revealed more of a focus on the ‘evils’ of a foreign culture (perhaps because the target was

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Correspondence</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bedouin</td>
<td>The Bedoun in particular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern and Southern tribes residing outside al Sour (the city wall)</td>
<td>Northern tribes in particular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desert dwelling culture</td>
<td>The ‘foreign’ other, the ‘other national’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native to the territory of Kuwait – those beyond the city wall</td>
<td>Fixation on transnationalism of tribes, questionable ‘origins’ transposed to ‘illegitimacy’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal culture, danger, threat</td>
<td>Iraqi – Iraq war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desert-dwellers, Nomadic</td>
<td>Desert, steppe, river or marsh, nomadic, semi-nomadic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Conceptual correspondences between the two categories of themes are grouped into sections separated by the broken, horizontal lines.
merely outside the city wall), whereas the targeting of the northern tribes concerned the ‘evils’ of a foreign nationality (the former also elaborated ‘nationality,’ to a lesser extent).

The vigorous development of tribalism theory in Kuwait appears to have played a significant role in convincing others (intellectuals, and political and elite social circles), that the Bedouin were unfit for Kuwaiti citizenship and participation in society, in addition to any implicit level of social conflict or innate cultural incompatibility (as al Anezi, 1989, p. 174-175, argued). My analysis of academic sources (Appendix C, vi-viii) indicated that tribalism theory was deployed in a relentless focus on Bedouin heritage by Hadar scholars in Kuwait. It provided ideological symbolism for the creation of cultural narratives over a number of decades that focused on the ‘other’ Bedouin while unselfconsciously omitting thoughtful analysis of Hadar society. Interviewees described stigmas projected onto them by others in Kuwaiti society that were the identical or very similar to those cultural motifs that originated in tribalism theory promulgated by intellectuals at the local (Kuwaiti) and regional (Middle East) levels.

The cause of the feelings of ‘threat’ of the desert dweller may well have been connected to the concern among the Hadar ‘original’ citizens (the ‘elite’) over their own inability to prove their origins. The matter appears to have been concealed under distracting nationalist dialogues produced by Kuwaiti intellectuals which stigmatised the desert-dweller. In a nutshell, it appears that tribalism theory was expanded via the elaboration of anti-Bedouin sentiment in academic discourse for the purpose of distracting those desert dwellers and others, from discovering that the Hadar were no more deserving of ‘original’ citizenship than they were according to the Nationality law (1959). If the Hadar’s inability to prove their long-term residence in Kuwait had become widely known, the Bedouin might never have widely accepted the political justification for delaying, let alone excluding, half the Bedouin’s citizenship claims from the 1960s (Human Rights Watch, 1995).

The notion of the Bedouin as desert-dwellers, uncivilised natives, tribally dangerous and therefore a threat to national security, was part of a regional approach to the Bedouin throughout the Middle East from the 1950s (Aurenche, 1993; Bocco, 2006; Lancaster and Lancaster, 1998). These stereotypes informed and reinforced the outcomes of national settlement and economic development programs for the Bedouin (Fabietti, 2006). Research associated with policy that aimed to force or coerce the permanent settlement of the Bedouin tribes in Middle East states, ‘officially’ perceived sedentarisation as enhancing the national security and economic prosperity of those states (Bocco, 2006, p.303-307).

Accordingly, it was the duty of sovereign states ‘to make the nomads evolve’ (Berque, 1959, p.515, 518 in Bocco, 2006, p.307), with citizenship distributed to Bedouin through the Middle East states as the major incentive for permanent settlement. But these development theories were expanded even further in Kuwait, to the extent that they were used to entrap the Bedoun (as I discussed in Chapter 2), but also to deprive them of citizenship. Therefore, the ‘Bedoun problem’ may also be seen as arising from the
regional Bedouin ‘nomad problem’ (Bocco, 2006, p.302; Marx, 2006, p.88). Although the policies toward the Bedouin did not change remarkably during the Mandate period, a new ideology of Bedouin sedentarisation was introduced from the 1950s, which legitimized state policies as metropolitan Hadar researchers were given the task of studying and inventing planning regimes to settle the Bedouin. Bocco (2006) pointed out: ‘The divide opposing Western experts to Bedouin populations is mirrored in the gulf separating the Arab intelligentsia from the rural people in their own countries’ (p.303). Intellectuals and government regimes shared a common perception of the Bedouin: ‘Most international experts and Arab regimes stigmatised nomadism as a backward social condition and condemned tribalism as a hindrance to the ideal of a united nation’ (Bocco and Jaubert, 1994, p.17).

The re-organisation of social or cultural groups, including the exclusion of some groups and the criminalisation of the Bedouin’s identity, reflected the narrowing of conservative values among the dominant group (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.354-359), the Kuwaiti Hadar. Many authors have pointed briefly to the critical event of the Bedouin administrative expulsion in 1986 (‘The Study,’ 2003) as a pivotal dividing line in government policy between the Bedouin from the citizen society. However, al Anezi (1989) indicated that deep cultural patterns between the Bedouin and Hadar existed at the time of the implementation of the Nationality Law 1959 via the Nationality Committees, from 1960.

Alhajeri (2004, p.16) showed that these patterns had continued to exist in Kuwaiti society thereafter, spoiling the perception of the Bedouin cultural identity (as in the tribal stigma, in Goffman,1963). These patterns influenced ordinary Hadar citizens to assume or accept that the whole group was unfit and unworthy for participating in the modern state as ‘true’ or ‘real’ Kuwaiti citizens. The cultural patterns were reinforced by Hadar politicians and intellectuals united in anti-Bedouin nationalism (Stanton Russell, 1989, p.37, n13), deploying the same anti-Bedouin ideological themes over decades (Aljajeri, 2004, p.16). Both al Anezi (1989, p.174, p.272) and Alhajeri (2004, p.16) emphasised the social and cultural factors contributing to the Bedouin’s situation alongside the role of government. The convergence of these factors points to a conscious, organised effort among those who recognised anti-Bedouin ideology in academic modes of thought, to see it implemented strictly as national policy in Kuwait.

In Chapter 2, I pointed out the development of nationalist thought in Kuwait from the 1960s via Kuwaiti Hadar nationalists and Arab nationalist thinkers who lobbied individually or together, even crossing party lines or forming new parties (al Mdaires, 2010), as they disseminated their policy platform to keep the Bedouin out of Kuwait (al Mdaires, 2010), eventually targeting the northern tribal origins (insomuch as this group were the assumed to be the Bedouin). Thus, the Hadar had squarely targeted the Bedouin in Kuwait from the time that the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) was first implemented. Such values were expressed through ‘tribalism’ theory in Kuwait over the ensuing decades (Appendix C,
vi-viii), and reinforced practically via successive committees appointed to ‘manage’ the Bedouin population from 1962 (Appendix D, ii), leading to the long-term segregation of the Bedouin from the citizen population.

Znaniecki (1952a, p.335) explained that prohibitive rules and regulations were generated to create ‘outsiders’ independently of their social performance, in ways that changed the official definitions of identity determined by authorities. In other words, outsider status was not linked to what an individual did, but how he or she was portrayed and perceived by others (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.356). This principle is also reflected in labelling theories, which others apply to stigmatize a person, regardless of the label’s actual correspondence to the individual concerned (Becker, 1963; Goffman, 1963). This process leads to the social construction ‘the other’ as enemies (Short, 2010, p.833), justifying the cultural destruction of other groups to the extent that they may be physically removed, killed (Davidson, 2012; Znaniecki, 1952a) or administratively erased on government databases via re-allocation to other nationalities (Sigona, 2005) so that traces of their existence are eliminated (Znaniecki, 1952a). Stateless groups have been particularly vulnerable to these practices, which culminate in administrative erasure of whole populations (Dedic, 2003; Green, MacManus, and de la Cour Venning, 2015; Sigona, 2005; Weissbrodt, 2008).

The Bedouin were confronted with two major types of stigma and labelling (Goffman, 1963) at the social/cultural and government/bureaucratic levels, emanating from the themes of the desert-dweller and the northern tribal ‘enemy.’ Both themes were elaborated with prohibitive generalisations about why the group were unsuitable for citizenship and inclusion in Kuwaiti society. Within each type of labelling, many inter-related labels could be found, connected to a complex system of ideas (shown in Table 21), which I have called an anti-Bedouin ideology (Table 21). Nevertheless, prohibitive generalisations cannot even be tentatively accepted as valid classifications of human actions, since they are based on judgements of the lack of an action and the non-existence of a fact (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.35). Ironically, the Bedouin were confronted with the tribal stigma (Goffman, 1963, p.4) in the most literal sense, and labelled as enemies (Short, 2010, p.833; Znaniecki, 1952b, p.98) quite directly. Eventually, the ideology and prohibitions would manifest in the system of erasure (the 'status adjustment' program), not uncommonly experienced by stateless groups (Dedic, 2003; Green, P., MacManus, T. and de la Cour Venning, A., 2015; Redclift, 2013, 2016; Sigona, 2011). The former stigma represented the general prejudice against the Bedouin, and the latter stigma, narrowed the focus to the northern tribes. The targeting of the 'northern tribes' was more divisive, attracting defensive responses from Kuwaiti citizens including violent opposition (Znaniecki, 1952b) to individuals labelled ‘infiltrator,’ ‘fifth column’ and ‘disloyal.’ These themes included the projection of hate-speech in a historical context, and in the present-day (Appendix C, vi-viii).

Al Anezi (1989) indicated that the first critical event in this cultural pattern stemmed from the stigmatisation of the Bedouin as the desert dweller (p.174). The prohibition of
cross-cultural communications between the two groups was described as part of customary cultural practices (al Anezi, p.175), rendering the Bedoun ‘outsiders,’ separated from the Hadar-controlled state. This cultural divide was expressed in Decree 5/1960. The Decree enabled the Nationality Committees to close off access to the various clauses in the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) according to which the Bedouin qualified for citizenship, by enabling them to choose from a list of alternative, subjective measures to justify exclusion. This practice was reflected throughout all of the government commitments to grant the Bedoun citizenship thereafter (in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, during the early 2000s and after 2010, as listed in Appendix B, iii), none of which were honoured. Commencing with distribution of citizenship in the 1960s, only half the Bedouin who registered were granted citizenship, all of the Hadar received citizenship (Human Rights Watch, 1995).

The existence of this equation used to enforce a prescribed, demographic composition on the state has always trumped all other arguments justifying why the Bedoun were not granted citizenship. The bottom line is that the proportion of the Bedouin permitted to become citizens was conjured and implemented artificially, as a sum (Human Rights Watch, 1995). The same formulaic approach was followed to remove the Bedouin from the Kuwaiti population as part of the population policy of the 1980s and 1990s, even though the state also claimed that those who had proof that their family had been counted in the 1965 census would receive citizenship (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994). It is the nature of the cultural patterning in Kuwaiti society that has made both the artificial, formula-driven demographic policies and the subjective exclusionary measures used to implement the policy, acceptable to Kuwaiti citizens.

The use of arguments that the Bedoun ‘failed’ to register (Human Rights Watch, 1995; Longva, 2005, p.175) or ‘refused to register’ for citizenship (Shultziner, and Tétreault, 2012, p.284) to explain the cause of the Bedouin’s statelessness have been used to avoid, rather than to engage with, the issue of demographic engineering – by simply blaming the Bedoun. I have never located evidence suggesting any portion of the population consciously rejected the opportunity to register for citizenship, beyond just a few anecdotal accounts according by Human Rights Watch (1995), without disclosure of the actual number of interview respondents who cited non-registration. Such claims appear to have been motivated to distract from the politics of enforcement of the demographic formula.

Ultimately, the anti-Bedouin ideology of the desert dweller can be linked to the Bedoun’s encampment and entrapment (Rabinowtiz, 2002; Redclift, 2013; Rosenfled, 2002) in the desert settlements, the process by which their citizenship grants associated with the formal settlement program (according to Zahir, 1985, p.53 in Stanton Russell, 1989, p.34) were delayed from 1965 and eventually forgotten amidst anti-Beoduin ideology. The ideology was evidence in the administrative expulsion in 1986 (‘The Study,’ 2003; see Appendix E, i) and violent ethnic cleansing and killing of around half the population from
1990 to 1995 (Human Rights Watch, 1991a; see Appendix F, i-iii). The same small Nationality Committees remain responsible for citizenship grants today.

It is difficult to know where to draw the line between social and individual responsibility for mass human rights atrocities committed against the Bedoun that increasingly appear to be a crimes against humanity, but certainly these phenomena are not aided by government-blaming approaches (Mann, 2005). The Hadar elite were described by political scientists as having dominated and controlled every aspect of the country that would engender their personal profit (Alnajjar and Selvik, 2016; Stanton Russell, 1989, p.30; Tétreault, 2000, p.156). The political rhetoric and policy plans of Hadar individuals who expressed a desire to deprive the Bedoun of citizenship, basic human rights, education and access to land, who then set about implementing those policies through the government bureaucracy with little or no regard for the consequences of the Bedoun’s statelessness, are discussed herein. Their ideas can be read in the thematic analysis in Appendix C, vi-viii. Al Anezi (1989) pointed out that just a select few individuals controlled the Nationality Committees, and that those individuals hold more power than the ‘Supreme Committee for Nationality’ charged with supervising them. Hakeem al Fadhli explained the impact of the Hadar elites on the Bedoun’s situation:

There [are] two things. They are above the government or the authorities: they are involved. The second is the family [values] themselves, the environment, or the society of the Hadar. (Hakeem al Fadhli, interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 3 August, 2015)

Ironically, Kuwaiti parliamentarian Saleh Ashour, reiterated precisely the same sentiment during parliamentary question time in the National Assembly on May, 17, 2016, on the same day that both the front page of The Kuwait Times and the Arab Times named the interviewee as a politically targeted individual, along with a headline confirming the government's finalisation of the Comoros Plan, which was later proven to be a false report (requiring Kuwait's Foreign Minister to publicly clarify the government's position, in Toumi, June 20, 2016.). MP Saleh Ashour explained,

There is a group in the country that is more powerful than the National Assembly and which does not want bedoons to be naturalized… Can the government naturalize the 32,000 bedoons whom the committee said qualify for citizenship? No, because this influential group is more powerful than the government. (Ashour quoted in Izzak, May 17, 2016)

Finally, the role of the United Kingdom in enabling the promulgation of Decree 5/1060, which would ultimately determine the make up of the citizen population of Kuwait, is salient to the Bedoun's status as an indigenous tribal people in international law. The Bedoun experienced their first permanent settlement (relinquishing nomadic and semi-nomadic ways
of life) to settle in the desert camps in return for citizenship. Decree 5/1960 was passed prior to Kuwait becoming an independent nation.

7.3.1 The role of the Nationality Law (1959) Kuwait, in keeping the Bedouin out of Kuwait.

The Bedouin had always been regarded as culturally incompatible with the Hadar due to their having occupied the territory of Kuwait beyond the city wall (al sour) (al Anezi, 1989, p.174-175). This was the basis upon which the Bedouin were regarded as ‘foreigners’ and excluded from citizenship due to their cultural differences (al Anezi, 1989, p.174-175, 272). The interpretation by the Hadar that the Bedouin who lived beyond the city wall were ‘foreign’ was then very easily transposed symbolically onto the notion they were ‘nationals’ of anywhere else, as long as they were not ‘nationals’ of Kuwait. The policy whereby government demanded the Bedoun cite a foreign nationality (that did not belong to them) on official identity documents was the ‘official’ policy in Kuwait from 1983 (al Anezi, 1989, p. 263, n132) until 2011 (Kuwait government response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.7; see also Appendix, D, i, E, v, and vii).

The policy represents the heart of the ‘status adjustment’ program, which seeks to change the identity of the Bedoun as a cultural collective. Government had pledged it would retract or rescind the policy of citing the Bedoun had another nationality on official documents issued by government, and deliver genuine human rights reforms, during the Arab Spring via Decree 409/2011 (Amnesty International, 2013; Human Rights Watch, 2014). However, external observers reported that very little had changed for the Bedoun as Decree 409/2011 reforms were never implemented in a plausible fashion (Appendix G, i). This problem was expressed in the interview findings in this study (Appendix A), which were gathered while Human Rights Watch (2014) was in the field working with community leaders. Hakeem al Fadhli explained to me in September 2014, that since the policy of imposing ‘other nationality’ on the Bedouin (the 'status adjustment' program) had been carried out to the letter since 1983, it would be naive for agencies and researchers expect that the staff at the Central Apparatus who enforced the policy, could suddenly adopt a humanitarian approach to the Bedoun on receipt of a memo announcing Decree 409/2011, after some 28 years of systematic indoctrination under the previous policy.

A traditional man explained the process of his Bedouin’s family’s permanent settlement in Kuwait, which appears to have been an equally disturbing and difficult process for the Kuwaiti Bedouin as it was for the Hadar. The Hadar lacked the willingness, though certainly not the resources, to assist the integration of the Bedouin of Kuwait’s territory despite their cultural differences.

P12: You know the Gulf area, all the open for the Arab man. And this is moving, begin my father… But you know what the system for the Arabic people, he don’t live in one area. Arabic Bedu with the camel, you know with the camel, where is that, what place the area, he live here, maybe one month,
two month here, then another, and another and another [place]. Not live in one area.

You know since this time… no cars, no… no, no [not] anything, maybe one month from the desert not come in, maybe one year, one time to pay something to his family... This is Kuwait, this is Saudia, this is Iraq. Before that, open.

At the beginning the government from the U.K., you know, the British, halas, cutting [Kuwait’s Independence]. My father, go [in the 1960s] to government work in the forces, army... 1970 and 1980 fine. I am Arabic, I am Kuwaiti, I am… Not begin the problem, after 1985 begin the problems and looks...

Are you from camel? Are you from where?

And if I want nationality, it’s near – maybe I go and come back tomorrow and I can take nationality. (Participant 12, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 1 April, 2014)

This passage continued to include the quotation at the opening of this chapter. P12 emphasised the cultural predisposition of the Bedouin as 'light,' living in the moment, lacking in formal education, unhindered by doubt in their ruler, the al Sabah. But he was also aware that Hadar were positively discriminated for grants of citizenship because they owened property in Kuwait City (he called these residents of the Kuwait Municipality, 'Mr Plan').

Al Anezi (1989, p.181) explained the role of the Nationality Committees in the implementation of the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) via Article 21 of that law, which enabled the Hadar to rely on a range of stipulations that facilitated them to grant citizenship to members of their own group, but also facilitated them in blocking citizenship grants to the Bedouin on the basis of the desert dwellers’ cultural attributes. He showed that property ownership was indeed one of the criteria which could be met for a grant of citizenship (Decree 5/1960, Article 15), but it could also be over-ridden by the Committees members if they wished, by invoking other Articles (al Anezi, 1989, p.181).

Additional clauses enabled discrimination on the basis of property ownership in particular. The stipulation could also be over-ridden by the Committee members, by invoking the (hostile) witness statement, in Article 12, for example. In the case of an individual who did own property in Kuwait City and produced a title deed sufficient for a grant of citizenship, Article 12, the witness statement, was invoked to reject the application (p.183). Alternatively, Articles 13 and 17, where the accent and physical appearance of an individual, or their name, was deemed insufficient or unsuitable to be regarded as ‘Kuwaiti’ in the opinion of the Nationality Committee, their application for citizenship could be rejected. On this basis, anyone who looked like or sounded like, or even dressed like a ‘foreigner’ – a desert dweller - could have his (and his families’) citizenship application
rejected without explanation. Only two committee members’ opinions were required for the grant to be approved or rejected.

The conditions of Article 11 were even more remarkable. Generally speaking, all other criteria listed under the relevant Articles of 1960 (including those just mentioned) could be over-ridden, as long as the Committee members were personally acquainted with the citizen applicant (Article 11). The procedures also stated that knowing a family name was sufficient to establish that such a personal relationship existed. This meant that Article 11, which ostensibly set out to require personal knowledge of an applicant, did not actually require it. All that was required was that the name of the applicant to be known by one member of the Committee, and for the member to acquire the agreement of one other Committee member, for a grant of citizenship to be awarded.

Thus, it is arguable that personal contacts were ultimately the key criteria that determined if citizenship would be granted, or not. Certainly Al Anezi (1989, p.182) seemed to believe that this was indeed the case. The focus on names is most ironic, since the Hadar have claimed the Bedouin have attempted to exploit that Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) on the basis of tribal names (Longva, 2006), when the Hadar used this as a method to facilitate their own grants of ‘original’ Kuwaiti citizenship. On the other hand, the Bedoun have been subject to a policy promoting the systematic removal of their names indicating ethnic targeting for the purpose of cultural destruction (see Chapter 6, Table 20, above).

Al Anezi (1989) emphasised the significance of Article 12 because the Explanatory Note in the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) referred to it directly, underscoring the Articles’ importance to the Nationality Committee. The Explanatory Note regarded the assessment of personal knowledge the applicant as grounds for a citizenship grant. A witness who ‘knew’ the citizenship applicant and his family was the evidence likely to be most relied upon,

Since most Kuwaiti people are known through their family-names and little doubt is likely to arise in such circumstances. Furthermore, if members of the Nationality Committees [were], themselves chosen from prominent Kuwaitis whose status had already been proved, were convinced of the nationality of the individual concerned as stated above, through their own personal knowledge of him, no further investigation would likely be needed. (al Anezi, p.182 n79)

While the researcher emphasised that, ‘No consistent criteria appear to have been adopted by the Committees in reaching their decisions’ (al Anezi, 1989, p.183, including n81), equally, this could also mean that if the Committees did not lean on the provision too much, obviously, proof residence in Kuwait was not ‘relied upon’ for ‘original’ citizenship, either.

The relevant provisions of the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) and Decree 5/1960 are listed in Table 22, below. Al Anezi (1989) did not provide a specific reference to the Explanatory Note of the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait), but Article 21 of the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) established the facility of the Nationality Committees (1989, p.277, para.

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1), while Decree 5/1960 set out the common criteria and procedures by which citizenship could be granted by the Nationality Committees, to all applicants.

7.3.2 The Hadar: citizens without documents.

The Hadar elite’s influence over policy determining nationality in general and specifically, the process of naturalisation (al Anezi, 1989, p.175, para. 2), empowered the group to ensure citizenship was received by their family, friends and those with familiar names (p.248). The procedures of the Nationality Committees also enabled a small group of Hadar elites who sat on the Committees to exclude the Bedouin on the basis of their ethnicity and indigenous status – for the fact that they were desert dwellers of Kuwait, regarded as a ‘foreign element’ (al Anezi, 1989, p.272). The Bedoun were forced to show their ‘original’ nationality although government was aware they are stateless (Kuwait government response to Human Rights Watch, 2011, p. 2-7, para. 2), due to the relentless ideology that deemed them ‘foreign’ (expressed in the demand in 1987 that they must produce foreign passports by any means, even if that means committing a criminal offence – see the ‘letters program,’
Table 22

Criteria Enabling a Citizenship Grant by the Nationality Committees (Decree 5/1960)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Relevant Articles of Decree 5/1960</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Article 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two members of the Committees’ personal knowledge of the applicant and his circumstances, ‘no further investigation was required’ (al Anezi, 1989, p.182, n78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witness statements, including hostile witnesses over-riding the authority of a title deed proving property ownership, to deny a grant of citizenship (al Anezi, 1989, p.183, para. 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accent and physical appearance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ownership of a title deed for real estate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A valid Kuwaiti passport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family name</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note This information is from al Anezi (1989), p.182-193, A Study of the Role of Nationality in International Law with Special Reference the Law and Practice of Kuwait.

Appendix E5, Table E5). The so-called ‘foreign element’ symbolised the fear of the stranger (Simmel, in Wolff, 1964; Thomas and Znaniecki, 1919) for which government attempted to impose ‘other nationality’ of the Bedoun.

What was the reason that Article 21 empowered the Nationality Committees to examine citizenship applications (al Anezi, 1989, p.279)? To facilitate grants of citizenship,

\[
\text{Owing to lack of evidence in such matters, a particular expedient was resorted to, and thus, Article 21 of the Law provides a pragmatic method for proof of settlement in Kuwait and hence of original Kuwaiti nationality. (Al Anezi, 1989, p.277, para. 1; italics added)}
\]

That is, the ‘original’ Kuwaitis were facilitated to receive ‘original’ citizenship in the first-degree (with voting rights), without the documentary proofs required in the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait), such as title deeds demonstrating their settlement in Kuwait prior to 1920, or the Kuwaiti passport (which many Bedoun military servicemen held due to their carrying out service for the country overseas, prior to them being prohibited from travelling altogether). This point cannot be over-emphasised. Al Alanezi’s (1989, p.277) explanation of the need for Decree 5/1960 Articles enabling the Nationality Committee members to grant citizenship to their personal contacts, corresponds to the description of the very reason why
the Bedoun were deprived of citizenship. The ‘original’ Hadar citizens were without documents or without papers (which was the definition of the Bedoun given by interview respondents, in Chapter 6, section 6.1.3). According to this statement, the Hadar ‘original’ citizens did not have documentary proofs of citizenship set out in the *Nationality Law 1959* (Kuwait); they were also Bedoun (without). These facts also explain the perfect record of the whole Hadar population being granted first-degree citizenship without exception. I have never located any journal article or newspaper article discussion that stated that any member of the Hadar, did not receive ‘original’ citizenship.

The focus on the subjective attributes mentioned in Decree 5/1960 remains so widespread in society today, that many Bedoun individuals assume purely social causes of discrimination, because the same themes of ethnic exclusion continue to predominate in their social interactions with others. Almost all interviewees appeared to be unaware of the provisions of Decree 5/1960, but they were highly aware of how ethnic targeting and discrimination due to their family’s supposed lack of documents (‘papers’), had harmed their lives. In the interviewee quote above, P12 seemed to possess some degree of local knowledge of the historical preference to grant citizenship to the individuals within Kuwait City who owned houses (to the exclusion of those who did not) and the tendency for those individuals to live within close proximity of each other, and the corresponding influence of personal relations on the members of the Nationality Committee’s ability to grant citizenship:

P12: I have *paper*, but I don’t have nationality. Because nationality in Kuwait, take it in nationality, all have city, all have *house*. I know you are near from me, same street, Mr Plan, Mr, Mr, Mr and finish. And if I want nationality, it’s near – maybe I go and come back tomorrow and I can take nationality, I can write my name, there is legnan [registration ledger], but where is my family? Not coming in the city, maybe come one year, one time. This is big issue for my family. (Participant 12, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 1 April, 2014; italics added)

Humanitarian organisations have consistently lamented that the *Nationality Law 1959* (Kuwait) has been applied arbitrarily. Al Aenzi’s (1989) account demonstrated the law was indeed applied arbitrarily, not in a secret or unpredictable manner, but in an official manner – it is written into Kuwaiti law, for all to read (for those who can read). The wording of Decree 5/1960 was set out intentionally, to enable arbitrary and subjective judgements to be implemented by law. The Decree allowed the Hadar to ethnically target the Bedouin for exclusion from the nation, and on the basis of their tribal identity, and to be systematically deprived of citizenship from 1960, virtually as soon as the Nationality Committees and the *Nationality Law 1959* (Kuwait), came into effect.

This may explain why the state of Kuwait has rejected criticism of its treatment of the Bedoun, as government leaders may from their perspective, be quite satisfied that the law
has been followed correctly. The problem for the Bedoun is that lack of public knowledge about these practices means that there has been no public debate (at least none that I am aware of in the academic literature in English, or human rights reports) about areas where domestic law reform might be introduced to diminish such ethnic targeting practices used against the Bedoun in Kuwaiti law. The same obstacle applies to Supreme Planning Council Resolution No. 11 of 1992, which removed the ability of the Bedoun ethnic group to receive citizenship 
\textit{en masse}, introduced by the \textit{Academic Team for Population Policy} without parliamentary discussion (see Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994). Similarly, the provision that seems to be unheard of among other researchers, even those who are fluent in Arabic. Furthermore, because these laws seem to be unknown by the general public, scholars and humanitarian organisations, the result has been that Hadar intellectual and social leaders, as well as senior government officials, have remained free to continue these practices with little or no resistance (a similar law is Emiri Decree 58/1996, which enabled the \textit{Executive Committee for Illegal Residents’ Affairs} to override the implementation of the \textit{Nationality Law 1959}, Kuwait, for any/all individual Bedoun applications that qualified a person for citizenship, also on grounds of Bedouin ethnicity. Mdaires (2010) put forward a worthwhile interpretation of this decree named in \textit{Kuwait government’s response to Human Rights Watch} (2011). Certainly it warrants further attention as a strategy of targeted, Bedouin citizen population reduction. See Appendix D, i.

This example has shown that the mechanisms by which the Hadar privileged themselves in the matter of ‘original’ citizenship and had excluded a certain proportion (half) of the desert dwellers of Kuwait from 1960 (here, I refer to the very first citizenship application period for all Kuwaitis, which involved citizenship grants throughout the 1960s). Key to this process was the power held by just a few individuals over the population makeup of the entire state of Kuwait. The discrimination of the Bedouin desert dweller was carefully considered and indeed programmed through exclusionary social actions, into Kuwaiti law. As I have also pointed out, this has included the projection onto the Bedoun the notion that they have an ‘other nationality,’ which has formed a key ideological premise of the so-called ‘status adjustment’ program used to erase the group.

These conclusions also lead to the recognition of the significance of the suppression of intellectual development and education of the Bedoun by nationalists, promulgated by Alessa (1981). Alessa (1981) openly campaigned for the deprivation of education to the Bedouin, while implementation of the policy of Bedoun naturalisation was undermined. The Bedoun were then also prohibited from studying Law. Alessa (1981, p.109) expressed a desire to intentionally prevent the Bedoun from developing the collective knowledge and political consciousness (al Naqeeb also expressed this desire, but did not target the Bedoun in particular, merely all Bedouin). After all, this would have enabled the group to pursue genuine law reform measures that could be taken to alleviate their situation, to stop their suffering, and achieve self-determination via citizenship under Kuwaiti law.
Many previous authors have drawn on al Aenzi’s (1989) work or his work in Arabic, but do not seem to have read or understood his commentary on Decree 5/1960. Curiously Aziz Abu Hamad, the associate director of Human Rights Watch who was responsible for compiling the research and writing the seminal Human Rights Watch (1995) report, wrote about the Decree according to al Anezi’s (1989) text, but overlooked its most crucial functions that al Anezi (1989) emphasised (which I set out in Table 22), the ability of the Committee members to grant ‘original’ citizenship on the basis of personal knowledge or familiarity with names, in the absence of documentary proofs. According to the accounts of Bedoun interviewees, the features mentioned in the Articles in Decree 5/1960, such as discrimination on the basis of personal appearance, clothing, accent and family name, are believed to enable individuals to discern ‘real’ Kuwaitiness in others. The belief was so deeply entrenched into Hadar society, the ideology appeared to form a continuous whole connecting social practices and government policy.

7.4 Ethnic Targeting of the Bedouin and the Origins of the Northern Tribes

The second major ideological theme arising from the interview data concerned the northern tribes distinguished from the southern tribes, and the northern tribes being subject to particularly acute stigmatisation and hate speech. The northern tribes were ethnically targeted through two main, inter-connected themes: the portrayal of the Bedoun as ‘nationals’ of other states, particularly Iraq, and the ‘status adjustment’ program, which is the administrative program that changes the Bedoun’s ethnic and national identity in order to erase the population on government records. Both aspects of the targeting had been used to implement administrative and physical ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun, since 1983 (see Appendix E). Government’s assertion that the Bedoun hold citizenship in the northern Middle Eastern states was premised on their membership of the Bedouin tribes with northern dirah. The theme was associated with broader stigmatisation of the entire Bedouin community, similar to the notion of the Bedouin as the stranger, ‘foreign elements’ (al Anezi, 1989, p.272), but with an emphasis the Bedoun as ‘foreigners’ who are ‘disloyal’ to the nation (al Alhajeri, 2004, p.16; Dashti, et al., 2014) (see Chapter 8, Table 26).

The theme objectifying the northern tribes was more specific and more harmful than the theme of the ‘desert dweller,’ because the cultural attributes were interpreted as more threatening, entailing a more extreme response. The foreign stranger had become the foreign ‘enemy,’ which could be used to justify wholesale exclusion, eradication and killing (Znaniecki, 1952a, 346-350). The theme was amplified by regional political tensions between the state of Kuwait and its neighbours during the 1980s and 1990s, with some degree of cross-fertilisation with negative ideology directed toward the Shia community (a Najjar, 2001). Incidentally, this tendency was also shown recently in hate-speech directed toward the Bedoun and Shia (Dashti et al., 2014). The theme relates to the location of the Bedouin’s tribal dirah across the Middle East, which determined the region that individuals were assumed to come from – generally speaking, the north or the south – although many
\textit{dirah} (tribal lands) stretched across countries both to the north and the south (see Appendix B, i). While the distinction may not be clear to those outside the society, it is very clear to local people, as the interviewee data illustrates below. Note that the ruling family, the al Sabah, are also from the northern tribes.

Prior to their administrative expulsion of 1986 (‘The Study,’ 2003), when the Bedouin collective was still expecting to receive citizenship en masse as part of government policy, the Bedouin population was accused of being ‘Iranian’ fifth columnists (Alnajjar, 2001). The accusation was based association with an attempted assassination of the Kuwaiti Emir in 1985. The Bedouin were accused of being Iranian, Shia terrorists, even though a Bedouin servicemen defended the Emir and lost his life in the incident (al Anezi, 1989; Alnajjar, 2001; Alhajeri, 2004). Shia terrorist attacks in Kuwait occurred at that time in relation to broader political issues characteristic of the era, which were not remotely related to the Bedouin. Then, during the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, the Bedouin population was once again made the focus of accusations of being ‘fifth column’ traitors, this time as ‘Iraqi’ nationals (Human Rights Watch, 1991a).

But a critical feature of the timing of the attribution of the Bedouin as ‘Iraqi,’ was that the propaganda reached its zenith after Kuwait was no longer in danger from Iraqi forces, and while the government had initiated the policy prior to the invasion, and had implemented it after the invasion (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1995; see Appendix F, iii). The policy consolidated and capitalized on the outcomes of ethnic cleansing of both the Bedouin and Palestinian populations (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1992, 1993, 1994). The policy was referred to as ‘population restructuring’ implemented through the National Council. Therefore, the ideology of the Bedouin as ‘Iraqi’ was not a defensive ideology that had arisen under the duress of war, but one of aggressive, nationalist expansion (Znaniecki, 1952b) that just happened to consolidate the Hadar position. The suppression of information about the Bedouin’s ethnic cleansing at this time has also helped to hide the realisation that both Palestinians and Bedouins were viewed by intellectuals of mixed races (Hadar) as Bedouins with the purest of Arab lineages. Ethnic hatred and/or racial prejudice had reversed the country’s previous tendency toward assimilative (socially integrated) expansion (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.132) of both the Bedouin and Palestinian populations in Kuwait.

The ethnic cleansing of the Bedouin (1990-1995) was promoted as a legitimate exercise of removing the ‘enemy’ after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, after Iraqi forces had been removed from Kuwait due to the intervention of Western, coalition forces. But the policy was promoted as concerning the arena of inward migration control, obscuring the identity of the Bedouin and government policy toward the group, as I discussed in Chapter 2 (I have provided a chronological analysis in Appendix F, iii). The population policy demographic measures, linked to Bedouin ethnic cleansing and killings, were initially called population ‘purification’ under 'Kuwaitization' policy (Evans, February 28, 1991; Fineman, November 8, 1992). But later, it was re-labelled as population ‘balancing’ and restructuring.

Stanton Russell appears to have been the only researcher attempting to point out that the ethnic cleansing was not only very closely linked to national policy development, but that the intervention of the so-called ‘Academic Team’ in what was normally ministerial business, produced specific, anti-Bedouin policy measures while the Bedoun were being killed and driven out of Kuwait (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1995). Crystal (1995, p. 182) cited the post-war phase as 'the new postwar demographic environment [that] gave Kuwait policy-makers an opportunity to rethink and reshape population policy.' Al Ramadhan (1995, n.p.) claimed 'this phase [was] characterized as having clearer vision and direction.' In other words, academics aided the government of Kuwait in the cover-up of the ethnic cleansing. In response to the instructions from government to ethnically cleanse the population (Evans, February 28, 1991; Fineman, November 2, 1992; Gasperini, August 20, 1991; Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1992; Wilkinson, May 20, 1991), approximately 150,000 Bedoun were eradicated (Human Rights Watch, 1995; Ghabra, 1997b based on the numbers implied by Ghabra, which put the pre-invasion population at around 300,000).

The ethnic cleansing involved methods of violence and killing (Appendix F, i), expulsion and other forms of population eradication (Appendix F, ii). Methods of eradication included shots to the head at point-blank range, beatings and starvation in prisons and torture for the purpose of obtaining confessions prior to show-trials. Others disappeared or were officially deported or otherwise ‘driven’ into Iraq; women and children were dumped in the night in mine-infested areas with no food, water or light (Amnesty International, 1992, 1994, 1996; Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1992, 1994, 1996). After the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from the country, government officials informed Bedoun inhabitants of the Abdali border camp, along with the international media, that their identity was ‘Iraqi.’ The action served as an additional strategy to drive thousands of Bedoun from the refugee camps over the border into Iraq (Cushman, June 30, 1991, July 16, 1991; Gasperini, August 20, 1991).

Other Bedoun were accused of being Iraqi, or called ‘Iraqi’ in information releases, for example, prisoners who were dumped over the border into Iraq appeared to be for all intents and purposes, Bedoun, while family members from Kuwait City who attempted to collect their Bedoun family members from the refugee camps, were prohibited from taking them home (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1992). In June, 1991, around eighty Bedoun mothers became so traumatised by the threats that they would hang, that their newborn babies died of failure to thrive syndrome (Cushman, July 16, 1991). Gasperini (August 20, 1991) revealed that there were more camps filled with Bedoun than reported; in one area, he was aware of three camps with around fifteen thousand inhabitants, whereas other reports cited just one camp, with one third of those numbers.
It was in this context that the notion of the Bedoun as ‘Iraqi nationals’ was invented as an ideology of retaliation against a hidden enemy of the state, after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990. The notion of the Bedoun as ‘Iraqi’ drew on stronger associations for both Sunni and Shia Bedoun of Bedouin tribal descent, compared to the former accusation the population was ‘Iranian,’ which limited to the targeting of any Shia Bedouin. The power of the ideological motifs lay in the layering of meanings connected to historical and cultural data. This had great symbolic value at the grassroots level among Kuwaitis, and it would be reasonable to say that the provocation of these themes would make Kuwaiti citizens fear each other, and make even members of the same Bedouin tribes fear each other, knowing that the Bedoun had become the states’ kill target (those that killed the Bedoun and Palestinian populations worked for the State Security Investigative Police under special powers, and were recruited from returned Kuwaiti citizens; see Mason, 2010; see also Appendix F, i). For example, virtually all Kuwaitis would know the northern tribes were associated with traditional tribal *dirah* in Iraq, although members of the northern tribes may have never been to Iraq, nor had any relatives in Iraq, or any other present-day connection to Iraq. On the other hand, many Kuwaiti citizens, including the well-known Hadar merchant families of mixed Bedouin-Persian/African/Asian descent (Longva, 2006), maintained active connections in Iraq. The ruling family has maintained date gardens in Iraq for hundreds of years, while many other ‘elite’ Hadar families also own land in south Iraq, due to their own Iraqi heritage linkages. This is common knowledge in Kuwait.

The connection between the states of Kuwait and Iraq had always been close and somewhat complex, threatened by land and border disputes, but united as allies in the Iran-Iraq war prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Indeed, Kuwait’s citizen population remains characterised by shared ancestry with Iraq and Iran, across all levels of Kuwaiti society (al Nakib, 2014). But the targeting of the northern tribes was more specific, due to the war. The Bedoun members of the military services were wrongly blamed for the invasion (see Alhajeri, 2004). The members of the Kuwaiti armed forces at entry-level were Bedouin of the northern tribes, mainly Bedoun but also some Kuwaiti citizens (Alhajeri, 2004). The Bedoun members of the northern tribes comprised the majority of the military personnel. The accusation that the Bedoun were ‘Iraqi’ was reinforced by accusing Bedoun civilians also, of being ‘Iraqi’ (that is, not merely collaborating with, but having Iraqi identity) such as refugees at Abdali, who were mainly civilian Bedouns (Cushman, June 30, 1991, July 16, 1991; Gasperini, August 20, 1991).

Any link between Bedoun ‘collaborators’ and Iraqi forces were so tenuous, that no organized form of collaboration was ever established (Human Rights Watch, 1995), and yet instructions to ‘cleanse,’ ‘cleanup’ and ‘purify’ the population (Evans, February 28, 1991; Human Rights Watch, 1991a) were issued on this basis. Furthermore, those who served in the police or armed forces were qualified to receive citizenship due to their service to the nation, in Article 4, paragraph 4 of the *Nationality Law 1959* (Kuwait) (Appendix B, vi).
Military and police occupations were explicitly cited in the explanatory note attached to the legislation (al Anezi, 1989, p.193). Military servicemen were also entitled to receive citizenship under the Constitution of Kuwait, (1922/1962), Article 25 (Appendix B, v).

7.4.1 Iraq is ‘stealing’ our identity – the ideological justification for ethnic cleansing (1990-1995).

The ideology that the Bedoun were from the northern tribes and were therefore ‘Iraqi,’ appears to have been deployed not only to justify ethnic cleansing, but actually to incite and expedite the process by assigning guilt to the targeted Bedoun. Similar (but not identical) strategies for allotting guilt to the Palestinian population, to expedite their exit from Kuwait, were also used (Mason, 2010). The Bedoun military servicemen were subject to prohibitive rules (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.335) during the invasion, prior to their expulsion from the military that also led to wrongful blame of the Bedoun.

The Bedoun military servicemen were prevented from taking defensive action during the invasion due to lack of military instruction as a prohibitory rule in military law. There were various reports of Bedoun men attempting to take action to resist the invasion (Human Rights Watch, 1995; Levins, 1995). However, these attempts did not amount to a groundswell of resistance because there was no order for action, no instructions given to the Bedoun soldiers to tell them how to respond, and no organisation of the troops.

The reason that the military stayed in ‘stand down’ mode at the outset of the invasion was that they were abandoned by their commanding officers who fled the country, while they stood at their posts without military orders (Alhajeri, 2004, p.92). The senior-most officers who fled Kuwait (Alhajeri, 2004) were Kuwaiti citizens from the ruling elite, many trained at the prestigious British military academy, Sandhurst (al Fayez, 1984, p.252).

A second prohibitory rule was then issued to Bedoun military servicemen and others, in October 1990. The military resistance, in whatever form it comprised, was instructed to cease its activities via a broadcast to the population inside the country, from the Minister for Information (Levins, 1995). The Bedoun military servicemen were then blamed for not preventing or halting Iraqi forces from invading Kuwait, and were dismissed from the services en masse prior to liberation – in the midst of the occupation (Alhajeri, 2004, p.94). Thus, the ideology was expanded to draw in a range of themes of ‘othering’ such as ‘disloyalty,’ being a ‘traitor,’ ‘collaborator/fifth columnist,’ ‘national security threat’ and so on, while the themes of ‘disloyalty’ and the ‘undeserving’ citizen were also inflated through tribalism theory in reference to the desert dweller of Kuwait (I discuss this phenomenon below, in the context of ‘Desertization.’)

The ideology of Iraqi ‘stealing’ Kuwaiti identity emerged on September 28, 1990, just days or weeks prior to the announcement of October 1990, advising any Bedoun military servicemen to stop resisting the invasion. The ideology was revealed by Wines (1990), writing for The New York Times, in the headline: Confrontation in the Gulf: Iraq Seen Looting Kuwait of Identity. The story claimed, ‘Iraq has embarked on a systematic
effort to strip the nation of its very identity.’ The headline was issued around nine weeks after the invasion, prior to the Jeddah Conference (where Kuwaitsis rallied in support of the Emir), within just a few days of the Free Kuwait movement conducting their first panel discussions (al Younis, 2012) and after they had hired the Hill and Knowlton public relations firm to publicize information on the invasion to persuade Congress to send American military forces intervene in the conflict (‘Deception on Capitol Hill,’ 1992; Doorley and Garcia, 2015, p.66; MacArthur, 1994; Secunda and Moran, 2007, p.134). Coalition forces did not enter Kuwait until January 16, 1991, while instructions to ‘cleanse’ the enemy, or those working for it (‘fifth columnists’), were issued in April 1991, after the coalition had removed all Iraqi forces (Human Rights Watch, 1992).

While Wines (1990) account may have been a plausible interpretation of the events that took place in the country during its occupation by Iraqi forces, its relevance to the program of Bedoun eradication, and the ideology that it was founded upon, is virtually undeniable. After all, the idea expressed in a nutshell, the basic principles upon which ethnic cleansing of some 150,000 Bedoun took place (under the observation of U.S. and Coalition military forces, see Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1992), as well as the thinking behind the ‘status adjustment’ program first implemented in 1983. Political actors may influence collective attitudes using mass communications, public policies and nationalistic fervor. Decision makers, be they government or a ruling elite, may influence political behavior using techniques of social engineering. Such practices were honed by Western nations during the world wars. Methods may include directing hatred against definite targets, reinforcing or aggressively targeting selected national, ethnic or sub-ethnic levels of identity (Gross, 1978, p.162-163).

The sequence of events demonstrated a logical system of ideas: first, the idea of the Iraqis stealing Kuwaiti identity was issued in the media (Wines, 1990), then the Bedoun military were told to stop their resistance efforts (Levins, 1995), military and civilian Bedoun were then accused of being Iraqi (Alhajeri, 2004; Human Rights Watch, 1995), and finally instructions to cleanse the population - using a variety of metaphors - were issued (Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1992). Significantly, this included the Minister of Information suggesting the ‘cleanup’ of traitors should be completed prior to the National Assembly being reinstated (Evans, February 28, 1991), which in turn, was connected to the ‘population restructuring’ policy pushed through National Council. (I constructed a detailed timeline of this sequence of events in Appendix F, iii).

Prior to the reinstatement of the National Assembly, legislation was rushed through the National Council to shift the Bedoun from the ‘Kuwaiti’ to the ‘non-Kuwaiti, other Arab’ section of the national census (see Appendix D, iv), along with the prohibition on any further collective grants of citizenship to the Bedouin (Supreme Council Resolution No.11, 1992) (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994). The links between the prohibitory rules (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.335) on the Bedoun, the blame allocated to them for the war, the
incitement of ethnic cleansing and ‘de-nationalisation’ of the Bedoun (Human Rights Watch, 1995), show remarkable consistency with the broader ideological motif of the Bedoun of the northern tribes (many of whom were military soldiers) having ‘Iraqi identity’ (as expressed in the headline by Wines, 1990), while the dual policy objective of eradicating the Palestinian population ran alongside it (ostensibly the Shia element), at virtually every step (Amnesty International, 1992, 1994; Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1992). The analysis of interview data in this study, and the quality of information provided by Bedoun respondents, demonstrates the enduring impact of the theme of the northern tribes.

The ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun was concealed and legitimised further, under the new national ‘population policy’ introduced prior to the resumption of the National Assembly, by the Academic Team for Population Policy, the National Council and the Supreme Planning Council while the ethnic cleansing was still taking place. The official discourse of population policy seems to have been designed to consolidate the outcomes of the ethnic cleansing as a ‘migration policy,’ through the introduction of the ethnic ban on Bedouins receiving citizenship. The discourse on immigration in to the state was used to cover up and at times to justify, the forcing of populations, principally the Bedoun and Palestinians, out of the state. As I have mentioned, scholars helped to further legitimise the ethnic cleansing based on the Bedoun being ‘Iraqi’ and/or criminal, other nationals who had infiltrated Kuwait, in the ensuing years.

Additionally, violence was reported to have escalated throughout 1992 (Brown, 1997), after Kuwaiti citizens had returned to the country. However, those who inflicted violence against the Bedoun and Palestinian targets, as well as indiscriminately upon other Arab and African expatriate nations in Kuwait, were not attacked by mere ‘vigilantes.’ Brown (1997) downplayed the joint role of the State Security Court, State Security Police and State prosecutors managing key aspects of the violence, as reported by Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1992). The resistance effort, which formed a second, distinct group, were described differently in media sources compared to the first resistance group. The first group appear to have been a genuine, self-organised civilian force. The second group carried out the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians (Mason, 2010) and also the Bedoun (Human Rights Watch, 1991, 1992). The second group was placed under the orders of Kuwaiti authorities, but many individuals appear to have been initially recruited by the CIA in the United States. The group became active after Kuwaiti citizens had returned to the country and were available to carry out the organised, state-sanctioned retaliatory violence (Mason, 2010).

Young, Kuwaiti Hadar males at university overseas were trained by the CIA to pursue and ‘identify’ ‘Iraqis’ (Chen and Lamb, 1990; Fialka, 1991), remembering that the Bedoun were accused of having ‘Iraqi’ identity as a matter of public policy, at the same time. Thousands of weapons and rounds of ammunition were left behind by coalition forces for civilians to access (Drogin, March 18, 1991; Hedges, August 2, 1991). It is likely this group has since ascended to power (see Appendix Fi). The sources cited indicated that the second
resistance group were recruited specifically to hunt down and enact retributive violence upon Palestinians and Bedouin. Note that my analysis (Appendix Fi, ii) indicated that the Bedouin were targeted more intensively and had less opportunity to escape, and received substantially less external assistance from the United Nations, humanitarian organisations and others, compared to the Palestinian population. The possible links between this group of young, educated, Hadar elite residing in the United States trained by the CIA, with the intellectual elite who advised government to ‘restructure’ the Bedouin population (the so-called ‘Academic Team’) and intellectuals involved in misleading the US Congress at this time, warrants further research.

As I mentioned above, some years after the war, Ghabra (1997a, 1997b) became a key propagandist in this effort. The scholar carefully combined both the themes of the undesirable, uncivilized ‘desert dweller’ that polluted urban culture, together with the ideology of the northern tribes’ as ‘traitor,’ clearly implied the Bedouin were ‘Iraqi’ traitors (Ghabra, 1997b), as part of a historical accounting of this violent period of Kuwait’s history. Ghabra (1997a, 1997b) cleverly combined the dual motifs, stigmatising the Bedouin as desert dwellers and the Bedouin as members of the northern tribes, in his concept, ‘desertization.’ I refer to this concept as an example of the tribal stigma (Goffman, 1963, p. 4) realised quite literally (see Table 21).

But Ghabra (1997a, 1997b) was not alone in his approach - his propaganda was part of a broader milieu of anti-Bedouin sentiment expressed in Kuwait studies in the 1990s. Crystal (2005, p.177) quoted an obscure reference to wrecklessly claim the Bedouin were a proxy army of Iraq, years after information disputing such flawed accounts was available to her. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, many Western scholars simply repeated the same ideology inscribed in government policy, portraying the Bedouin as ‘Iraqi’ national, criminal infiltrators in ethnographic narratives. Their first accounts of the Bedouin identity were either incorrectly referenced (Crystal, 1992) or unreferenced (Longva, 1997), and later, significantly downplayed or outright ignored, the mass human rights atrocities inflicted on the Bedouin (Crystal, 1995, 2005; Longva, 2005) that were known to have been carried out under the instructions of the invading Iraqi authorities, and then the returning Kuwaiti authorities (Amnesty International, 1992, 1994; Human Rights Watch, 1991a, 1992, 1993, 1994). The sheer physical impact of ethnic targeting of the Bedouin at this time is likely to have influenced the order of cultural patterning of social interactions between the Hadar, Bedouin citizens and the Bedouin ever since.

The exploitation of the ideology of the Bedouin as ‘Iraqi’ because they were members of the northern tribes, is indicative of political models where defensive consolidation is provoked among the dominant social group in order to drive out a weaker group. Ideologists attempt to destroy the weaker group due to existing ethnic hatred or racial prejudices (Znaniecki, 1952b). A Bedouin woman in her thirties explained her perspective on
the ideology, which she knew from her own experience, denies her right to her own identity due to social causes:

P17: I have the right to be different. I don’t have to, we don’t all have to, look similar like copies, and repeating the same lies… I don’t have to lie about my background or my religion or my beliefs or my thoughts… I have the right to have my own things and you have the right to argue, to discuss this with me. You can [be] convince[d by] it, you can disagree with it, but you can’t force me to deny my identity. (Participant 17, interview in Al Rai, Kuwait, 11 April 2014)

The passage illustrated the familiarity of the Bedoun with the ideology that sought to eradicate their identity and self-expression, such that it had become a familiar object of personal reflection, analysis and rationalisation.

Nationalist ideology interfered with the functional, assimilative expansion (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.132) of the Bedoun in Kuwaiti society. Znaniecki (1952b) pointed out the danger to targeted groups living among a dominant group undergoing defensive consolidation. The target group may become vulnerable to retaliatory action if they attempt to defend themselves (p.99). It is not unusual for indigenous groups and/or minorities to be accused of being associated with ethnic groups in neighbouring states and expelled en masse by states in the aftermath of war with those neighbouring states (Bell-Fialkoff, 1999; Mann, 2005). However, the administrative expulsion just a few years prior to the war, and the accusation the whole group were ‘Iranian’ fifth columnists prior to being accused of being ‘Iraqi’ fifth columnists, revealed the nature of the broader program to eradicate the Bedoun, of which the expulsion was merely one component part of a larger, ideological system (Gross, 1978, p.7; Wimmer, 2002, p.222; Znaniecki, 1952a, p.355).

7.4.2 The ‘status adjustment’ program – imposing any ‘other nationality’ but Kuwaiti.

As I have mentioned, the Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program began to enforce ethnic change on the Bedoun from 1983 (see 6.1.2.5 The ‘Bedoun Bedoun’ – erased identity). Initially, the policy was implemented in relative secrecy (al Anezi, 1989, p.263, n132) in order to prevent the general public and international authorities, from realising that administrative erasure was in progress. Thus, the ‘status adjustment’ program had begun to change the identity of the Bedoun to a variety of nationality labels during and after public debates over Law 100/1980 and Law130/1986, some years before the government articulated (as far as I am aware) the notion that the Bedoun were citizens of other countries, but certainly after notable Hadar had open accused Bedouin citizens of having dual nationality. The invasion of Iraq was then used to legitimize ‘adjustment’ of Kuwait’s population (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994), and thus major population shifts and anti-Bedouin legislation that had introduced prior to the invasion, were rapidly expanded during and
Immediately after the invasion (Appendix F, iii), quietly ignored by the international community.

The program involved the collection of fraudulent nationality documentation from Bedoun individuals, which were then held by government in each individual's so-called 'security files.' Programs involved fraudulent passports from a variety of nations and affidavit declarations signed under coercion or force (Human Rights Watch, 2000, 2001; WikiLeaks U.S. Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, November 26, 2006). The Ministry of Interior collected these documents as 'proof' of the Bedoun's 'other nationality.'

Government bureaucrats began recording the Bedoun under false nationality labels on drivers' licences and identity cards from 1983, starting with military personnel and then all males requiring a licence (al Anezi, 1989, p263, n132). Some time later, the Ministry of Interior sent letters to all Bedoun government employees instructing them to supply 'foreign' passports of any kind - as long as they were not Kuwaiti - to the Ministry of Interior (al Anezi, 1989, p.266-267, n151, 152). Another part of the program was developed within the Ministry of Defence, which involved thousands of Bedoun servicemen, who were forced to sign affidavits claiming they were nationals of another countries (al Waqayan, 2009; Beaugrand, 2010) (see Appendix E, v, vi). They had previously held Kuwaiti national passports, issued to them because they performed their military roles in Kuwait and overseas. This approach was then 'ramped up' after the war, as part of government's process of expelling the Bedoun military and police forces.

In the previous chapter, I discussed the role of the 'status adjustment' program in the collective ethnic and national identity of the Bedoun. The program had led to the proliferation of a new sub-group of people with erased identity, called the Bedoun Bedoun (section 6.1.2.5). These methods attempted to accumulatively cause the 'disappearance' of the Bedoun's Kuwaiti identity on government records, via the use of a variety of different names for the whole group (Appendix C, i), as well as by changing individual's family and tribal names (Table 20). I analysed the names against Professor al Waqayan’s (2009) developmental stages of Bedoun policy, which demonstrated how criminalisation was imposed through prohibitive rules and sanctions (Znaniecki, 1952a) in discrete stages (Appendix C i, ii). Criminalization was imposed not through identification of actual transgressions, but via simple labelling that transformed the Bedoun's collective identity into a transgression. The named ‘Bedoun’ was prohibited; the group were labelled ‘illegal residents.’ Later, the group were assigned ‘other nationality’ on their identity documents and government files, in order to logically justify their status as 'illegal residents.'

After the Arab Spring (2011-2012), the program expanded into a formal system of identity typing, which sorted the population into four categories of criminal types referred to as four different colours, formalising the programmed allocation ‘other nationality’ labels that had been in place since 1983 (Appendix C, iii, iv, v; Appendix E, v, vi). The policy and practices enabled population re-allocation on the National Census from ‘other Arab –
unknown’ (Appendix D, iii) to other Arab – known (i.e. placement under individual, foreign citizen counts). I have not been able to establish whether the group is then actually redistributed on the National Census or are simply deleted from the Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program as ‘closed’ files (see Appendix G, iii). Nevertheless, these policy developments alone are compatible with frameworks of population elimination (such as Stanton, 2004).

The procedure whereby the Apparatus and other government departments coordinated to pre-fill government-issued identity documents with the Bedoun’s ‘nationality’, was described by the Ministry of Interior in its correspondence with Human Rights Watch (2011):

The Central System, based on investigations and research, supplies the Ministry of Health (in the case of birth and death certificates) and the Ministry of Justice (in the case of marriage and divorce certificates) with an indication of the citizenship of the concerned parties. This information is recorded in the official documents being requested. The statement of citizenship is essential on these documents and it must be supplied before they are issued. However, realistically, some individuals of this class refrain from collecting their documents as they object to the statement of citizenship found in them. The reality of the matter is that the denial comes from this class, not from the Kuwait government. (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011)

The ‘statement of citizenship’ refers to the parts on the forms which ask for the applicant to list their citizenship or nationality. The ‘indication of citizenship’ is not proof of citizenship, or a confirmation from another government’s offices. The research conducted by the Apparatus appears to be largely internal (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011), and its constant pressure on the Bedoun to procure false documentary evidence in the form of affidavits stating the signees had relinquished their citizenship rights as well as openly demanding the Bedoun acquire and submit to the Apparatus fake passports, to justify corresponding allocation of the country of the passport on registration certificates (for birth, death, marriage or divorce), attest to the fact that the ‘statement of nationality’ was a false declaration. The Ministry of the Interior’s procurement of fake passports has been a role relished by Sheikh Mazen al Jarrah in particular (see Appendix G, iii).

One of the most striking features of these actions by the government of Kuwait is that they have been rarely discussed in detail at the international level, although the practice has been frequently discussed in the Kuwaiti news media since 2012, particularly in relation to the Comoros Plan from 2014 (Sloan, November 11, 2014). The Bedoun are saturated with a steady, relentless stream of slogans by the Ministry of the Interior in Kuwait’s daily newspapers, to adjust their status, regularize their status, admit their status, or reveal their status. The newspapers have also fed progressive totals of the number of individuals who had adjusted their status from KUNA, the Kuwait government’s newsagency, to the population. The Comoros Plan has received a great deal of press, not only regarding
resistance – a message that reached Western media cycle – but also many stories in which
government authorities staked out the development of the program, as if to convince the
Bedoun in advance, that mass identity erasure is a foregone conclusion.

According to interviewees who conveyed the accounts of their fathers, the affidavit
program was implemented within a year or two after the Iraq war, after the most violent
phase of ethnic cleansing had receded. The affidavit program required the Bedoun to sign
affidavits declaring their nationality was not Kuwaiti (Human Rights Watch, 2000, 2001). It
was also premised on the basis that individuals would submit to having their identity erased
on government records and would be given a new identity to replace their ethnic identity as
well as national identity. This phase of the program was organised as a citizenship
'registration' opportunity for all Bedoun, which was mixed with the official threat of mass
deporation for those who did not qualify for citizenship according to the Ministry of the
Interior (Human Rights Watch, 2001).

It is clear that the Bedoun did not initiate the supply of fraudulent identity
documents, but were forced by government to supply them, preferably to match the
nationality they had determined belonged to the Bedoun individual. The impact of the 1986
administrative expulsion and later government measures after the withdrawal of Iraqi forces
from Kuwait (state-sanctioned ethnic cleansing) provided circumstances which made the
Bedoun population easy to 'manage.' Not only were the Bedoun led into conditions in which
male heads of household would relinquish their whole family's identity due to the pressures
of homelessness, hunger and unemployment related to the administrative expulsion and
postwar conditions (in return for meagre and humiliating handouts), but also the threat of
death, heinous violence and extreme conditions of cruelty meted out by authorities, during
the years of ethnic cleansing (1990-1995).

The Ministry of Interior seems to have perceived this strategy as enabling the state to
actually blame the Bedoun for the state’s practice of administrative erasure, used to eradicate
the population (WikiLeaks U.S. Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, November 26, 2006). In
fact, General al Mazen al Jarrah al Sabah recently affirmed his evaluation of the legitimacy
of the program, specifically the element of fake passports, which he encouraged the Bedoun
to hurry up and replace with new, fraudulent passports after the five-year expiry date had
passed ('Bedouns to Get,’ 2015). The instructions were issued because many Bedoun
initially coerced or forced into submitting the fraudulent documents to the Ministry of the
Interior, had since become aware of the true nature of the program and therefore, had not
purchased replacement documents after the date on the first fraudulent passport they
acquired, had run out. Two sisters in their thirties described their experience of having their
identities officially erased by ‘status adjustment’ due to their father’s coercion by Central
Apparatus authorities, to submit to the program. The first young woman was overcome with
sadness in describing her seclusion from society:
P10: Its like you are a normal person. You live in this country, you love this country. But the government and some people… its like a demon. It’s really like a demon. You don’t want to interact with them about this situation. You feel you are Kuwaiti and you have the right to say you are Kuwaiti, even though the paper, the document… it says not, but you feel it. You are born in this country. It’s so emotional… like you do something wrong. I am stigmatised… I hate it. (Participant 10, interview in al Rai, Kuwait, 28 March, 2014)

Her sister, who carried the burden of financially supporting the whole family, was somewhat more resilient because she was tied to her social role through professional work and academic activities. She felt ashamed of being abused by others, as it reflected the low standard of society’s behaviour toward the Bedoun:

P11: It’s different for me because… if anyone asks me about my nationality, I answer ‘I am Kuwaiti.’ It’s different for me. Because no one has the right to take this, to take this from me. It’s no one’s right. So for me… I have feelings of shame of not being Kuwaiti because people, they treat me this way. (Participant 11, interview in al Rai, Kuwait, 28 March, 2014)

The fake documents demanded by the Minsitry of Interior for ‘status adjustment’ were either organised directly by bureaucratic staff, or by agents to whom the Bedoun were referred to by government authorities at the offices of the Central Apparatus (WikiLeaks U.S. Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, November 26, 2006). The impact of this fraudulent document industry in Kuwait on international document and migration flows, for which Kuwait’s Ministry of Interior is responsible (see also al Waqayan in interview with Beaugrand, 2010, and Abrahamian, 2015), is worth considering. Affluent citizens and other nationals in Kuwait who can more readily access and use these documents due to their comparatively greater mobility and affluence than the Bedoun.

The most common nationalities related to the transnational tribal dirah in the Middle East. The nationalities all happened to be the areas of the traditional dirah of ‘northern tribes’ – covering tribal lands of the Middle East but omitting parts of Saudi Arabia and Yemen to the south, in relation to Kuwait’s geographical location. The countries in which these areas of land were located were emphasised as the Bedoun’s ‘original nationality’ by the Supreme Planning Council working with the special Academic Team for Population Policy. The ‘academic team’ comprised Hadar intellectuals from the ‘elite’ families, including those with both Kuwaiti nationalist and Arab nationalist interests, including Abdullah al Ghonaim and Shamlan Alessa (al Ramadhan, 1995).

The contribution of intellectual leaders is a necessary component of the development of new ideologies. These individuals design the systems of ideas that are then disseminated by professional propagandists until they are absorbed by the general population (Znaniecki, 1952b). The Academic Team for Population Policy held considerable influence over the National Council (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1995) during the ethnic
cleansing of the Bedoun and Palestinian populations involving hundreds of thousands of people. The development of the population policy by the Academic Team coincided with scripted ethnic cleansing propaganda issued by government authorities (see Appendix F, iii). The possibility that the ‘status adjustment’ program, the 1986 administrative expulsion measures and the ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun and Palestinians were all policies designed by the Academic Team for Population Policy seems quite possible. This area of anti-Bedouin policy and Bedoun targeting warrants further investigation in connection with the overall population reduction of the Bedoun during last twenty-five years, as it appears that the policy was integral to the implementation of state crimes against the Bedoun.

7.4.3 The ideology of the northern tribes 'enemy' - everyday social encounters.

The findings of this study showed that ethnic targeting was linked to the ideological motifs of the desert dweller and the northern tribes’ Bedouin, although further research would be required to demonstrate to what degree the ideology has been adopted by the general population. A female interviewee in her thirties explained the how preoccupation with the northern tribes was experienced in social encounters,

P17: Because Bedoun must become from the tribal, still they coming to look at itself, look to itself as modern people and tribal people, like Bedouin people and civilised people.

And even the Bedu people they look which country, you are from this country, from the north or the south? And, if you are from the north, from which part?

… you are from the north, problem… they look to distinguish the Bedu, and then to distinguish you to the north. Then they relate it to your religious background… this is a problem. (Participant 17, interview in Al Rai, Kuwait, 11 April 2014)

She described the impact of this criminalising form of marginalisation on the Bedoun as leading to lack of disclosure of identity in public, which accounted for the seclusion from society of many Bedoun, due to their feelings of stigmatisation. She explained the process she and others had experienced in interactions with the Hadar, who attempted to confirm whether or not they were from the northern tribes, through the individual’s accent or appearance. In turn, the impact on the Bedoun was for them to avoid social interactions altogether:

P17: I know because some people that try to hide this from others, they are pretending they are from different backgrounds… or from a different sect. They avoid going into situations that will deal with this thing. Because they feel maybe they will deal with them in a different way. They think like you, maybe you are from this background, maybe you don’t believe in God. Or if you are from the north you are not Kuwaiti, or there is nothing that makes you
look like Kuwaiti. They will look at you… like you don’t have the full right because you have the north background, your roots are from the north.

So they… look to people with this conflict based on background.

(Participant 17, interview in Al Rai, Kuwait, 11 April 2014)

A member of a different northern tribe explained that accent and dialect remain extremely important markers of identity in Kuwaiti society, thought they were known by the Bedoun to be unreliable markers of identity:

P05: I have many friends who speak different dialects. Nobody can deny this, that we don’t speak the same.

SK: So it there a different dialect for each tribe? Is that how it works?

P05: No, no I wouldn’t say for each tribe. The southern tribes use the same dialect. The northern tribes use another same dialect.

SK: People of the sea, who live by the sea [as he had referred to them] use a different dialect?

P05: Yeah, yeah.

SK: You mean the Hadar, the people by the sea?

P05: Yes.

SK: They have their own? The Bedu, the ones who lived further out, they have their own?

P05: Yeah. Ah, even in the Badu there are different dialects but they are not that different from each other…

SK: So they are similar but just slightly changed among families?

P05: Yes. (P05, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, March 15, 2015)

The interviewee linked the accusations of the Bedoun as ‘Iraqi’ nationals and wartime sympathisers with belonging to the northern tribes and northern tribes dialect (discussed above):

P05: Hadar always make comment, ‘Your language is Iraqi.’ It is not. It is not, it is just prejudice. It’s nothing wrong with the Iraq language, but they say this specifically about the language to discriminate against us.

When some Kuwaitis make these comments I think he is trying to prove from this comment that this person is not Kuwaiti he is Iraqi [and] he should not speak this way.
I have some friends who speak Kuwaiti dialect better than the Kuwaiti themselves. (Participant 05, Interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 15 March, 2014)

The ideology appeared to have been absorbed in a very general way, across all sections of society, reinforced in the academic literature by scholars who later synthesized aspects of this propaganda into their writings about the Bedoun (see Chapter 2). Tensions between the northern and southern tribes over their own origins, were influenced by this ideology. Some interviewees explained that the attribution of the northern tribes was projected onto Bedouin individuals, regardless of whether or not such individuals were actually derived from the northern tribal groups, looked, or sounded like a Bedoun (P05, P13, P19). The absorption of the ideology of the northern tribes associated with the ‘enemy’ even by some citizens of the southern tribes, was explained succinctly:

P05: Because here you have the problem. If you are Bedoun from the Northern tribes, if you talk to the Kuwaitis from southern tribes, he will say, you know, ‘Maybe he is Iraqi.’ (Participant 05, Interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 15 March, 2014)

The subjective nature of these markers goes without saying. Another example is the use of a stigmatising term for the northern tribes, the moaidi. Participant 19 introduced the term to me, in December 2015. The association was quite different to the war-related issues, but it still focused on the northern tribes and the area of Iraq nearby to Kuwait, around Basra, and a tribe with which many Bedoun are affiliated, the D’afiri. The example shows the way in which the ideology is informed by all manner of ideas that can be connected to the key, basic concepts through a network of local meanings that are known to insiders in the culture, while outsiders may not recognize them until the connections are explicitly drawn.

The Moaidi refers to village-dwelling tribes, or the Marsh tribes (also known as the riverine tribes) (Ingham 1986), who lived in southern Iraq. The D’afiri tribe were known to spend some part of their nomad route along rivers in Iraq where they watered their stock, then made their way to the grassland steppe and desert of the Gulf (Ingham 1986). Ingham (1986, p.1) found some relationship between the dialects spoken between the riverine Bedouin and the D’afiri. According to the interviewee (P19), this term was used in Kuwait to stigmatise the accent of particular northern tribes. The participant who described this motif was a member of the D’afiri tribes himself, but he was unaware that Ingham (1986) had referred to his own tribal background in connection with the example he provided to me. The term moaidi is socially powerful because it refers to a tribal group that was not regarded as transnational or desert-dwelling, unlike the tribes of Kuwait, but was regarded a tribe isolated in Iraq, with which the D’afiri mixed. It also disparages the pride of the desert-dwelling Bedouin in their heritage (Badiat al Kuwayt, the ‘desert dwellers’ of Kuwait), by implying they lived permanently on or near the water rather than in the desert.

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In this instance, the demeaning meanings of ‘desertization’ (Ghabra, 1997a, p.61, 612, n20, 1997b, p.366-267; Tétreault, 2001, p.205, 208, 210, 214, 216; 2003, p.228) and ‘desert dwellers’ deployed by ‘elite’ Hadar merchant representative Walid Gharabally (‘Mussalam al-Barrack,’ 2015) were inverted. The Bedouin are ridiculed for not being from the desert, yet not ‘urbanised’ enough via their location in villages, to be acceptable (the attraction of the term ‘urbanite’ to Hadar scholars comes to mind). Instead, the moaidi is too close to the river lands, representing the semi-nomadic phase between nomadism and urbanisation. Generally speaking, the Bedouin vernacular, is perceived to be equivalent to ‘Iraqi’ or even ‘you are only Iraqi,’ because in the Kuwaiti context, the term conveniently imagines Bedouin ancestry exclusive to tribal ground in Iraq only, and not in Saudi Arabia or any the other countries over which the tribe’s dirah was spread.

Through this meaning, the exclusive association with the northern tribal dirah is invoked, with equivalence to ‘northern tribes’ or ‘only the northern tribes’ (Participant 19, interview, 29 February, 2016), further reinforcing the idea that all Bedouin are, even today, ‘Iraqi.’ The theme of defence against a common enemy (Znaniecki, 1952b) is a form of nationalist propaganda that promotes the dominant group as superior (p.88), ‘good,’ ‘true,’ and always ‘right’ (p.97). Defensive solidarity stimulates ordinary people to fear outsiders and adopt increasingly conservative values and attitudes in response, which in turns strengthens group solidarity and notions of superiority (Znaniecki, 1952a). These characteristics of social reinforcement may help those who abuse the Bedouin to feel justified, because they are able to rationalise their abuse within the logic of their own values, which conform to ideological foundations of the conservatively organised cultural system. 7.5 The significance of the concept of northern and southern tribes

In Chapter 6, I theorised the multiple identifications of the Bedouin according to the ethnic theory of Felix Gross (1978), which encompassed the Kuwaiti national identity (section 6.1.2.1), the Bedouin identity (6.1.2.2), the northern and southern tribal identity (6.1.2.3), the Bedouin identity and the Bedouin Bedouin (erased) identity (6.1.2.5). I indicated that certain scholarly work discussed the southern tribes in contrast to the northern tribes, some times explicitly, and sometimes implicitly. For example, as I have mentioned, Longva (2006) omitted the Bedouin altogether in her article Nationalism in pre-modern guise: The discourse on Hadar and Badu in Kuwait, while conveying a rather implicit representation of the Bedouin of the southern tribes: ‘the term badu designates a specific group of newcomers: these are immigrants, mostly from Saudi Arabia... they moved to Kuwait between 1960 and 1980.’ The general Hadar narrative typically portrays the deserts of Kuwait prior to 1920 (the cut off date for settlement in the Nationality Law, 1959) as terra nullius, or almost terra nullius in an attempt to exalt the mythological ‘city state’ (al Naqeeb, 1990; al Nakib, F., 2010, 2013) of those who lived behind the old city wall (the Hadar enclave) to mystical proportions. The motif is a well known symbol of nationalist ideology (Smith, 1986, 1991; Znaniecki, 1952a, 1952b). Clearly, this account does not sufficiently convey the complexity
of the tribal origins of the Hadar themselves, and their subsequent ethnic differentiation, details which Hakeem al Fadhli emphasised in his interviews with me (see Chapter 8). Other authors have traced the history of the Bedouin ‘arrivals' in Kuwait from the 1930s and 1940s (Asmar, 1990; Hill, 1969) but they did not discuss the northern-southern groups. Beaugrand (2010), discussed the northern tribes, but she failed to connect the significance of both the northern and southern tribes’ identity to Hadar nationalist ideology and aggression.

In Kuwaiti scholarly literature (most of it unpublished), descriptions of the southern tribes involved their taking up employment in Kuwait Oil Company, along with the northern tribes being brought to Kuwait by sheiks on behalf of government, and selected by government committee to join the military and police (al Fayez, 1984; Alhajeri, 2004). The difference between the two was not entirely clear, as some members of the southern tribes also appeared to join the public service (al Haddad, 1981). Members of the northern tribes were later moved to Taima and Sulabiya with citizens, and given contracts stating they were the owners of their houses, confirming their access to citizenship rights (al Zaher, 1990). Some of this group received citizenship, but it appears that the vast majority did not (al Moosa, 1976; al Zaher, 1990). Bedouin who lived at al Magwa (near Kuwait Oil Company) received citizenship at a higher rate than those at al Jahra, but still the majority appeared to be systematically deprived of nationality (al Moosa, 1976). On balance, it appears more likely that the majority of the Bedouin comprised members of the northern tribes, or at least one group in particular: the group of around 35,000 identified as qualified to receive citizenship in 1992 who are now designated as ‘green’ by the Central Apparatus (‘Color ID Cards,’ 2012; Saleh, May 2, 2012).

The difference between the northern and southern tribes was further elaborated during national debates over Law 130/1986, which were focused on the criminality of dual citizenship among existing citizens under the Constitution (al Anezi, 1989). According to al Anezi’s (1989) account of the national political debate that took place during the 1980s, the claim that the Kuwaiti Bedouin were citizens of other countries was directed at Kuwaiti citizens of the southern tribes prior to it becoming the dominant ideological motif directed at the Bedoun of the northern tribes. This factor provides new insight into the victimisation of the Bedoun. The matter of dual citizenship concerned grants received by the Ajman tribe, who share close family connections with the ruling families of both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (al Haddad, 1981). Ultimately the claim that they held citizenship in other countries was projected onto them through the 'other national' identity ideology, in order to prevent the Bedouin from receiving voting rights equal to the Hadar ‘originals,’ extending their waiting period for voting rights thirty years after receiving second-degree citizenship (without voting rights). Citizens of the Mutairi tribe were also accused of the same during the Arab Spring (‘Insulted Kuwaiti,’ 2012).

This factor illustrates that the claim the Bedouin are not ‘real’ Kuwaitis is part of a continuously recycled ideology aimed at all tribes - including the largest, citizen-dominant
tribes in Kuwait - and not just the Bedoun, as a stateless group, or ‘lower’ tribes (Longva, 2006). Additionally, Law 100/1980 concerned the Bedoun, and their unexpected submission of citizenship applications in response to a government pledge citizenship would at last be granted to them. The Bedoun were also accused of having citizenship elsewhere, mirroring the idea that the Bedouin citizens of Kuwait had citizenship elsewhere. Ultimately, it was shown that the Ministry of the Interior simply never processed Bedoun citizenship applications (Human Rights Watch, 1995). Thus, the use of the same ideology of ‘other nationality’ to target the Bedouin of any tribal ‘origins,’ from either the north or the south.

In other words, the ideology of the Bedoun as not ‘real’ or ‘true’ Kuwaiti cannot be separated from its application to the Bedouin community in general, as the ideology is deployed to target the Bedouin using both the contemporary (citizens and stateless) and customary (the northern and southern tribes) state frameworks. Crucially in section 7.3, we saw that this also applied to the concept of the ‘original’ Kuwaiti citizen. Essentially, the northern tribes have been generalised as the unwanted, perhaps even hated, ‘illegal residents,’ while southern tribes have been generalised as the naturalized citizens ‘undeserving’ of citizenship. Both are not ‘real’ Kuwaitis, according to Hadar public discourse. Suspicion of dual citizenship was not only attached to the Ajman tribe, which scholars have focused on (referencing just one study, al Haddad, 1981, as I explained in Chapter 2), overlooking the fact that this assumption is generalised in Hadar hate-speech directed to all of the southern tribes and all of the northern tribes.

These concepts linked to Bedouin identity in Kuwait has also formed a key source of propaganda in the Bedouin’s criminalisation, even though the notion first arose from Hadar attempts to exclude citizen Bedouin from receiving first-degree citizenship. Hate-speech has been deployed in very public demands that all Bedouin in Kuwait should be forced to have DNA tests to prove if they are ‘true’ Kuwaitis (‘Kuwaiti Bedouin,’ 2009; ‘Insulted Kuwaiti,’ 2012). The public questioning of all Bedouin’s right to citizenship in Kuwait is a virtually constant political strategy (Alhajeri, 2004, p.16) deployed to politically destabilize Kuwait. In August 2016, it was suggested that hundreds of thousands of the citizen population should be stripped of their citizenship (‘Tuwaijri: Hundreds,’ 2016).

From the 1990s, Western scholars have not explicitly acknowledged that the Bedoun were predominantly from the northern tribes, although it is likely that anthropologists and political scientists in particular, were quite aware of this fate (since they consistently theorised the citizen Bedouin as southern tribal people). Instead, they cast aspersions on the Bedouin as citizens or nationals of other countries associated with the northern tribes’ traditional dirah, following government policy. The northern tribal identity of the Bedoun was omitted from references to the Bedoun, although it was conceded that some Bedoun were present in the territory of Kuwait prior to 1920 (Longva, 1997). A consistent analysis would have described the Bedouin as the northern tribal people and not as an ‘other nationality’ group (since there was no proof of this), just as the southern tribal group was...
described according to their tribal origins. Scholars have failed to acknowledge this factor - the similarity of the ideologies directed toward the Kuwaiti Bedouin, both citizen and stateless. One interviewee (P12) explained that the ideology was continually promoted in the media until it had saturated the citizen population, to the extent that some still accused the longest-standing indigenous desert dwellers of Kuwait of being imposters (al Nakib, F., 2014) who entered the country during the Iraqi invasion:

P12: Are you from, your father… maybe your father from the foreigners… soldier from Iraq and keep here [stayed in Kuwait], and [I say] ‘What?’ … [and they reply] ‘Maybe your father is from Iraq soldier and keep in Kuwait? … And because the government again and again in newspaper and media…
(Participant 12, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 1 April, 2014)

Instead, portrayals of the Bedoun in the academic literature have been characterised by the representation of a 'social group' comprising a myriad of exceptional cases rather than general phenomena in the literature when authors attempted to explain the Bedoun's situation (Crystal, 1992, 1995; Longva, 1997; Beaugrand, 2014a). The Bedoun 'other' has therefore been emphasised, overshadowing the similarity of ethnic targeting strategies used against both the stateless and citizen members of the Kuwaiti Bedouin tribes. This has made the Bedoun group appear to be heterogeneous, isolated strangers, downplaying the fact that the Bedoun and citizens have been members of the same families since the time that the first citizenship distribution by the state left half of the Bedouin without citizenship (the Bedoun). Simultaneously, the southern tribes were described as a homogenous group of citizens whose origins were Saudi Arabian, who encroached upon the Hadar, taking up nationality though it was ‘undeserved’ and detrimental for 'urban' culture (al Naqeeb, 1990; Crystal, 1990; Ghabra, 1997a). The approach has de-emphasised the positive and constructive aspects of ethnic solidarity among the tribes, and functioned as a barrier to in-depth analysis of Kuwaiti society.

Scholars routinely observe Hadar concerns about the number of citizenship grants being distributed to the southern tribes after Kuwait’s independence, but discussion of the northern tribes is omitted (it is virtually non-existent). According to the approach, the northern tribes need not be mentioned in the same context, because they are merely Bedoun who have already been cast out never to receive citizenship. Due to their perceived status, they may be described as strangers (for example, Longva, 1997), enemies (Crystal, 2005), members of inferior tribes (al Nakib, 2016) socially and culturally disconnected from the ‘superior’ southern tribal people (Beaugrand, 2010, p.18) and/or omitted from discussion of the Bedouin altogether (Longva, 2006). This research challenges the current paradigm used to describe Kuwaiti society. I suggest that Kuwait’s Bedouin population should be conceived of as a dynamic social and cultural system (Znaniecki, 1952a, 1954) including both northern and southern sub-groups that coexist within individual tribal units and
confederations. The Bedoun were previously known as members of the main tribes of Kuwait (al Anezi, 1989, p.263).

Both individual tribes and confederations may be viewed as having dynamically blended to achieve a functional level of ethnic and social integration, with some tribal units achieving social integration at the level of the nuclear and extended family level. Others have increased their (ethnic) distance from each other at the intra-tribal level (among northern and southern tribal members of the same groups for example) and inter-tribal level (loosening bonds with other tribes within or between confederations and other units, for example). Without including the Bedoun in the social and cultural Bedouin population of Kuwait, the policy of segregation is realised in the academic discourse, re-created by scholars. This approach is becoming increasingly explicit, articulated in statements referring to the omission of Bedoun from research of the Kuwaiti Bedouin, and non-nationals (in al Nakib, F., 2014 and Shah, 2013, respectively) whereas in the past, the Bedoun were consistently included in Kuwaiti research in discussions of the Bedouin community.

Crucially, as Hakeem al Fadhli (interview, 3 August, 2014) pointed out, the current perspective on the northern and southern tribes of Kuwait explains very clearly why both groups are perpetually accused by local scholars and politicians of not being ‘real’ or ‘true’ Kuwaitis by the Hadar, despite the significant difference in legal and social status between the two groups (the southerners tend to be citizens, the northerners tend to be stateless Kuwaiti Bedoun). The Hadar do not accept either group. Overall, interviewee accounts given by Bedoun individuals who had no relationship to each other, were remarkably similar in describing the tribal stigma (Goffman, 1963, p.4) that was applied to them by others, in the most literal sense. The tribal stigma was associated with both the ‘desert dweller’ identity – the Bedouin in general (remembering the traditional term is the ‘desert dweller of Kuwait’) and also regarding the northern tribal identity. However, stigmatisation was intensified for the northern tribes, due to its conflation with the ‘Iraqi’ ‘other national’ identity. Additionally, the northern tribes identity had been clearly delineated in stigmatizing government discourse (as the ‘cleansing’ and ‘purification’ ethnic target, discussed above) and academic discourse (see Appendices C, vi to viii).

This powerful, tribal stigma (Goffman, 1963) lies at the core of the anti-Bedouin ideology. Hakeem Al Fadhli described the division between the tribes wherein the southern tribes are assumed to be citizens and the northern tribes are assumed to be Bedoun, accounting for the local and historical context. He noted that this was a general and taken-for-granted assumption, emanating from the initial periods of recruitment of the northern tribes to the military and police services. However, while the assumption did not emerge until the 1990s, he also pointed out that scholars had not taken into account in any kind of detailed fashion, the positive social dynamics of the tribes over the last twenty-five years that pointed to their integration. Al Fadhli (interview, 3 August, 2015) confirmed this ideology predominated social relations for the Bedouin community and the Bedoun in particular,
especially since the Arab Spring (2011-2012). First he responded to the notion the Bedouin are not ‘real’ Kuwaitis (Alhajeri, 2004, p.16):

Yes, first of all when we are, when we want to talk about this, it is an issue, it is true, it is there, especially for the last three or four years, it was here in the community. (Hakeem al Fadhli, interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 3 August, 2015)

He provided an example the enduring Hadar nationalist perception of Kuwaiti society fed through the media, personified by the government-sponsored public figure Mohammed Juwaheil. The Hadar nationalist narrative is continually broadcast to provoke ongoing conflict between Hadar and Bedouin in Kuwait, and usually delivered in the most divisive terms possible. Juwaheil promulgated the nationalist narrative that set out the absence of the Bedouin as ‘real’ members of Kuwaiti society, the ‘originals,’ and the desirability of their exclusion from nation:

… the origins of the families in Kuwait and that there is no Bedu, and he is against Bedu, and there is only families in Kuwait… which is inside… al Sour… the wall of Kuwait. And whoever is enclosed inside the wall, he is an original Kuwaiti.

And whoever is outside the wall, he is not a Kuwaiti, [but] is an outsider, an intruder.. And this [has] included the Bedouin tribes and the Bedoun. (Hakeem al Fadhli, interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 3 August, 2015)

I have pointed out that ethnic exclusion of the Bedouin was integral to the nationalist policy platform in Kuwait from 1965 (al Mdaires, 2010). This factor may help to explain why ethnic hatred toward the Bedouin expressed openly in public forums by figures such as Juwaheil (WikiLeaks U.S. Embassy Cable 09Kuwait1204 (2009, December 22), has become acceptable to the Hadar, reflecting the status quo of their political and social domination which can be contrasted with the oppression of freedom of expression of the Bedouin (see Chapter 8 for further discussion of this point). These hatreds continue to be circulated among the general public at the grassroots, including the persistence of the idea that the Bedouin are racially and/or culturally inferior to the metropolitan Hadar (Dashti, et al., 2014).

Arguably, the recycling of these ideas and their proliferation into new concepts, originating from the core set of concepts encompassing a specific anti-race and anti-cultural ideology (extreme nationalism and local anti-Bedouin ideology emanating from interpretations of tribalism theory), may be viewed as forming a continuum of violent language and negation signifying genocidal intent (Townsend, 2014), occasionally boiling over into a 'genocidal crescendo' (Arnaut, 2006) provoking protest or violent reactions among ordinary Kuwaitis. Arnaut (2006) emphasised that dehumanising hate speech is not
only delivered via crass language but also appears in 'well-crafted, reflective and even compassionate text' (p.118). Herein lies the power of the Hadar domination over the production of knowledge about race, ethnicity and nationality in Kuwait (Appendix C, vi-viii):

When we survey modern literature about nationalities, we discover that many authors treat a cultural nationality as almost coextensive with a race, implicitly or explicitly assuming that a distinct culture must be the product of a distinct race… Apparently, those who use it are unaware that the identification of race was initiated by nationalistic ideologists who used the term ‘race’ with evaluative connotations, postulating the inequality of races and claiming that the people who belonged to their own nationality were racially superior to people of other nationalities. (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.88)

Znaniecki (1952b, p.88) referred to this phenomenon as the myth of racial unity and superiority. Gross (1978, 1998) drew the same conclusions regarding the concept of ethnicity, where one ethnicity was substituted for a national identification and other ethnic groups were expected to comply with it. This form of mono-ethnic nationalism permits ethnic domination and therefore, protracted social inequalities and gross human rights atrocities committed against minority groups (Edayat, 2014; Gross, 1998).

Hakeem al Fadhli (interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 3 August, 2015) responded to the notion that the Hadar believed the Bedouin should never have been given citizenship grants from the government of Kuwait at all, regardless of their legal entitlement to it, which was documented by Abdullah Alhajeri (2004, p.16). The symbolic role of the Bedouin being deprived of citizenship is thus central to the broader ethnic conflict between Bedouin and Hadar. As to the Hadar’s resentment of the Bedouin citizens participating in the state of Kuwait,

In general, I agree with Dr Alhajeri, his thesis, in general the idea itself… from my own experience, I can testify that there is discrimination against the Bedouin and it is, there is a dark feeling, which is the Bedouin should not come to Kuwait and this is a mistake to give us nationality… that feeling is there.

You should know something, that this discrimination in Kuwait it is in the core, in the core of society.

He added,

I believe that I am a citizen, that I am a national of my country, and I believe there is discrimination against the Bedou… the tribal Bedouin. (Hakeem al Fadhli, interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 3 August, 2015)

The sentiment toward not giving the Bedouin citizenship due to their tribal identity and culture, because giving any Bedouin citizenship was ‘a mistake’ in Kuwait (Alhajeri,
2004, p.16), has been widely articulated in Kuwait. The Bedouin were perceived as ‘undeserving’ due to their cultural inferiority, ‘disloyal,’ wartime ‘traitors,’ of ‘other nationality’ and so on (see Appendix C, iv-vii) making up the key features of a local, anti-Bedouin ideology.

Despite this, Al Fadhli (interview, 3 August, 2015) emphasised that beyond the strategies of political and social division that were undertaken at the elite level by the ‘original’ Hadar and their proxies, the tribal cultural system has remained relatively functional and unified. He pointed out that tribal relations between the northern and southern groups had remained characterised by social cooperation, resource sharing and a desire for stable social life respecting traditional cultural values, which is why social relationships, intermarriage and diwanniya still took place between them.

The interviewee explained that the basis of this system was founded on the tribes' equal status prior to the intervention of government in the modern era, which had led to the exploitation of both groups for different aims: one used for vote-casting (the southern tribes), and the other for public service, protecting the nation (the northern tribes). That is not to say that the picture was only one of positive integration, as the stigmatisation of the Bedoun and fear among citizens has created some degree of aversion of the Bedoun even among some family members, as well as within tribal social networks. But overall, the cultural system showed signs of being active, resilient and consolidating in new ways, despite the oppressive and destructive influence of oppressive social relations with the Hadar and imposed, government restrictions which impacted the cultural system as a whole. To put it another way, the stigmatisation and fear of association of the stateless group which erodes social relations between some the of tribal groups over time, was counterbalanced by integrative social practices among other tribal groups who consciously choose to continue or even to renew their positive relationships and to consolidate in solidarity with the Bedoun.

Conclusion

This chapter concerned the social exclusion and ethnic targeting of the Bedouin in Kuwaiti society. Ethnic and non-ethnic identities and the cultural patterning of social interactions were discussed in the relation to the interviewee's descriptions of their social interactions with citizens. I set out the nature of cultural patterning that characterised these social interactions. In relation to discrimination of the Bedouin on the basis of their origins as desert dwellers, I discussed the role of the Nationality Law 1959 (Kuwait) and Decree 5/1960 in creating a social environment that enabled the Hadar to grant themselves ‘original’ citizenship and the Bedouin of the northern tribes (who subsequently became known as the Bedoun) to be deprived of citizenship, despite both groups not necessarily having sufficient documentation under the law to establish proof of residence in Kuwait. This crucial matter not only frames the Bedoun as targets of ethnic persecution, it may lie at the core of the ethnic conflict responsible for the state’s failure to provide the Bedouin citizenship.
I attempted to show that the ideology responsible for the persecution of the Bedoun have historically targeted the whole Kuwaiti Bedoun population, with the Bedoun becoming selected targets of more extreme forms of ethnic exclusion and violence after the 1980s. As I have indicated above, the two general themes targeting the Bedoun (section 7.2.1, Table 22) appear to have merged over time, to form a tribal stigma (Goffman, 1963) particular to Kuwaiti society. Importantly, these ideological themes were also linked to themes arising from academic and public discourses, especially the Orientalist and developmental theory approaches to the Bedouin, arising in tribalism theory (these findings are discussed in the following chapter, in section 8.4.1, including Table 26).

But I have also argued that the power of these themes or motifs is that they also feature important, localised historical and cultural content that increases their meaning and value to the actors involved, which have also influenced the way in which the Bedoun have been regarded and treated by others (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.245). The role of theorisation of the northern and southern Bedouin tribes of Kuwait in controlling perceptions about the Bedouin population, and in aiding the suppression of information about the the central role of the Bedoun in ethnic conflict between Bedouin and Hadar was outlined in this context. The chapter concluded by emphasising that positive, functional social organisation persisted in the Bedouin community. The Bedoun retained relatively close, though gradually diminishing, social relations with citizens, and as peaceful co-existence as possible.

Chapter 8

Discussion of Intellectual Identity, Education and Cultural Re-organisation of the Bedoun in Kuwaiti Society

The new generation is different from the older generation. They want to change... they have visions outside. They are aware of what they should be.
(Participant 5, Interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 15 March, 2014)

Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss the development of the intellectual ideal (Halas, 2010, p. 201; Znaniecki,1952b, p.100), which was highly valued by the research participants. Most of the research respondents had begun to articulate an intellectual identity, developed via their progression through advanced, technical and higher education studies or involvement in professional or other social leadership roles. Participation in post-secondary education fulfilled very personal and positive values and aspirations. I explain how creative, social organisation within the broader Bedouin collective has become evident in the community’s social actions, attempting to advocate for and to organise the increased activity of the Bedoun in society, especially toward the participation of all young Bedoun in education.

In this chapter, I also consider the issue of freedom of expression in Kuwaiti society, and the development of the Bedoun’s intellectual leadership group since the Arab Spring (2011-2012). The discussion focuses on the cultural context and nature of government
restrictions that target the group on the basis of identity, including ethnic identity and the criminalised 'activist' identity associated by government with discussion of the Bedoun's human rights. It also focuses on the nature of restrictions on freedom of expression of the Bedouin as part of a continuum of extreme forms of ethnic targeting.

Despite restrictions on education, intellectual leaders in the community worked in a variety of areas, including creative writing, journalism, and research, among others. The targeting of Bedouin intellectual leaders and social activists due to their ethnic identity occurred in particular ways that set them out from all other groups. This emerged as a major problem for the Bedouin beyond generalised 'discrimination' related to their stateless status. This form of ethnic targeting was part of the historical repression of their intellectual growth as a collective, which was formulated as part of the 'manpower' policy of Alessa (1981). For example, they were most acutely targeted regarding their public communications of their own identity and culture. In contrast, the Hadar did not suffer from restrictions on their expression about the same topics, but were instead indulged with generous public acclaim (I provide examples below).

The expansion of the Bedouin's intellectual values and identification with new ideas and modes of thought was provoked by the Arab Spring. These new forms of identification were linked to an awareness of the universal values of human rights, prompted by increased contacts with the international community. Contacts occurred via social media, international humanitarian organisations, journalists and academics. Consciousness of international human rights law had increased the interviewees’ awareness of that their collective oppression was considered as unlawful in other countries and cultural contexts. They had begun to develop a new vision for society, investing into their own cultural system through their personal growth, new identifications, and transmission of new systems of thought. Such new ideas could change their personal outlooks and ideological perspectives through cross-fertilization with the citizen society from which they were restricted, and the cultures transmitted by their new contacts situated in other cultural settings (Znaniecki, 1952a). Overall, the group experiences were indicative of the value of personal, intellectual growth leading to an expansion of culture, despite the extraordinary challenges they faced.

It would be premature to surmise that the participants’ intellectual identity had eroded or replaced their traditional, cultural identity. Rather, the Bedouin interviewees appeared to have identified with certain, complementary aspects of both forms of identity, which facilitated their integration of the intellectual ideal into the personality (Gross, 1978). The values of altruism, social cooperation, and solidarity were expressed readily in relation to the educational ideal and intellectual identity, through self-education and knowledge of the formal principles of universal human rights. Arguably however, these values were already present in their tribal culture, expressed as concern for others, collective aspirations and goals and wasata, the use of social influence to aid others. I briefly compare the intergenerational social solidarity felt among the interviewees to the Palestinian principle of
**sumud**, which means ‘steadfast’ or ‘steadfast perseverance’ (Shehadeh, in Said, 1986). I also explain the special features of social participation described by the research participants as ‘active citizenry’ (Bayat, 2013, p.313) and the praxis of ‘true generosity’ (Freire, 1970) (in section 8.1.3).

According to Guibernau (2004), the importance of cultural identity, ethnic and social bonds tends to be increased among stateless collectives in the absence of government protections or victimisation. When we combine this factor with the characteristic tribal social solidarities (*asabiya*) of Bedouin communities in the Middle East (Gross, 1998), the increase in knowledge of concepts of human rights among citizen Bedouin (al Rasheed, 2015) and the (stateless) Bedoun members of their families, they may be regarded as having a mutually reinforcing effect on social cohesion.

### 8.1 The Growth of Intellectual Identity and the Ideal of Education

#### 8.1.1 The historical, social context of the Bedoun in education.

Official information on the Bedoun’s participation in education, such as enrolment and completion numbers, is not published by the state. This is not because information is not collected from educational institutions or students. Data on Bedoun participation in education and intellectual activity is rigorously monitored and collected by the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Awqaf and the Central Apparatus, and collected from every educational institution in Kuwait. Government reports vaguely report on Bedoun education, offering data that obscures rather than clarifies, participation.

For example, internal transfer of monies shifted around various government departments are purported to be the direct indicators of public participation in education, in reports to the United Nations (‘Kuwait Showcases,’ 2015). I have called the fund the ‘Education Fund’ for the purpose of this study, although it is sometimes passed off as a ‘charity’ organisation, it functions under the auspices of government. The Education Fund was claimed to provide for education exclusively for the Bedoun population (Human Rights Watch, 1995). Despite this, it has historically funded all ‘needy’ expatriates of non-Kuwaiti nationalities in Kuwait (*National Report on Education 2004-2008*, 2008). The numbers of education ‘service’ users (students) are disproportionately low across the Bedoun population, with children’s schooling reported in interdepartmental reimbursements for ‘illegal residents’ (‘Kuwait Showcases,’ 2015), indicating that much of the Education Fund is spent on the children of other national expatriates in Kuwait, while large portions of the Bedoun population appear to still be systematically deprived of basic schooling.

Mapping out quantitative data on Bedoun participation is complex and difficult, due to lack of data and the obscuration of real measures. Even local insiders with privileged access to the education system (Khandari, 2013) cannot obtain substantive, consistent internal reporting data from the Ministry of Education, upon which any kind of clear or consistent picture of what the public education sector is actually achieving, could be based.
The limits of knowledge at the official level about the Bedoun’s participation in education were analysed in Appendix G, ii.

The historical background to this problem was also highly relevant to the Bedoun’s experience of participation in society as an indigenous group and as a minority group, in the present day. Khandari (2013) illustrated bureaucratic isolation within all government departments involved with the provision of education. Supreme Planning Council control had all but crippled the Ministry of Education’s management of the public education system, while most (but not all) Hadar have historically accessed an entirely different quality of education via private providers and/or overseas (Yanai, 2014). This has enabled the Hadar to consolidate on their unique, cultural privileges in Kuwaiti society, and reinforcing the group’s power to maintain ethnic boundaries. On the other hand, depriving the Bedoun of education was an integral aspect of the policy to deprive the Bedoun of citizenship, while inhibiting the growth of their collective, political consciousness, as part of the anti-Bedouin policy (Alessa, 1981, later expounded by al Naqeeb, 1990, as part of his philosophy of distinguishing 'tribal consciousness'). The policy was designed not only to force as many Bedoun out of Kuwait as possible to leave Kuwait (depriving them of access to basic public resources), but also to ensure that those who remained would be maintained in the state as an illiterate masse. In turn, the Hadar merchant elite would be enabled to exploit the population economically and maintain their dominant position.

As I have already discussed, the ‘status adjustment’ program of identity erasure and ‘Kuwaitization’ policy were introduced in 1983 and 1985, followed by administrative expulsion in 1986 (‘The Study,’ 2003). The different policies were a natural fit, so to speak, as if designed to reduce the Bedoun into an underpaid, underemployed, unofficial, ‘illegal’ workforce, while boosting Kuwaiti nationalist sentiment (Stanton Russell, 1989). Thus, while the ideal of international-standard education was prized by nationalists of both Kuwaiti nationalist and Arab nationalist persuasion (al Mdaires, 2010), the deprivation of education was used as a weapon to cripple the Bedouin population in general, and the Bedoun in particular. In fact, scholarly dialogues issued at the time, indicated that this level of ‘expert’ thinking was involved in the policy planning to make sure that the Bedouin’s intellectual development would remain severely limited (Appendix C, vi to viii). This kind of planning appeared to be quite similar to the expert-level theoretical knowledge expressed in ethnic targeting policies such as the removal of the Bedoun’s names (see Chapter 6, Table 20).

Al Nakib, F. (2014) acknowledged that the first generation of the Bedoun in broadly participating in higher education are still at university, at present. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (later renamed as the World Bank) reported that in 1963, only thirteen percent of Kuwaiti civil service employees had completed primary school, less than five percent had completed secondary school, and less than 1 per cent had acquired a degree-level qualification (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1965, p.40 in Redman, 2014, p.43). While authors such as Crystal (1995) and Redman...
(2014) lamented the inefficiency in Kuwait’s bureaucracy, they merely blamed the Bedouin workers, but not the historical, political influences that lay behind the problem.

This research discovered that the Bedoun were excluded from developmental measures including the standard education monitoring programs managed under the auspices of UNESCO (see Car-Hill, 2013; Kennedy, 2015a). This included data collected by UNESCO (2015) for the *Education For All Global Monitoring Report, 2000-2015* and data collected by the UNESCO Institute of Statistics (2015) reporting for *Children Out-of School*, the program that monitors critical gaps and omissions in *Education for All* reporting). In other words, there was no reporting on any Bedoun children as a population cohort to international development agencies by the state of Kuwait, including those who go to school and those who do not go to school (the same applies to other types of development measures, such as health, employment and economic wellbeing which are also unreported).

The Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program obscured participation in education due to government’s incremental erasure of the Bedoun’s Bedouin identity, Kuwaiti national identity, and/or false declaration of ‘other national’ identity of the Bedoun population in the national statistics. This was reflected in the omission of the Bedoun population from developmental measures at the international level (Carr-Hill, 2013). The ‘status adjustment’ program also targeted children and their parents, attempting to force young children to accept the assignment of a fraudulent nationality on their birth certificates, in order to secure enrolment in private schools (Kuwaiti MP Hassan Jawhar in ‘Tough Requirements,’ 2014). The state also refused to pay the full costs for such schooling.

Universal (free primary-school level) education is provided for in the Article 26, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations 1948; Articles 13 and 14, International Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights (1966).

Participation was not wholly invisible (Beaugrand 2010) but subject to highly restrictive and oppressive state surveillance and information control. The omission of collected data demonstrated a particular aspect of control, increasing the difficulty for the Bedoun to assert their collective's human right to receive education for every child without the pressure of submitting to 'status adjustment.' All Bedoun who attend educational institutions must be registered with government, and the institutions must report to the Ministry of Education. However, government did not disclose information on enrolments, student retention or other types of participation of Bedoun children in schools; nor has UNESCO demanded disclosure in Kuwait’s national reporting measures.

The Ministry of Information plays a role in managing and publishing information collected by the Ministry of Education (that is, limiting information disseminated about the Bedoun), under the instruction of the Ministry of Interior. The Ministry of the Interior’s Central Apparatus maintained oversight over the group’s participation and instructed the Ministry of Education to permit Bedoun children to go to school, or not to permit Bedoun children to go to school, as it saw fit (al Hajji, October 14, 2014). This was because the
Central Apparatus determined whether Bedoun are officially recorded as ‘documented’ or not recorded, and therefore ‘undocumented,’ on its ‘system.’ As a result, it controlled whether or not, if and when, Bedoun children could be enrolled in and attend, educational institutions. Similarly, it could ensure that the Bedoun were excluded from school, via placing restrictions on an individual’s government record preventing their enrolment or discontinuing their enrolment at any time, and through expulsion. Mass prohibitions on new primary school enrolments and threats of mass primary school expulsions occurred in September 2014 (al Hajji, 14 October, 2014). The problem was never effectively resolved despite claims from the US Department of State that it was (a detailed account of the issue can be found in Appendix G).

In Appendix G, ii, I explained how adequate disclosure of the Bedoun’s participation in schools was avoided with simple, discursive strategies and accepted without question, by the United Nations Human Rights Commission, the United Kingdom Home Office, and the U.S. Department of State. These extraordinary conditions, including bans on education that much of the population has experienced in their lifetime, have led to education taking on new meanings and increasing in value, to the group. Education was one the main means by which a Bedoun individual might acquire resources that would enable them to survive in the future, but it also provided personal meaning, and a means for cultural expansion (Znaniecki, 1952a).

The highest level of education achieved by the research participants was shown in Table 14 (Chapter 5). The institutions that they attended, was shown in Table 15 (Chapter 5). Their areas of subject specialisation were shown in Table 16 (Chapter 5). Some individuals excelled in vocational, technical or higher education and beyond, through the embodiment of the intellectual ideal, the cultivation of their aspirations, and the exercise of sheer determination and hard work. For the interview group, the intellectual ideal involved an awareness of their broader social context. They recognized that substantial social change was required in the near future, if they were to ensure the next generation of Bedoun children could uniformly complete their basic education, and that this in turn, was crucial to their survival as a cultural group. Therefore, the ideals of genuine citizenship, altruism and social solidarity were oriented toward the future development of the Bedoun’s culture, and this aim seemed to be virtually inseparable from their intellectual identity.

8.1.2 The development of the intellectual ideal.

As I have mentioned, the interviewees valued education highly. They associated the function of education with the ideals of intellectual and creative development and expression, and service to one’s family and society. Generally speaking, the purpose of education was associated with idealistic, non-material aims such as self-development, the cultivation of self-awareness and moral virtues, and the improvement of society, more than the a desire to fulfil discrete career goals or to acquire a high salary. Participation in education and intellectual development was clearly an area where the Bedoun research
participants could experience the positive aspects of social participation and cultural organisation, personal growth and the expression of personal and group-orientated values.

Experiences associated with formal and informal education and training included intellectual stimulation, self-discovery and self-realisation, self-esteem arising from the acquisition of basic and specialised knowledge and skills, as well as from personal excellence and philosophical inquiry, the expansion of positive and cooperative social relations with others, including teacher-student, mentor-mentee and inter-collegial relationships, the personal rewards of helping others, improved understanding of a variety of social, cultural, religious and secular values, and enjoyment and satisfaction from lifelong learning. A summary of themes related to positive experiences in education discussed by interviewees is shown in Table 23, below.

Table 23

*Summary of the Theme of Positive Experiences in Education*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-themes</th>
<th>Other Themes (Participant Experiences)</th>
</tr>
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| Positive social relations            | • Positive experience with peers  
• Good relationships with teachers/Professors  
• Part time study facilitates a larger and longer-term social network |
| Persistence, resilience and high achievement | • The impact of education bans  
• Returning to school to access Kuwait University  
• High achievement and lifelong learning  
• Love of learning  
• Family support |
| Participation in civil society       | • Giving back to the community  
• Kuwait University activities  
• The ‘khatatib school’ (community school) (October 2014) |
| Intellectual life and visions of society | • Changing your ideas  
• Self-realisation of the scale of the Bedoun problem  
• Suppression of Bedoun authors  
• Creating a new society |
The question arises as to whether or not the Bedoun could be said to participate in an education system that was reflective of their own culture, or not. Overall, the groups’ experiences indicated some degree of cultural assimilation into the education system, even mastery over their environment (especially for P03, P05, P08 and P13). But generally speaking, the education system for all Arabs in Kuwait was either dominated by Kuwaiti Hadar in public schools or other Arab Hadar nationals in schools for expatriates. The latter schools were often owned by Kuwaiti Hadar and managed by expatriates, for the purpose of transmitting home-country nationalistic values to the non-Kuwaiti student-body. This made the Bedoun outsiders in both of the major segments of the education system. The nature of the group as a sub-ethnic group of the Bedouin, was strongly emphasised through the education system, due to the structure of the private education system in Kuwait which had been developed around the exclusion of the Bedoun and other, non-Kuwaiti Arabs from the public school system. Ethnic tensions between other Arab Hadar teachers (with Arab nationalist leanings promoted by unionisation of the education workforce), and Bedoun students for example, were high. ‘Bedoun schools’ were those in which the student body was predominantly Bedoun, characterised by low quality education. They were so badly managed that the Ministry of Education had shut them down prior to the Arab Spring (P03, P09). At the time of this study, Bedoun children and youth mainly attended expatriate schools for other Arabs, although children of Kuwaiti mothers were allowed to attend public schools for Kuwaiti citizens. Bedouin citizens had filled the schools once attended by the Bedoun.

Nevertheless, the interviewees gained a great deal from their participation in the education system. The recognition of the intellectual ideal, the tendency for the individual to follow and expand it into a broader systems of ideas (ideology) (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.283), occurred due to engagement in the education system. But the intellectual ideal also appeared to have developed in response to self-education in formal and informal settings. This creative expansion of the education ideal into a positive system of ideas may be viewed as a counter-response to the oppressive public environment that the Bedoun confront every day, whereby freedom of expression and development of civil society has been limited by government restrictions (Amnesty International, 2013, 2015a, 2015b, June 20 – July 15,
2016). It may also been viewed as a counter-response to the ethnic targeting of the Bedoun in general and concerning education in particular.

Positive experiences in education and identification with intellectual roles in society arose along a number of lines involving social integration, contributions to society, and a new vision for society (Table 23, above). Some interviewees explicitly expressed their conscious identification with educational, intellectual and community leadership roles, inspired by the hardships faced by their family and community. This was an unexpected and refreshing difference between the findings of this study and previous accounts of the Bedoun that have been focused out of necessity, on human rights deprivations and social dysfunction caused by lack of education and employment (Beaugrand, 2011; Refugees International, 2007; Human Rights Watch, 2011; Amnesty International, June 20 – July 15, 2016).

Interviewees also identified strongly with the practical side of the education process, embracing the experience of reading, writing, learning, and applying their skills in the public domain, via teaching, publishing, and presenting their work to professional audiences.

In other words, the interviewees had not only integrated the intellectual ideal into their identity through daily social action, it was regarded as a positive and expansive experience, rewarding, and deepening their processes of identity formation, in new ways. Among the many cultural factors that play a part in the Bedoun’s motivation for learning, personal expression and communications, there was a desire to transcend some of the traditional social values that tended to isolate young people of different genders prior to marriage. Again, this emphasised the liberating function of education, although it was just one of many factors, and should not be overestimated for its novel value or as a factor particular to the Bedoun compared to other Kuwaiti students. Education is typically a strong value in Kuwaiti society generally speaking, but for different reasons among different social groups. This is an important area warranting further exploration, beyond the scope of the present discussion.

Despite the positive expansion of experiences in education and intellectual growth, increased consciousness of their group’s social, political and legal problems introduced some measure of social or existential conflict for many of the interviewees. The three youngest of the interviewees (P05, P06, P06) valued the cultivation of their intellectual identity, but were also quite aware that it did not necessarily enhance their ability to form social relations with their student peers. They described intellectual values as the virtual antithesis of citizen society, because according to the interviewees, citizens tended to value higher education for different reasons to the Bedoun, mainly as a process for advancing opportunities for in-group socialisation and to secure material stability rather than intellectual achievement.

Experiences described by the participants indicated that they were not only deprived or a range of basic human rights, but they were also deprived of the right to express their thoughts and ideas. This problem affected their ability to function socially in educational institutions while disclosing their identity, and was a source of potential conflict. Clearly,
one was more likely to have intellectual and social currency if one ‘passed’ as a citizen. Alternatively, expressing oneself as an authentic human being via the honest disclosure of identity tended to provoke intolerance of intellectual expression by others, likely due to their discomfort with the Bedoun identity.

Interview participants at university perceived a general lack of value within the citizen population for intellectual development. Research respondents indicated that the issue was not only related to government restrictions on freedom of expression, but also to the increasing value of materialism within the (citizen) culture (‘where selfishness has become a social interest,’ Halas, 2010, p.143). These values emphasised education as a consumer product to the extent that it could be a factor weighed into the marriage bargain (P08, P13).

An example of the immense personal struggles faced by the Bedoun participants who attempted to acquire higher education was provided by P05. It was just one of many accounts of the severe practical and psychological pressures faced by the Bedoun developing their intellectual identity. Like a number of interviewees, he described spending years of his life struggling with deep depression due to his life circumstances, which were directly and negatively impacted by his Bedoun identity, and which at the time, he had no power to change. His transformation into a young intellectual, once he was given the opportunity to learn, was remarkable. P05 had been introduced to alternative systems of thought through his studies at Kuwait University, after he acquired citizenship (in special circumstances that did not seem to apply to other respondents). His identification with the intellectual ideal was explicit:

SK: How did you develop this interest?

P05: [Laughs] It’s a long story. Because, I am very interested in the intellectual matters, you know. Because before I go to university I used to read a lot.

SK: Of books?

P05: I saw many lectures on the web… so I was very interested.

SK: What kind of things did you look at?

P05: Philosophical matters. I think because of my situation as a Bedoun. It determined this path for me. Because when we are living in a hard existential situation, when I, when you ask yourself why am I here? Why am I doing this? Why I can’t change my life?

SK: So you are looking at existentialism? John Paul Satre?

P05: Yes, but after you go to school, you have another [chance], may you continue…
SK: Who are your favourite thinkers?

P05: Well, I love Bertrand Russell.

And from ethics, I love Kant. I read for Kant. And the ethical point of view, I love Kant. But you know from the different fields, no I have many, many favourite philosophers.

SK: Can you give me examples?

P05: You know, I was interested in Hegel, but now Hegel does not make sense for me.

SK: As you changed your situation, your viewpoint changes?

P05: I tell you the truth, even your religious point of view… it determines the direction you go for in philosophy.

SK: Which means you are more interested in Muslim thinkers…?

P05: No. I will go to Satre.

SK: O.K… you have obviously read widely.

P05: Well, it was a struggle for me, it’s not easy to change your ideas.

( Participant 5, Interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 15 March, 2014)

The alignment of personal identity reflecting educational aspirations and intellectual values was not limited to those young interviewees who found achievement at school more easily than others. P05 had returned to secondary school complete his final year as he entered his twenties. He had developed his interest in systems of thought by listening to lectures on the internet. He did not read books because he had gone blind. He was unable to access medicine to prevent the loss of his sight due to restrictions on Bedoun access to public health resources.

The re-alignment of identity toward the intellectual ideal was just as important to more mature participants who had struggled to achieve highly in education. For example, two sisters entered university after being deprived of the opportunity when they experienced bans on education in the 1980s and 1990s. Their family had made extraordinary sacrifices to ensure they had received basic school education in the hope they might eventually achieve a basic level of income. They were unable to attend college or higher education until after they had experienced many years of unemployment, and had worked their way through a number of menial jobs, leading up to receiving positions with sufficient security to save for tuition. They waited more than fifteen years to become capable of re-entering the education system as mature age students.
Like all but one of the female interviewees in this study, these women had never been able to marry or to have children due to the immense challenges of their life circumstances (see Chapter 5, Table 6 and Table 7). This problem for the Bedoun was a more serious sign of suffering for the community compared to Palestinians and Kurds. The latter have been recognised as at risk of genocide by the international community and interventions have abled their populations to recover numerically, while the Bedoun population was diminished further after the radical post-Iraq invasion losses (Doebbler, 2002). When I interviewed them, they were both working full time and attended Arab Open University part time. They were conscious of the positive returns of intellectual growth, in view of their life challenges. The ideal enriched life their life purpose:

P16: You have to find out what you have as your interests. Your abilities will be not shown only by work or staying at home… it will be by development… by your [intellect], it open more and more and yourself, it opens more and more. So you have to know yourself more and more. (Participant 16, interview in Al Rai, Kuwait, 11 April 2014)

P17: I will improve my English and I will have more confidence in myself, my abilities. And I can find that there is something important to look at… and make a difference in my life and I have a dream in my life… and having all my life not having to living, to get to eat and work and sleep, yianni, I feel that I have a goal, I have principles in my life and I gain, I gain, I am trying to, getting my life, you know? Improving myself, not like, I am useless. There is some point after that. It is not about getting the certificate itself, it is about myself, it is about how I look to myself. (Participant 17, interview in Al Rai, Kuwait, 11 April 2014)

When I observed their excellent language skills, the two women informed me that they had educated themselves in the English language. But they also attributed their process of self-education and to interacting with people from other cultural backgrounds:

SK: I am always very impressed with the way you can express yourself in English.

P17: You can get the idea?

SK: It’s very clear.

P16: It’s self-learning. It’s not from high school, this is our self-learning.

P17: From TV.

SK: Your English?

P17: [And] maybe from people, because we work with all kinds, we work with people from different nationalities… Asian, and… and that maybe is also one of the things in Kuwait, that they refuse to mix with other people.
We are Bedoun… sometimes they refuse to mix with others, with people similar to them. (Participant 17, interview in Al Rai, Kuwait, 11 April 2014)

While online course delivery had also offered the Bedoun increased opportunities for study, such courses still needed to be paid for, while the group faced restrictions and insecurity in the employment sector. This meant that the return on the (privately funded) investment in education was not assured. Interviewees who took on the challenge of post-secondary education therefore, valued the opportunity while being careful not to put all of their hopes in a particular employment outcome related to their course of study. A third woman discussed her identification with the intellectual ideal, having gained numerous vocational, certificate-level qualifications, while she worked full time and was promoted into a management position. She was also unable to attend university when she completed high school because she was Bedoun, and had never married. Her mother was a Kuwaiti citizen. It was not until her school teachers informed her that she should not fill out an enrolment form for Kuwait University like her classmates, that she realised that she was not a Kuwaiti citizen.

SK: What’s motivated you to do that, for example to do two qualifications instead of one?

P04: I have always… I think I need to have a better [situation] than I have. I have ambition… I still want more, better [conditions] than now. I am starting to study being lawyer. It was my dream… when I finished high school – I wanted to study law but I cannot. At Kuwait University I could not enter, because my father was Bedoun. It is my dream. (Participant 4, interview in central Kuwait City, 13 March, 2014)

The most qualified of the interviewees had been able to leave Kuwait on a scholarship around 2000, prior to stricter border controls being applied to the group. He had subsequently received citizenship in a new country, where he became an Assistant Professor. He explained the way that his identification with the intellectual ideal, and a great deal of hard work, had propelled him forward in his life, toward achievement and leadership:

P03: I wasn’t one of those who would be depressed due to life’s circumstances. I would also take it as a force that would push my life forward. So, I don’t recall any negative impact on my education. I always took it as a force that would make me detach from everybody and everything, distractions, and just focus on my studies. I found that this is me, this is my identity. I’m somebody who loves education and learning and identifies himself as a life long learner. I still take Coursera and MOOQ courses [online university course delivery] all the time. I spend most of my midnights and driving time listening to lectures…
I identify myself with research and learning. (Participant 3, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 7 March, 2014)

The interviewees’ expression of intellectual identity and value for education indicated that the intellectual ideal had influenced their social actions and motivated them to change their habits of thinking, and way of life. They were conscious that the ideal had changed the way they thought, viewed the world and acted in it. Their new vision of society (P09) was characteristic of the creative and expansive influence of ideals (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.201). This led them to participate in vocational and higher education despite considerable challenges, or to seek informal methods of self-education. According to Znaniecki (1952a, p.201), ideals are realised in the dynamic course of creative actions. Once realised, such actions may lead to cultural change (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.205; Halas, 2010, p.197). Creative actions that result in well-known contributions to cultural growth are characterised by the intentions of the individuals who make such contributions. They adopt a conscious purpose to produce something new, valuable and important – a contribution not only valuable to themselves, but to all those who could benefit from their actions (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.205).

It was clear that interviewees regarded the pursuit of the intellectual ideal and the development of their identity as new, valuable and important. These values enable ideals to be transformed and transmitted to others, giving birth to new ideologies, standards and norms (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.282-284). As long as they were involved in the process of education, it was a fulfilling and worthwhile endeavour. However, the question of whether they could benefit from the attainment of particular qualification and/or professional status in a normative fashion, remained a troubling, open question. This uncertainty also highlighted the importance of the mature role-models and high achievers to the community. Such individuals in the interview group were very conscious of their roles, and hoped to serve as positive inspiration to others.

8.1.3 The transformation of ideals into social actions.

The interviewees wished their personal development to inspire the younger and less fortunate members of their community and therefore, their participation could be viewed as a positive input into the cultural system, one that could lead to social and cultural change (particularly P03, P04, P08, P09, P13, P18, P20). A threshold for the interviewee's creative actions influencing culture was their practical and effective utility for others. The intellectual ideal, once accepted, acted upon and disseminated to others, expands into a series of actions initiated independently by individuals. If successfully integrated, the ideal and the related systems of actions stemming from it, could lead to the development of a new ideology, expanding existing cultural patterns. While the intellectual ideal does not provide a fixed solution for each individual, it offers a general model of a ‘type’ that could be applied by others to their own situations (Znaniecki 1952a, p.204, 284). The flexibility of the ideal or ideology maintains an attraction for others as a continually evolving ideal, which can be adopted in an adapted form, to meet to different personal circumstances or worldviews.
Each individual responds to the ideology in slightly different ways, initiating their own particular set of social action, expanding the cultural pattern (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.205).

In theory, if individuals can readily adapt ideals or systems of ideas to their circumstances and benefit from them, they are more likely to promote this through social interactions (Znaniecki, 1952a). The ideal and any ideology that grows henceforth, must continue to change in order to remain its dynamic principle. It may be transmitted to others through the sharing of ideas, or leading by example, which inspires others to follow. This process of the expansion of the ideal, its absorption by others and implementation into new social actions, may introduce a new order into the cultural world (Znaniecki 1952a, p.284). As long as some members of the community were able to realise the intellectual ideal and reflect benefits to others by example of cultural leadership, or through the sharing of experiences, they could continue to inspire other Bedouns to follow their path. Some interviewees had served as examples to their brothers and sisters, who followed in their footsteps, either continuing with their education after secondary school or returning to education in adulthood.

Some individuals inspired members of the citizen community to assist the Bedoun financially to participate in higher education. They sought to expand their acceptance of the whole group as legitimate social actors in society, which in turn, might enable future generations to also transmit these values to others. According to the interview data, this was already happening in Kuwaiti society, via instances of cooperative organisation leading to the ‘sponsorship’ of students (financial support from a private source) by citizen benefactors who generously paid for some individual’s school fees, or the utilisation of citizen wasta (personal networks of influence) to activate ‘connections’ to resolve bureaucratic barriers, for the purpose of enabling Bedoun students to enter schools.

Thus, the development of the Bedoun interviewees’ intellectual ideal, and its incorporation into personal values and identity, appeared to be aligned with the characteristics of creative cultural re-organisation (Znaniecki, 1952, p.359). For many interviewees, as I have mentioned, the purpose of education was personal, related to the positive psychological effects of intellectual growth and the expansion of relationships with others. The research participants desire to reconcile with other ethnic groups with whom they experienced social tensions, and to improve their society while avoiding social conflict, was revealed through open dialogue in interviews (P08, P09, P16, P17, P18, P19), as well as descriptions of in their identity management strategies (P03, P05, P06, P07, P13, P14, P15) particularly among the younger interviewees, who explained their ‘passing’ strategies arising from the demands of their everyday participation in citizen society.

There appeared to be a strong but unspoken commitment to the philosophy of non-violent social solidarity. In Palestinian studies, this is called sumud, meaning ‘steadfastness,’ or ‘steadfast perseverance’ (Shehadeh, in Said, 1986). The interviewees did not explicitly
discuss the philosophy and I am not even sure if any interviewee followed sumud. Rather, I am interpreting my analysis as sumud, as it arose through the quality and content of participant descriptions of ideas and concrete experiences. It was revealed through the strong value of altruism and sharing of resources, such as displaying an interest in social cooperation with other ethnic groups, and the de-escalation of ethnic conflict. Careful management of levels of personal frustration that could provoke aggression from others was key to this process. Bayat (2013, p.313) referred to this as ‘active citizenry,’ a form of resistance to social marginalisation, which moved beyond passive resistance into new forms of active social participation. There were many examples of culturally creative and expansive social experiences and actions discussed by the interviewees, related to the purpose of education. These are listed in Table 24, below. The sub-themes may be seen as the desired social action, while the minor-themes derived from them, may be interpreted as the values behind them.

Nevertheless, the research participant’s commitment to personal growth and social cooperation through education was not without its drawbacks. Aversion of social conflict amidst the constant projection of stigmatisation by others (discussed at length in Chapter 7), could lead to the breakdown of identity management and total seclusion (discussed in Chapter 6). Among positive experiences, the interviewees indicated that they had responded to the increased aggressive opposition from authorities and citizen ideologists since the Arab Spring by implementing their active, intellectual ideals into social action. They had increased their level of social participation in accordance with their ideals of citizenship and altruistic values. Mallat (2015), recently explored non-violent philosophy of the Arab Spring, focusing on political and religious desire for freedom in society. Interestingly, the work omitted social explanations that would account for altruism and social solidarity among Arabs, characteristically found in Bedouin communities. But additionally, Mallat (2015) did not account for the Bedouin culture, statelessness or dispossession in the Middle East.

Arguably, social solidarity stemmed from the tribal cultural aspect maintained among the Bedouin - sumud, or asabiya. The Palestinian concept of ‘sumud’ (Shehadeh, in Said, 1986) is more symbiotic for the Bedouin as a localised interpretative tool for describing the social solidarity and active citizenry derived from the traditional value base of Bedouins, than Islamic-socialist (Marxist) interpretations such as Mallat (2015) which have previously

Table 24

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Sub-themes</th>
<th>Minor Themes</th>
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*Summary of the Theme of the Purpose of Education*
Note: This table shows analysis of a particular theme into sub-themes and sub-sub-themes. The sub-sub themes shown in the right column, correspond to one or more interview quotes influenced the development of the theory of social solidarity as *asabiya*, by theorists such as Cole (2006). This is especially so given developments in social movement theory, which has become quite dominated by Arab nationalist and Islamic socialist themes that as Mallat (2015) shows, are inherently disinterested or unsympathetic with Bedouin dispossession (noting that it was Arab nationalists who promoted the statelessness of the Bedoun in Kuwaiti politics from 1965, in Al Tuwaijri, 1996; al Mdaires, 2010). *Sumud* was elaborated from a poem by Raja Shehadeh:

Steadfastness, the non-violent resistance of the Palestinian against land confiscation and ethnic cleansing. Like an old olive tree deeply rooted to the ground, those practising sumud refuse to move away despite political, economic and physical injustice committed against them. (Shultz and Hamer, 2003)

In my own experience with members of the Bedoun community, what resonates strongly is their strength and generosity, both *sumud* (Said, 1986) and ‘true generosity’ (Freire, 1970). Some interviewees and their families had suffered a great deal while pursuing their goal to acquire education, such as economic strain, precarious border-

| Fulfilment of basic needs | • Poverty alleviation - family  
|                          | • Productivity  
|                          | • Financial independence  
| Cultivation of Self      | • Hope  
|                          | • Life purpose  
|                          | • Self-worth  
|                          |   • Dignity  
|                          |   • Self esteem  
|                          |   • Self confidence  
|                          |   • Self respect  
|                          | • Self awareness  
| Identification with a higher purpose | • Intellectual growth  
|                          | • Personal excellence  
|                          | • Personal empowerment  
|                          | • Identification with higher principles  
|                          | • Transcend limitations  
| Improvement of society   | • Positive input into society  
| Recognition and reconciliation with other social groups | • The Bedoun identity is Kuwaiti  
|                          | • They must ask the Bedoun about their heritage  

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crossings (and the risk of permanent expulsion accompanying it), and official sanctions imposed on whole families, such as punitive retaliation for talking about their identity and culture in public or online.

Identity erasure by the Central Apparatus was associated with the Ministry of Interior ordering the automatic cancellation of student enrolment, although education was hardly a main priority if erasure occurred. Other challenges faced by the respondents during their education included homelessness, severe illness and disability, loss of employment, high levels of surveillance and incarceration. Overt threats tended to be associated with blacklisting, then 'security restrictions' (experienced by P04, P09, P12, P18, P19). Having endured these constant hardships, the interviewees emphasised that they were the lucky ones, as they believed that those who suffered the most could not even reach a level of participation in society that would enable them to sustain themselves economically, psychologically or emotionally. In this context, the interviewees were not only speaking about members of the community in general, but referring to their family members, friends and neighbours.

Some interviewees also had faced challenges developing their capacity for intellectual leadership, but nevertheless they continued on this path. It was extremely difficult for interviewees to find or create environments that supported the development of their intellectual and creative abilities. But additionally, for those who had managed to develop their intellectual capacity through higher education, it remained very difficult to capitalize on their abilities and training to perform intellectual roles in society consistently over a long term. However, these challenges did not stop some of the interviewees from attempting to express their intellectual identity. The processes of negotiating their intellectual development in the context of their social relations with others are described in three interview excerpts, below. A young man studying at Kuwait University, explained the value of his relationships with his professors:

SK: So has friendship with these mentors helped you in relation to making you who you are?

P05: They gave me power to deal with the situation, the confidence, because our problem is with the confidence… we don’t have the confidence to stand for ourselves and speak for ourselves in the right way… but when we have an academic person, who tells you this should be your point, go from there… you have something that other students don’t have, they tell me, ‘You came from an experience of hard life that will help you with your study… you will become a philosopher and you will understand the world.’ (Participant 5, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 15 March, 2014)

A female interviewee explained her journey through to PhD study:
P11: Because, I was trying to prove to everyone, ‘This is me. This is me.’ And I can reach the best and I can be the best…

SK: Regardless of the circumstances?

P11: Yeah. So when I reached for example the masters, I was the first one in the family, or the child, who got… the Bachelor degree. And when I finished it, it was like, ‘Okay, now I have to push myself more. With the Masters and now the PhD, it’s like, ‘This is me.’ (Participant 11, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 7 March, 2014)

A male interviewee recounted his journey to PhD study, having been able to study overseas while concealing his identity:

SK: So you were very determined and resilient. You weren’t going to let anything get in the way?

P03: No. I really love and I still love education, that’s why nothing was able to distract me from it… because I value what the opportunities that were given to me to continue my education.

SK: You must have worked very hard.

P03: Oh, yeah, it was all my life you know, until now… I’m an Assistant Professor. So I have been studying all my life.

Higher education is about understanding life. Having a broad view of life. And being able to explore things deeply. And then come up with your own thoughts of how they should be.

Because whatever I succeed in, there are many people who are looking into hope you know, for their kids. Yes, the situation is very difficult, but you can succeed, you can be who you want, and you can make it. And it had positive effect on many families, many of my friends and of my cousins… So understanding that has been my highest achievement I think.

Nobody can constrain you, unless you accept to be constrained. And life can give you chances, so work hard now and don’t think about when you finish school that there is no opportunities. Because if you succeed, doors will open to you.

So this is one of the things that also motivated to me to always excel and give these kids an example that they should never surrender to this situation. And to maintain good character and ethics and moral behaviour, because I am aware of the fact that when I succeed, it’s a responsibility, and many people are looking up to that. (Participant 3, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 7 March, 2014)

When the Bedoun interviewees spoke about their life experiences, or their society and culture from their own perspective, there was very little about their concrete experiences
that did not involve the deprivation of their individual or collective human rights. Additionally, according to the interview data referring to the Bedoun participant’s experiences of intense stigmatisation and resistance to oppression in everyday encounters, it appeared that the disclosure of the Bedoun's identity in public was interpreted by others as a disturbance of public order of some kind. Others seemed to associate the Bedoun with ‘criminal’ identity, based on similar beliefs expressed by academics such as Crystal (1992, 1995) and Longva (1997). In some of these cases, the interviewees had to defend their identity, manage aggressive provocation, or to leave the scene to avoid social conflict. This scenario applied to classroom settings, as well as other educational and public environments.

Accordingly, there was little opportunity for the Bedoun to express themselves intellectually in public spaces at all. Intellectual expression in public spaces was increasingly limited. Social communications had been largely transferred to the online environment due to the presence of police surveillance monitoring gathering in public, but online monitors, censors and trolls had since been deployed to increase internet surveillance and enforce new media laws in Kuwait (Amnesty International, 2015a, 2015b). Historical factors also contributed to the interviewees’ ability to express their intellectual identity, particularly their social segregation which had led to many having a lack of confidence in expressing their own ideas (P05) and speaking in public (P07). Additionally, the interview data indicated that once individuals became used to expressing their intellectual identity, the level of risk to themselves or their families also increased, due to ethnic targeting (P03, P04, P09, P12, P18, P19).

8.2 The Development of Intellectual Leadership

8.2.1 The path of intellectual leadership.

When evaluating the development of intellectual leaders in the community, it is worth considering that many of the parents of interviewees had never received any formal schooling. Bedoun mothers in particular, were unable to transfer literacy skills to their children to prepare them for school. This problem had been identified among Bedouin who lived in desert settlements outside Kuwait City by al Moosa (1976), prior to the Bedoun’s administrative expulsion. Most of the interviewees pointed out that their parents were highly supportive of them, making every effort to obtain an education and often, older siblings who had been schooled first, took on the role of teaching their younger siblings at home, helping them to improve their results.

But there was sometimes an important exception to this approach concerning young men, where patriarchal values tended to influence their life direction. Some of the fathers of Bedoun sons did not approve of them pursuing higher education due to their family’s more pressing economic needs (P05, P13, P14). They had to work in order to fulfill traditional values which prioritised economic needs over personal expression and fulfilment. On the other hand, it is not well known that many Bedoun men who were at the peak of their working life at the time of the administrative expulsion (1986), had acquired basic literacy
skills as part of their occupational training. Although they may not have acquired a general school education or an advanced level of literacy, basic literacy training was received by the Bedoun men recruited into the army (Alhajeri, 2004), the police force and oil industry (al Moosa, 1976).

Al Moosa (1976) emphasised that Bedouin men in the desert camps taught themselves to read and write to pass the police literacy exam in Arabic, required for entrance into the police force. Those men were from the northern tribes and later became known as the Bedoun (al Moosa, 1976; al Zaher, 1990). Al Moosa’s (1976) findings revealed that the Bedouin’s approach to education and employment was characterised by adaptability, innovation, hard work, and a tendency to seek out new opportunities (p.43, 67, 149, 158, 170, 214-215, 219, 254, 317). However, these positive inputs were almost entirely overlooked by the author in his study’s conclusions (p.166, 170, 317). The same kind of innovations, adapted to new circumstances, could be observed in many of the Bedoun interviewee’s strong, largely self-taught, skills in English. These characteristics of ingenuity, industry and adaptation to new circumstances have been observed among the Bedouin in previous research (Marx, 2012). Unfortunately, not only was the potential for intellectual growth and leadership among the Bedoun repressed, evidence of it was omitted or repressed by researchers. Bocco (2006) and Eikelmann (2012) have discussed different aspects of self-censorship among social science researchers who study the Bedouin.

Up until 1986, in theory, the Bedoun were provided the same state-funded education support as all other Kuwaitis. But, it is important to remember the rates of access to education were already very low across the Bedouin population, due to their isolation in the desert settlements where they had been directed to settle, by the Municipality of Kuwait and the Ministry of Planning (al Moosa, 1976). The first Western publication recognizing the Bedoun (Human Rights Watch, 1991a) pointed out that although the vast majority of the community had been impoverished, nevertheless there were a number Bedoun who had developed professional roles and become successful business people in Kuwait (p.51). A previous generation of older Bedoun managed to develop intellectual and professional roles in society prior to the Arab Spring, especially in the intellectual and literary fields. Beaugrand (2010, p.167; 2011, p.245) discussed what she thought comprised an intellectual group within the Bedouin community that was educated prior to the new millennium, professionally engaged in education, journalism, literature and the arts. Some of these individuals featured in the early reports published by international humanitarian organisations, such as Human Rights Watch (1995), but they are no longer visible to outsider researchers due to oppression of freedom of speech and/or for personal reasons. They do not seem to publicly support the younger generation of Bedoun who emerged into public spaces during the Arab Spring, and pushed the state to provide basic human rights reforms in education and other areas (Decree 409/2011), along with international humanitarian organisations and the Bedoun diaspora (such as P20, Mohammed al Anezi, of London, who
advocated for the Bedoun internationally for many years prior to the Arab Spring). The reason may be due to their experiences of the invasion by Iraq and the aftermath. Ann Lesch (in Lesch and Lustick, 1995, p.180, n66) observed that Palestinian intellectuals were targeted for torture and assassinations in the post-war ethnic cleansing. I argue that the Bedoun were very likely also targeted in this way, below (section 8.2.2 including Table 25).

This lack of support can be observed via the non-participation of more mature Bedoun intellectuals in the international media during the Arab Spring. The impact of government suppression of information, opinion and artistic expression among the Bedouin especially, means that the community has faced a deep problem as it attempts to re-build its intellectual capacity since the population was banned from schools in 1986. The nature of ethnic targeting of the Bedoun appears to have seriously diminished the ability of the community to transmit knowledge, skills and experience across generations. This might explain why the interviewees had increased their identification with intellectual values while drawing on the support of their immediate families, communitarian values and social solidarity networks, with other Bedouins and mentors of Hadar or expatriate backgrounds. They almost never described having any relationship with better-educated members of the Bedoun community as their mentors, even though those from older generations who were well-educated, obtained their education in a less restrictive environment than the one currently experienced (discussed by Beaugrand, 2010, p.167; 2011, p.245).

My personal observations in Kuwait and my interactions with members of the community since then, indicated that such individuals were embedded in Hadar society and comfortable in their professional roles, and did not wish to expose themselves to the risk of public association with other members of their community. They preferred conformity, which provided them with a reasonable lifestyle, given that they had been able to build their lives when the Bedoun had better relations with the Hadar and government authorities. Their workplace peers were predominantly Kuwaiti or other Arab national Hadar. But, it is difficult to evaluate the constraints faced by this group of older, highly educated Bedoun without knowing their experience form their own point of view. They may also have feared that public associations with their own community would be interpreted as a transgression, a form of defensive solidarity (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.97) that threatened the Hadar or government authorities. Such activity could lead to sanctions such as blacklisting, ‘security restrictions,’ the loss of their job, and so on. These individuals had assimilated into citizen society and perhaps obtained a good degree of social mobility, but the benefit of their inputs in to Kuwaiti society appeared to have been largely lost to younger generations of Bedoun.

This problem reflected the lack of human security for the Bedoun (Sokoloff and Lewis, 2005), inhibiting the group’s ability to consolidate the social, cultural or material gains of previous generations. The situation also restricted their ability to invest back into the Bedoun community, in order to transmit improved education standards to future generations. The Bedoun were very limited in their capacity to develop their culture in ways
that were acceptable to the dominant social and political powers. For this reason, identity management and ‘passing’ (Ginsberg, 1996) as citizens in citizen society, may have remained an important social strategy for older, more successful Bedoun who did not wish to see their fortunes reversed. For this older group who received the benefit of funded, government education by the state of Kuwait, the desire for personal security and materialism appeared to have overshadowed notions of social solidarity and cultural survival, leadership and ‘giving back’ to the community. These challenges raise broader questions about the outcome for the more ‘successful’ Bedoun who become assimilated into the national culture, and attempt to emulate mono-ethnic nationalism, elitist self-privileging and gross materialism reflecting dominant Hadar values, while they remain stateless.

8.2.2 The oppression of intellectual leadership roles and the conflation of ethnic difference.

I will attempt to briefly account for the oppression of intellectual identity and problems experienced by individuals as they became more accomplished in intellectual fields. Znaniecki (1952a) emphasised that punitive actions in all societies with a well-developed ideological base are culturally patterned (p.345). Bedoun intellectuals who participated in this research were somewhat overwhelmed by the suppression of their intellectual activities, which hindered the development of a publicly active, intellectual class in the population of over 110,000 (‘Over 111,000,’ 2013). They lacked institutional support, while faced with the historical targeting and limitation of their group’s intellectual development, social and political mobilisation. The community did not have the resources to develop educational materials or systems for themselves, nor the ability to monitor their children’s participation or non-participation in school, safely due to lack of institutional support (H. al Fadhli, Ahmadi, personal communications, 24 November 2014; M. al Anezi, London, personal communications, 26 December 2014). Individuals who were capable of performing public roles and helping to resolve their community’s practical problems through rational analysis and cooperation with other social groups, were faced with ‘activist’ labelling. Such labelling diminished their ability to maintain and expand their professional or creative roles, and thus contribute to the organisation and development of their own culture.

Additionally, they were subject to ethnic targeting for their attempts to express their thoughts and actions. For example, one male interviewee (P09) was an author of once-published works including non-fiction literature about Kuwait and a collection of poems. He had once sold fruit on the street for his living. He established the Bedoun ‘I have a dream’ campaign during the Arab Spring (al Saadi, January 3, 2012; see also ‘Kuwait, the Other Side,’ 2016) and the Khatatib School (al Hajji, October 14, 2014) at Kuwait Teacher’s Society, which taught undocumented children prohibited from commencing primary school in September 2014. In his spare time, he also organised sponsorship from Kuwaiti citizens to privately fund some Bedoun students’ higher and vocational education. Despite his
intellectual leadership and positive influence in both the Bedoun and citizen communities, he felt despondent because he was unable to build upon his positive social actions. Whenever he attracted public attention to the Bedoun’s education needs, targeted, individualized oppression ensued. He had received ‘warnings,’ blacklisting, and multiple security restrictions. I discuss his vision of a new society, under section 8.4, below.

Such respondents appeared to be targeted by authorities due to their ability to articulate their intellectual identity with power (talent or charisma-based leadership, discussed in Halas, 2010). Such individuals attracted followers of their ideas, indicative of their intellectual and social leadership qualities (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.24). In turn, they were oppressed by laws prohibiting their freedom of expression and public gathering.

As I have mentioned, additional punitive sanctions such as blacklisting, multiple security restrictions and incarceration were regularly doled out by Central Apparatus authorities to the Bedoun for speaking publicly about their community’s situation (Amnesty International, 2015b). At least five individuals among the research participants had received multiple ‘security restrictions’ between 2012 and 2015 (P04, P09, P12, P18, P19), and many were subject to Central Apparatus and surveillance of their public activities. But additionally, other, specific measures controlling Bedoun intellectual activity through access to education were experienced. These included:

- Cancellation of access to education reimbursement (via the so-called Education Fund)
- Cancellation of enrolment in educational institutions (by the Central Apparatus)
- The requirement the Bedoun have a higher set of entrance marks across all areas of post-secondary school study for admission to educational institutions
- Blocks on access of the Bedoun to particular institutions
- Blocks on access within institutions, to student clubs, and particular disciplines of study, particularly law (see Appendix G, ii).

These prohibitive rules and regulations were aimed toward ‘non-action.’ The contents of the actions that transgress such rules have no bearing from the point of view of authorities. The point of their enforcement is the suppression of social actions (Znaniecki, 1952, p.335). The effect was to prevent the Bedoun’s participation in virtually all aspects of public life unless their identity was concealed, regardless of the value that any positive cultural content such actions could bring to society.

The standard of conformity required many of the Bedoun to adopt habits of social seclusion, non-action and/or ‘passing’ (Ginsberg, 1996). There is little doubt that these official, prohibitive strategies suppressing the intellectual and cultural development of the Bedoun were designed to eradicate the conscious awareness that the Bedoun existed in Kuwaiti society, among the citizen population. The targeting of intellectual content of public speech was clearly, designed to prevent others from gaining awareness about Bedoun thoughts, ideas, opinions and narratives. Obviously this could not be achieved at present
within the Bedouin community, due to the Bedoun’s integration with the citizen Bedouin. But it could be achieved within the Hadar community. In fact, some Hadar intellectuals have already demonstrated how this is done, through their omissions, and rationales for omission, of the Bedoun from scholarly narrative (discussed in Chapter 2).

An example of the link between security restrictions and public intellectual activity can be drawn from one research participant’s experience (P12). He had acted as a key information source for the Human Rights Watch (2011) report on the Bedoun Prisoners of the Past (verified in the report). He was a key author of the Group 29 report *Observing and documenting the violations of stateless (Bidoun) children’s rights* (verified in the report), and submitted his own documentation to a United Nations Human Rights Council quarterly review on the Bedoun's situation. These were not merely the activities of human rights ‘activist’ defiance in protest (Beaugrand, 2014a), but a sustained pattern of intellectual activity arising from his self-education in international human rights law, an expression of practical experience with community leadership and concrete attempts to solve real-world problems. The research participant had provided highly detailed reports and analysis to secondary organisations (both local and international human rights organisations) in service to his community. After he was named by Group 29 Kuwait, a local activist organisation, he was issued with security restrictions and required to report to the Central Apparatus regularly. His security card was adjusted to expire every twelve weeks, which required him to continually ‘renew’ the card, as part of a criminal, probation-like system. The ‘expiry’ of the card led to regular ‘security blocks’ being placed on his bank account leading to difficulties accessing his salary, while the need to spend inordinate amounts of time waiting at Central Apparatus offices to complete procedures to renew the card, impacted on his work in a managerial role where he was responsible for a number of staff. It is worth noting that these ‘security blocks’ also inhibited enrolment in schools, unless *wasta* (informal) solutions were found.

While the research participant (P12) had received multiple security restrictions for his intellectual activities researching and reporting on the Bedoun, the Hadar members of Group 29 such as Ebtihal al Khatib and Sheikha al Muhareb (whom I interviewed in Kuwait, see Chapter 4, Methodology) had been elevated to celebrity status in Kuwait and established their own television program as a result of exactly the same, or similar activities. In other words, Hadar members of Group 29 were rewarded for their advocacy of the Bedoun, while the Bedoun members of the same organisation were criminalized and punished. The bulk of the information-gathering research about human rights breaches produced by Group 29 during the Arab Spring (2011-2012) was carried out by members of the Bedoun community (personal communications with two Hadar, female members of the group in Kuwait, 28 March, 2014 and 2 April, 2014; altogether I interviewed six members of Group 29 during my fieldwork).
The hyper-surveillance and victimisation of the Bedoun members of the group, appeared to have no impact on the remaining Hadar members of the organisation. The latter had refrained from defending their own members while advancing their roles in society as community advocates and developing careers in television. Some Hadar members of the organisation, and all but one or two Bedoun, had left the organisation after the Arab Spring for this reason. This problem is an example of the infiltration of civil society organisations by government informants, which is a hallmark of Arab governance (Whitaker, 2009). But also note that the ethnic targeting of the Bedoun members of the group in this case, was not related to public ‘activism,’ (roles that the Hadar elite members of the group promoted to enhance their television celebrity), but behind-the-scenes research roles performed in service of the organisation.

Al Waqayan (2009, p.33-36) identified discrete stages of Bedoun policy development illustrating a conceptual structure of criminalisation over the Bedoun. This model went beyond the mere labelling of the Bedoun as 'illegal residents;' as it explained the impact of criminal labelling as well as punitive actions upon the Bedoun, on the culture of the group. He believed that not only were the Bedoun suffering a collective identity crisis due to being stateless and deprived of human rights, the knowledge of the historical origins of the group and their culture had already begun to be erased (al Waqayan, 2009, p.38). As I mentioned in Chapter 2, the ignorance of others about the group, including those in government, meant that the Bedoun were not only accused of being 'illegal residents,' they were also accused in ignorance of their heritage, of being 'outside the category of Arab peoples' (p.38). Al Waqayan's (2009) evaluation of Bedoun culture was based on close observation of the community, and the development of Bedoun policy, through his parliamentary role. He emphasised the 'clear relationship between illiteracy and ignorance results from the deprivation of education' (al Waqayan, 2009, p.33). He pointed to the dual nature of the policy: intentional *programmed* deprivation of education of the Bedoun at the top-level (set out by Alessa, 1981 and the administrative expulsion document of 1986 in *The Study,* 2003) along with the oppression of the Bedoun’s capacity to for development and expression at the grassrots.

This problem manifested in the Bedoun as community as illiteracy, lack of conscious awareness, a range of different expressions of suffering, which was observable through artistic and literary forms of cultural expression (al Waqayan, 2009, p.35, 36). Al Waqayan (2009) believed that petty criminal acts were undertaken for the purpose of survival or in resistance to oppression, and in response to the psychological pressure of the administrative program preventing active participation in society and fulfilment of basic human rights. He also believed that the consequences of the Bedoun's suffering led to collective symptoms of psychological disorientation due to loss of identity and diminishment of social status, depression, anxiety, pessimism, loss of confidence and self-esteem, paranoia, loss of hope,
obsessive-compulsive disorder, aggressive behaviours, and other problems (al Waqayan, 2009, p.33, 35).

Al Waqayan (2009) went even further in arguing that there was a cultural crisis among the Bedoun was observable in the Bedoun’s social relationships, writings, biographical narratives, poems, and that certain cultural patterns of perception and cognition influenced by their protracted situation of statelessness and chronic human rights deprivations were revealed in their imaginative literary work. He referred to these expressions of suffering as a ‘culture of statelessness’ characterised by sadness, tragedy, the loss of all essential components of identity and citizenship (p.36), evidenced in a variety of types of intellectual and artistic expression. Al Waqayan (2009) provided previously hidden insights into the emotional aspect of the Bedoun’s collective consciousness, characterised by their suffering, as well as pointing to a little-known literary sub-culture among the Bedoun. A prominent feature of this literary activity was poetry, emanating from the tradition of Bedouin poetry widely known among the Bedouin (Abu-Lughod, 2000). I observed this in my relationships with the Bedoun, who in times of grief and despair, express themselves in poetic form both individually and in small, group conversations. A research participant (P19) consented to my inclusion of one of his poems in this study, in which he expressed his feelings about his present conditions with visions of his childhood during the Gulf War:

Between heaven and hell is a stateless life
Hovering in haze, spirits with hopes
But by rusty chains are strangled to thrive
A childhood bypassed on a train of miseries
Heading to undefined destinations
All seen is a crushing fence of put-downs
    Cramming thoughts into the noose
How to fly with a pair of severed wings?
A question I asked myself repeatedly
I dodge through gloomy fumes
Blocking vision from grey
My lungs inhale stifling Oil-smoke
    Whose wealth is used to thwart and choke
A spirit fed up to the back teeth
Watching hopes become heaps of ash
My hear throbs like a drowning man in a bottomless gulf
Seeking a glow to get my ebullient self ashore
Where ways are paved to guide dupes out of the coop
    And fight to restore stolen dreams
An arduous way to challenge Satans and their loyal sons
Who have means to choose unshielded heads and rusty guns
My dream is to grow trees with seeds of love
The air grants life to all beings unbiasedly
The dark sky cannot veil a shining moon
    Sable clouds cannot defeat a dazzling sun
Fertile soils render life so heavenly
Nature’s charm is made of air, water and dust
Every grain of dust, drop of water or a waft of breeze
Is a unique universe full of love and life
It is just a call of time to please
Like Solomon’s wish for the queen of Sheba’s throne
   No matter how long or far it will take
We are just tenants and soon will end the lease
And power will be for no man or fiend
Between heaven and hell, life and death are shuffled confusedly
But high my voice will always remain – shrieking
Oh God! Free me or set my trapped soul free.  (Participant 19, August 2, 2016)

Echoing al Waqayan’s (2009) findings, the Kuwait Society for Human Rights (December, 2012, p.5) emphasised the connection between the restrictions on the Bedoun’s freedom of expression and the group’s inability to exercise ‘the right of individuals to participate in cultural life’ of the nation (Shadow report on the State of Kuwait's second periodic report presented to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). As I have mentioned regarding the analysis of human rights issues in the international law context, the analysis of such issues by international humanitarian organizations has tended to be have been restricted to 'discrimination' (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1999 in Kuwait Society for Human Rights, December, 2012). The broader, deeper ramifications of the Bedoun's restricted freedom of expression is better appreciated in the cultural context. It can be seen as one factor in a continuum of prohibitions, punitive restrictions and violent atrocities that have lead to the segregation of the Bedoun in education at all levels, the oppression of their intellectual development as a collective (due to ethnic targeting as northern tribes Bedouin) and the prevention of self expression and inter-group communications necessary for cultural expansion. This broader contextualisation has not been a strong theme in the literature of international humanitarian agencies, who focus more narrowly on topical human rights issues.

Another example illustrating the Bedouns' experience of oppression of intellectual expression and leadership, involved the plight of other Bedoun who worked in literary fields (P09). Again, the theme of erasure of collective identity emerged, experienced at the grassroots level of society (rather than in reference to government administration), pointing to an ingrained ethnic conflict between the Bedoun as Bedouins, and the Hadar arising in social interactions. The Bedoun’s professional contributions were trampled over by the power and ambition of Hadar citizens, who exercised their superior ‘rights’ as citizens in the abuse of power relations with other groups. This self-privileging of the Hadar which involved the abuse of the Bedoun, seemed to be a taken-for-granted assumption. Certain Hadar were identified as taking credit for the literary contributions of the Bedoun, due to a narcissistic conviction that Bedoun intellectual contributions existed solely for Hadar
consumption and recycling in *their* names (T2 represents a second translator/interpreter, P09 is the Bedoun interviewee):

T2: He was talking about some famous… like, literatures [literary figures] and most of them are so isolated from the Kuwaiti community because they are want to represent the Kuwaiti upon them [replace their authorship with Kuwaiti names]. So they are not well respect[ed] and they are like, evaluating them better as Kuwaitis, they are not equals.

SK: So they can’t get the similar kind of work like he was saying, the similar kinds of challenges to getting professional work?

T2: They were representing their talents by social media, especially by writing, because we have here in the Kuwaiti community… the Kuwaiti community did not allow them to participate as a Bedoun community. So they [the Hadar management] are preparing to put Kuwaiti names up on the Bedoun names [i.e. to replace their names], although they are so talented. So that is why they went to the social media to represent…

P09: Themselves.

SK: Are they [the Bedoun writers] using their real names?

T2: Yes, if they are writers, they use their real names. (Participant 09, interview in Taima, Kuwait, 26 March, 2014)

Note that in the observation by the interviewee above, that the community’s contribution to society was soundly negated by the Hadar. The translator/interpreter was a Hadar of Persian origins, who also had also acquired professional background in the literary arts, and was therefore well acquainted with the professional environment discussed. According to the interviewee's account, the Bedoun were regarded as so unworthy, their names were replaced by Hadar operatives who stole their intellectual property. This attitude among the Hadar reflected the government action of replacing Bedoun names (discussed in section 6.1.5, Table 20; an approach rationalised by al Nakib, F., 2014, p.6-7), but in this instance, the was attitude extended to justifying the theft of cultural products from the Bedoun, as well as the erasure of their identity. It is not possible to know how widespread these attitudes and practices are, due to the limitations of this research. However, another participant explained this kind of treatment from a more personal standpoint:

P05: Most Kuwaitis [citizens] didn’t have any struggle in their life, no problems. They come to study and go home. But if I struggle in this world, I experience pain, they try to make my negative feelings a factor of power. (P05, interview in Salmiya, March 15, 2015)

The Bedoun have not developed a recognised body of national literature reflecting their culture, due not only to their late development as a literate population, but also to the
lack of acceptance of their community as an ethnic group. This is likely because such
cultural development would render literary development another ‘threat’ from a minority,
tribal culture. Crucially, there has been a lack of attention given to the Bedoun’s cultural
history by scholars in general, due to their adoption of conservative Hadar, pro-government
perspectives, although al Anezi, 1989, Alhajeri, 2004 and al Waqayan are important
exceptions (see Chapter 2). Nevertheless, the Bedoun have accounted for their own
suffering in detail in the literature of international human rights organisations, which may
serve as a concrete example of a broader, oral historical record of a population faced with
cultural destruction by an oppressive, rival ethnic group (Gross, 1998). Clearly, the lack of
academic work representing the population from a neutral or positive standpoint, has
hindered the development of new roles for the Bedoun who might seek to represent their
own culture, who would normally have access to creative works produced by members of
their own cultural group, upon which they could build new contributions.

Despite these negative factors, some of Kuwait’s most accomplished writers and
poets are Bedoun. Substantive literature by or about the Bedoun, including novels and
poetry, is banned by the Ministry of Information (Trenwith, 2014). The reason for targeting
Bedoun literature cited by the Ministry of Interior was that books dealing with the ‘sensitive’
period of the 1980s and 1990s are not permissible (Trenwith, 2014). This standard has not
been applied to prize-winning books that account for the same era and the same kinds of
topics, authored by the Hadar, such as a volume of short stories by Mai al Nakib (Banerji,
2014) and a novel, ‘The Bamboo Stalk,’ by Saud Alsanousi (Yassin-Kassab, April 15, 2015).
These works were not regarded as morally or politically sensitive but as unexpectedly
refreshing accounts of Kuwait’s contemporary modernity. Again, as I outlined in the
example of Group 29 above, the Hadar - and particularly Hadar academic scholars - are
publicly celebrated for precisely the same type of intellectual activity that the Bedoun are
punished for.

Hadar scholars in these examples (Mai al Nakib and Group 29's Ebtihal al Khatib are
from ‘notable’ Hadar families and professors of literature at Kuwait University) have the
appropriate degree of social influence (wasta) to change these attitudes but instead, they can
be found at the very centre of social activities that exalt the Hadar’s participation in the arts,
while the Bedoun’s experience is diminished, which has the effect of affirming and re-
affirming conservative Hadar values. The Ministry of Information's blatant privileging of
Hadar academic scholars and literary personalities in relation to their freedom of expression,
along with the targeting of their Bedoun literary counterparts, should be taken into account in
any analysis of restrictions on personal expression, public activity, the role of civil society
organisation, and information and media regulations in Kuwait.

A number of interviewees had cultivated or were in the process of developing formal
intellectual roles for themselves by means of higher education through post-graduate study,
teaching, lecturing and research. But they were challenged by marginalisation at every stage
of the process, delaying their fulfilment of these roles. As individuals became more influential in society due to their intellectual input, or advanced in their scholarly careers, the more that they continued to face challenges related to their status. Alternatively, their challenges escalated if they attempted to speak publicly about themselves or their community.

Over the long term, this became a strain on families and in some cases, deprived their achievements of meaning, because such individuals felt they could not put their intellectual capacities to effective use for the betterment of society. Some of the most intellectually gifted and accomplished individuals in the interviewee group spoke in the most detail about their situation of existential crisis. Some struggled with the desire to kill themselves due to their inability to control their own futures, or to improve the situation of their collective. Yet such individuals never lost sight of the collective struggle of their community is establishing harmonious relationships with those who would prefer to eradicate their population:

P05: As a Kuwaiti, you live in a situation there are Bedoun among you, and you don’t have the right to negate them…. their existence is not up to you. For their existence, they have rights. These rights… you don’t give them these rights because you are generous or you... have to, [or] by choice. These rights come by existence. They were born on Kuwaiti land, in Kuwait, so you are not Kuwaiti more than them, they are Kuwaitis as much as you are.

From here to one hundred years from now, you can’t do anything to change that. They are Kuwaiti and you have to accept this if you want to live in a good and prosperous country. You have to accept this inside you even if you don’t like their background. The only option you have is to live with them peacefully. (Participant 5, Interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 15 March, 2014)

It is also worth noting that even Bedoun intellectuals who have fled the country and established themselves in teaching, research and entrepreneurial roles overseas, cannot simply transfer their skills to perform roles as public intellectuals who study the developments in their community from their second countries (M. al Anezi, London, personal communications, 26 December, 2015). Intellectuals who migrated to Western countries, as well as those in Kuwait, experienced inner conflict regarding their self-expression. They felt conflict about self-censoring their ideas in order to protect themselves and the whole group from further suffering and danger, and on the other hand, their need as intellectuals to analyse and evaluate the problem of their people, in order to solve it. The issue was not simply one of guarding their true feelings about their family’s situation, but even the release of basic information or neutral analysis was considered to be out of the question. The risk to their immediate families of being issued security restrictions or otherwise harassed by authorities was explained by an interviewee who no longer lives in Kuwait, whom I met while he was visiting his family in Taima:
P03: It is difficult, because… I felt freedom being a [country name deleted] citizen. I can’t go back and be constrained by families [compliant behaviours] or certain discriminatory laws. Or people not acting on whatever they talk about in the General Assembly, all these things. So I cannot accept it any more and I cannot tolerate it any more.

And if I come here [to return to Kuwait permanently], I will be a burden on my family because my family is stateless. And if I take any decision or make any voice because of my lack of tolerance [of the oppression of the Bedoun], this will affect their life, you know? Maybe even seriously. So if I come here to be silent, I just have to hide somewhere and not to be, voice my opinion, I cannot do that. Because I felt freedom.

So the best way for my family is for me to be away. And that was difficult too for me. I cannot live with them before because I cannot accept the way they are treated. I don’t know how I… I was tolerating it before, but now I can’t. And it’s not fair for them that I can express myself openly and affect them, not me. Because I am a… citizen [of a new country], the embassy can defend me. But them, nobody. (Participant 3, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 7 March, 2014)

The interviewee also hoped for the further positive development of the Hadar culture that would enable the creation of values that might help to reverse the damage of segregation policies:

P03: [When] they become independent [thinkers], I think they will be able to face the challenges and they will understand what they have done to us. Because I just don’t think they pause and ponder about it.

We are from the same country and from neighbouring tribes and everything, but we are discriminated [against] because our parents came at different times to the city.

But they can’t think about it, it’s not easy at all, because… of the collective, community-thinking mind. (Participant 3, Interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 7 March, 2014)

The interviewee had explained that he still suffered psychologically from the weight of his stigmatisation as a child, even after he had left Kuwait and very quickly achieved career success. Such individuals also required safe passage to and from Kuwait to visit their families (who cannot travel due to government restrictions), a factor that further limited their freedom of expression.

Intellectual leaders play a paramount role in the expansion and growth of culture (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.24-25). The intentional suppression of an ethnic group’s intellectual development and leadership may be regarded as a type of cultural destruction. As I have mentioned above, the Bedouin population was chronically deprived of school education.
resources by the state during the settlement period up until at least the 1970s (al Moosa, 1976; al Nakib, F., 2014, p.14, 21, 22). Alessa’s (1981) efforts to dismantle public education resources for the Bedouin (including the Bedoun), particularly in vocational and technical education, were designed to cut off the group’s access to adult literacy training. This occurred while education policy had been skewed to skip over children’s school education and focus on adult males, in order that they would be trained only to perform tasks directly related to their employment (McLachlan in al Moosa and McLachlan, 1985). Thus, the Bedouin were perceived by Hadar intellectuals (policy makers and political influencers) as best controlled through the deprivation of all forms of formal education, or deserving only of the most narrow, functional type of instruction possible, best provided by the private sector, ‘free’ to the state.

The state was not viewed as a provider of education, or as having a civilizing or culturally enriching function. For example, al Naqeeb (1990, p.127) used the notion of primitiveness and lack of civility as a rationale for depriving tribal people of education. Alessa (1981, p.108-109) had already explained that the basis of this rationale was that it would have enable the Bedouin to become politically consciousness of their lack of citizenship and human rights deprivations. The development of intellectual leadership in the Bedoun population had been impacted by extreme marginalisation and social segregation due to government restrictions since 1986, but specifically, by lack of access to consistent, good quality schooling from the time of the Bedouin’s permanent settlement in Kuwait, until the present day. But moreover, this maligned view of the role of national education can be regarded as having ultimately harmed the state, as it contributed to crippling the state's social and cultural development via oppression of the Bedoun.

Virtually the same measures of punitive repression (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.103) were imposed on the Bedoun regardless of the type of intellectual leadership in which the Bedou engaged. Taking these different areas of oppression into account, they may be interpreted as focusing on the intellectual leadership roles. I found at least six areas of intellectual activity were targeted. The activities and the punitive responses they attracted, are summarised below, in Table 25.

These measures existed in addition to prohibitions of children commencing schools unless they participated in erasure (‘status adjustment’: ‘Tough Requirements,’ 2014). Note also that the most acute target was personal conversation conducted between individuals about their own identity and culture. These factors added up to a broader movement of oppression of the Bedouin population as a whole, to an extent that has not been analysed to

Table 25

<p>| Oppression of the Bedouin’s Intellectual Activity and Leadership in Society and Punitive Government Responses |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Bedoun Intellectual Activity</strong></th>
<th><strong>Kuwait Government Response</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>Prohibition of public speech (face-to-face communications) regarding one’s own Bedoun identity or</td>
<td>Security restrictions applied to individuals and whole families, criminal charges, incarceration,</td>
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<td>one’s own community</td>
<td>deportation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prohibition of the production of original creative literature, including poetry and novels</td>
<td>Intervention by the National Censor, publishing banned, an open environment of stealing of Bedoun</td>
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<td></td>
<td>literary ideas and content by educated Hadar working in the literary and media professions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prohibition of journalists attempting to carry out their public, professional roles</td>
<td>Electronic media laws used to close of websites, blacklisting and security restrictions applied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibition of research roles, including behind-the-scenes technical research roles</td>
<td>Security restrictions applied to individuals and whole families, criminal charges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submission of research information during legitimate United Nations processes (e.g. Human Rights Committee reviews)</td>
<td>Security restrictions applied to whole families, criminal charges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postwar ethnic cleansing: Educated professionals appeared to be singled out for assassination and</td>
<td>Government appointed Abdhul Rahman al Awadi, whose role included regular reporting of the number</td>
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<td>torture (Lesch, in Lesch and Lustick, 2005, p.180, n66). The Bedoun were one of, if not the most</td>
<td>of extrajudicial killings achieved to the Prime Minister of Kuwait, to the role of Head of the</td>
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<td></td>
<td>He had previously argued to prevent the Bedoun from becoming educated and developing an</td>
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<td>intellectual class.</td>
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**Note:** This data was derived from the thematic analysis of interview data and documentary research.

date. While throughout this study I have highlighted the ethnic sameness of the Bedoun to the Bedouin citizen population, the interview data and other documentary data point to intellectual identity and leadership as particular areas of ethnic targeting and oppression, where the Bedoun are singled out for surveillance, control and punitive management.

With regards to the last section of the table which is likely to be the most controversial, a few points are salient. Ann Lesch (2005) focused on the Palestinian popualtion in Kuwait, while I have generalised her findings to the Bedoun for what I belive are good reason, which follow. As I discussed in Appendix F, i, both Lesch and Roth worked for Human Rights Watch. The organisation produced multiple, sequential reports citing
Bedoun were equally or more highly targeted than Palestinians for ethnic cleansing. Roth (June 11, 1991), working for the New York Times, was later censored, to the extent that the Bedoun atrocities that he was well aware of, were omitted from print. This made the public unaware of the ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun. Similarly, Lesch (29-31 May, 1991) did not extend herself a great deal, to coverage of the Bedoun. Palestinian accounts were characteristically recorded by other scholars or could document the atrocities themselves (in El Najjar, 2001 and Mason, 2010). The Bedoun ethnic cleansing was ignored, or inaccessible, although some foreign correspondents attempted to raise attention to the issues (see Chapter 2). In Appendix F, i, I also explained the greater political and practice support from external agencies and institutions received by the Palestinian population, compared to the Bedoun who received virtually no direct support whatsoever at this time. Nevertheless, the pattern of post-war methods for inflicting atrocities was remarkably similar for all Palestinians, Bedoun and Iraqis. My last point on this subject is that Beaugrand (2010) emphasised the existence of an intellectual class in the Bedoun population up until this time, largely involved with universities and the media. For these reasons, it seems quite reasonable to assume that the Bedoun were also targeted as Lesch (2005) described. I am suggesting that only reason the Bedoun were not discussed as targeted in similar or almost identical ways was due to censorship; the atrocities committed against the Bedoun were left for more limited circulation, in the humanitarian reports.

In Table 25, we see the policy of the eradication of the Bedoun expand from the initial focuses (already established in the literature) of the physical reduction of the population (through the administrative expulsion of 1986 repressing the ability to found families, followed by ethnic cleansing in 1990-1995). We might add the findings of chapter 6, such as the targeting of personal and historical ethnic identity (through re-naming vis a vis ‘status adjustment’), and marginalisation and stigmatisation related to the targeting of tribal origins that pertained to ethnic-sub-groupings of the Northern and Southern tribes, through specific nationalist motifs. These motifs were promoted in public and academic discourses.

Then, in the discussion above, I have illustrated the gross oppression of cultural expansion through education and intellectual development. This has included the inadequate provision of education that had commenced with discrimination against all Bedouin, but later manifested in policy directed toward the Bedoun. The specific targeting of the Bedoun’s intellectual development and leadership, at multiple levels: speaking in public about identity and community, producing different genres of literature about one’s own culture, journalistic roles, reporting on current events within one’s culture, and research roles and presentation of research to limit the development of knowledge about the community and culture. All manner of education and intellectual activity among the Bedoun was targeted for suppression for the duration of their lives, for the purpose of quelling the development of intelligence, civil society, self-realisation and fulfilment, political mobilisation and the growth of national identity. Al Naqeeb (1990, p.127) warned that the
Bedouin should not only be prevented from accessing education, but also from expressing themselves publicly, for fear that the 'pathology' of 'tribal consciousness' would spread via social media. Thus, the nexus of intellectual development and freedom of expression was the real target of anti-Bedouin propagandists who sought to suppress the Bedouin culture, and this ideology appears to be responsible for the restrictions on freedom of expression targeting tribal people in Kuwait today (al Rasheed, 2015).

Thus, we see the post-Arab Spring policy of the Kuwaiti government moving far beyond the targeting of ‘activists’ and ‘protestors.’ The broad and sweeping nature of the programmed eradication policy of the Bedoun, which is centred upon ‘status adjustment’ may begin to be appreciated for its overwhelming, extraordinary breadth and depth. Intellectuals introduced policy with a special interest in depriving the Bedoun of education and intellectual development, as well as citizenship, due to their Bedouin ethnic identity. Simultaneously, Hadar intellectuals and others operated in a regional milieu that stigmatised the cultural characteristics of ‘tribalism’ among the Bedouin, that was developed into an extreme nationalist ideology (see Appendix C-viii). The imposed, restrictive cultural re-organisation of the Bedoun appears to be an organised, decades-long program of eradication of the Bedoun population, aimed at total physical and cultural destruction of the whole population group. In the next section, the discussion moves from the development of intellectual leadership and the targeting of such cultural capacity, to the Bedoun's embodiment of the ideal of genuine citizenship at the grassroots of society.

8.3 The Ideal of Genuine Citizenship

8.3.1 Active citizenry by non-citizens.

Some interviewees were consciously aware that they had realised an ideal of genuine citizenship through daily social interactions with others. Others did not seem to be aware of this process, but their descriptions could still be interpreted as embodying or projecting the ideal of citizenship through values and actions, such as respect for others, cooperation and altruism. Their methods of managing their identity in complex situations revealed the practice of ‘active citizenry’ (Bayat, 2013). Interviewees described the performance of the role of citizen by deflecting or confronting marginalisation and stigmatisation during everyday social interactions and expressing themselves intellectually and creatively despite constant exposure to social and political oppression. As part of this practice, the interviewees not only strategically avoided or diffused stigmatisation and other forms of social conflict, they actively attempted to engage with those who directed stigmatizing attitudes and values toward them. Some interviewees pointed out that the purpose of this approach was to correct misconceptions and to re-educate others, while others appeared to adopt such practices as part of a more innate urge to express their identity. This data reflected Znaniecki’s (1952a) description of social transformation in the process of creative cultural organisation:
New ideals are initiated by thinkers who become aware of persistent conflicts within and between human collectivities and believe that the realisation of their ideals would substitute harmony for conflict. And this is what creative reorganisation of cultural systems is intended to achieve. (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.371)

Active citizenry involved the sustained presence of individuals, groups and movements in everyday social spaces, asserting their basic rights and fulfilling their responsibilities (Bayat, 2013, p.313) - in other words, the resistance to oppression by simply being and acting in society. The similarity between Bayat’s (2013) concept and this common theme among interviewees who described their approach to social interactions, was an unexpected and novel finding. It revealed a creative impetus among the interviewees, including a drive for self-expression of identity and for understanding their oppressors. The practice was adopted by those brave enough to actually take risks and experiment with their social situations, urged by the desire to communicate with others in society as ‘normal’ people (the role of a regular citizen) rather than from the position of a stigmatised non-citizen. Znaniecki (1952a, p.393) believed that social activity and interactions among individuals and groups was the source of cultural participation and change. These findings extended Bayat’s (2013) theorisation of marginalisation in the Middle East, including the use of informal social networks by ordinary people to resist oppression from state powers hostile to them, as in this case, it may be applied to stateless communities within a dominant citizen society, in the Persian Gulf.

This practice seemed to be attractive to the interviewees because the ideal of citizenship was a cherished ideal and aspiration, associated with a desire for freedom and belonging, the sharing of ideas and participation in society. In this context, ‘citizenship’ represented a resolution of the Bedouns' existential predicament as non-citizens, and of the social and political oppression to which they were subjected. This oppression was symbolised in the stigma that was projected onto them by others in social environments where citizens, particularly the Hadar, mixed. Therefore, there was an inherent paradox in this process experienced by the research participants that was not faced by others to whom Bayat (2013) applied his theory (that is, to citizens). The Bedoun interviewees took ownership over their identity as stateless, non-citizens in the legal sense, in order to perform as citizens in psychological and social roles. They had realised that their oppression was not merely a set of bureaucratic procedures, but was an expression of deeply rooted values held by others in society. They had also realised they could resist and potentially reverse this negative projection of social values in public spaces through their social interactions.

**8.3.2 Empowered identity performance.**

These interviewees had begun to consciously adopt a public persona as part of the inner cultivation of their intellectual identity and aspirational values, principally the concept of citizenship, universal values of human rights, respect for others, cooperation and altruism. They performed their identity via emulating the principles of genuine participatory
citizenship. This kind of undertaking was not for the faint-hearted. The performance was not a form of passing, but of resistance and embracing the real meaning of what it is to be a citizen. Such individuals were not seeking to conceal their status as Bedoun, but to function as citizens regardless of their status. That is, they were attempting to fulfil the ideal of the citizen, through performative action. It required a certain level of social competency for the interviewees to define their situation in citizen social contexts (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.243-245) as fellow citizens, and to perform such social roles due to the risk of marginalisation, stigmatisation and attention from authorities. Due to their statelessness, the interviewees needed to manage the constant risk that social disharmony could lead to arrest (due to their status as ‘illegal residents’). Bedoun interviewees indicated that in order to participate in citizen environments, they had to delicately avoid escalation of conflict to unmanageable levels.

Thus, active citizenship necessarily involved an empowered identity performance particular to the interviewees’ situation as members of marginalised group (Bayat, 2013) but also one that accounted for their increased vulnerability due to being stateless. Therefore, active citizenship tended to be carried out by individuals with strong personalities who were willing to disclose their identity as Bedoun, or alternatively, it was carried out almost by accident - in rare situations where the individuals did not seem to have a choice but to perform a citizen role. In the latter case, the performance arose in confrontational situations where individuals were ‘exposed’ as Bedoun and compelled to defend themselves to aggressors. Ironically, they were called upon in those contexts to define their situation as ‘real’ citizens with all the attendant human rights such a status carried, and to perform in that role, in order to resist the oppression of the aggressors.

The flipside of active citizenry was ‘passing,’ where individuals concealed their personal identity in order to avoid social conflict (Ginsberg, 1996). This strategy was more, but not entirely, passive (Ginsberg, 1996) as it was linked to conscious strategies deployed for survival (Redclift, 2013, 2016; see also Beaugrand, 2011) and playing ‘the game’ to obtain certain things that one could not access with identity disclosure (Ginsberg, 1996) as a Bedoun. If individuals maintained control of their identity performance and used it to achieve their own ends (such as attending classes without being stigmatised by students and teachers), passing could also function as an act of resistance, although a more subversive one. Some individuals used both strategies, guided by context (P08, P13); others used a particular strategy in all or particular social contexts, guided by a commitment to active citizen performance (P05, P07, P09) or their fairly fixed social environment that prevented authentic expression (P06, P15; also P03 prior to migration).

In active citizenry and passing, the Bedoun identity was fluid and responsive (Clarke, 2008, p.526; Gross, 1978, p.xv, 58; Znaniecki, 1952a, p.243-246), but mediated by individual and collective values. The complexity of the socialization processes shared by the Bedoun and their citizen relatives, whose status to each other was impacted by different roles
in the family, tribe and state, should also be considered against the backdrop of historical and cultural forces influencing that development. My interpretation challenges the view of Longva (2006, p.182), that Kuwait’s Bedouin identity is ‘empty,’ because the group’s ‘cultural content’ is solely context dependent, moment, by moment. This seems to be a somewhat supervifical view of human social life, conforming to the general trend of anti-Bedouin sentiment of tribalism theory.

A young, male interviewee explained the complex challenges for young people such as himself, who were emerging in public social spaces after the Arab Spring despite government repression. He had been part of the part of a new generation of young Bedoun who had discovered the notion that they could have ‘dreams’ during the Arab Spring.

P05: Because I am still searching for my place… in this world… what should I do… I am still at the beginning of the journey. Should I choose this point of view, or that? And to tell you the truth, it is so hard for me. So hard. Because of my background, I came from out of society. We are afraid to think. That was in the past. But I am talking about my place in my family, in my friends… it’s so hard to, it’s so hard to talk about these ideas… because they are afraid to think, afraid to live… (Participant 05, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 15 March, 2014)

One of the reasons that the interviewee could speak so frankly was because he had received citizenship prior to the Arab Spring (2011-2012). This had enabled him to access university education. Despite this apparently successful outcome, his family had been subjected to years of manipulation and delays by Ministry of Interior bureaucrats, while they waited for different family members to receive their citizenship approval. One of his siblings was disqualified from receiving citizenship and had remained stateless. His discovery of the full potential of his social identity was accompanied by his citizenship grant. Thus, another paradox for the Bedoun, was that those who attained confidence to speak out could often only do so after leaving the country and/or receiving citizenship (a similar paradox was expressed by P03, above). Resisting ethnic and cultural disconnection, they retained their Bedoun identity and very carefully and modestly introduced new cultural inputs into the community.

But as I mentioned above, the social practices of active citizenry and passing could sometimes enable the Bedoun to discover each other’s identity in public spaces (as well as online). Active citizenry involved a certain aptitude and audacity, because the confidence of oppressed people in public spaces is naturally low (Bayat, 2013, p.313). After he had adopted this strategy, P05 found that his act of identity disclosure also functioned as a signal for other Bedoun in the immediate social environment. His disclosure provided the ‘safe space’ for others to reveal their identity to him. In cases where other Bedoun had observed him disclose his identity then proceed to manage a harmonious social interaction with citizens, they would approach him afterward and disclose their identity. P05 believed that
their purpose of revealing themselves was a gesture of mutual support and potential friendship. The participant explained how he processed revealing his identity in public spaces:

SK: Did you think about Kuwaiti friends?

P05: You know when I meet new friend it's, ‘I’m Bedoun,’ if I see their reaction, I want to see how they respond.

P05: My professors all know I am Bedoun, my friends and colleagues, everyone knows. This is a test I love to put through everyone I know. I don’t want to continue with people who are against Bedoun, so that’s the first thing I always do.

SK: You know what you are dealing with then?

P05: Yeah. Almost everyone. There were different reactions… it’s funny because some of them were Bedoun, but once they know I am Bedoun, they… confessed, they are Bedoun too.

SK: What was that like?

P05: I wondered why they were pretending they were Kuwaiti [citizens]… there is nothing to be ashamed of, so I wondered why were you a secret? But I get it, maybe they were younger, they were scared of rejection, maybe I was older and I understood that. They are only 18, 19 [years of age]. They are my friends. (Participant 05, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 15 March, 2014)

In some examples, the Bedoun disclosed or confirmed their identity to others who were unlikely to tolerate their presence in the social environment, and proceeded to behave as if their interaction was perfectly normal, while observing the response of others. This process was described using empathetic language by a number of interviewees, as if the individuals concerned had chosen to educate the other social groups through real-time interactions, rather than choosing to challenge them out of frustration. The approach provided the other individual an opportunity to take in the information and to likewise, adjust their social response. Watchfulness was necessary for evaluation of the other party’s reaction, which according to the interviewees’ experience could be negative, characterised by verbal abuse and violence – or not. This process highlighted the complex and multi-level, meta-cognition that takes place when individuals are engaged in managing their personal and social identities (Goffman, 1963).

In social environments where Bedoun were not known to circulate, the interviewees could be very much on their own performing active citizenship, while other Bedoun remained hidden to avoid social conflict. Without accounting for the myriad of reasons why Bedoun do not participate fully in society, certainly it could be assumed that the vast majority of their encounters in mainstream society would involve interacting with citizens,
because the Bedoun are a minority group. A young woman explained that she was aware of
the ‘passing’ practice (Ginsberg, 1996) used by the Bedoun to avoid disclosure in
mainstream society:

P07: There are many of them. [Name deleted]. She is hiding her identity. There is many people hiding... [their identity]... This people are shying or afraid of people making to away from them.

They don’t tell me… they shy from this thing. Because Kuwaitis don’t like these people. So I must be like, ‘Oh, I’m Kuwaiti.’

Actually I am saying the truth [disclosing her Bedoun identity].

They just want to know your nationality... They think like Egyptian and Indian people are stupid people.

SK: Who thinks that?

P07: Some Kuwaiti citizens... In the social media when they say a joke, oh, come on you look like Egyptian people, you look like Indian. They think like people [of other nationalities] are stupid people. (Participant 7, Interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 25 March, 2014)

The interviewee then provided a concrete example of how this occurred. She continued:

P07: Don’t judge people just [by their] nationality. Look at their personality how they talk, how they suffer... don’t be like I am the king here, because your rights... there are many nationalities in many countries... So this is ideas continue in our life, with this generation. (Participant 7, Interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 25 March, 2014)

These social interactions took place face-to-face and online. The interviewee described her online activities in public forums where she disclosed her identity and answered other people’s questions about being Bedoun, while attempting to teach them about the values of social diversity and inclusion. This activity also included responding constructively to online bullies and trolls who attempted to discourage her from participating in the forums, due to their prejudices about the Bedoun identity. I heard about this problem from many individuals, but because I was personally unfamiliar with this kind of online chat (trolling), I found it difficult to comprehend how serious it was. However, Dashti et al., (2014) described the prevalence of online hate-speech in Kuwait, featuring attacks on Bedouin citizens, along the same lines as the anti-Bedouin ideology that was described by Alhajeri (2004, p.16) that I later found in my analysis of tribal stigma (Goffman, 1963; see Table 21) and academic and public discourse on the Bedouin (see Chapter 8, Table 26). This verified P07's experience, indicating that the top-down filtering of the anti-Bedouin ideology was widespread in Kuwaiti society, but her experience also suggested that it was likely experienced more acutely by the Bedoun, given the historical connection, where hate-speech
was used in the ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun after the invasion by Iraq (analysed in Appendix C, vi-viii).

Other examples of negative, even confrontational social interactions experienced by female interviewees included citizens in positions of authority asking everyone in a room if they were a Bedoun, and demanding them to declare this to everyone else, citizens openly declaring to all in the immediate environment that they refused to be addressed (spoken to) directly by a Bedoun, or to be served, touched or treated by a Bedoun (in healthcare environments). In other contexts, both male and female interviewees recounted being accused in public of being ‘imposters’ pretending to be Kuwaiti, or not ‘real’ Kuwaitis. When required, the interviewees responded to such claims by initiating conversation, calmly answering questions about their identity and elaborating about their family history in the country. Another approach cited included confronting such individuals with polite inquiries about their own identity. The latter strategy involved acting as if the inquiry was benign, even though such personal information would not normally be discussed with strangers in the cultural context.

Active citizenry was carried out in everyday situations that normally involved marginalisation and stigmatisation. In some examples, the Bedoun confronted citizens with their own prejudices, challenging them to reflect on their approach, and sometimes they addressed citizens directly with statements of fact about themselves or the Bedoun in general, in response to comments directed toward them. The use of this type of performance was also notable because the interviewees had usually (but not always) chosen to consciously define these situations as interactions in which they could behave and function as citizens. The performance aspect involved the interviewees introducing their identity to others, projecting the value of self-inclusion into the social context in real time. This gave the interaction a somewhat spontaneous and unpredictable quality, which further heightened the need to analyse and manage the risk element. Individuals appeared to be usually, but not always, empowered through these interactions.

Empowerment was expressed poignantly by a woman who had conceptualised her value for universal human rights as an ideal and an attitude toward life. Having identified with the new principle and adjusted her expectations accordingly, she was not about to relinquish her respect for her identity, anyone:

P17: Basically, [it is the] principle. This is the correct thing to do, whether you are gaining benefit from it or not. The basic thing is just to make sure people understand, ‘This is my rights. It is not your decision to take away my rights, it is my decision.’ And I am forced with that power, myself first then the others, to respect this life. (Participant 17, interview in Al Rai, Kuwait, 11 April 2014)

The respondent’s approach pointed to the social performance aspect. If individuals could conduct themselves with confidence and self-respect, projecting some degree of the ownership over their ‘right’ to participate in society and the way they were treated by others
they were more likely to be treated accordingly in social interactions. This assumption embodied the expectation that the human rights of all should be valued by others, regardless of their identity or social status.

The kind of social performance used to resist the tribal stigma, also took on more subtle forms, such as detaching from the negative projections of others, and consciously resisting the dominant social narrative through defensive non-conformity. Nevertheless, active citizenry seemed to provide a new method for the Bedoun to develop an alternative and more inclusive ideology, informed by knowledge of their human rights and traditional values, enacted though genuine participation in citizen society. In this sense, active citizenry provided practice at social problem-solving whenever the Bedoun encountered social opposition, which is the function of positive ideologies (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.205).

Znaniecki (1952) explained the desire to belong to a social group means that everyone wants to conform to the social system to some degree. When conforming to an existing social system becomes impossible due to rejection by others who remain in the ingroup, ‘othering’ does not usually lead to a solitary existence. Rather, those who are made outsiders by one group, seek out acceptance within a different social and/or cultural system. Many interviewees had spoken of their awareness that the oppression of the Bedoun was based on (a factually false) ideology that favoured the dominant group (the Hadar). They also believed that the Bedoun’s oppression was perpetuated by the conformity of all groups in society to the ideology including members of their own group. They understood these limitations, but continued to adopt social practices that could in theory provide them with a way to survive in the existing social system that rejected them. In other words, the performance of active citizenry was carried out in response to an ideal, as a new social system that provided for their acceptance as legal citizens did not yet exist. By developing social relations with others who held similar ideals, one could enter or establish an alternative social system. To this extent, some participants seemed to be aware that they were aligned with a new system of ideas. It one that contained an ideal vision of society, one that included the Bedoun as genuine citizens, and one to which they could successfully conform and belong (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.282-284).

8.3.3 Consciousness of the system of oppression.

The transformation of creative ideals into a system of underlying thoughts and action is indicated through its acceptance by a collective group (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.283). While intellectual development also held the promise of leading the Bedoun interviewees to solve their social and political challenges, a major shift had already begun during the Arab Spring (2011-2012), despite the gravity of the negative issues faced by the group. Some of the Bedoun interviewees had invested a great deal of time rationalising their situation, and reflecting upon ways they could improve their lives. They were aware of that their intellectual abilities could provide a pathway forward that could enable them to make sense
of their collective experience. They sought to understand the causes of their oppression, their historical ethnic cleansing, homelessness, hunger and suffering after the Iraq war.

The interviewees expressed different levels of understanding of the purpose of the Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program as a system of oppression and erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing), its potential impact on the collective, and the dimensions of its unlawfulness in international law. But certainly, they all understood equally, the impact of erasure on their own families. Some individuals were quite aware of the system of oppression, and could conceptualise it with clarity, including the role of Hadar nationalist ideology and Arab nationalist ideology in their predicament. A number of interviewees understood that the overall aim was to eradicate their population, and that the program could not be maintained unless there was a sentiment among a large proportion of the population for the program to be maintained. This understanding did not necessarily come from abstraction, but rather, from direct experience. P08 explained,

P08: They want to put you in the ground and you suffer. You cannot imagine the feeling. (P08, March 23, 2014)

The Bedoun were segregated in the education system in Kuwait. Not all of the student population were prohibited from attending public school, as there was an exception for children who had Kuwaiti citizen mothers and in previous years, for children of Bedoun military servicemen (which no longer applies). This provision was not as generous as it appeared, as once Bedoun children reached their majority age (at twenty-one years), they reverted to full Bedoun legal status. This meant that they were faced with the same limitations as Bedoun with two stateless parents, after they completed their schooling in the public education system (this exception was also complicated by widower and divorce statuses, but it is beyond the scope of this study to analyse these aspects further). Aside from this exception the other Bedoun were required to attend private schools that provided education to other Arab, expatriate children. It is beyond the scope of the present discussion to explore the effects on all students of the Bedoun attending these schools, although I touched on areas of cultural conflict in schools, in Chapter 7. In general, the consequences of removing the Bedoun from the public school system appeared to substantially but not entirely, disadvantageous.

The process of indoctrination into national culture usually takes place through the national education system, which trains students implicitly and explicitly, in the national culture (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.105). Without experience of full public schooling or private schooling within institutions promoting their culture (except for P04), the respondents lacked indoctrination (Znaniecki, p.1952a, p.290) into the official narrative of the national, citizen identity. That is not to say they had not absorbed the national identity, for clearly they had. But the influences were derived largely from their Bedouin culture including intergenerational, family transmission and broader social networks with communal (tribal)
histories, as I discussed in the opening of Chapter 7. As an elder explained to me in Taima, al Jahra, through a translator (T4) his forebears had roamed across Arabia seasonally as nomads, but Kuwait was the only country they had ever known. Additionally, the interviewee's national sentiment was to different degrees, uniquely constrained, conflicted and wounded, especially through the absorption of their father’s experiences during and after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. Their heritage informed them they had the right to belong to the land wherein they had settled, while forced to become legally stateless, they were rejected by the nation, but still entrapped within the state. Thus, their attachment to the national identity was complicated, but characterised by independent thought and reflection in the absence of systemic indoctrination.

It may be for this reason that the Bedoun interviewees were able to reason from their experiences and understand to some extent, the ideology that worked against them, that ‘made sense’ to the Hadar and Bedouin citizens, based on their particular vision of their own national identity. The responses from interviewees indicated that although there was a feeling that some citizens lacked compassion toward them, others did not. They recognised that materialism had cost Kuwaiti society dearly, if it was materialism that pacified the masses to tolerate the presence of the apartheid-like policies of segregation in their community. The Bedoun respondents did not lack awareness of the dulling effect of indoctrination of citizens through the education system and beyond, because many of their relatives and friends were citizens, and some worked alongside citizens in their employment roles. Hence, they had gained experience studying this aspect of Kuwaiti culture at close hand.

I believe that it was also partly due to lack of indoctrination, that many respondents were also aware of the true nature of the ‘status adjustment’ program and its accompanying ideology. They were aware that the ideology was little more than a self-justifying doctrine, unable to be proven in fact (I set out this argument in Chapter 2, attempting to deconstruct the ‘myths’ that had arisen about Bedoun identity and settlement in Kuwait). Both the intellectual ideal and the universal values of human rights seemed to have begun to be absorbed as a positive ideology for many of the interviewees, supporting their personal awareness that they were conscious, aware, knowledgeable human beings, capable of changing their lives. In other words, they were willing to take responsibility for their situations to the extent that they could access very limited freedoms, attempting to live out those limited human rights as active citizens as a means by which they emerged in public life, in the ‘dynamic of becoming’ in the cultural world (Halas, 2010, p.131).

Interviewees perceived the value of their lives as affirmed by the universal principles of human rights in the modern world, and as I have mentioned, this also resonated with key values of their traditional culture. As a result, through their intellectual development, they had come to understand that the universal principles of human rights law intrinsically made a great deal of sense to them. This connected them back to their own traditional culture of
their parents and grandparents, providing the ‘protective, social shelter’ from the state of the tribal social bond (Gross, 998, p.111). But, on the other hand, their ability to deconstruct the ideology that positioned them as stateless in their own country, meant that they had to live with the burden of this knowledge, and the temptation to imagine that their oppression could end, but might not.

A young man who worked for an Islamic charity explained his perspective on the Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program ideology, while addressing the government’s application of a system of typing comprising multiple levels illegality:

P13: You are talking about four or five generations… My grandfather is from Kuwait one hundred years ago… And before… [my father] he works for the government. He died… My father used to be in the military too, but he died very young.

… But you know forty years ago, there was no difference between Kuwaiti and Bedoun. So my parents start their life, they feel like working in the military… as I told you… so they didn’t care about nationality at that time, even passports, car licence they can get it… now, it’s become very hard.

… About the Bedoun… what the government said… there is thirty-five thousand of them deserve nationality, if you say they deserve, why you didn’t give it? That is the question.

And they say, some of them, they are not the same. Okay, give the people who deserve it, and judge that we deserve it, and that the [others] who didn’t have any nationality, they decide they are other people have nationality, they hide [it].

Okay, can I have something from the government [to prove this]? Nobody can hide anything about me.

If you say there is thirty-five thousand deserve nationality, just give it to them, then look after the peoples rights [those accused of being of other nationalities], send them to [a] judge, send them to court, send them to jail, send them to their countries. But what they say? They are hiding their nationality to get some [benefits] like Kuwait?[is]?

… then prove it.

Only Allah can judge people. All people are the same, and what people didn’t get… they suffer from it. But there is no difference [the Bedoun ] are the same people, the Kuwaiti people, they are same people. (Participant 13, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 2 April, 2014)

The interviewee highlighted the hypocrisy of the criminalisation of the Bedoun according to government policy, which was not merely based on a policy change, but upon the premise of accusing a population known to be stateless, of being legal citizens of other
countries, as I pointed out in Chapter 2. In conformity with this policy, government officials had denied the concept of the Bedouin being a stateless population group, as well as the concept of statelessness itself, even defying the existence of this aspect of international law, in settings such as reports to the United Nations Human Rights Committee periodical country review (see Appendix E, iii, iv).

Consciousness of the system of oppression included consciousness of the group’s destruction at the levels of the individual, and the collective. The death of the Bedoun was described by a number of interviewees. At one level, they referred to individuals lacking access to basic specialist healthcare, which led to unnecessary or premature suffering and death (P12, P14, P20). This occurred in direct relation to the lack of consistent provision of public services to the community (and the failure of Decree 409/2011 reform). At another level, they indicated indirect losses, which could be interpreted as indicative of both physical and cultural death. They referred to mass suicides and disappearances, particularly of young adult men. Interviewees referred to suicide of others, and of potential suicide of themselves (P01, P05, P08, P09, P16, P17, P18). One interviewee summed up the scope of the problem for the collective. He told me: ‘They are killing us’ (P09, personal communications, 21 July, 2014).

During my fieldwork in Kuwait in 2014, another interviewee, Hakeem al Fadhli, was detained and subjected enduring torture methods that could be interpreted as attempted murder, specifically attempts by authorities ‘acting out’ his suffocation (Amnesty International, 5 August 2016, para. 1, referring to his earlier detention from February 24, 2014). He recounted these methods to me in detail outside the formal interview process (H. al Fadhli, personal communications, Ahmadi November 24, 2015) shortly before he was incarcerated again in 2015 and 2016, for charges related to public gathering performed in the Arab Spring in 2012 and 2011. He had recalled that isolation was one of the steps in the procedures of torture by special authorities who functioned specifically to tortured him, while he was routinely denied medical treatment during periods of interrogation and torture, as this would enable authorities to ensure evidence of torture left on his body would not be recorded by medical staff. In October 2016, he was left indefinitely in an isolation cell with an untreated fever in Anbar 4, an isolated section of the prison (Front Line Defenders, July 15, 2016, October 21, 2016; Gulf Centre for Human Rights, March 13, 2017).

As this is a qualitative study, it is beyond the scope of the study to speculate as to whether or not the ideals of intellectualism and human rights for all people had transformed into a widespread ideology among the Bedoun group as a whole. However, I have attempted to point to some of the indicators of creative, cultural re-organisation achieved through intellectual leadership, social actions and solidarity. I also discussed some of the ways in which interviewees articulated their awareness of their own oppression contributing to a broader, collective consciousness of suffering that al Waqayan (2009) had described as characteristic of the Bedoun’s culture (this theorisation was discussed in section 8.2.2).
Active citizenry was also practised by interviewees who were less aware of the principles of universal human rights and situated in a more traditional social setting. In these examples, individuals felt solidarity with the Bedoun community in everyday contexts, and performed small acts of resistance to oppression out of necessity, in order to simply survive, responding to the external pressures of their circumstances (Bayat, 2013). Such acts involved merely staying in classes at university, or to continuing to seek out and participate in employment, while saving enough money to pay for books or a computer or a vocational education course. However, some traditional Bedouin values (Wilkinson, 1983) were naturally aligned with the universal values of human rights, such as social equity and the sharing of resources, and therefore, these values resonated strongly with the interviewees as they attempted to participate in society and build close social bonds and networks with people from diverse backgrounds.

Thus, traditional and contemporary Bedouin values (including universal human rights, see al Rasheed, 2015) were connected, through collective social solidarity. In one example (P14), where traditional values were found to be outmoded because they were no longer applied to the Bedoun by others (particularly in the tribal context), the identification with the tribe was weakened and the identification with the Bedoun was strengthened. The interviewee’s perspective showed an appreciation of the values of Bedoun social leaders that were aligned with the principles of human rights. He felt supported by the articulation of these values by Bedoun leaders during the after the Arab Spring. Knowing that he was surrounded by others who shared similar values, and with whom he could talk about his struggles, provided him with a sense of social solidarity. Although he did not have personal contact with the community leadership group, he explained:

P14: I chose the Bedoun community because… they are more feeling for each other more than tribals because the tribals are from more communities, maybe Kuwaiti, Saudi or something, but the Bedouns are the people from the same suffering, they face the same reality, the same destination, the same way.

Yes, I can discuss the situation of the Bedoun with my neighbours [in Taima, al Jahra]. Some people understand the situation but some peoples, they are against my rights and… maybe they are not from the same tribals.
(Participant 14, interview in Taima, 9 April, 2014)

In another case, the alignment of the Bedoun with the universal principles of human rights and their choice of young people to assert those rights, was perceived by an interviewee’s parent as collusion with criminals, because the expression of such ideas were regarded as antagonistic to the authoritarian regime (P05, interview 15 March, 2014, Salmiya). The interviewee recognised that his father applied his traditional values only to those whom he perceived as his own group: the Bedoun and citizen Bedouin who did not challenge the status quo. He explained that this defensive posture was a product of the
climate of fear that existed among some in the community who had grown increasingly afraid that they or their family members would have their citizenship stripped from them.

Historically, the defensive posture toward outsiders had been a feature of tribal solidarity, necessary for survival in the desert. The participant explained that these values had since been sublimated to survival under the ruling regime. He emphasised that it had been extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the generation of military men who were blamed by the state for the Iraqi invasion (including his father), to risk further non-conformity (see P05’s quotation above, in section 7.3.2). The interviewee concerned recognised the re-direction of these values toward self-preservation, but he also appreciated that there were forces in society that exploited these values to increase social conflict and ethnic hatred (P05).

P05 wished to reconcile these conflicting forces, to maintain positive family bonds and to express social solidarity with the Bedouins’ value for universal human rights, in ways that would not be perceived as oppositional. His traditional values were understood as having limited application in sectors of society that could not universalise them to apply to all people. This was despite the promise held in these ideals and the international humanitarian law, that claimed that all human beings held these rights (vis a vis the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: United Nations, 1948). The realisation had led him to identify with the intellectual ideal. The universalisation of the interviewees’ values could be allowed to develop relatively unimpeded, reinterpreted through a philosophical, intellectual framework.

The process had helped the interviewee begin to process and resolve his inner identity conflict and to harmonize his social relations with others, while he also continued to practice active citizenry more explicitly with others in public spaces. This seemed to prompt an increased awareness of his capacity for autonomous action in society. Active citizenry was the process by which the Bedouins expressed their ideals in the social world through creative actions in response to their social contexts. They applied their collective values to obstacles arising in social interactions among a range of different social groups, in order to solve such problems (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.201). As such, active citizenry comprised a positive input into the cultural system. It enabled the interviewees to perform in positive, citizen-like roles and to lead others to interact with them in these roles, and represented a conscious effort to create a new cultural pattern: expansive, cooperative and altruistic.

This process is similar to the liberation theory of Paulo Freire (1970). The oppressed were often trapped between polarities, between the social roles of the oppressed and the oppressor. They have become dehumanized by their conditions, which produces an unjust order in society. Dehumanisation distorts their vocation of becoming fully human. Freire (1970) believed that eventually, due to the influence of the distortion, the oppressed tended to see only one alternative to oppression, which was the role of the oppressor. In other words, the oppressed could themselves not see beyond conformity to the existing social roles.
which were the standards and norms imposed by the dominant social group and/or political
authority (Znaniecki, 1952a). Participant 5 had recognised this aspect in his father’s
generation.

For Freire (1970), the oppressed required liberation through education, including the
leadership and intervention of outside agents. Znaniecki (1952b) on the other hand, placed
more emphasis on the capacity of cultural groups to self-organize and to educate themselves
from within (p.105). As I have mentioned, Znaniecki (1952b, p.105) had first-hand
experience of this process within the Polish resistance and after their liberation. However, at
this time, the population had access to highly trained intellectual class, including himself,
participating in an underground education movement (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.104-105; see also
Thomas and Znaniecki, 1918 for a survey of those who experienced this movement).

Freire’s (1970) point about the need for external support is particularly salient to the
Bedoun. I set out two aspects of this problem above. The previous generation who had been
highly trained no longer appear to publicly support the younger generation to resist systemic
oppression or to increase their participation society. They appear to have ceased their public
activity as representatives of the Bedoun. I also analysed the new and various forms of
ethnic targeting and oppression of the intellectual leadership group that has emerged during
and after the Arab Spring (2010-2012). This latter group was more vulnerable because
members had not received the same level of intellectual training and mentoring as the
previous generation. Moreover, just as the former generation had become targets of the
1980s expulsion and 1990s ethnic cleansing, the current generation of intellectuals, had lived
though the same period as young children, and had then become targets of the
criminalisation via the secret ‘security restriciton’ in the post-Arab Spring environment (see
Table 25).

According to Znaniecki, (1952a, p.201), the basis of creative, cultural re-
organisation is a dynamic course of creative actions, which once realised, could develop into
dynamic ideals and new ideologies. A new ideology is a cultural product directed toward
future experiences and the activities of others (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.282). Creative actions
which result in well-known contributions to cultural growth are similar in that the
individuals who make such contributions adopt a conscious purpose to produce something
new, valuable and important - not only for himself or herself, but for all those who could
benefit from the actions (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.205). Therefore, there are altruistic and
collective values or motivations behind such actions, which emulate the dynamic ideal.

These characteristics enable the ideal and the creative actions that realise it, to be
recognised as a cultural product (an object, system or value) worthy of being adopted by
others (p.201). The ideal of active citizenry fulfilled this criteria as a new ideology: the
ideal was ‘dynamic’ because it was characterised by flexibility so that individuals from
diverse backgrounds could adapt the ideas to their own situations, so that individuals could
respond to real problems arising in social interactions. When the ideal grows into a system
of ideas it contains a nucleus of principled standards and norms that are readily adopted by the masses and applied to different definitions of situations that make it beneficial to those who experience the same or similar social problem (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.292).

When a dynamic ideal attracts widespread followers, usually via the dissemination of the ideal by a social leader, the ideal begins to expand into an ideology during the process of it being accepted and applied by others (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.283). It is transmitted by the leadership to increasing numbers of followers through social interaction (p.283). An ideal lasts as long as it has active promoters who believe it can be universally accepted and realized, even if only in the distant future (p.285). The realisation of the ideal can be confirmed when it guides the standards and norms of others (p.283), and it can be regarded as a stabilized ideology when it is regarded as binding by its followers (p.285). Only when it loses active promoters and its realisation appears to be altogether impossible, does the ideal cease to function as an ideal (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.285).

These points clarify the development of the dynamic ideal into an ideology initiated by social actions and their growth into new cultural patterns of common values, relationships of functional interdependence and ultimately, creative cultural re-organisation (p.359). But note that Znaniecki (1952b) marked the transition point in the transformation of the ideal to an ideology as when the ideal was implemented on a collective scale (p.283), even among small groups (p.285). Because this is a qualitative study, it is not possible to speculate as to how widespread the practice of active citizenry has become. It seems reasonable to suggest that is has passed the embryonic stage, as the new system was no longer reliant on any particular leader to transmit it, but was embodied in the independent social actions of multiple individuals in this study. Traditional values embodying certain collective values aligned with the universal principles of human rights aided in the transmission of the value of these rights. However, a weak link in the community appeared to be intergenerational connections between intellectual leaders. Those Bedoun who took on intellectual leadership roles faced enormous challenges and vulnerability in modelling these ideals for the next generation, once their activities became visible to those social forces that opposed their cultural growth.

8.4 The High Value of the Cultural Collective

8.4.1 The historically, culturally patterned order of Bedoun values.

If dynamic ideals are ‘guiding principles’ introducing new order into the cultural system, can this order be identified in logically consistent way among the Bedoun interviewees? The emergence of the dynamic ideals among interviewees discussed in this section can be characterised by a particular order, according to culturally patterned systems of values and actions. This latter principle is reflected in Znaniecki’s (1952a, p.311) concept of ‘functional interdependence.’ Functional interdependence is the general principle by which individuals are guided when they show a tendency to follow definite cultural patterns when dealing with the same value (or the same complex of values). The actions ‘become
integrated in the course of their performance into an axionormatively organized, dynamic system of actions' (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.311). This explains why we may see the same system of values applied across different stages of historical and cultural growth, systematically applied to a vast range of situations defined by individuals who apply these values independently.

This order would likely posit altruism and communal sentiment as the pre- eminent values of tribal society among the Bedoun, which reflect the historical cultural patterns of the Bedoun when they lived on their traditional dirah (tribal territories). The active values supporting the creative re-organisation of tribal communities in Kuwait, in which the Bedoun population was predominantly featured, existed prior to the Bedouin’s transition to contemporary society but additionally, remained active during the phase of transition to permanent settlement in Kuwait. This was demonstrated by the Bedoun’s gradual relinquishing of the nomadic pattern determined by the seasons, due to the incompatibility of nomadism with new forms of economic participation (al Moosa, 1976), in contrast to the consolidation of cultural patterns of organisation among their households in desert settlements (al Moosa, 1976), and later, urban household settlements among citizen Bedouin (al Haddad, 1981).

The development of intellectual and national identity (citizenship) is one of logical and ordered steps in the development of the group's culture from a pre-literate to literate society (Znaniecki, 1952b) because its members had retained their tribal identity. Literacy is required to facilitate the preparation of young people for full participation in modern society (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.100; Halas, 2010, p.204) and to further enhance the development of culture and loyalty among the masses (Znaniecki, 1952b, p105). These steps are required for societies to develop technical functions, which require skill and conformity in the standards of production to sustain the state economically (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.206; 306). Accordingly, states throughout the Middle East implemented formal settlement programs, which addressed the social and economic needs of the Bedouin tribes and those states, during their transition to permanent settlement and mass nationalisation (Bocco, 2006; Fabietti, 2006), including land distribution and a ‘settlement annuity’ (Fabietti, 1993, at para. 12).

Thus, the development of the national identity assuming the Bedoun’s assimilation into the state of Kuwait by the early 1970s (al Moosa, 1976) was not surprising, because it was planned by thinkers at the regional and national levels (Bocco, 2006; Fabietti, 2006). Note however that the genuine ideal of citizenship was always at odds with the Hadar conception, which viewed the Bedouin as ‘Other’ to their own cultural order.

Representations of the Bedouin at the regional level were characterised by ‘Othering’ from the 1950s and 1960s, when Hadar academics and experts conducted formative research on the Bedouin (Bocco, 2000, p.21). In Kuwait, objectification of the Bedouin was elevated to a more extreme level; the group became targeted as a symbolic ‘foreign’ element (al Anezi, 1989, p.174-176). The state, headed by the Bedouin tribal leader
al Sabah, was perceived as the leader of both a multi-tribal social unit according to customary law (the Bedouin social contract) and the leader of a modernizing, sovereign state (the Hadar social contract). Thus, the national policy to extend citizenship to all Bedouin specifically recruited by the state to provide service to the nation (employment in the military, national guard and the police) was likely regarded by the Bedouin as the (paternal) expression of an altruistic value by the head of state in accordance with the modern law of the state. Clause 4 of the *Nationality Law 1959* (Kuwait) is expressed as a reciprocal value: service to the nation was a condition for the conferral of nationality, which would be fulfilled by public servants, particularly those in the military and police forces whose function was to protect the nation.

The Bedoun were actively assimilated into the national identity via their performance of employment roles protecting the state (Alhajeri, 2004), as well as participating in self-education, government and private sector training to enhance their professional capabilities (al Moosa, 1976, p.149, 215), and via their participation in civic roles such as the census process *as citizens* (see Appendix B, iv for examples of original copies of national census documents issued to the Bedoun, and Appendix D, iii for the two statistical abstracts showing whole population transfer). They integrated their new, citizen identity and corresponding social roles into their existing tribal cultural patterns, while adapting to the contemporary values and regulations of the state.

Thus, the Bedoun’s integration into the state via the recruitment of the tribes *by* the state, and their service *for* the state, and participation *with* the state as citizens waiting for official recognition of their status to be conferred by the state's authorities, confirmed and reinforced their pre-existing, altruistic and communal tribal values. These activities promoted the adaptation and integration of the new value, citizenship in the sovereign state. The rapid historical adaptation of ideals and ideologies within the Bedoun community during the twentieth century, required them to relinquish their centuries-old nomadic and semi-nomadic practices. The process included the requirement that they be granted citizenship in order to function in the economy and in particular, to fulfil their roles in the public service and as workers for private economic projects of the Hadar merchant community (Alhajeri, 2004, p.38). The Bedoun were not yet segregated from the Bedouin community at this time, and therefore their historical, cultural development in Kuwait, was very much a shared history with the citizen Bedouin and the metropolitan classes. Altruistic values promoting service to society were passed on from fathers to sons:

P13: I want to be a good guy. Actually I want to serve my country, like my father and my grandfathers. But I look for the opportunity or the choice.

SK: I see that is a strong theme for the Bedoun, is contributing to Kuwait, serving Kuwait.
The absorption of the national identity signified by the self-ascription of the term ‘Kuwaiti’ transmitted in family and tribal social contexts, was discussed in Chapter 6, section 6.1.2.1. Thus, in the context that the term is used as a self-referent including the Bedoun identity, the term may be regarded as a contemporary referent to belonging to, and wanting to work in service of, the sovereign state (Gross, 1998, p.91, 111).

8.4.2 The transgressions of intellectual debate, creativity and innovation.

It appears that according to the dominant social order in Kuwaiti society, which is controlled by the Hadar, the Bedoun commit transgressions not only by virtue of their mere presence in the state, but also via the expression of cultural identity. Social order relies on conformity with a certain order of social actions. Regular conformity to ideological models is required for this order to be maintained. Transgressions are perceived as injuring the values of conformists or otherwise interfering with the realisation of their purposes (Znaniecki, 1952a, p. 337). The Hadar seemed to have perceived the ‘dangers’ of the Bedoun’s creative reorganisation, a positive, expansive input into the cultural system. Their cultural activity appeared to breach the normative standards of Bedoun segregation and cultural confinement, defined by Hadar values.

The Bedoun were therefore perceived as dangerous to the existing social order when they became publicly active and socially influential, as this had the potential to change the existing social order. Bedoun individuals may be perceived as being adherents of alternative, outsider, systems - possessing ‘uncivilised’ tribal values or alternatively (especially after the Arab Spring), adherents of universal, secular values that destabilise the privileged Hadar with the notion of social and political equality. They may be in the process of becoming members of social groups that support these new value systems, due to opposition and rejection within existing order. They may be faced with active opposition or a revival of conservatism from adherents of the existing social order (p.360), defined by the Hadar as premised on membership to Kuwaiti society, by ‘original’ citizenship.

Through this point I attempt to illustrate the danger of creativity and innovation posed by the Bedoun as non-conformists, particularly threatening to authoritarian systems which rely on conformity and oppression to maintain their organisation of, and control over, society. The targeting of the Bedoun human rights ‘activist’ in this context may be interpreted as a response to the perceived danger of Bedoun non-conformists, signalled by the introduction of a new kind of intellectual content into the cultural system – one that could usurp the dominant sources of power. The new content would not only be perceived as a criticism of the status quo (human rights rhetoric circulated by the media), but embodied among ordinary people in society, threatening to introduce the possibility of new ideals, values and normative behaviours based on the principles of humanitarianism, peace and
social cooperation, to the whole of society. Thus, an alternative framework could be adopted by the masses, such as the ‘pro-democracy’ sentiments expressed across the Middle East during the Arab Spring. Furthermore, this kind of positive, expansive cultural development would likely lead to the increased capacity of society to produce innovative leaders who can solve social problems via cooperation with different interest groups.

Such developments that could challenge the existing social order had been identified. Both the citizen and stateless (Bedoun) Bedouin leaders in Kuwait, Mussallam al Barrack and Hafeem al Fadhli, were incarcerated for exercising their freedom of speech and public gathering while this thesis was written. Bedouin leader Mussalam al Barrack had shown signs of the capacity to solve the Bedoun problem via his attempt to introduce humanitarian values at the parliamentary level, which was interpreted as an antithesis to the current power structure (al Rasheed, 2015). Al Fadhli served shorter, concurrent sentences, characterised by torture and threats to life (Amnesty International, et al., July 15, 2014; April 29, 2016; August 5, 2016; October 6, 2016). He was incarcerated in 2016 prior to my submitting this thesis, for public gathering in 2011 and 2012.

While commentators such as Chomsky (Chomsky, 2008, 2016; Chomsky in Hurwitz et al., 1977) view the overarching imperative of the Gulf governments (and their Western imperialist supporters) as the maintenance of authoritarian governance in order to suppress general democratisation from taking hold among citizens, the situation in Kuwait is somewhat different. Despite their oppression and marginalisation, the Bedoun have maintained functional social relationships within the Bedouin community. The potential to destabilize Hadar domination (but not necessarily the ruling regime) if the Bedoun were granted Kuwaiti citizenship, is real. Thus, the imperative has been not only to prevent democracy spreading among citizens, but to violently suppress the aspirations for democracy that spread among Bedouin citizens, and sentiments of support for citizenship to be granted to the Bedoun. The largest protest movements of Kuwait’s Arab Spring arose from these two ethnic sub-groups of the Kuwaiti Bedouin.

Historically, these values were not part of the so-called citizen-state ‘social contract’ in Kuwait, because it was essentially, a Hadar contract (al Naezi, 1989). Although all Kuwaiti citizens are distributed regular, lucrative lump sum cash payments to their bank accounts by the state (oil dividends), Hadar citizens remain structurally privileged to the detriment of the Bedouin citizens, due to the nature of resource distribution and infrastructure development (al Nakib, F., 2014). The nature of resource distribution and infrastructure development is in turn, built upon Hadar-dominated national policies and influence with the ruling family, including the manipulation of the *Nationality Law 1959* (Kuwait) (al Naezi, 1989). The ethnic conflict between the Bedouin and Hadar has involved the suppression of social change initiated by Kuwait’s Bedouin population. The high value of self-centred materialism has bound the Hadar to the contract – they have rewarded themselves with the spoils of the state while the Bedouin are excluded and oppressed from
exercising ‘real’ citizenship (one of the predominant themes of anti-Bedouin ideology, discussed in Chapter 7).

Hadar control has been so strongly premised on mono-ethnic nationalism, which has transformed Kuwaiti society into an apartheid state comparable to the entrapment of the Palestinians in Israel, to split and oppress the northern and southern Bedouin tribes. Recently, the go-ahead for the sale of the Bedoun’s collective identity to one of the most impoverished governments in the world (the Comoros Islands) was confirmed (Izzak, May 17, 2016). Hakeem al Fadhli explained the ideological stagnation and narrow-mindedness he believes is characteristic of the Hadar ethnic in contemporary society:

I believe that the Bedouin life right now… it is more advanced than the Hadar, themselves.

Why? Because we don’t have the same mentality as the Hadar. Their mentality is different right now. They don’t think of the Hadar as a weak people or just a stupid people… or a naive people. (Hakeem al Fadhli, interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 5 August, 2015)

Here, he referred to the fact that the Hadar think of the Bedouin as weak, stupid and naive. This tendency for the Bedouin to view the Hadar compassionately compared to the Hadar, who look down upon the Bedouin, was confirmed by my analysis of scholarly and public discourse on the Bedouin and Bedoun, particularly ‘developmental’ theories, which I discuss further below (Chapter 8, including Table 26).

Why, the Hadar, they having the same ideas before 100 years, and still the same now? They are thinking ‘Oh, he is a Bedouin, he should have a camel in his home…’

But it is not, it is different, totally different…

His opinion of the ideology:

It is a shameful thing, that’s what I think. (Hakeem al Fadhli, interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 5 August, 2015)

8.4.3 Challenging the dominant paradigm.

Znaniecki (1952b, p.24) emphasised that the birth of national culture society does not commence within authoritatively organised groups or association of members of the economically dominant class, but originates in the ideals proposed by individuals who are or become intellectual leaders:

It originates with independent, individual leaders in various realms of cultural activity, who gradually create a national culture in which a plurality of traditional regional cultures becomes partly synthesized…. As the national culture grows, these leaders, and their followers, and sponsors who participate
in its growth form an increasingly coherent intellectual community activated by
the ideal of a culturally united and socially solidary national society… (p.24)

The realisation of this ideal is expected to overcome the cultural isolation
of local and regional communities, political divisions, religious differences,
class conflicts… Throughout this process new social groups become
organised and existing groups modified, either to promote further
development and perpetuation of the national culture or to integrate, expand
and defend the evolving society.’ (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.24-25)

Bedoun intellectual and social leaders have attempted to overcome their cultural
isolation since the Arab Spring as I have mentioned, but their message has been interpreted
through the narrow lens of political science and the limited scope of reporting by
international humanitarian organisations. Broadly speaking, the consequences of the
stigmatisation of the Bedoun ethnic identity, the targeting of intellectual identity and the
policy of repressing the Bedoun's development of intellectual capacity, is that the group's
intellectual identity and intellectual contributions have also been stigmatised, omitted or
actively repressed.

This approach occurred at the same time as to academic researchers were
interpreting information about the Bedoun’s administrative expulsion as a ‘policy
change’ (Longva, 1997, p.51, 52), a ‘secret decree’ (Beaugrand, 2010, p.150) and a
‘subtraction’ of the population (Crystal, 1995, p.182) amidst a systematic series of official
policies of exclusion and expulsion, the physical ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun after the
Iraq war (Fineman, November 2, 1992) and the Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’
program, which has attempted to make the population appear to be nationals of other states
since 1983 (al Anezi, 1989, p.267). This has contributed to a virtual academic silence about
the Bedoun, influenced by local intellectuals who produced the local version of the tribalism
theory, following in the footsteps of their European and American scholarly mentors (al
Ghabra, 1997a; al Khandari and al Hadben, 2010; al Ansari in al Qatari, February 22, 2010;
al Jassem in 'Kuwaiti academic,’ 2016), which has become the dominant ideology.

The administrative expulsion of the Bedoun (1986), post-war ethnic cleansing of the
Bedoun (1990-1995) and the Central Apparatus ‘status adjustment’ program (1983-), all
reflect a pattern of cultural destruction (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.213). The pattern has targeted
intellectual leaders, limiting their development, social roles and influence within their own
societies, as well as Kuwaiti society and beyond. As I have mentioned, the Bedoun’s
intellectual expression of their identity and culture, which inevitably involves descriptions of
human rights deprivations due to the Bedoun’s situation, is clearly regarded by the
government of Kuwait as a challenge to the dominant paradigm and as a transgression that
must be met with punitive action (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.336).
Al Rasheed (2015) described a similar approach to the Bedouin citizen community in Kuwait, and the same ideological themes have been repeated in regard to the ‘transgressions’ of both Bedouin citizens and the Bedouin stateless population (the Bedoun) for decades. For example, as I discussed in Chapter 7, the Bedouin and Bedoun are described as not ‘real,’ ‘true’ or ‘pure’ Kuwaitis in recurring motifs (Alhajeri, 2004, p.16; see also ‘Racial Tensions,’ 2010; ‘Insulted Kuwaiti,’ 2012), which may be linked to motifs of nationalist ideology held by oppositional groups, such as the quest for purity (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.356) and the myth of ‘original’ perfection (p.87).

The Bedoun have been persecuted not only on the basis of their ethnic identity, but also in response to their intellectual development and public intellectual expression, which is a natural expression of their individual, social and cultural (ethnic and tribal) identities and experience in the social and cultural collective. Hakeem al Fadhli pointed out the risks of challenging the dominant paradigm which has criminalized the Bedoun as ‘other nationals,’ reflected in methodological issues and theoretical positioning:

Why, we are talking about humans, and we are talking about culture… and we are talking about… these people they are in this land for at least the last five hundred years.

These people [academic researchers] who are supposed to be putting the structure, or the profile, the knowing [accumulation of knowledge], or… the demographic system of Kuwait… they are talking… and reading a lot … But they don’t know the people, they don’t move through the people, know the Bedoun. They did not go to al Jahra, they don’t sit with the Kuwaiti Bedouins, the Bedouin people. They don’t like them. First, if you want to know, you must meet with the people and talk with them. (Hakeem al Fadhli, interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 5 August, 2015)

The Bedoun leader touched on the dynamic of the humanistic coefficient (Znaniecki, 1952a, p.132). He implored researchers to look beyond the dominant paradigm that segregated the Bedoun, to discover who the Bedoun really are. The dominant paradigm could only be properly understood in this context. His ideas followed the similar lines of argument that have been used in cultural studies by Znaniecki (1952a) and Halas (2010):

Human beings create culture together. Therefore, it is not enough to study the continuation and development of culture from the point of view objective reality and structure of these systems… It is necessary to study the social organisation of cultural life of human beings. (Halas, 2010, p.165).

Al Fadhli pointed to the dominance of the Hadar over the production of knowledge about Kuwaiti society, including interpretations of the Bedouin ethnic identity, which has theoretically positioned the Bedoun as not genuine, criminalized, and ‘other’ than what it really is. He explained that Hadar intellectuals and gatekeepers were assumed to fulfil the
role of interpreters of Kuwaiti society by international human rights advocates, scholars and journalists, although Hadar have been historically, politically opposed to the Bedouin:

Why did all the academic studies till now… why are they coming to some kind of line, like a common idea… You know why? Because the same [kind of] person that is supposed to be helping them to study, they feed it [the same ideas] to the people who come from all over the world, from the outside.

But I know they don’t have… [the] mind to answer the question, because they are not from our society. We are the nation, we are the tribes…

If we are not from Kuwait and we are not Bedouin, then what are we? If we are not Bedouin and we are not supposed to be Hadar, then what are we? If we are not from Kuwait, then we are from where? This is the main issue, it is not academic… it is not [a matter of] analysis… it is pure, socially pure, racism. Nothing more. (Hakeem al Fadhli, interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 5 August, 2015)

Al Fadhli challenged the dominant paradigm that has questioned the origins of the Bedoun via criminalising tropes, built on the (incorrect) assumption they held citizenship in other nations (Crystal, 1992, p.75, 76, 1995, p.167; Longva, 1997, p.51). He questioned why the Bedu should relinquish their collective identity simply because they live in urban environs (al Nakib, F., 2014, p.5). He also emphasised the gaps in academic rationale theorising the identity of the Bedoun and Bedouin in Kuwaiti society, which had lead to the incorrect assumption the Bedoun are not part of the Bedouin society or ethnic group (Beaugrand, 2010, p.18) or do not have an awareness of ‘ethnic’ issues that affect their situation (Beaugrand, 2014a, p.3).

Most of the interviewees identified the ethnic targeting and various forms of discrimination as racism, as this is the term in English that is used locally to refer to the social and cultural conflict experienced by the Bedoun and/or Bedouin (for examples in the local newspapers, see Abbas, April 22, 2014; al Ansari in al Qatari, February 22, 2010; Darwish, October 20, 2015; 'Kuwaiti Bedouin,' December 10, 2009). Additionally for the Bedoun, it is a term they recognize from references to racial discrimination in the human rights context, via the lens of minority rights. The emphasis on the term has been developed by them in reference to their understanding of international law, and the interest of international humanitarian agencies' approach to Bedoun, which has been largely delimited by the concept of discrimination and minority rights (see my discussion in Chapter 2, section 2.5 and Chapter 6, section 6.2). Despite this, once interviews moved beyond dialogues of ‘rights,’ interviewees refer to a range of expressions of ethnic/cultural concepts, including their identity, tribal belonging, social relationships, ‘passing’ (Ginsberg, 1996) inside citizen society, conforming to social norms in Bedouin and Hadar society, stigma, humiliation, hate-speech, culture, nation, being ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the social group, and so on.
In this study I have attempted to outline the applicability of framing the Bedoun’s situation in the context of cultural systems and ethnic groups, while attempting to refer specifically to different types of social exclusion, discrimination, prejudice and so on, and being careful not to over-generalise terms such as ‘racism’ and ‘marginalisation,’ as specific reference to social actions was a strength of Znaniecki’s (1952a) cultural science theory (Bierstedt, 1981, p.213). I am not sure if my frequent use of 'ethnic targeting' helps to overcome the overuse of these other terms, but the factor of ethnic identity and persecution of grounds of ethnicity and tribal identity, is salient. Nevertheless, I have challenged the notion that the Bedouin and Hadar are one ethnic or national group (promoted by Longva, 1997, 2006), and attempted to show that the Bedouin-Hadar ethnic difference is, generally speaking, fairly clear at the grassroots level of Kuwaiti society. Although there are exceptions, the cultural differences and ethnic conflict emphasised by both the Bedouin (including the Bedoun) and Hadar can be read in Kuwait's daily newspapers. Furthermore, I have also mentioned that Hadar scholars very clearly pointed out the ethnic differences between their own group and the Bedouin, through their objectification and dehumanisation of the Bedouin in scholarly writings.

In Chapter 7, I surveyed a number of contributions to ideas that framed the Bedouin as culturally distinct, if not incompatible, with the Hadar, and I challenged of the opinions of scholars that such ethnic distinctions were merely 'popular discourse' (Longva, 2006; al Nakib, F., 2014; Beaugrand, 2014a; Fletcher, 2015) because it was quite clear that these ideas have a strong, ideological component that has origins in, and is disseminated by, intellectuals through political and academic discourse (which is not 'popular discourse' in my view, but quite specialised dialogues) (see my analysis in Appendix C, vi-viii). Specifically, language deployed to discuss the Bedouin and Bedoun in society have contained a nucleus of principles and values embraced by sociologists and anthropologists. For example, the notion that Kuwaiti Bedouin society and culture is inherently ‘anti-modern’ but should disappear upon complete assimilation into urban society was, developed by Learner (1958), and remains popular across disciplines (al Nakib, F., 2014, 2016; Alissa, 2013; Ghabra, 1997a, 1997b; Têtreault, 2001, 2003).

The more overtly anti-ethnic portrayals of the Bedouin ‘mind,’ adopted from Patai’s (1976) famous treatise on ‘The Arab Mind,’ seems to have been quite popular with Kuwait's urban Hadar intellectuals (and many others). The treatise was projected onto the rural dwellers in the guise of tribalism theory (for example, al Khandari and al Hadben, 2010, al in al Qatari, February 22, 2010, al Naqeeb, 1990, Alessa, 1981, Khalaf and Hammoud, 1987 and al Jassem, in ‘Kuwaiti Academic,’ 2016). In the previous chapter, I also outlined some of the most potentially harmful, emerging themes in the literature, highlighting the trend toward casual eradication dialogues (Abrahamian, 2015), negative eugenics (Johns, et al., 2015) and dehumanisation (Beaugrand, 2010) (see Appendix C, vi-viii). Some of the other themes analysed (and this is by no means an exhaustive list) that reflect ideologies seeking to
challenge or oppress the Bedoun’s capacity for intellectual development and expression, were clustered around the theme of ‘Developmental approaches to the Bedouin’ are shown in the Table 26 below. Quite often, these ideas were used in arguments promoting the segregation of the Bedouin.

Despite this troubling edifice of intellectual opinion, Bedouin intellectual and social leaders have continued to contribute to the growing literature on the Bedouin and Kuwaiti society since 1991 (Human Rights Watch, 1991a). They have contributed to the development of knowledge about their society by bypassing local gatekeepers, and communicating directly with the global community via social and news media, with journalists, international humanitarian organisations and researchers since the Arab Spring (2011-2012). Furthermore, this development has occurred as a result of self-education and self-initiated community education. It has occurred due to the deliberate, independent Table 26

Summary of Themes of ‘Developmental’ Approaches to the Bedouin in Academic and Public Discourse

‘Developmental’ approaches (meta-theme)

The ‘psychological development’ approach (theme)
- Intellectual and personality characteristics
  - The Bedouin ‘mind’
  - The Bedouin ‘personality’
  - The Bedouin ‘attitude’
- Capacity for productivity
  - The lazy, ‘underproductive’ Bedouin
  - The ignorant, Bedouin ‘illiterates’

The ‘cultural development’ approach (theme)
- Misrepresentations of ‘dangerous’ social activities (examples confined to ordinary activities and normal behaviours)
  - Cultural practices
  - Recreational practices
  - Educational practices
  - Work practices
- Cultural hygiene – ‘Desertisation’ and feminist critiques
  - ‘Desertisation’ - urban pollution and the ‘national security threat’ (examples confined to ordinary activities and normal behaviours)
    - More ‘dangerous’ tribal activities
    - Religious practices
    - Personal appearance
  - Scholarly, feminist critique
    - Bedouins with women’s representation are misguided
    - Bedouins won’t support purchase of weapons of mass destruction
    - Bedouins are religious fanatics and terrorists

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The (deprivation of) ‘resources’ approach (theme)

- Deprivation of resources targeting Bedouin in desert settlements and popular housing areas
- Delay in state education expenditure on the Bedoun at all levels
- Lack expenditure on Bedouin children’s education by design
- Arguments for the withdrawal of the state education expenditure
- Arguments for the withdrawal of resources from civil society

Note: This table shows analysis of a particular meta-theme into themes, sub-themes, sub-sub-themes and minor sub-sub-themes. I have not provided every quote for this thematic analysis (unlike the interview analysis), but a referenced, detailed discussion of these themes can be found in Appendix C, vi).
actions of individuals, as a result of their active participation in society and of increasing innovation (Halas, 2010, p.200). Individuals who have accepted the duty to develop their own skills and generate innovations valuable to others, are regarded as fulfilling the role of creative innovators (Halas, 2010, p.200). Thus, the transmission the intellectual identity as an ideal may be regarded as having influenced the cultural expansion and creative reorganisation of Bedoun society. Until the Arab Spring, the group had been undergoing ethnic proliferation and consolidation in response to the expulsions of the 1980s and 1990s. Signs of cultural expansion were not known or seen by scholars prior to the Arab Spring period.

The expansion of the Bedoun’s culture has occurred via the interactions of Bedoun social and intellectual leaders with the global community in the spheres of activity I referred to above. The group’s attempt to restore their human rights led to engagement with the intellectual field of international humanitarian law, as well as social and professional engagement with international humanitarian organisations. Thus, the Bedoun’s intellectual engagement with human rights had provided the opportunity for cross-cultural fertilisation (Znaniecki, 1952a), while intellectuals in the social sciences had worked toward depriving the Bedoun of the capacity to develop intellectually as a whole group, and continued to manufacture ideologies that work contrary to these aspirations.

The Bedoun’s cultural expansion in relation to their human rights, had also been generated by ordinary Bedoun individuals in Kuwait, as indicated by the range of social and cultural activities and experiences recounted by the interviewees in this study. They persisted with ‘normal’ cultural activities such as vocational, technical and higher education and sought to normalise their social relations in public spaces through the ideal of genuine citizenship. Those Bedoun who are taking on intellectual leadership roles in their community have been being ethnically targeted as ‘activists’ of human rights; yet if their human rights and citizenship had been provided to them, they would have been more readily recognized for their alternative roles in other areas as innovators, intellectuals, community leaders and educators, which they currently perform.

The Bedouin community as a whole, does not yet appear to have reached its full intellectual ‘awakening’ as a result of mass education, though this threshold seems to be fast approaching (if al Nakib’s, F., 2014 comments are correctly timed). The Arab Spring marked the beginning of the Bedoun’s discovery their of role in creating and disseminating their own historical and cultural narratives that compete with the official, mono-ethnic, Hadar ideologies. By building on their intellectual capital, they hoped to find a way out of their oppression and entrapment in the state. WHule Alnajjar and Selvik (2016) argue that the only political model capable of delivering the Bedoun a release from their situation is a ‘real’ democracy, which
Kuwaitis don’t want (p.67), other channels in law may be pursued against individuals and corporations who have profited from the Bedoun’s murder, entrapment, ethnic cleansing, their physical and cultural destruction. Democracy is not a requirement for accountability to the crime of *jus cogens*.

8.4.4 A new vision of society.

The development of a unified, modern cultural identity and the production of cultural products which reinforce it, requires leadership in different areas of cultural activity (intellectual, social and technical) (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.24; Halas, 2010, p.191). Previously, the Hadar had adopted the role of intellectual leaders of the Bedouin ‘illiterates’ in Kuwaiti society, until the administrative expulsion of the Bedoun could be achieved (Alessa, 1981). The Bedoun were left without strong leadership after their expulsion, particularly due to the timing of the Iraq war (where their military leaders also abandoned them, see Alhajeri, 2004) and their ethnic cleansing immediately after the war. Various degrees of ethnic expansion and contraction (Horowitz, 1975), conservative and creative cultural re-organisation (Znaniecki, 1952a) likely occurred at this time, although this period was not accounted for in academic research.

The Bedoun began to assert social leadership roles within their own community commencing in the early phase of the Arab Spring following revolutionary activity in Tunisia (al Saadi, November 24, 2011; Davidson, 2013), and since then, ordinary individuals have consciously modelled genuine citizenship in their social interactions within and beyond the local community, a framework through which they perceive themselves as members of Kuwaiti society and in fact, as citizens of Kuwait. This ‘new order’ of society integrated the values of altruism (mutual aid) and communal sentiment into the cultural system in social interactions with other cultural groups. These values may be seen as a local expression of social values emphasised in Western societies: equality and social inclusion, which is also described by the Bedoun and Kuwaiti citizens as love, the ancient principle of universal love through which subjects seek social unification (Halas, 2010, p.120).

In this section, I focus on altruism expressed through the principle of universal education, which the interviewees identified with quite strongly. The value of the cultural collective expressed was ‘a new vision for society’ discussed by an intellectual leader (P09), based on the notion that Kuwait may only become a truly developed society when intellectual values are transmitted to all Bedoun through universal education, a value defined in international human rights law (Article 26, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations 1948; Articles 13 and 14, International Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights). The notion that the Bedoun share values compatible with the goals of mainstream Kuwaiti society would become more apparent to those social groups who oppose the Bedoun, if the Bedoun could access the resources to actually realize those values.

A large, public social gathering called *I Have a Dream* took place in Kuwait during the Arab Spring (al Saadi, January 3, 2012). Such public gatherings are rare in Kuwait. One
of the purposes of this event was to stimulate the creative imaginations of the young Bedoun in order to give them hope and to encourage their increased participation in society, especially in education (al Saadi, January 3, 2012). The rationale behind the social event was that once young Bedoun had developed their intellectual abilities and confidence as a result of receiving college and higher education, they will be more likely to develop the capacity to articulate themselves among Kuwaiti citizens and other nationals in Kuwait (P09).

Young Bedoun’s self-empowerment and ability to think independently would be strengthened by the cultural exchange with others from different cultural systems. The rationale seemed to have a similar potential to affect cross-communications with other social groups, such as the use of strategies adopted by intellectual and social leaders who had bypassed Hadar gate-keepers and communicated directly with the international community. However, the I Have a Dream event was focused on developing positive relationships between groups locally, with Bedouin and Hadar citizens. Znaniecki (1952b) referred to this kind of positive and cooperative input into the cultural system through personal interactions as the part of the creative cultural expansion of cultures, which he believed was one of the most positive forms of cultural relations. This type of creative development could reduce aggressive tendencies within cultures and restore equilibrium to social relations (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.145).

In theory, the modelling of such behaviours by the Bedoun with other ethnic groups in citizen society could reduce aggressive sentiments toward the Bedoun. Znaniecki (1952b) called this type of social input from one culture into another, ‘cultural fertilisation’ (p.145). He believed that when both of the groups involved in such exchanges were able to use creative developments to promote the growth of their cultures, ‘cross-cultural fertilisation’ had occurred (p.145). This process occurred when national societies utilised the results of creative work done by other societies for their own development. The I Have a Dream event described above was created along these lines.

The event encouraged individuals to move beyond the boundaries of Bedoun and Bedouin culture and to aspire to increased social interaction and educational achievement. As a result of the event, many individuals came forward to offer financial support to ‘sponsor’ Bedoun to complete courses of higher education, which was organised by Bedoun social intellectual leaders. During my fieldwork in Kuwait, other Bedoun who were not associated with the organisation of this event, verified the outcome of the event and the phenomena of resource-sharing in society for the purpose of education (see Table 24 and Appendix B, ii, where I discuss the failed Education Fund that was claimed to pay for the Bedoun’s education). These series of actions comprised positive inputs within Kuwaiti society.

This was the thinking behind the ‘I Have a Dream’ ideal (see al Saadi, January 3, 2012), work in the Khatatib school (al Hajji, October 14, 2014) and the efforts of mature
members of the community encouraging young people not to give up on their situation, to resist the tendency toward seclusion and to remain active participants in society. P09 explained his hope of a new vision for society for Kuwait:

P09: We are trying to make a new society for Bedoun, new ideas, get them out from scared [living in fear], you know? There is some people trying to help Bedoun, somebody to give them hope…. Now we are thinking young Bedouns who are studying at university, they are trying to think in a different way, not like another generation… for a lot of them, if they find another way to get to another country, they will not stay here.

So he is trying to make some plans, ‘When I finished I must find some places, not important is here. I want to have a good live, a happy life, I want to make my family, I want to work a good work and make something in my work.’

So the Bedoun generation now, the young, they have now… not like [before]… they are thinking to have a new dreams, the new dreams… because he saw his big brothers or his uncles or another people… they [government] destroyed their dreams. So they want to study and finish university, and that’s important to [them]…. So there are a lot of difference [between the generations].

I think they will not deny it, that, and they will remember us. We were the first guys who said ‘No, we must have a good future for the next generation.’ I think they will not forget us…. I hope that. (Participant 9, 26 March, 2014, interview in Taima, Kuwait)

Active participation in society by the Bedoun in education and employment in a new society in which the Bedoun had acquired Kuwaiti citizenship, would substantially diminish the perceived ‘threat’ of tribal culture promulgated in Hadar nationalist tropes aligned with tribalism theory (al Moosa, 1976; Alessa, 1981; al Naqeeb, 1990). The Bedouin collectivity would no longer be required to reinforce their tribal ethnic identity (as a primary identity) in defensive cooperation in order to access basic resources through wasta (informal networks). They would be free to express their identity in a plural society in which all social groups cooperated in solidarity with each other for the benefit of society, as members of one nation. However, the notion of a ‘new society’ was focused on problem-solving by the Bedoun within the Bedouin community, within the scope of their very limited freedoms and resources. It was not intended to account for the underlying problem posed by the mono-ethnic ideology which formed the basis of Hadar national identity, which intellectuals had continued to elaborate, undermining the very cultural development within the Bedoun population that they had disparaged and lamented in their tribalism theories (al Khandari and al Hadben, 2010; al Ansari in al AQatari, February 22, 2010; Ghabra, 2014; al Jassem in ‘Kuwaiti academic,’ 2016).

According to this vision, mass education of the Bedoun was required for the population to participate in contemporary society, while citizenship was required to secure
this right along with the removal of the specific and additional layers of restrictions on the Bedoun’s cultural expression. This conception was precisely the opposite to the nationalist agendas of key Kuwaiti intellectuals, which had constructed a nationalist vision for the cultural destruction of the Bedoun, premised on the deprivation of education (al Naqeeb, 1990, p.127-128; Alessa, 1981, p.108-109) as a necessary measure for to the suppression of ideas, *vis a vis* ‘tribal consciousness’ (al Naqeeb, 1990), specifically, the Bedoun’s awareness of their political and human rights (Alessa, 1981). The author of this new vision of society (Participant 9) was unaware of Alessa’s (1981) very specific policy design later realised in government policy expelling the Bedoun. He had formed his ideas independently on the basis of his experience as an intellectual with many years experience functioning in citizen society. According to social theory, the individual constructs the cultural world by participating in it. Through subjective experience the cultural world, it becomes integrated into the personality, and by social action, the individual co-creates the reality (Halas, 2010, p.131). P09 had consciously entered the process of becoming in the cultural world and affected social change that had touched the Bedoun society. By inspiring others with the reality of an alternative system of ideas, he had shown the community that social change was possible.

This new vision of society had the potential to address directly, the principles which had enabled the state to oppress the Bedoun and render them perpetually stateless, by targeting education (at all levels) and intellectual development of the whole group as part of the plans for administrative expulsion and deprivation of citizenship (in Alessa, 1981; *The Study*, ‘2003). One young interviewee in his twenties questioned the national policy strategy of restricting education to prevent a whole population group from participating feely and effectively in the economy:

P13: … But the parents here cannot, cannot afford that [to pay for education]. Most of them cannot… get even food. No, their education, education is [a] luxury, you know. They need more then 74% to get accepted into the university, but if they didn’t, they can’t [be admitted into university or college].

That is if they have a Kuwaiti mother they can, but if they didn’t they can’t. It is a very complicated situation and… most of them come from parents didn’t study. Most of them [the parents] in the military [and then] they didn’t work, they didn’t find work. And if they did find work it is only about 200 to 300 [KD per month]… it’s really hard to know their situation.

Most of the people didn’t go to study they went to work… [But they] cannot find work, because they are not [acquiring post-secondary] education and they don’t have a degree.

That is about the community, not the government. I don’t know how the government is thinking, what is the strategy. But you know, you can
simplify it. If you put a slice of the community in one area, and you didn’t teach them, you didn’t give them work, what do you expect from them to be? What do you expect from them, exactly? Do you want them to be doctors, or nurses or what? Most of them will be criminals. They are uneducated…and you know that…it is a danger, if we didn’t teach those people.

SK: There are other people who have hadn’t had any education…

P13: Who haven’t had any school at all? They didn’t go to school before because they could not pay the fees. Before they have left school to work in the street, not official work or something like that.…

SK: How many do you think are like that?

P13: Seventy percent of Bedouns.

SK: Seventy percent? So you are talking tens of thousands.

P13: About, more than fifty thousand.

I support uneducated people to get educated. I speak to them and I motivate them as I can. If some one I know, one of my friends, I support them to register at university. Sometimes I will help them with money, if I can.

But the more Bedoun works for Kuwait, the more it will benefit the country, not for the people. The country needs skilled people…and even getting a degree the Kuwait people, it is a selfish thing. They only want a degree, [their perception is] ‘I have it.’ [But] they didn’t use it… It’s about government strategy, I don’t know it… but… they are creating uneducated people [among the Bedoun]. There is a lot of conflict, maybe I don’t know how many people… maybe the way of speaking: ‘You are Bedoun.’ (Participant 13, interview in Salmiya, Kuwait, 2 April, 2014)

The interviewees discussed a variety of experiences of belonging and marginalisation with Bedouin citizens, whereas during interactions with the Hadar citizen community they were faced with stigmatisation and almost wholesale rejection. Where individuals had a weak tribal affiliation or had been rejected by their family or tribe due to their statelessness, they felt crushed. This was because tribal solidarity was the one area regarded as the basis of social security and support expected by the Bedouin in environments where the state did not provide it, reflecting the values of traditional tribal solidarity, asabiya (Gross, 1998, p.111). This is why tribal communities persist in states with weak civil governance, in states which deprive a tribal group of public resources and which threaten such social groups (Gross, 1998). These individuals found comparatively stronger solidarity among the Bedoun, as I mentioned in regard to the discussion by P14 about his community in Taima. In particular, some interviewees had experienced abandonment by their extended families or tribal elders in times of need, which they attributed to their Bedoun status.
these cases, aspiration toward the ideal of universal belonging to the global community, embodied in the universal principles of human rights, compensated for the limitations of traditional culture, which was impacted by the tribal stigma (Goffman, 1963) of Bedoun identity.

Given these experiences, the Bedoun identified with the values of the Bedoun collective as a unique group characterised by multi-tribal membership, ethnic solidarity and common life experience that set them apart from Bedouin citizens. Some, but not all, felt solidarity with those in the Bedoun community in their local neighbourhoods, individuals whom they knew personally, or with whom they shared social media contacts, as well as Bedoun social leaders. This was shown in the discussion of the proliferation and consolidation (Horowtiz, 1975) of the Bedoun sub-ethnic group at the beginning of this discussion, which demonstrated a shared consciousness of collective solidarity. Although they remained extremely vulnerable as a population group threatened by the state via the ‘status adjustment’ program, which imposed a system of oppression that enforced restrictive cultural re-organisation, the interview data indicated the some sections of group were undergoing creative re-organisation and cultural expansion, even participating in the discussion of humanitarian issues an international level, as they learned how they might adapt and survive into the future.

The repression of the Bedoun and Bedouin citizens in public speech indicates the active disorganisation of society. The most intense area of surveillance and perceived transgressions of the Bedoun regarded their expression of intellectual capacity and reference to their own situation. This focus reflected Alessa’s (1981) preoccupation with the potential of the political power of the Bedouin ‘illiterates.’ In the Gulf, the assertion of Bedouin identity has continued to emerge since the Arab Spring (2010-2011) (Alshawi and Gardner, 2014; al Rasheed, 2015). The key values expressed by the Bedouin who have sought greater freedoms and equitable access to resources in the Arabian Gulf are compatible with the Islamic value of the *Ummah*, the global spiritual community (Akram, 2007; see also Abdullahi an ‘Naim, 2008, in Edayat, 2014, p.21) and the awareness of human rights law and the roles, obligations and duties of citizens and the state (al Rasheed, 2015). Thus, a number of different modes of thought or spheres of social life to which the Kuwaiti Bedoun have limited access, appeared to be simultaneously converging to influence group social values, combined with defensive opposition toward the forces which seek to destroy Bedouin cultural values (al Rasheed, 2015).

Hakeem al Fadhli described the dual influences of Hadar dominance over government policy and processes along with the lack of cooperation of the Hadar with other groups in civil society. He believed this problem arose from the Hadar’s inability to identify shared values between themselves and other social groups, based on the ideology of elitism (similar to the description of Hadar social and cultural values set out by al Anezi, 1989, p. 174-175). The ideology continued to infiltrate the youngest generations of Hadar. He also
believed that the ideology had stimulated the progressive consolidation the Bedoun and the Bedouin ethnic group in cooperative defence since the Arab Spring (2011-2012).

I asked the participant about his opinion about future developments in social relations between the Bedoun citizen Bedouins, as a result of their increased participation in higher education. He elaborated by first referring to manner in which ethnic targeting, citizenship-stripping and restrictions on freedom of expression experienced by Bedouin citizens from 2011 to 2015 had highlighted the instability of their citizenship in the state of Kuwait, and just how close many were to losing their citizenship. In doing so, he affirmed the ethnic relations between the two tribal groupings. The Hadar citizenship, by comparison, had remained privileged, stable and taken-for-granted:

It is not now, but it is coming, on the way… Because just right now is happening to the Bedoun is happening to the Bedu….

Second, because the closest group of the people… as like the ethnic… we are very close, even if we are talking about the tribes, it is very close. Even if there is some difference, between the northern and southern tribe, still there is some kind of [social] relations.

The Hadar they have the problem, still they are seeing everyone else, is like someone who is less human and is down to them [inferior].

They are no longer flexible any more. They are running out of ideas. They [the Hadar] think, ‘We have a disagreement, we cannot come to work on some kind of solution, no.’ Whoever does not like the way the country is running - outside, he has to go outside [outside the country: via citizenship-stripping and/or deportation].

Really, the Hadar they are becoming a very closed society, they are not open any more. Yes, we have some kind of social media like, twitter… but you can see, the same closed minds [expressed] in the diwanniya, you can see it on twitter on Instagram or Facebook. You can see the same mentality.

I can understand the old man, the old woman, sixty years old, who is thinking in the so racist and closed-minded way. But someone who is twenty or twenty-five years old, he is going to the university and he is supposed to have friends from all over Kuwait, and there is the social media, and there is a new world… And he is still thinking the same way that his family is thinking. (Hakeem al Fadhli, interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 3 August, 2015)

Secondly, the interviewee had inadvertently but quite clearly, articulated the process whereby the Hadar ideology had begun to crystallise into dogma. He had noted the underlying rejection of all Bedouin (citizen or Bedoun), the influence of the ideology disseminated across multiple communications channels and audiences (physical and online communications, and intergenerational transmission), and the closing down of the dynamic system of ideas (the Hadar were unable to generate new ideas, the inflexibility of existing
ideas, which would lead to repetition of the ideology in response to demands to solve new problems, and an incapacity to cooperate with other social groups) (Znaniecki, 1952a discussed this process in detail). Some of these characteristics can be seen in the variety of methods and target audiences used to suppress Bedoun intellectual activity, in Table 26 (above).

Furthermore, these are all tendencies which appear to be largely unchanged since the concept that citizenship could, and should, be withheld from the Bedoun was introduced as a general policy platform by Kuwaiti Arab nationalists around 1965 (Mdaires, 2010) and then emerged as a specific set of restrictions on the Bedoun's participation in the nation some ten years later, through the medium of urban planning and development theories absorbed by the Municipality of Kuwait and the Ministry for Planning (al Awadi, 1980; al Khatib, 1978; al Moosa, 1976; Zhou, 1976). Through this localised urban development paradigm, Hadar academics felt free to develop their vision of their city, explaining their need for segregation of the Bedouin who had not yet received citizenship (the Bedoun), through the dangerous, primordial ideal of cultural hygiene (refer to the analysis of academic discourse, Table 26, and Appendix C, vi). Znaniecki (1952a, p.286) referred to this problem as the regression of dynamic ideals into dogma, which causes stagnation of culture and limits creative cultural development (Halas, 2010, p.164). A problem with such conservative organisation is that its adherents do not recognise the increasing conformity it requires to function (Znaniecki, 1952a). The ideal of cultural hygiene, frequently a component of extreme nationalist ideologies (rationalised as a return to ‘original’ perfection) expressed an innate drive for cultural destruction (Znaniecki, 1952b, p.87). This ideal has had an almost continuous life in Kuwaiti academic discourse, returning in the 1990s and 2000s as ‘desertization’ (see Chapter 7).

Alternatively, the Bedoun interviewees indicated that their ideological identification was directed toward new ideas, intellectual life and active citizenry, which embraced the ideal of genuine citizenship, was an innovative, novel and reformatory social practice. Active citizenry appeared to fulfill the function of the ideal of modern education, characterised by innovation, self-education and altruism (Halas, 2010). The interviewees had demonstrated they were capable of considering and articulating the dominating ideology which had enforced cultural destruction upon the families for generations, based on their lived experience and the knowledge passed on to them by their parents and grandparents. According to Znaniecki (1973, vol II, p.132, in Halas, 2010, p.199):

Among social relations researched by Znaniecki, the educational relation that prepares an individual for a role of a creative innovator ranks first. Znaniecki understands the education relation as a specific interaction between an individual being educated and a person or a group that consequently tries to shape an individual according to a certain pattern (Znaniecki, 1973, vol. II, p. 132). Znaniecki says that the social task of modern education is to overcome egoism for the sake of values of altruism through the development of creative
participation in common tasks. Since it is not stability but the development of social groups and the development of culture that is the characteristic of modernity, Znaniecki considers the development of creative aspirations and the ability of social cooperation to be the modern education ideal. (Halas, 2010, p.199)

The dynamic process of cultural development in which the Bedoun were pressured by their extraordinary life circumstances to change and adapt to the 'new world' signified by the Arab Spring (Hakeem al Fadhli, in interview, 3 August, 2015), had led to the growth of the intellectual ideal, the practical realisation of self-education and assertion of identity within citizen society, among the Bedoun interview respondents. The larger task that still ahead of the community, involved the schooling of new generations of children, the cessation of the ethnic cleansing via the 'status adjustment' program and the 'Comoros Plan,' and the acquisition of Kuwaiti citizenship. Kuwaiti citizenship would always remain necessary for the Bedoun not only as it was their historical right repeatedly pledged by the government of Kuwait, but also because it had become the necessary means of physical and cultural survival. The Bedoun perceived genuine citizenship as the only reasonable safeguard remaining for the Bedoun to acquire protection from ongoing ethnic conflict at the social level, and from the boarder policies that promoted the group's physical and cultural destruction.

Conclusion

In their discussions of identity and participation in education, the Bedoun research participants demonstrated the high value of the intellectual ideal (Halas, 2010, p.201; Znaniecki, 1952b, p.100) in their lives. Some had begun to form an intellectual identity, through advanced, higher education studies or via their professional or other social leadership roles in the community. The Bedoun’s participation in education fulfilled very personal and positive values and aspirations. The interviewees emphasised the integration of their roles as students, teachers, professionals and community leaders with their tribal identity and traditional cultural values. Social relationships and social solidarity among members of the group (the family, tribe and between tribes) was also highly valued, and illustrated by concrete examples. Creative social organisation was initiated by community leaders, to increase the participation rate of young people in education, as a part of a shared aspiration for a better life.

Brief exploration of the development of intellectual leaders in the community revealed the Bedoun functioned effectively in a number of areas. However, a pattern of targeting across a variety of levels of intellectual expression and areas was drawn from examples in the interview data and the literature. The pattern extended established ideas about education and freedom of expression in Kuwait. It pointed to the use of multiple strategies in the ethnic targeting of the Bedoun in particular, broadly preventing the group from establishing a literary history and culture, punishing the Bedoun for participation in intellectual activities and for the development of intellectual leadership. The most acutely
targeted area was discussion of their identity and culture in face-to-face public, social interactions, a transgression that attracted incarceration and deportation.

The interviewee's experiences indicated an expansion of intellectual values and identification with new ideas and modes of thought emanating from the Arab Spring. These new forms of identification were linked to an awareness of the universal values of human rights, prompted by increased contacts with the international community via social media, contact with local and international humanitarian organisations, journalists and scholars. The nature of the intergenerational social solidarity felt among the interviewees was similar to the principle of *sumud*, ‘steadfastness,’ the social solidarity expressed by Palestinians (Moore, 2013; van Teeffelen, August 9, 2014). These values were also activated in personal interactions in citizen society, and could be regarded as expressions of ‘active citizenry’ (Bayat, 2013, p.313) and the practice of ‘true generosity’ as a pedagogy of resistance and social change (Freire, 1970, p.91, 120, 121).

The activation of these values signified the high value of the cultural collective to the Bedoun, as the positive, traditional values with which they chose to identify, were compatible with the universal principles of human rights. These new types of social encounters introduced new and creative inputs into the existing cultural system, recalibrating the Bedoun’s relationships with others in society. These activities indicated the positive expansion of the Bedoun culture including cross-fertilisation with other cultures. Despite encountering a range of barriers designed to block their participation in education, and the growth of an intellectual leadership group in particular, the Bedoun had developed a new vision of society, one which transcended the cultural barriers of Hadar ideology (for example, Alessa, 1981; al Naqeeb, 1990; al Khandari and al Hadben, 2010) that had once prevented the entire group from becoming educated, active citizens, in an attempt to distinguish the 'pathology' of tribal consciousness (al Naqeeb, 1990, p.127).
Chapter 9
Conclusions and Recommendations

This is a continual issue in our family and youths in the community, the consistent detainment, the unclear charges, the abuse and harassment.

The near future doesn't look promising. The government has no plan, and is only concerned about the public relations aspect of this issue, how this could affect the prestige of the country.

The authorities like to present themselves as supporters of international law and human rights, but they are not even implementing it in the country. (A Bedoun woman, in al Saadi, March 21, 2014).

‘... their importance to the state is too vital to ignore’ (al Anezi, 1989, p.188).

In this chapter I present my conclusions to this study, including new contributions and limitations. I also suggest recommendations for future researchers, the community and international agencies, including research with the Bedoun community in Kuwait, the Bedoun diaspora, and other areas of research, including areas for investigation by independent agencies. Much of this section presented somewhat more directly than other chapters in the thesis. This is due to the dire situation of the Bedoun, the profound lack of response in the social sciences to the group’s suffering, and the nature of the recommendations which call for international intervention and serious consideration that ethnic cleansing has occurred and is still occurring (Kennedy, 2015a), and genocide of the Bedoun also appears to be in progress. The urgency is also heightened because the Bedoun’s conditions may continue to deteriorate before social scientists pay much attention to the group, while international humanitarian organisations and scholars of international law may be better placed to undertake further studies in the immediate future. At the time of writing, the Bedoun were no longer unable to represent themselves as a collective, due to security operations in Kuwait including the incarceration of the Bedouin leaders. The group was slated for mass identity transfer to the Comoros, with threats of mass deportation emanating from the Ministry of the Interior from 2014-2016, the outcome of which is as yet, unknown.

9.1 Contributions

New contributions were made to understanding the Bedouin tribes as an ethnic group and a cultural collective in Kuwait, studies of citizenship, nationalism and identity, and the role of ideology in the criminalisation of identity in ethnic conflicts. The study contributed to understanding of the impact of colonialism on the Bedouin and developmental theories on contemporary society in the Middle East. It also contributed to knowledge of labelling and identity erasure practices, ethnic cleansing and statelessness, as well as to theoretical areas in the sociology of knowledge and education.
This study appears to be the first doctoral research on the Kuwaiti Bedoun from a sociological perspective. Additionally, the field of Kuwait studies is quite small. The number of new findings should be weighed against these factors: in a larger field, there might be fewer new findings.

The research explained the apparent contradictions between the Kuwaiti Bedoun's identity and culture portrayed in the social sciences, compared to the field of international humanitarian law, and the grey-literature of international humanitarian organisations’ reports. This was done via careful analysis of the literature, identifying analytical flaws in analysis of Kuwaiti Bedouin ethnicity (in Longva, 1997, 2006) and Bedoun ethnicity (Beaugrand 2010; 2014a), and adding to that knowledge, with personal data from the Bedoun population, and analysis of historical data collected from secondary sources.

Firstly, study established that the Bedoun have formed a sub-ethnic group within Bedouin society, having proliferated and re-consolidated as a marginalized group drawn from members of multiple tribes, who were made stateless by the Kuwaiti government in 1986. Secondly, the Bedoun maintained their ethnic relations within their existing tribes, but also shared a collective consciousness and identification as Bedoun. Finally, I suggest that Bedoun does not mean ‘stateless,’ but is the name of a unique, cultural collective that are ‘without’ a legitimate form of citizenship and effective nationality, which has never been granted to them, by any state. The ‘economic citizenship’ plan linked to the Comoros Islands, certainly did not provide this, and should be regarded as merely a new step in a long project of ethnic cleansing.

The research dispelled the myth that the Bedoun had citizenship in other states, and were using a criminal, imposter identity. This was done by checking evidence (or for the most part, observing a distinct lack of evidence) provided by these scholars, and then deconstructing of how these ideas came to become taken-for-granted facts in the social science literature. I identified and explained the local ideology that was responsible for these ideas, and discussed its development in Kuwaiti politics and the academic literature in tribalism theory, since the 1960.

The research explained how the myth of the Bedoun as an ‘outsider’ was created and embedded in Kuwaiti society, via application of Znaniecki’s (1952b) theory of nationalism. Therefore, it builds on al Anezi (1989), Alhajeri (2004) and al Waqayan (2009), contributing to existing knowledge about the nature of the ethnic cleavage between the Bedouin and Hadar in Kuwait. However, I also extended my analysis to distinguishing between and comparing the concept of the northern and southern tribes. The study established that both the northern and southern tribal people were subject to anti-Bedouin ideologies, in both different and similar ways. The Bedoun appear to have been more intensely victimized due to their comprising more people from the northern tribal dirah than those from the south.

It is the identity of the Bedouin of the north that has been the target of destruction. The administrative expulsion that made the Bedoun stateless ‘illegal residents’ in 1986 ('The
Study,’ 2003), led to large-scale human rights atrocities and deprivations for the group particularly during the early 1990s, which continue until this day. Although we cannot confirm this in a definitive, quantitative sense for reasons explained in the discussion, it is reasonable to believe that the population reduction of the Bedoun, around two thirds over the last twenty five years (from around 300,000 prior to 1990 to 111,000 at present), occurred as a result of a national policy aimed at reducing the population size realised by ethnic cleansing, state-sanctioned ethnic violence including killings, and due to the population being unable to sustain itself due to human rights deprivations imposed since the 1980s.

In this thesis, misconceptions about the Bedoun identity, and the phenomena of contemporary Bedouin-Hadar ethnic conflict, was linked to their historical antecedents at regional level, in colonialist and development discourses adopted in relation to regional tribal settlement programs in the Middle East (Aurenche, 1993, Bocco, 2006, and Fabietti, 2006). This approach to the Kuwaiti Bedouin (including the Bedoun) does not seem to have been taken before. This approach stemmed from the discovery that interviewees encountered a set of ideological motifs quite often in their everyday social interactions with the Hadar, other Arab nationals and sometimes with people of various southern tribal dirah.

Secondary sources showed that ‘tirbalism’ theory had developed from the 1950s in a way that legitimised misconceptions created about the Bedoun identity and culture across the Middle East. The themes were expanded and elaborated by scholars and government propagandists, such that they continue to be the standard frame of reference for the Bedouin (as well as the Bedoun) in scholarly work. Overall, the themes analysed appeared to be academic elaborations on simpler symbolic representations that were more frequently used in public forums by, and/or for, ordinary Kuwaitis. For example, the notions that the Bedouin are not ‘original,’ ‘real,’ ‘true,’ or ‘pure’ Kuwaitis (nor ‘loyal,’ or ‘deserving’ of citizenship), were phrases commonly used by scholars and politicians (Alhajeri, 2004, p.16) that still frequently featured in online discussions among Kuwaiti citizens (Dashti, et al, 2014) in Kuwait.

Themes of ideological discourse took on extreme forms in the Kuwaiti context, such as texts indulging in the objectification of the Bedouin identity and demonization of tribal consciousness and culture, while urging Hadar cultural hygiene. Scripted forms of hate-speech used to incite violent ethnic cleansing showed signs of having been distributed to government authorities by intellectuals and/or propagandists. Dehumanisation, including reference to the Bedouin as animals and vermin, and the characterisation of mass identity transfer as an acceptable, even desirable form of human trafficking and ‘global citizenship,’ arguably qualified as indicators of genocidal intent expressed in texts (Arnaut, 2006; Townsend, 2014, see Chapter 7).

The research demonstrated that the destructive impact of the ethnic conflict that has been driven principally by the Hadar (al Anezi, 1989), has negatively affected Kuwaiti society at a variety of levels: the Bedouin citizen community (Alhajeri, 2004), the Bedoun
community (al Waqayan, 2009), and people of the northern tribal dirah in particular, have comprised the main targets. This approach tends to support the view that the Bedoun were not initially marginalized due to their statelessness, but that they were already ethnically targeted due to their tribal identity, prior to administrative expulsion in 1986 (‘The Study, 2003’). Therefore, I concluded that statelessness was not the initial cause of the Bedoun's marginalization, but merely one of many consequences of their marginalization by the Hadar and government authorities historically subject to Hadar influence (al Anezi, 1989).

Scholars in Kuwait studies have almost uniformly portrayed the policy to give the Bedouin citizenship as an anomalous national policy, conjured up to enable the ruling family to corrupt the National Assembly with tribal political representatives (e.g. Crystal, 1992; Longva, 1997; Tétreault, 2000; al Nakib, 2014). I arrived at a different interpretation which incorporated regional history. The government’s formal program to permanently settle the Bedouin for the purpose of distributing citizenship, commencing in 1965 (Stanton Russell, 1989, p.34), was aligned with the regional program to settle the Bedouin in the newly independent, sovereign states of the Middle East, during the 1950s and 1960s (Bocco, 2006; Fabietti, 2006).

While some Kuwaiti authors had pointed out that the settlement of the Bedouin had been systematically organized by government through Bedouin tribal leaders and Hadar merchants as part of a conscious, national plan (Alhajeri, 2004; Haroon, 1976 in al Haddad, 1989; al Fayez, 1984) this unpublished work does not seem to have been explored in depth by leading authors in Kuwait/Middle East studies. Yet this is an important aspect, because combined with knowledge of the regional Bedouin settlement programs, it challenges previous, government-blaming approaches of unwanted, 'chaotic' or disorganized mass Bedouin settlement (Alissa, 2012, 2013; al Nakib, 2014, 2016; Beaugrand, 2011, 2014b). It shows that the government’s previous policy to grant the Bedouin tribes citizenship, which catered for the Bedoun specifically as a condition of their permanent government employment and corresponding settlement in Kuwait (Stanton Russell, 1989; see also Appendix B, iii), was entirely consistent with the regional program coordinated by the Arab League, the United Nations, the International Labour Organization and other international agencies charged with assisting sovereign states to settle the tribes for the purpose of modernization (Bocco, 2006; Fabietti, 2006).

Thus, the analysis pointed to more complex causes and pressures on government and the ruling family directed by the Kuwaiti Hadar and other Arab national Hadar, regarding their role in the social segregation of the Bedouin and ultimately, the Bedoun's political excision from the state. It pointed to the opportunity for the Hadar to be analysed as an ethnic group and extreme nationalist movement. A strong mono-ethnic nationalist vision pursued by its privileged upper echelons includes the self-proclaimed economic 'elite' (al Anezi, 1989, p. 175, 248) determining who gets ‘precious’ nationality and who does not (p. 189, 273), is supported by the 'enlightened intelligentsia' which positions itself and the 'core'
of society (Ghabra, 2014, p.4) and controls the production of knowledge in Kuwait along with the Ministry for Information. These narcissistic tropes are commonly used by Hadar intellectuals and notables, who are invested in these nationalist motifs. This is why we see Western academics absorbing these same symbols in discussion with Hadar intellectuals but generalised to all of Kuwaiti society, as if their reality were the way things are (a point made by Hakeem al Fadhli in Chapter 8). Further research is required to establish if these ideas have filtered to or from the grassroots, or exist predominantly in the elite/intellectual classes.

This group has been willing to cripple the state of Kuwait by enforcing an ideology that has lead to extreme, prolonged ethnic segregation, violence and enforced, protracted statelessness of the Bedoun. This movement warrants framing as an active, ethnic nationalist movement emanating from an ethnic group that defines itself as culturally unique in quasi-metaphysical terms, rather than merely as a ‘social group’ (al Nakib, 2014, 2016; Longva, 1997, 2006; U.K. Home Office, 2014). Longva (1997) applied ethnic theory (Longva 1997) but then failed to theorise the Bedouin as an ethnic group even when all roads led to Rome (Longva, 2006, p.175). Her claims historical and cultural theorisation should be discarded in preference for studies of nationalism and the welfare state model (Longva, 2006, p.172, 184) confirmed a tendency to avoid the obvious, that Hadar etho-nationalism was extreme (ethnically cleansing the Bedoun), and that such nationalism could be traced to Hadar supremacy ‘even without the Badu’s presence’ (p.180-181).

The study also contributed to knowledge about Bedouin citizen society, beyond the integration of the stateless and citizen communities. I argued that the statelessness of the Bedoun has also been used to intimidate, control and oppress the Bedouin citizen population since 1986, functioning as a symbol of Hadar ethnic hatred. Between 2014-2016, Bedouin community leader Abdulhakeem al Fadhli and Bedouin citizen leader Mussallam al Barrack were repeatedly incarcereted, while the vast majority of Bedouin who had long proven their eligibility for citizenship under the Nationality Law (1959), were criminalised with ‘security restrictions.’ These developments and others discussed in this researched, underlined a focus on criminalisation of the tribal social order (Gross, 1998). This cultural patterning imposed and restricted freedom of expression across a variety of communications and literary genres (Chapter 8, Table 25). It reflected the order of discrimination and stigmatization of the Bedouin that occurred in social interactions in citizen society (Chapter 7, Table 21). Al Rasheed (2015) indicated that this was indicative of a post-Arab Spring regional approach to the Bedouin masses in the Perisan Gulf. This research has begun to develop knowledge about the impacts of criminalisations on stateless Bedouin. Futher research on the impact of the criminalisation of Bedouin citizen leaders on their communities is required, and the potential link to their ongoing deprivation of state resources due to Hadar monopolisation (al Nakib, 2014; Ghabra, 2014). This points to ongoing historical and cultural issues, social inequalities and conflict that are not addressed by theorisation of the

The implementation of the *Nationality Law 1959* (Kuwait) was analysed for its relevance to the Bedoun situation. Al Anezi (1989, p.182-193) observed that Decree 5/1960 was designed to compensate for the Hadar being ‘without’ documents (p.277). This mechanism enabled to the politically dominant Hadar to grant themselves ‘original’ nationality without having sufficient documentation to qualify according to the *Nationality Law 1959* (Kuwait). Another provision (the Explanatory Note) enabled citizenship to be granted to personal friends and acquaintances of the individuals assessing the citizenship applications. Al Anezi (1989) ceased his analysis right there. I built on this analysis by observing that the law could be used not only to deprive the Kuwaiti Bedouin citizenship (making them into Bedouns), but that its wording also enabled it to be used the other way around: the grant ‘original’ citizenship. Thus, we can equally conceptualise the ‘original’ Hadar were ‘Bedoun’ – ‘without’ papers. This is a generalization, arrived at through abstract reasoning, yet it is a logical conclusion arising from the legal facts. In contrast, the lack of documents of the Bedou (as the reason for their not being ‘original’ citizens), was never quantitatively established during the first period of citizenship processing (in the 1960s) due to government secrecy. I believe that this is one of the most significant findings of this study.

It has also been established that many of the Bedouin did actually have sufficient documents to satisfy the *Nationality Law 1959* (Kuwait) (Human Rights Watch, 1995; WikiLeaks Cable 06Kuwait4514, November 26, 2006). Some Bedouin government service employees informed al Moosa (1976) they believed that they had already been formally granted citizenship by government, related to their military service (per *Nationality Law, 1959* (Kuwait), Clause 4), but they were still waiting to receive the corresponding document. Field evidence in al Moosa (1976, p.94-96) indicated the Bedouin had been led to believe they had received citizenship as early as 1969, in accordance with their classification on the National Census that stated they were Kuwaiti nationals.

Al Moosa's (1976) narrative revealed an important stage of development of Hadar opposition to the national policy of naturalizing the Kuwaiti Bedouin, expressed in the construction of the Bedouin 'migrant' who had independently encroached upon Kuwait, contrary to evidence they were intentionally coerced to settle in return for citizenship. This provokes speculation as to whether or not some Bedouin had actually been received citizenship at that time (1969-1974), and as to the possibility that formal government records that would have confirmed this, were later removed as part of the administrative erasure practices implemented from 1983 (in al Anezi, 1989).

This finding has fascinating and serious implications, especially in view of the attempts by the state to ethnically target and eradicate the population on grounds they did not ‘qualify’ for citizenship, when the Hadar ‘originals’ may not have qualified for citizenship.
either, during the same historical period and in relation to the same law. Perhaps this finding represents the heart of the Bedouin-Hadar ethnic conflict in Kuwait, and accounts for the inability of the government of Kuwait and the ruling family to grant the Bedouin the Kuwaiti citizenship to which they are entitled overshadowed by the Hadar 'elite' (al Anezi, 1989). Certainly it would explain obsessive nature of the Hadar nationslit preoccupation with ‘pure,’ ‘real,’ and ‘true’ Kuwaitiness, due to a secret knowledge they are ‘undeserving’ of Kuwaiti citizenship according to their own standards. It also explains the careful alignment and coordination of anti-Bedouin propaganda used against all Kuwaiti Bedouin (Bedouns and citizens) in the production of public discourse disseminated to the grassroots of Kuwaiti society (where as scholarly inputs have gone some way to cover up similarities in these approaches, as I discussed regarding the perception of the northern and southern tribes).

A limitation of this finding is that quantitative figures representing those Hadar who did not qualify for citizenship but received it, and for those Bedouin who did qualify for citizenship but did not receive it, cannot be assured. However, the problem of insufficient documentation was significant enough that Decree 5/1960 was implemented to make up for the lack of proof given by the Hadar 'originals' that they qualified as citizens, and allowed the Hadar to grant citizenship to their personal friends and acquaintances regardless. The date of the implementation of Decree 5/1960 indicated the law was in place prior to the commencement of the very first citizenship grants in the state of Kuwait. I also extended al Anezi’s (1989) legal analysis to illustrate connections between specific articles of Decree 5/1960 with the existing anti-Bedouin ideologies, ethnic targeting of the Bedouin (revealed in the interview and documentary data), and the nationalist policy platform in Kuwait from the beginning of the state's independence (al Mdaires, 2010; Stanton Russell, 1989).

This study identified that the approach used by social scientists to explain how and why the Bedouin community (Bedoun and Kuwaiti citizens) did or did not received citizenship in Kuwait, has been flawed. There has been a lack of consideration of the history of the regions’ development involving Bedouin settlement (e.g. Aurenche, 1993; Bocco, 2006; Fabietti, 2006; Kark and Frantzman, 2012) and analysis of the process of citizenship distribution, due to a preoccupation with the proselytisation of anti-Bedouin ideology. Additionally, the different analytical approaches to the northern and southern tribes used by academics indicates an intentional inclination to distract from some very obvious similarlites in the strategies of oppression of the stateless Bedouin and Bedouin citizens in Kuwait.

One of the most glaring omissions by researchers commenting on Kuwaiti society has been the lack of genuine consideration of the Bedouin’s point of view (Lancaster and Lancaters, 1988), demonstrated by lack of researcher field data. For example, the Bedouin ‘are empty vessels – albeit important, symbolic ones’ in Longva, 2006, p.182. The author attributed the sentiment to Barthes. However, I would suggest that Longva (2007) derived this comment from al Naqeeb, 1990: ‘the tribal majority does not possess, or show any inclination towards, an ideological affiliation’ (p.135) despite the ‘pathology’ of ‘tribal
The soft analysis of the Hadar as a 'social group' is undoubtedly one factor that has led to a gross under-estimation of the ethnic cleavage interpreted as discrimination of undocumented Bedoun, and the gradual exclusion of 'documented' Bedoun (those registered with the Ministry of Interior Central Apparatus) from the concept of discrimination, in asylum claims (see the concept of documented/undocumented stateless Bedoun introduced in a letter from the F.C.O. Kuwait, 2007, in U.K. Home Office, 2009). The expressed aim to distinguish the 'pathology' of 'tribal consciousness' (al Naqeeb, 1990) as a rational doctrine leading up to the ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun, ought to be taken seriously in analysis of Kuwaiti society, but also in international law regarding Bedoun claims.

Explanations of the influence of the Kuwaiti Hadar on the victimization of the Bedoun as merely indicative of a problem of discrimination carried out by a social group (see for example, al Nakib, F., 2014, 2016; Beaugrand, 2014a; Longva, 1997; Peterson, 2014) may have also occurred due to the persistence of scholars in fields other than sociology, presenting definitional claims about sociological groups, in the absence of in-depth study or even reasonably substantive fieldwork evidence of those people (Kennedy, 2015b). These scholars have grossly under-reported the extent of ethnic targeting of the Bedoun (and the Bedoun in particular), that has occurred in Kuwaiti society, which has been studied more seriously by international humanitarian organisations and scholars of international law. Arguably this occurred due to the poor state of knowledge about Bedoun identity that we started with. This study has attempted to thoroughly address this problem (Chapter 6, sections 6.1 and 6.2). This should lead to a reassessment of the state of knowledge by the U.K. Home Office (2016) and other agencies who deal with Bedoun refugees, who rely on the ‘social groups’ model to refute or water-down claims of persecution by the so-called documented Bedoun (U.K. Home Office, 2009, 2014, 2016; also BA and Others, UKIAT [2004] 00256 CG.). New evidence of the ethnic targeting and persecution of this sub-group Bedoun was also provided in Appendix D, iv.

I challenged the consensus among scholars that a radical and inexplicable policy position against the Bedoun was suddenly adopted, manifesting in the administrative expulsion of 1986 (‘The Study,’ 2003). On the contrary, the policy to stop any Bedouin becoming a citizen of Kuwait was integral to the Nationalist Bloc and later the so-called Democratic Bloc policy platform, from the early 1960s, headed by Ahmed al Khatib (al Mdaires, 2010), applying intense political pressure to Kuwait's Bedouin settlement program and naturalisation policy. A continuous chain of administrative committees was established to control, monitor and segregate the population from 1965 until 2016 (Appendix D, ii) (noting that the Ministry of Planning and Ministry of Education operated quite independently of government and was saturated with nationalists according to Mdaires, 2010).

This is an important discovery because it re-orientates the study of the Bedoun deeper into the historical record, and (should) impact studies of the Kuwaiti national identity,
Bedouin-Hadar social and political relations and bring new understanding to the Bedoun’s entrapment in the state (Rabinowtiz, 2001; Rosenfeld, 2002). Essentially, the Bedoun have been entrapped in the state of Kuwait since their permanent settlement, after having relinquished their nomadic lifestyle for the state, which sought their settlement for the purpose of fulfilling national and regional economic and social goals. This involved the settlement and protection of the indigenous Bedouin tribes of the Middle East, according to the *International Convention on Indigenous Tribal Populations* (1957) (ILO) (Bocco, 2006, p.306) and providing for the state of Kuwait's economic development during the oil boom, of which ultimately, the Hadar ethnic group, of whom the merchants elites (Crystal, 1992), notables (al Naqeeb, 1990; Yanai, 2014), urbanites (al Nakib, F., 2016) and enlightened intelligentsia (Ghabra, 2014) have been the main beneficiaries.

In return for their permanent settlement in Kuwait, the Bedoun (Bedouin of the northern tribal dirah) were also pledged citizenship. As I have already discussed, the Bedouin of the northern tribes, and/or those Bedouin perceived to be of the northern tribes, were under the attack of nationalist political ideologists from the very beginning of the state's independence. These ideologists seemed to have been incapable of perceiving the Bedouin as fellow citizens, due to a mono-ethnic vision of the nation. They aimed not only to deprive the Bedouin of their human rights, but also to undermine the social and cultural fabric of the state of Kuwait. The Bedoun collective was misled to the extent that they could not have known they should leave Kuwait to secure citizenship in other states, and that they could have received citizenship in other states, if they wished to prevent themselves becoming stateless.

Bedoun intellectual activities and leaders have been ethnically targeted and persecuted with punitive actions since the Arab Spring (as discussed above). This appears to have occurred simply because the Bedoun identified themselves to the international community, and asked for the end of their suffering. I discussed this finding in the introduction of this chapter. The criminalization of the human rights ‘activist’ in relation to the prohibition of the 'protestor' was the most recent label used against the Bedoun to justify punitive targeting of individuals, especially those who showed capacity to lead society and generate solutions to overcome the Bedoun 'problem' (see Chapter 8, section 8.2.2). This study connected the production of anti-Bedouin ideologies to stigmatisation and labelling practices used at the social, cultural, political and bureaucratic levels. The Bedoun were confronted with the tribal stigma (Goffman, 1963) quite literally, due to their membership and perceived membership, of the northern tribes. This stigma manifested as hate-speech and eradication dialogues, and through the ‘status adjustment’ Program.

I analysed the ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun (1990-1995) (Appendix F, i-iii) and the ‘status adjustment’ program (Appendices E and G, iii) in depth. This had not yet been attempted by scholars. The analysis of the ‘status adjustment’ program showed the program of identity typing introduced in 2012, was most likely a continuation of the incremental
erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing: Weissbrodt, 2008) which commenced in 1983 to rid Kuwait of the Bedoun. Similar to the physical cleansing phase of the early 1990s, the program was linked to official, national population policy. Population policy itself, closely linked to ethnic cleansing (Appendix F, iii), was labelled 'population balance' (Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994; al Ramadhan, 1995; Crystal, 1995). More recently it has been termed 'commodification' of citizenship (Beaugrand, 2015) and 'global citizenship' (Abrahamian, November 10, 2014, 2015) in constructivist frameworks.

The study also revealed that the Bedoun were intentionally deprived of education (al Moosa, 1976) in order to ensure the group remained politically powerless, deprived of citizenship and basic human rights (al Naqeeb, 1990, p.129; Alessa, 1981, p.109). Alessa's (1981) manpower policy was as a perfect marriage between Arab nationalism and Kuwait's Hadar merchant prerogatives, in 'Kuwaitisation' economic policy. It prevented the intellectual and economic development of the whole group, and robbed the group of the opportunity to receive citizenship indefinitely, justified by labelling the group as inferior and incapable tribal people and 'Arab' strangers (some Kuwaiti Hadar writings indicate that some do not view themselves as Arabs, but as an elite civilization of mixed races). The policy rationalised the cultural destruction of the Bedoun, claiming to pave the way toward higher citizen productivity and citizenship for the most 'deserving.'

As I have mentioned, the Bedoun population has been reduced by around two-thirds over the last 25 years (see Appendix D, i). This appears to be a new finding, despite the information being relatively easy to access (Human Rights Watch, 1995, ‘Summary of findings, para. 4; Over 111,000,’ 2013). The size of this physical destruction of the population (being over 50%) indicates the group is at risk of genocide, as substantial destruction of the population has already occurred. The chairman of the Islamic Human Rights Commission, Massoud Shadjareh, has indicated that he believes that the Comoros Plan is also an indicator of cultural destruction and genocide (Hayden, November 10, 2014). The plan has this capacity whether or not mass deportation occurs.

I attempted to illustrate the depth of ethnic targeting, including specific policies and other findings of this study, in Figure 3 (which can be found at the end of this chapter). The population appeared to be unable to sustain itself over the long term given the large range of specific population reduction policies and methods imposed upon it introduced in ‘The Study’ policy document in 1986. It is likely that the group has been subjected to, and remains subject to, genocidal intent (Townsend, 2014); certainly this appears in hate-speech at the discursive level in the analysis of academic and public discourse, the administrative ethnic cleansing of ‘status adjustment’ (1983-) and physical ethnic cleansing and state-sanctioned killings (1990-1995). I have limited the thesis by not comprehensively analysing the available data against a particular genocide theory, but I would suggest that Gregory Stanton’s (2004) or Damien Short’s (2016) frameworks though they have different purposes, would likely both yield confirmatory findings. Here, I refer to Lemkin’s (1944) original
The conception of genocide discussed in Short (2016), which encompasses both physical and cultural destruction.

The research argued that restrictions on intellectuals were targeted toward individuals on the basis of their Bedoun identity (Chapter 8, Table 25). While the suppression of academic freedom by government seemed to be a genuine obstacle for many researchers of different backgrounds residing in Kuwait or in regard to Kuwait area studies, so too was Hadar domination of educational institutions, and the privileging of Hadar academic and intellectual activities, which has created and re-creates, the pro-Hadar, mono-ethnic, nationalist intellectual narrative. In Chapter 2, I explained that within the social sciences, there has been virtually no critical engagement with, or counter-narrative (al Rasheed and Vitalis, 2004) to this problem concerning the ‘Kuwaiti’ narrative, which is a Hadar nationalist narrative, and hence the proliferation of marginalizing and stigmatizing anti-Bedouin discourses in the social sciences regarding Kuwaiti society has been tolerated if not encouraged, by scholars internationally. That the presence of the Bedoun oppression in Kuwait has not given pause for scholars to explore more deeply, the Bedoun 'problem' in their published work is worrying. Additionally, as I have mentioned, this problem has affected not only how the Bedoun are perceived in relation to their presence in Kuwait, but also in relation to how they are processed internationally when they flee Kuwait as refugees (Kennedy, 2015b).

Certainly there has been little if any, sustained, critical engagement regarding the development of knowledge about Kuwaitis society from post-colonial theorists who are generously funded and actively engaged in policing Middle East studies beyond the Gulf. Arabic-speaking capacity among some scholars has provided little increased value in expanding knowledge of Kuwait society, or diversifying influence over the field. This lack of critical engagement has impacted social sciences scholarship about Kuwait, demonstrated in the contrast between the interpretations of the Bedoun in the social sciences, compared to international humanitarian law. As I discussed in Chapter 2, the latter area of research does not show the same signs of being overwhelmed by Hadar ideological perspectives as the social sciences.

Foreign correspondents initially discovered the Bedoun after the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. They reported ethnic cleansing, 'purification' and state-sanctioned killings in progress accompanied by flagrant legitimization of these acts against the Bedoun by government authorities (Cushman, June 30, 1991, July 16, 1991; Evans, February 28, 1991; Fineman, November 2, 1992; Gasperini, August 20, 1991; Lorch, May 12, 1991; Wilkinson, May 20, 1991). This trend among journalists appears to be a new finding in the academic literature, as it was quickly followed by social scientist narratives which basically ignored or minimised these arguments as much as possible, commencing with Crystal (1992, 1995, 2005) (see Chapter 7, section 7.4 on the northern tribes) and this remains the dominant approach. The intense focus of the state on the intellectual activities which it sees related to
the ‘Bedoun problem’ seem to be symptomatic of a broader problem regarding the production of knowledge in the region.

This study contributes to understanding of the purpose and function of education as a means of conservative cultural re-organisation (Znaniecki, 1952a), nationalist indoctrination, conformity and punitive oppression, as well as a means of creative cultural re-organisation, ideological expansion, cultural cooperation (Znaniecki, 1952b) and creativity. The research explored cross-cultural fertilisation (Znaniecki, 1952b) as a tool of political resistance, collective consciousness-raising and liberation. In particular, the research has emphasised the function of self-education in environments where public education is restricted, the limitations of access to formal systems of education for stateless communities, and the education policy-practice cleavage within Kuwait's education system and within UNESCO regarding citizens and stateless groups who together comprise a particular national culture. The study also contributed to the understanding of social justice issues in education, the impact of ethnicity, identity and minority status in education, and the use of education as a weapon of for dividing people by appealing to ethnic and political loyalties (Znaniecki, 1952b) among extreme tribal and ethnic-nationalist movements (Gross, 1998), in the Arab nationalist context.

I applied Znaniecki’s theory of cultural systems as a comparative framework for the study of political oppression and social control, social mobilisation through education, active citizenry and non-violent philosophies (Bayat, 2013). I briefly discussed the limitations of social movement theory and Islamic-socialist (Marxist) interpretations (such as Mallat, 2015) in studies of Arab societies in lieu of the damage done by Arab 'liberals' via extreme nationalist ideologies in the past, in the region (Massad, March 30, 2015) and to the Bedoun in Kuwait (Mdaires, 2010). The Islamic-socialist (Marxist) approach may be inherently impacted by the same anti-Bedouin sentiments as many scholars who have written about Kuwaiti society. On the other hand, Akram (2007), unlike Mallat (2015), was able to integrate the notion of the global Ummah with a holistic philosophy that was not incompatible with the traditional values of the Bedouin. I suggested that the Palestinian resistance framework (‘sumud,’ in Shehadel, in Said, 1986) and community education resistance movements (in Znaniecki, 1952a) and critical pedagogy (in Freire, 1970) were more applicable to the situation of the Bedoun experienced by the interviewees.

9.2 Limitations

A major limitation of this study was the existing social attitudes toward the Bedoun, which has contributed to a wall of silence about the group. Additionally, many Bedoun experience understandable fear of speaking about their life experiences, which contributed to challenges with fieldwork. However, this was a mixed blessing, because the problem provided rich insight into the difference between cultural practices of voluntary Bedouin seclusion from outsiders and the practice of outsiders 'passing' among their privileged oppressors (Becker, 1983; Ginsberg, 1996; Goffman, 1963), as well as responses to imposed
forms of suppression. This stimulated my interview discussions and enabled me to explore more deeply, the stigmatisation of the Bedoun by Hadar especially, and the social behaviours of the Bedoun in citizen society.

This study drew mostly on research in English. While there may be a great deal more that can be discovered about the Bedoun in Kuwaiti society through research of Arabic literature, the question arises as to why Arabic speaking researchers have not already found it. Scholarship in Arabic appears to have been very much invested in imported Orientalist tropes projected onto the Bedouin masses, as Bocco (2006) and Fabietti (2006) have pointed out. I would suggest that this remains a dominant approach in Middle East studies, and I am not alone in this view (Lockman, 2004; Turner, 2003). Some academics have already begun to criticize my interview data because I do not speak fluently in Arabic, which is a requirement for credibility among many Orientalist anthropologists, and Middle East studies scholars of a variety of disciplines. This is a view which, while it has some positive points, lacks relevance to the current situation of the Bedoun, their language choices, and glosses over both my direct experience in the field, and the government of Kuwait’s use of English language mediums. I have discussed the more technical aspects of my methodological approach in Chapter 4, which counters these views in more detail.

Other limitations of the research included the size of the participant group, and the reliance on snowball referral sampling and the influence of self-selection. Comparison with Beaugrand (2010) against the number of participants who were actually Bedoun and who lived in Kuwait at the time of her study, shows that this study involved more Bedoun participants in Kuwait, and who were not refugees in Western countries. Additionally, this study demonstrated that the interviewees comprised a greater cross-section of the Bedoun community, in terms of age, gender distribution, employment and professional status, geographical location within Kuwait City and other forms of population diversity (such as participants with citizen spouses or parents or who had become citizens themselves).

Due to deteriorating conditions for the Bedoun in Kuwait, especially regarding restrictions on freedom of expression, the principle of self-selection now appears to be a more desirable one than prior to the fieldwork. I raised the issue of the exceptionally large number of interviews (over five hundred) conducted by Human Rights Watch (1995) in the discussion, concerning the lack of transparency of the data, considering that ethnic cleansing had occurred at the time the interviews were conducted, and the organisation did not conceptualise ethnic cleansing in international forums such as the United Nations, where they claimed to have presented such data. I have suggested that the transcripts should be made available to the community for future claims (obviously protecting confidentiality).

A minor limitation of the study was the lack of quantitative data located about the extent to which the Bedoun participated in the formal system of education in Kuwait. This was only a minor issue because the research was qualitative and did not rely on detailed government reporting, as much as the past reports of international human rights
organisations in this area (e.g. Human Rights Watch, 1991, 1995, 2011). I discussed these limitations in depth in Appendix G, ii. The problem was exacerbated by tolerance of a thin, evasive reporting style on national education. I demonstrated that even local researchers experienced substantial barriers to accessing quantitative data on the formal education system, beyond what is made available in Kuwait's national statistics. I suggested that this limitation may be illustrative not only of the attitude of government authorities toward the Bedoun, but also more broadly, to limitations of knowledge and skills among those responsible for education policy and reporting in the state. Additionally, UNESCO has been uncooperative with the Bedoun to date, concerning efforts to account for the group statistically. This provides little motivation for Kuwaiti authorities to do the same.

9.3 Recommendations for Future Researchers

Note that these comments below were written with the best case scenario for Bedoun participation in society, and the use of collaborative fieldwork methods, in mind. At the time of writing, such conditions seemed out of reach, but they may change in the future. Researchers should think carefully about how they enter the community. They should approach the community as an indigenous community, capable of participation in collaborative research methodologies, but vulnerable to research fatigue. The group seeks opportunities to be involved in the development of knowledge about their own culture, but their engagement in the research process is vexed by the challenges they face in everyday life and government targeting.

Collaborative frameworks supporting the local community that help to document their history and culture, would be beneficial to all parties. Research to date has tended to focus on community vulnerabilities, but statements of those vulnerabilities have tended to be repeated rather than explored further, due to the attempt of local people to attract attention to their human rights deprivations. This does not have to be the only approach, but it likely remains the most relevant. I would suggest that because intellectual expression currently attracts very negative attention from the authorities in Kuwait, that studies of educational processes and intellectual development would not be favourable for the group at this time, but they could be in the future, if the political climate eases.

I have attempted to compensate for this problem while filling in gaps in the literature, by constructing the Appendixes with summaries of factual data and analysis, and making available a large portion of my interview data for the Bedoun in the Australian Data Archive and compiling the photographic record in Appendix H, which may be valuable for future research and for the community itself. Additionally, the Australian Data Archive and the Australian National University has agreed to work with me after the submission of this research, to establish a Bedoun archive for the data I have collected.

Future studies of the Bedoun’s history in the military and police services (up until the invasion of Iraq), Kuwait Oil Company and other areas of the public service, as well as their experiences of communal life in the desert settlements (where they lived in tribal
groups up until the 1980s), could draw on the experiences of local community elders through interviews. Such research would help to document the cultural history of tribal elders, and articulate their proven loyalty and service to the state of Kuwait. This could restore some pride to the community, which is desperately needed.

Due to the age of the generation I am referring to (those active in government service prior to expulsion in 1986), this research needs to happen soon, or a great deal of the Bedoun’s cultural history may be lost forever. This research could be a restorative cultural practise, if it were handled appropriately and without Hadar interference. This kind of work should be a UNESCO priority, but UNESCO seems to have forgotten the group since the Bedouin settlement programs era (Bocco, 2006). In the current climate, these kinds of efforts are not possible in Kuwait, but given UNESCO’s ongoing funding of the state’s cultural development and the nature of their international mandate, it is possible that a more open environment that could support this kind of work, may become available in the future.

The issue of Bedoun’s national service during the invasion of Iraq and afterward until 1995 (until the closure of the State Security Court), warrants an independent, international inquiry. Inclusion in an investigation by the United Nations Rapporteur on Genocide would be more appropriate (see below). The period of 1990-1995 marks the period of physical ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun (population transfer and killing), when military servicemen were prevented from defending Kuwait. They and their other security forces counterparts (such as police and other government security forces) were then made the primary targets of killings until the State Security Court was closed and civil trials resumed (see Appendices F, i, ii and iii).

The management of the United Nations Compensation Commission claims (‘Late Claims’) process in relation to the Bedoun warrants re-appraisal in the light of the academic analysis of the Bedoun's ethnic cleansing and state-sanctioned killings discussed herein. Palmer (2015, p.126) briefly discussed the Late Claims process for the Bedoun but raised worthwhile and contestable points, while providing an extensive critique of the Palestinian Late Claims Process. Investigation into the process for the Bedoun should include investigation into the definitional terms used to identify payment recipients (conducted by the government of Kuwait), the level of compensation given (the minimum possible award for individuals was distributed to the government of Kuwait rather than directly to the individuals concerned) and the UNCCC's extraordinarily close collaboration with the government of Kuwait in the claims process for the Bedoun, which did not occur with claims for any other population type or class (that is, the government of Kuwait was enabled to retain exceptional control over the UNCC process for the Bedoun only). The award of compensation for the death on one individual (United Nations Security Council, June 30, 2005) in light of Bedoun population loss of around 150,000 during ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun during and after the war, is obscene (see United Nations Security Council, June 30, 2005).
There is a need for historical and policy research that does not require direct contact with the community, but this research should be provided to community leaders for their information. From another perspective, any researcher who has studied Kuwait’s history, society, politics and economics up to 1986, has actually researched the Bedoun, as they were integrated into the Bedouin citizenry awaiting citizenship. They were not discussed as a separate group of the Bedouin ethnic group. Virtually all Kuwaiti researchers I have cited in this thesis discussed the Bedoun openly in their research if it was conducted in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, regardless of their position of the issue. Anti-Bedouin ideologies of this era were therefore clearly set out and are not difficult to identify.

The Bedoun were not omitted from these more recent research efforts because information about them did not exist. Generally speaking, there is a need to review past Kuwaiti research and develop fresh interpretations of the history of the Bedoun within the Bedouin community. Unbiased attention to the Bedouin community as a whole (who are now the majority of the Kuwaiti population) would likely transform Kuwait area studies.

Research on desert settlements and city planning ethnically targeted the Bedouin community, as the process of segregation (including citizenship and education deprivation) was accomplished as a practical reality through urban planning. The influence of Arab nationalists in this sector of government was well established (al Mdaires, 2010). A great deal of Hadar research activity has taken place around this topic over many decades. Systematic review of Arabic language research in this domain is likely to reveal new evidence of extreme, Hadar nationalist dialogue including the tribalism and cultural hygiene motifs (see Chapter 7).

The Bedoun diaspora has been neglected by both researchers and international humanitarian organisations. Questions about the diaspora’s identity are generally speaking, based on myths about collective identity generated in the social sciences (see Chapter 2), which has contributed to this neglect. The Bedoun are a genuine refugee community with unique characteristics and needs. Future research could analyse the proportion of these populations who have received refugee status, permanent residence and citizenship in new countries, compared to those who have been left perpetually stateless in those countries. This would be a fertile area for future research on statelessness. However, politicisation of the Bedoun ‘problem’ and suppression of genuine public discussion about the group occurs internationally, and this is already an issue for the Bedoun diaspora beyond the scope of the present study.

Small Bedoun communities and individuals in the diaspora have been left isolated, perpetually stateless and without resources. They are often prevented from working to support themselves by authorities in the countries where they resettle. Some have been abandoned completely by authorities and exist in a state of virtual destitution, their refugee claims rejected, with no resolution of their case available to them. In refugee receiving states that refuse to settle Kuwaiti Bedoun who are stateless, their right of permanent
settlement and citizenship in alternative states could be investigated, such as exploration of appropriate social and cultural environments that could support Bedoun refugee's positive adaptation. Their situation poses a genuine social problem for the Bedoun diaspora, while the receiving communities have little understanding of the extent of Bedoun suffering, especially the impact of historical prohibitions on employment and education.

This problem has markedly affected the outcomes for the Bedoun diaspora who seek refugee status. For example, authorities assume Bedoun applicants are ‘lying’ about their claims because their identity as a collective remains questioned in academic studies. This is ‘confirmed’ when Bedoun refugee applicants are inclined to fail ‘tests’ of Kuwaiti history, based on questions about the written Hadar narrative of history (that is, the history of the opposing ethnic group), even though the applicants state they are illiterate, may have never attended school, and have been raised in what still remains largely, an oral-based, traditional culture. Alternatively, other accounts of refugees are rejected by courts because they appear to be inconsistent or unbelievable to court authorities, even though their accounts are perfectly consistent with the Bedoun’s experience in Kuwaiti culture, and accurately reflect common experiences with authorities (I have developed this view from my reading of confidential case histories of Bedoun asylum seekers in Australia and the United Kingdom). Individual case studies of Bedoun experiences in the refugee system, the claims of everyday life experience in Kuwait, and the perception of the receiving authorities (revealed in migration casework records and court transcripts), are yet to be researched by scholars.

Population monitoring and control of the Bedoun by Kuwaiti authorities warrants serious and deep investigation. The methods of recording the Bedoun as illegal residents and as other nationals in the ‘status adjustment’ program and the National Census, warrants urgent attention. This should involve scrutiny of the National Census data from 1985 until the present time (due to the date of the Kuwaitisation policy as 1985, the administrative expulsion policy as 1986, and back-dating of Census data in 1992, to 1985). A total population audit involving the National Census and the Central Apparatus (or the equivalent bodies shown in the Appendix), from 1985 until the present, is warranted. Every Bedoun individual who was recorded on the National Census from 1985 should have their identity investigated to establish if the government of Kuwait regards them as Bedoun or as ‘other’ nationals. This should include the content of their corresponding Ministry of Interior 'security' files after the fist administrative expulsion, nationality transfer, file deletion, deportation, death and/or disappearance. This task should be carried out by an appropriate agency of the United Nations, such as the Special Rapporteur on Genocide or the UNESCO statistical division, in consultation with the community, in the context that such an investigation would be an examination of a state program of erasure that featured gross, systematic violence including killings never investigated by domestic or international authorities, and the dumping of innocent people across the borders of enemy lines during war.
Representations of the community through the United Nations review processes would provide a fertile area for future study. In particular, Kuwait’s historical participation in reviews of its performance at the Human Rights Committee, women rights, children’s rights, social, cultural, political and economic rights review processes, can be collated and analysed. The issues raised on behalf of the Bedoun community by international humanitarian organisations going back at least to 1991 (and perhaps further) and outcomes of those engagements within the United Nations framework, warrants investigation. The processes of representation should also be considered: the roles of the actors who select representatives and the representatives themselves who speak for the community at these forums (and not necessarily with the community's endorsement), warrants further inquiry.

The processes by which the state of Kuwait adjusted its population data with the United Nations and its organs from 1983, especially concerning the administrative expulsion of 1992, should be investigated. In particular, a time-line of events of the responses of UNESCO and the UNDP (including the UNESCO/UNDP statistical divisions) to the population ‘adjustment,’ can be established. The processes by which the United Nations funded and monitored the development of the Bedoun population as part of Kuwait's citizen population until 1986, and then ceased to do so, while exiting the population as Kuwaiti nationals on its population statistics, requires attention.

Mechanisms of self-representation for the Bedoun community within the United Nations framework needs to be established, as does measurement of the population group at the statistical level. This is not because the Bedoun have sought political recognition as a national group, like Palestinians or Kurds. Rather, recognition that the group that exists at all at the qualitative (self-representation) and quantitative (statistical monitoring of the population) levels is required as a preventative measure, as the group appears to be at substantial risk of total, physical eradication. UNESCO and the UNDP has allowed the Bedoun to be erased from their programs by the state of Kuwait. On the other hand, the Human Rights Committee has also been aware of the detrimental situation of the Bedoun population according to reports it has received regularly for many years without ensuring that the Bedoun can report regularly and directly to it (as I mentioned above, citizen proxies are installed by international humanitarian agencies to represent the Bedoun at this level; the practice has little justification). Additionally, the Committee has not sought to ensure the population group has been monitored by the population monitoring divisions within UNESCO and the UNDP after their expulsion from the state, despite the alarming population decline.

To date, the Bedoun have also been prevented from adequately representing themselves via the United Nations Human Rights Committee processes and other regular treaty review processes, due to their criminalisation and entrapment. In this study, I discussed the Kuwaiti authorities’ response to a (citizen) human rights activist who claimed to represent the Bedoun to Geneva in 2015, who participated in the review process. The
participant was met at Kuwait airport with an arrest warrant when he returned from attending
the review (Amnesty International, 2015a, 2016a, p.222). The young participant was not a
Bedoun, he was not experienced with formal human rights protocols and he was not formally
endorsed by the community (I referred this issue above). The government has prevented the
Bedoun from articulating their needs either directly, or through humanitarian organisation
partners. Furthermore, members of the Bedoun community should be enabled in principle,
to represent their own cultural collective directly.

The Bedoun do not appear to be mentioned in any reports published by the UNDP
and UNESCO. Currently, the Bedoun population group is ‘missing’ and does not exist at the
statistical level, in regards to any official statistical development measures, published by
UNESCO or the UNDP (Carr-Hill, 2013). This is because their identity on official,
statistical data in Kuwait has been systematically and progressively altered since 1992
(Stanton Russell and al Ramadhan, 1994), so that it is impossible to tell if the population
group of over 110,000 (Over 110, 000,’ 2013) are ‘counted’ as Arabs of different nations by
being re-allocated on statistical data referring to expatriate Arab nationals, or have been
deleted from national statistical data altogether (although the Ministry of Interior's Central
Apparatus maintains heavy surveillance on the group, including the administration of the
whole population's 'security' files).

Therefore, in order to account for the actual existence of the group, both quantitative
and qualitative safeguards are required. The quantitative safeguard should include the
implementation of international development measures that would enable the UNDP and
UNESCO to establish baseline data on the group (which does not exist at present). The
qualitative safeguard of self-representation is essential to provide the group the capacity to
receive appropriate training to conduct cross-checks to ensure that monitoring is genuine and
taking place. The qualitative safeguard should also include the group’s self-representation,
so that the group can report back to the United Nations and its organs, if the quantitative
safeguard (population monitoring) is impeded. Both of these safeguards are also required to
ensure that the groups’ future development is supported by the United Nations framework, is
monitored accordingly, and involves the community’s active leadership.

The Bedoun appear to be subject to conditions that give cause for investigation by
the United Nations Rapporteurs for Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect. A
population reduction of around two-thirds over the last twenty-five years, as I have
mentioned. This indicator of physical destruction that alone, should warrant investigation.
The administrative expulsion of the Bedoun in 1986 (‘The Study,’ 2003) and the killing and
physical expulsion (ethnic cleansing) of the Bedoun (1990-1995) are on record. These
factors also establish physical destruction, and also warrant investigation. Other nations and
non-government agencies have historically expressed concerns through various United
Nations forums that cultural destruction of the Bedoun has been taking place. These factors
alone should also warrant investigation.
Wartime and postwar population losses require thorough investigation, but so too does the diminishment of the population since the early 1990s. I referred to the issue of wartime population reduction above. This sensitive area remains a collective cultural trauma. Population loss at this time was approximately 150,000 (Human Rights Watch, 1995; Ghabra, 1997b). Information provided in this study about erasure (administrative ethnic cleansing) via the program of ‘status adjustment,’ Kuwait’s manipulation of National Census data since 1985 concerning the Bedoun population, and the Comoros Plan, should also be investigated in this context.

The state of Kuwait's official program of Bedoun erasure called ‘status adjustment’ has been confirmed via reports of information held by the governments of the United States (WikiLeaks U.S. Embassy Cable 06Kuwait4514, November 26, 2006) and the United Kingdom (U.K. Home Office, 2014, p.18, n62, 63, 64), as well as those involved in parliamentary life (for example, see MP Faisal al Duwaisan in ‘Government to Offer,’ 2014 and MP Hassan Jawhar in ‘Tough Requirements,’ 2014; research by Dr Faris al Waqayan, 2009). The existence of the program since 1983 (al Anezi, 1983, p.263) is beyond doubt. The program has been openly discussed in Kuwait’s National Assembly. A parliamentarian has also openly discussed the existence of external interference that prevents the government from stopping the deprivation of the Bedoun's citizenship and corresponding human rights deprivations. MP Saleh Ashour (quoted in Izzak, May 17, 2016) confirmed this problem in a statement that was remarkably similar to the view of community leader Hakeem al Fadhli, expressed in this research (interview in Ahmadi, Kuwait, 3 August, 2015). Clearly, if the National Assembly and the government of Kuwait does not have the capacity to stop the program, the country requires external support from the international community to stop it, in order to prevent further ethnic cleansing and theft of the Bedoun's identity.

Qualitative data in this study and the data from a range of international humanitarian reports listed in the reference section of this study (commencing from 1991), can be analysed by the Rapporteurs, as the data was apparently derived directly from the Bedoun community. This could help to establish grounds for a full fieldwork investigation by the rapporteurs.

National policy designed by Hadar intellectuals (subsequently implemented) to reduce the population size, including specific doctrines designed to deprive the Bedoun of education on grounds that their cultural 'consciousness' should be prevented from developing, and efforts to convince others of the worthiness of such aims, should be considered as evidence of the intent to cause physical and cultural destruction of the Bedoun.

Community representatives who have attempted to advocate for their needs should be involved in any investigation, and this should include the Bedoun diaspora as well as the local community in Kuwait. Non-Bedoun humanitarian organisations and representatives in Kuwait should not be involved in these processes, due to the progressive replacement of Bedoun 'activists' with citizens since the Arab Spring which has arguably, marginalised the Bedoun from participating in public discussion and the development of knowledge about the
group, as much as human rights deprivations have themselves achieved this effect. Instead, international agencies with long-term contacts in the community who have maintained positive relations with the Bedoun, would be best placed to facilitate, but in no way substitute, the community’s representation. In order to clarify the need for such an investigation, I have included a conceptual map of the local and international influences on the creation and enabling of ethnic targeting and population reduction of the Bedoun (see Figure 3, below). Ethnic targeting occurs at so many levels of the cultural system, that the basic concepts can be difficult to grasp due to the overwhelming nature of the Bedoun problem. Yet the solution to the problem, the grant of Kuwaiti citizenship in accordance with previous government commitments, has always been very simple.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this thesis explored the identity and culture of the Bedoun of Kuwait, who are part of the Bedouin community in Kuwait. The group were permanently settled in a formal program from 1965, in which they were to receive citizenship on the basis of their tribal membership (Stanton Russell, 1989). They settled in Kuwait as part of regional steps taken to settle all Bedouin tribes across the Middle East; in other states, the Bedouin were provided with citizenship and land on which to settle (the International Convention on Indigenous Tribal Populations (1957) (ILO) discussed in Bocco, 2006, p.306; also Fabietti, 2006; Kark and Frantzman, 2012). The group were regarded as citizens in Kuwait, or as Kuwaitis to whom citizenship would be granted imminently.

There have been two broad approaches to studying the Bedoun, one in the social sciences, and the other in the field of international humanitarian law (individual authors were discussed in Chapter 2). The study of the Bedoun in international law has involved secondary source research of the human rights reports of international humanitarian agencies, who have contributed substantially to the existing state of knowledge about the Bedoun. This thesis attempted to draw together and synthesise this previous literature from a variety of fields including unpublished research by Kuwaiti authors, and to use the sociological method to demystify (Horowitz, 1975) some of the misconceptions surrounding the Bedoun in existing social science interpretations.

The study utilised a sociological framework drawing on mainly humanistic sociology utilising theories of culture (Znaniecki, 1934; 1952a), cultural and ethnic identity (Znaniecki, and Gross, 1978, 1998), and also theories of nationalism, marginalisation (Bayat, 2013; Znaniecki, 1952b), stigmatisation and ‘passing,’ labelling and criminalisation (Becker, 1983; Goffman, 1963; Sigona, 2005, 2009, 2011). The findings were discussed in the context of cultural patterning, evidence of ethnic cleansing and indicators of genocide in the context that the Bedoun are a stateless group, and an indigenous Bedouin group (Lemkin, 1944; Short, 2010). The research was qualitative, and employed multiple methods, with an emphasis on fieldwork in Kuwait with the Bedoun community, and supplementary research of literature, government data and other materials.
Because this field is still emerging, and appears to have been subject to censorship at some levels, there were quite a few new findings in this study. Overall, the findings were concentrated around the emerging Bedoun ethnic identity, their exclusion from society, and their attempts to remain connected to the cultural order through engagement with citizen society. They did this through social interaction with other groups, conscious management of identity, the emulation of principles of citizenship in the practice of ‘active citizenship’ (Bayat, 2012, 2013). A strong theme of the findings was the emergence of new ideals and values based on the universal principles of human rights. Such principles were aligned with the traditional culture, the sharing of resources and altruism and social solidarity arising from it. This phenomena also manifested in different forms of resistance of oppression and cultural expansion including cross-fertilization with other cultures, ethnic and/or political solidarity (‘sumud’), expressisons of ‘true generosity’ (Freire, 1970) toward their oppressors and social movement toward self-education (Znaniecki, 1952b).

I have argued that while the Bedoun have been subject to extraordinary conditions of administrative expulsion (1986) (‘The Study,’ 2003), physical expulsion and killing (Fineman, November 2, 1992; Gasperini, 1991, August 20; Lorch, 1991, May 12), and a program of erasure that commenced in 1983 (al Anezi, 1989, p.263) the group remains subject to that same or a similar program today, referred to in this research as the program of 'status adjustment.' The program attempts to remove ethnic and tribal identity of the Bedoun and to ‘replace’ it with an ineffective nationality label (i.e. fraudulently recording a false identity) via force and coercion of individuals. The 'status adjustment' program managed by the Ministry of Interior's Central Apparatus makes the group vulnerable to mass identity erasure and deportation under The Comoros Plan. Erasure is a form of administrative ethnic cleansing (Weissbrodt, 2008).

The psychological pressure experienced by the Bedoun due to this program, along with social marginalization and stigmatization, are quite extraordinary. This is because the whole of their culture is subjected to a system of organised repression, which gives rise to a unique form of imposed, restrictive, cultural re-organisation (M. Secombe, personal communications, January 22, 2016). Although the interview group also showed very positive signs of creative, cultural re-organisation, including the presence of an intellectual leadership group, the Bedoun also remained especially vulnerable to ethnic, identity-based targeting (Chapter 8, Table 25), reflective of the broader program of government management and control over the whole population.

The Bedoun interviewees demonstrated a remarkably resilient capacity for cultural expansion and intellectual identity. They have articulated their community's situation and the extraordinary extent of their suffering with clarity. But this aspect of their culture, their ability to express themselves and communicate their ideas, remains most at risk. In the long term, as long as the Bedoun cannot speak for themselves, mobilize as a community and expand their culture, their population also remains at risk of diminshment of numbers. This
is without even considering the range of concrete policies in place that prevent them from expanding through normal family and social life. The forces of social disorganisation and cultural destruction are almost overwhelming and appear to outweigh the Bedoun’s capacity for creative, cultural organisation. Thus, part of the study explored interview data on the group’s consciousness of the indoctrination of citizens and the ideologies used to oppress them (section 8.3.3).

The study contributed to understanding of ethnic identity and social change, statelessness and citizenship, nationalism, social relations and cultural systems, refugee studies, ethnic cleansing, genocide studies and society in the Middle East. It also contributed to understanding of the role of nationalism in education, the sociology of knowledge (particularly regarding the development of knowledge indigenous tribal people, and the control of modes of knowledge production about them by elites) and the role of education in developing pedagogies of resistance. Urgent intervention is required to stop the erasure of Bedoun identity, ethnic cleansing of the Bedoun via 'status adjustment,' which includes the Comoros Plan, to prevent further physical and cultural destruction of the population and to provide the group with the safeguards they require to sustain themselves into the future.
Figure 3 A Conceptual Map of Local and International Factors Enabling Ethnic Persecution of Kuwait's Bedoun (1983-)

**Regional (Middle East)**
International agencies and states – regional settlement program - gave rise to ‘tribalism theory’ - Bedouin as inferior; Hadar academics virtually uniform in approach to the Bedouin

**Social**
Anti-Bedouin ideology, transmitted through national education system, diwaniya, media, interpersonal interactions. Same themes target citizens and Bedoun; Bedoun more vulnerable due to statelessness

**International Agencies**
UN, UNDP, UNESCO, UNHCR – no formal statistical monitoring of the Bedoun population; no coordination across agencies, no investigation of post- Gulf War ethnic cleansing, particularly killings and disappearance of large proportion of population

**International Governments**
U.K. Foreign office and U.S. Department of State aware of erasure policy since at least 2006; aware of extreme ethnic nationalism at the political level, Ministry of Interior's spawning of fake passport trade in the Middle East. U.K. policy changes block Bedoun refugee claims

**Persecution of Kuwait’s Bedoun (1983-)**

**Academic**
Local application of ‘tribalism’ theory from regional level, proliferates at social level, transmitted to/from government level as extreme, nationalist ideology
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